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2026 IEHC 253

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 253 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW 2024 1282 JR BETWEEN ANAN OZEK APPLICANT AND MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Garrett Simons d

Article 6(1), and that those rights were to continue.

The immigration permission was declaratory of, and probative of, those rights. The first decision emphasised that the Applicant was required to register the immigration permission, and the reference to “one year” fixed the date after which it would become necessary to renew the immigration permission and the associated registration. It cannot be read as intended to negate the finding of fact that the Applicant had completed one year of legal employment in the State on 7 January

  2. The Applicant cannot, therefore, be criticised for not seeking to challenge the first decision. To do so would have involved the Applicant attributing an 26 intention to the Minister to breach EU law in circumstances where there was nothing on the face of the decision to evince such an intention.
  3. The fact that the solicitors subsequently retained by the Applicant sought confirmation of the temporal limit of the permission issued by the first decision does not gainsay this. This confirmation was sought in circumstances where the question of the Applicant’s immigration status in the twelve-month interregnum had become a live issue because he intended to apply for naturalisation. The Applicant wishes to rely on the twelve-month period as part of his overall period of reckonable residence.
  4. This approach of seeking confirmation might be characterised as overly cautious. The fact of his having sought confirmation does not, as appears to be suggested on behalf of the Minister, give rise to some sort of estoppel whereby the Applicant should be taken as acknowledging that the first decision should have been challenged at the time. As explained, the natural and ordinary meaning of the first decision is that the Minister acknowledged that the Applicant had already accrued

Article 6(1).

The proper interpretation of the first decision is a question of law for the court. The fact, if fact it be, that the Applicant’s solicitors may have read the decision as operating prospectively only is not conclusive. The subjective view of the solicitors is largely irrelevant. 69. The response issued on behalf of the Minister in September 2024, in reply to the letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, determined that the immigration permission did not encompass the period between the date upon which the Applicant accrued

Article 6(1), and the date upon which his application had been belatedly determined.

The Minister’s position 27 has since been elaborated upon in his opposition papers. In the verifying affidavit, it is said that while their application for a Stamp 1 is being processed, Turkish nationals remain entitled to renew their existing permission which allows them to continue employment in the State. On the facts of the present case, this would have entailed the Applicant having to renew his student permission, with its limited working hours, notwithstanding that he had already accrued

Article 6(1).

  1. The Minister’s second decision appears to be inconsistent with that recorded in his first decision. The Minister seems to have moved from a position of accepting the Applicant’s accrued rights, to suggesting that he should have been confined to a student permission pending the tardy processing and determination of his application. This would have entailed an additional period of twelve months. Certainly, it cannot be said that the second decision is merely a reiteration of the first decision. At best, the second decision determines an issue of substance which had not been conclusively determined by the first decision; at worst, it contradicts the first decision. In either event, the second decision represents a “new” decision in the sense that the term is used in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority. The substance of the second decision is different and the grounds upon which it is challenged simply do not apply to the first decision. It could not have reasonably been anticipated in January 2021 that the Minister would take the stance of refusing to acknowledge that the Applicant’s residence and employment during the period between January 2020 and January 2021 were in accordance with domestic law. 28
  2. Accordingly, time only began to run for the purpose of the three-month timelimit under Order 84 from the date of the second decision. The judicial review proceedings were commenced well within time of that date.
  3. For completeness, it should be observed that the CJEU has held that it would be incompatible with the principle of effectiveness to rely on a domestic time-limit if the conduct of the national authorities, in conjunction with the existence of the time-limit, had the effect of totally depriving an individual of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the national courts (Flausch, Case C-280/18, EU:C:2019:928). Here, the Minister cannot rely on the lack of clarity in his first decision to defeat the Applicant’s claim by reference to the three-month timelimit. DETAILED DISCUSSION OVERVIEW
  4. The principal question for determination in these proceedings is whether the Irish State—having elected to require Turkish nationals to apply for and obtain a permission to work and reside in the State—is obliged to ensure that the permission, as issued, accurately records the date upon which the individual acquired the relevant rights under EU law.
  5. The resolution of this question necessitates consideration of the interaction between the substantive rights, i.e. the employment rights and the corresponding right of residence, and the procedures established under national law for applying those substantive rights.
  6. The answer offered on behalf of the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration is to invoke the doctrine of “direct effect”. There are two strands to 29 the argument. First, it is submitted that the Applicant did not require an immigration permission under domestic law in order to acquire his directly effective rights under EU law. It is said to follow from this that there is “no logical basis” upon which to contend that the accrual of the EU law rights and any permission granted by the Minister must be “temporally coterminous”. It is further submitted that the entitlements accruing to a Turkish migrant worker under EU law are “separate and distinct from a permission or immigration stamp from the Minister”.
  7. Second, it is submitted that the Applicant’s exercise of his substantive rights has not been impaired or undermined by the commencement date of the immigration permission.
  8. These submissions are addressed, in turn, below. DIRECT EFFECT AND OBLIGATION TO ADOPT ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
  9. The CJEU has consistently held that Article 6

(1)of Decision No 1/80 has direct effect in the Member States and that Turkish nationals who satisfy its conditions may therefore rely directly on the rights given them by the various indents of that provision. This is so irrespective of whether the host Member State has ever issued the migrant worker with a specific administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit. Any administrative document issued by the host Member State would merely be declaratory of and probative of rights which have accrued under EU law, rather than constitutive of those rights.
  1. It is, however, a non sequitur to suggest that the issuance of administrative documents is entirely a matter of domestic law, untrammelled by any obligation under Decision No 1/
  2. The fact that an individual is, in principle, entitled to 30 rely on the direct effect of the substantive rights does not absolve a Member State from complying with its obligation to adopt such national legislation, and to take such administrative measures, as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights.
  3. This obligation is imposed upon the Member States by Article 6
(3)of Decision No 1/
  1. This article provides that the procedures for applying the rights conferred on Turkish nationals are to be established under national rules. The CJEU has held that this article merely clarifies the obligation incumbent upon the Member States to adopt such national legislation and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. Member States cannot, under the guise of implementing legislation or administrative measures, restrict the application of the precise and unconditional rights which EU law grants to Turkish nationals.
  2. The position has been summarised as follows in Ertanir, Case C-98/96, EU:C:1997:446 (at paragraphs 30 to 33): “[…] Article 6
(3)merely provides that the competent authorities of the Member States may adopt such national legislation as may be required for the application of the rights conferred on Turkish workers by paragraphs
(1)and
(2)of that provision. However, that provision cannot be construed as reserving to the Member States the power to adapt as they please the rules governing Turkish workers already integrated in their labour force, permitting them to adopt unilaterally measures preventing certain categories of workers who already satisfy the conditions of Article 6
(1)from benefiting from the progressively more extensive rights enshrined in the three indents of that paragraph. The effect of such an interpretation would be to render Decision No 1/80 meaningless and deprive it of any practical effect. Likewise, its purpose would not be achieved if restrictions imposed by a Member State could result in denying Turkish workers the rights which the three indents 31 of Article 6
(1)confer on them progressively once they have been in gainful employment in the host Member State for a certain time. Moreover, the wording of Article 6
(1)is general and unconditional: it does not permit the Member States to deprive certain categories of Turkish workers of the rights which that provision confers directly on them or to restrict or attach conditions to such rights.” 82. The CJEU has considered, in a number of its judgments, the contingency of a host Member State refusing to issue an administrative document which accurately reflects the rights enjoyed by a migrant worker. The judgments typically address a scenario whereby a Turkish national has lawfully entered the Member State for a specific purpose, such as vocational training or study. This purpose is reflected in the initial administrative document issued to the migrant worker. The migrant worker then completes one year’s legal employment in the Member State and thus accrues the rights provided for under the first indent of Article 6
(1). The Member State nevertheless seeks to deny or limit these rights by reference to the initial administrative document. 83. In Ertanir, for example, the Member State sought to rely on the fact that, under domestic law, foreign nationals employed in the relevant occupation (specialist chefs) were permitted to reside in Germany for no more than a total of three years. In Payir, the Member States submitted that Article 6
(1)applies only to persons who have been admitted precisely as workers and that Turkish nationals who have been given leave to enter for the purpose of study, even if they carry on secondary activities, in principle do not fall within the scope of the article. 84. The CJEU held, in each case, that the reasons for which he was first granted the right to enter that territory or any temporal limitations attached to his right to work are not to be taken into account in determining whether a Turkish national 32 who has entered the territory of a Member State lawfully may, after working for a year in that territory, rely on the rights conferred by Article 6
(1). Crucially, the case law indicates that the remedy is that the Member State must issue an administrative document in appropriate form. The CJEU held that the relevant migrant worker was able to rely on Article 6
(1)for the purposes of obtaining renewed permission to work and a corollary right of residence. Put otherwise, the legal consequence of Article 6
(1)being directly applicable is that the Member States must disapply any conflicting domestic law rules and issue an immigration permission which acknowledges the full extent of the rights which had accrued to the individual as a matter of EU law. 85. It follows that it is incorrect to contend that the direct effect of Article 6
(1)obviates the necessity for the national competent authority to issue an immigration permission in proper form, where a permission is required under domestic law. Article 6
(3)obliges Member States to adopt such national legislation, and to take such administrative measures, as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. As discussed further at paragraphs 92 to 98 below, it is a general principle of EU law that national implementation measures must be sufficiently clear and precise as to ensure that individuals concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights. This is especially so in the present context where the rights accrue on a progressive basis. It is essential that an individual migrant worker know the extent of his rights at any particular point in time. 86. In circumstances where the domestic law of the host Member State requires a Turkish national to obtain an administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit, then a migrant worker who has completed the qualifying 33 periods of employment under one of the indents to Article 6
(1)is entitled to be issued with an accurate administrative document. The administrative document must acknowledge the full extent of the rights which have accrued to the individual as a matter of directly applicable EU law. This is necessary to comply with the principles of legal certainty and effectiveness. The migrant worker needs to know the extent of his rights and to have a document which he can rely upon to demonstrate the existence of those rights to his employer. 87. The dates upon which the various indents are satisfied determine, in sequence, the migrant worker’s entitlement to renew his permission with the same employer, to respond to other offers of employment in the same occupation, and ultimately to have free access to any paid employment of his choice. The migrant worker must know, at any given point in time, where he stands in this progression. The administrative document issued by the host Member State is, in practice, the principal instrument by which he may do so. If the document misdates the accrual of the rights under the first indent, the dates upon which the rights under the second and third indents will accrue are displaced by the same amount of time. The defect is, therefore, not confined to the date which it misstates. It propagates throughout the migrant worker’s progression under Article 6
(1).
  1. The Minister’s attempted reliance on the judgment in Bozkurt in this context is misplaced. As explained earlier, on the facts of that case, the migrant worker (an international lorry driver) required neither a work permit nor a residence permit under the domestic law of the host Member State. The judgment does not stand as authority for the proposition that—in the counterfactual circumstances where a Member State does require a migrant worker to hold an administrative 34 document—it is legitimate to issue same in a form which misdates the accrual of rights. Where the host Member State chooses to operate an administrative system to record and evidence the migrant worker’s immigration status (whether or not such a system is strictly required by EU law), it cannot maintain that accuracy within that system is optional.
  2. The Minister makes a specific argument predicated on the three-week gap between (i) the date upon which the

Article 6

(1)first accrued and (ii) the subsequent date upon which the application for a permission on Stamp 1 conditions was made to the Department. It is submitted that no immigration permission can properly be operative from a date prior to the date of application, and further submitted that the acceptance of the Applicant’s principle would permit a Turkish national to demand retrospective adjustment of his permissions at any point in time and for periods long past. 90. The rights conferred by the first indent of Article 6
(1)accrue, as a matter of EU law, upon the completion of one year’s legal employment. The only legitimate function which an immigration permission, issued under domestic law, can perform is declaratory and evidential. The immigration permission cannot diminish the rights which have accrued under EU law. The immigration permission must accurately reflect the date of the accrual of the right. That is precisely what distinguishes a declaratory instrument from a constitutive one.
  1. The Minister’s argument also appears to be inconsistent with Ergat, Case C-329/97, EU:C:2000:
  2. There, the CJEU held that the Member States do not have the power to restrict the right directly conferred on a Turkish national by EU law to have free access to all employment and, concomitantly, to reside in 35 the host Member State for that purpose, by refusing to extend his residence permit on the ground that he made his application late.
  3. Finally, it should be explained that the foregoing analysis involves no more than the application of well-established principles of EU law to the specific context of the Turkish Association Agreement. The question of the implications of the doctrine of “direct effect” for a Member State’s obligation to take implementing measures has been settled in the analogous context of EU Directives. The CJEU has consistently held that a Member State cannot rely on the fact that a particular directive has direct effect as a justification for failing to implement the directive in the domestic legal order. This point is illustrated by the judgment in Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79, EU:C:1980:
  4. There, the respondent Member State had contended that since the relevant directives were sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional as to have direct effect, and were in fact being applied by the competent authorities, there was no need for formal transposition.
  5. The CJEU rejected this argument as follows (at paragraph 12): “The justification based on the ‘direct applicability’ of the directives in question cannot be accepted either. The effect of the third paragraph of Article 189 is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate implementing measures carried out by the Member States. Only in specific circumstances, in particular where a Member State has failed to take the implementing measures required or has adopted measures which do not conform to a directive, has the Court of Justice recognised the right of persons affected thereby to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting member state (cf. on this subject, the judgment of 5 April 1979, Ratti, Case 148/78 ECR 1629). This minimum guarantee arising from the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of the directives under the third paragraph of Article 189 cannot justify a Member State’s absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive. […]”. 36
  6. The case law also establishes that where a European Directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the implementation measures must ensure that individuals are able to ascertain their rights. The position is put as follows in Commission v. Germany, Case 29/84, EU:C:1985:229 (at paragraph 23): “It follows from that provision that the implementation of a directive does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. In particular the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render implementation by specific legislation superfluous, provided however that those principles guarantee that the national authorities will in fact apply the directive fully and that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the legal position arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the possibility of relying on them before the national courts. That last condition is of particular importance where the directive in question is intended to accord rights to nationals of other Member States because those nationals are not normally aware of such principles.”
  7. These sentiments have been reiterated in a series of judgments. By way of example, the position is put as follows in Commission v. Ireland, Case C-50/09, EU:C:2011:109 (at paragraph 46): “Whilst it is true that, according to settled case-law, the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require the provisions of the directive to be enacted in precisely the same words in a specific, express provision of national law and a general legal context may be sufficient if it actually ensures the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see, in particular, Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR I-6277, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited), the fact remains that, according to equally settled case-law, the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision and clarity required in order to satisfy the need for legal certainty, which requires that, in the case of a directive intended to confer rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full extent of their rights (see, in particular, Commission v Ireland, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).” 37
  8. Properly understood, the doctrine of direct effect ensures that EU law rights are effective notwithstanding a failure in implementation on the part of the Member States. As the CJEU says, the doctrine is intended as a “minimum guarantee” to ensure that the individual can assert his rights notwithstanding the failure of the Member State. The doctrine is not intended to absolve the Member States of their obligation to take appropriate implementation measures.
  9. The principles that pertain to European Directives with direct effect extend, by analogy, to the directly applicable rights under Decision No 1/
  10. In each instance, the fact that the substantive rights have direct effect does not absolve the Member States from their obligation to put in place the necessary implementation measures. Whereas the source of that obligation is different, arising under Article 6
(3)of Decision No 1/80 rather than Article 288 TFEU, the logic is the same.
  1. The fact that it becomes necessary for an individual to rely on the principle of direct effect to invoke their rights before the national courts is a consequence of the Member State’s failure in implementation, not a justification for it. The Member State’s obligation to implement is not discharged, suspended, or attenuated by the availability of direct effect as a remedy. U.M. (A MINOR) V. MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
  2. Counsel for the Minister placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in U.M. (A minor) v. Minister for Foreign Affairs [2022] IESC 25, [2024] 1 IR
  3. It is submitted that the judgment of Dunne J. is authority for the proposition that the use of the “immigration stamp nomenclature” is “administrative in nature”, particularly in circumstances where the non- 38 national’s permission to be in the Irish State derives otherwise than from section 4 of the Immigration Act
  5. The applicant in U.M. had argued, somewhat ambitiously, that the revocation of his refugee status did not necessarily invalidate the immigration permission issued to him and registered under the Immigration Act
  6. More specifically, the applicant had argued that the permission to remain in the State and the granting of refugee status operate “distinctly and independently” from one another. The counterargument advanced by the Irish State had been to the effect that the immigration permission and the source of the right to remain in the Irish State were coextensive, with the consequence that if the latter failed, then so must the immigration permission.
  7. It was not necessary for the Supreme Court to make a conclusive determination on the precise interaction between the declaration of refugee status and the immigration permission. The case was, instead, resolved on the ground that while a declaration of refugee status was in force, it was valid and effective for all purposes, and remained so unless and until it was revoked.
  8. The decision in U.M. does not stand as authority for the proposition that an immigration permission is “separate and distinct” from the substantive immigration rights which it evidences. Indeed, such a proposition would appear to be at odds with the stance adopted on behalf of the Irish State for the purpose of the U.M. proceedings. PREJUDICE
  9. It is a constant refrain of the Minister’s submissions that the Applicant has not suffered any “prejudice” by reason of the finding that he was only entitled to an 39 immigration permission subject to Stamp 1 conditions from 5 January
  10. Yet, the Minister fails to address the most obvious source of prejudice, namely, the consequence of the misdating for an application for citizenship by naturalisation.
  11. It is common case that the Applicant initially entered the Irish State on a student permission (Stamp 2). The conditions attached to a student permission include a limit on the number of hours for which the non-national may work each week. Crucially, the Applicant should have been released from these temporal limits once he had been legally employed for one year. In the event, however, there was a delay of some twelve months in issuing the new immigration permission (Stamp 1). It is suggested in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Minister that the Applicant could have applied for a renewal of his student permission in the interregnum. With respect, this would represent an improper encroachment on the Applicant’s acquired rights. As of January 2020, the Applicant was entitled, as a matter of EU law, to work for the same employer without any temporal limitation (other than those pertaining to all workers under general employment law). This indicates that, even on the Minister’s own analysis, the misdating did breach the Applicant’s EU law rights.
  12. The potential prejudice continues having regard to the statutory criteria governing an application for naturalisation under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act
  13. It is a condition precedent to a successful application for naturalisation that an applicant has had a period of one year’s continuous residence in the State immediately before the date of the application; and, during the eight years immediately preceding that period, has had a total residence in the State amounting to four years. It is expressly provided that a period of 40 residence in the State shall not be reckoned when calculating a period of residence for the purposes of granting a certificate of naturalisation if it is in accordance with a permission given to a person under section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004 for the purpose of enabling him or her to engage in a course of education or study in the State. Put shortly, residence pursuant to a student permission is not reckonable.
  14. Having regard to the statutory definition of reckonable residence, the precise status of a migrant worker in the interregnum between the date of application and the date of decision assumes a critical significance in the context of a change from a Stamp 2 permission to a Stamp 1 permission. The Minister declined to address this issue in these proceedings. Instead, the Minister contends that in circumstances where the Applicant has not yet made an application for naturalisation, he has no standing to speculate upon the outcome of same in these judicial review proceedings. For the reasons which follow, this contention is incorrect.
  15. Order 84, rule 20 requires that an applicant for judicial review have a “sufficient interest” in the matter to which the application relates. The concept has been described as follows by the Supreme Court in Grace v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESC 10, [2020] 3 IR 286 (at paragraph 31): “Therefore, the starting point is that the decision or measure under challenge must be said to give rise to an actual or imminent ‘injury or prejudice’ to the challenger or that the challenger has been or is in danger of being ‘adversely affected’. That can be described as the broad general principle. In order for a person to have standing to bring a judicial review challenge, ordinarily the person concerned will need to be in a position to demonstrate that the decision or measure which they wish to challenge either has or is imminently in danger of having adversely affecting their interests so as to cause or potentially cause injury or prejudice.” 41
  16. The Applicant has “sufficient interest” to challenge the decision of September 2024 in circumstances where that decision gives rise to an imminent injury or prejudice. More specifically, the Applicant is at risk of having his intended application for naturalisation refused by reason of the Minister’s characterisation of his immigration status in the interregnum between January 2020 and January
  18. On the Applicant’s analysis, he had four years’ reckonable residence for naturalisation purposes by the date of the institution of these judicial review proceedings. The correctness of the Applicant’s analysis turns on the proper characterisation of his immigration status in the interregnum between January 2020 and January
  19. The stance adopted by the Minister for the purpose of the judicial review proceedings is that the Applicant only obtained a permission subject to Stamp 1 conditions with effect from January
  20. The implication is, seemingly, that prior to that date the Applicant had been subject to Stamp 2 conditions referable to a student.
  21. It follows, therefore, that there is a live controversy between the parties, the outcome of which is potentially decisive of the intended application for naturalisation. It is not necessary, in order to establish “sufficient interest”, that the Applicant must first have applied for and been refused citizenship by way of naturalisation. It is enough that the evidence establishes that he has a genuine intention to make such an application imminently and that the impugned decision of September 2024 has the potential to prejudice him by adversely affecting the outcome of the application. The Applicant is entitled to have his immigration status clarified in advance, without his having to incur the delay inherent in pursuing an application for naturalisation which, on the basis of the 42 Minister’s current stance, must likely fail. These judicial review proceedings have the force and urgency of reality: the rules on standing are designed to safeguard against proceedings which lack that quality.
  22. Indeed, it seems likely that were the Applicant to have deferred challenging the decision of September 2024 until after the determination of an application for naturalisation, he would be met with the objection that he had not complied with the three-month time-limit under Order 84, rule
  23. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER
  24. In circumstances where the domestic law of the host Member State requires a Turkish national to obtain an administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit, then a migrant worker who has completed the qualifying periods of employment under one of the indents to Article 6
(1)of Decision No 1/80 is entitled to be issued with an accurate administrative document. The administrative document must acknowledge the full extent of the rights which have accrued to the individual as a matter of directly applicable EU law. This is necessary to comply with the principles of legal certainty and effectiveness. The migrant worker needs to know the full extent of his rights and to have a document which he can rely upon to demonstrate the existence of those rights to his employer.
  1. The Irish State imposes an obligation upon a Turkish migrant worker to apply to the Minister for an immigration permission and to register same thereafter. In the absence of any dedicated legislation for these specific purposes, the only domestic legislation which allows for the imposition of such requirements is the 43 Immigration Act
  2. It follows that the immigration permissions can only have been issued pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration Act
  4. The immigration permission issued under domestic law is declaratory of and probative of the rights acquired under EU law. It is essential, therefore, that the immigration permission accurately reflect the full extent of the rights accrued.
  5. The decision of September 2024 fails to meet these requirements. The decision holds that the Applicant was only entitled to the benefit of Stamp 1 conditions from January
  6. This represents a breach of the Applicant’s directly applicable EU law rights. The Applicant had accrued the right to work for his current employer, free from the temporal restrictions referable to a Stamp 2 permission. The Applicant is entitled to an immigration permission which accurately records his status in the period between January 2020 and January
  8. The contention that the immigration permission is merely administrative in nature is circular. Article 6
(3)provides that the procedures for applying the rights conferred on Turkish nationals are to be established under national rules. These procedures will, by definition, include the taking of administrative measures. It is no answer to the complaint made—that the administrative measures adopted, which involve the misdating of the accrual of the substantive rights, are inadequate—to say, well, those are merely administrative measures. That, with respect, is the entire point. The Irish State’s practice of misdating immigration permissions does not comply with its obligation under Article 6
(3).
  1. I will discuss with counsel the precise form of order required to achieve this result. My provisional view is that a declaration should be made to the effect that the Applicant had achieved the milestone of one year’s legal employment 44 by 7 January 2020, and that thereafter his permission to work and reside in the Irish State was as a migrant worker, and not for the purpose of enabling him to engage in a course of education or study. It is also proposed to make an order of certiorari setting aside the decision of 13 September
  3. As to legal costs, my provisional view is that the Applicant, having been entirely successful in the proceedings, is entitled to recover his costs in accordance with the default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act
  4. If the Minister wishes to contend for a different costs order, he will have an opportunity to make oral submissions at the next listing.
  5. The proceedings will be listed before me on 21 May 2026 for oral submissions on the final form of order and costs. Appearances Conor Power SC and Niamh Harnett for the applicant instructed by Cathal N. Young, O’Reilly & Co. Mark J Dunne SC and Colmcille Kitson for the respondent instructed by the Chief State Solicitor

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