APPROVED NO REDACTION NEEDED THE COURT OF APPEAL Record Number: 240/2024 Neutral Citation: [2026] IECA 94 Kennedy J.
Burns J.
Owens J.
BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT
-AND BH APPELLANT JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 5th of May 2026 by Ms.
Justice Tara Burns.
1.This is an appeal against conviction. On 15 March 2024, the appellant was found guilty by unanimous verdict of the jury of two counts of sexual assault of “C” contrary to s. 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape)(Amendment) Act 1990.
2.On 16 July 2024, the appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment on each count.
1 Background 3. The offending in this matter occurred in the summer of 1991.
4.The appellant and his wife were very friendly with C’s parents. The two women (who originally were from an offshore island) had been childhood friends and remained close in adulthood. C’s family lived in the Midlands and the appellant, and his wife lived close to the ferry terminal to that island where his wife ran a B&B. C’s family holidayed on the island every summer and visited C’s grandmother and other relatives on the island during the year. On such occasions, the family frequently stayed in the appellant’s house on their way to the island.
5.In 1991, C’s sister secured a summer job on the island. It was decided that C (then aged 11) would travel to the island ahead of her family for the annual summer holiday and stay with her sister and grandmother. This was C’s first time away from home by herself. It was arranged that the appellant, who was travelling from another part of Ireland through the Midlands, would collect C in his car to assist getting her to the ferry terminal to cross to the island. According to C, the plan was that she would stay in the appellant’s house overnight and travel to the island the following day.
6.On the journey to his house, the appellant sexually assaulted C, which included digital penetration of her vagina (Count 2). When C got to the appellant’s house, she was upset. C recollected having dinner, her mother being called to indicate her safe arrival at the appellant’s house and being told to go to bed by the appellant’s wife. C said that she stayed at the appellant’s house that night. She slept in the sitting room (which C said was not unusual on occasions when the B&B was fully booked). C had a pain in her vagina and noticed some blood when she went to the bathroom.
The following morning, the appellant entered the room she had slept in and again sexually assaulted C (Count 1).
2 7. In the course of the car journey to the appellant’s house, the appellant bought C sweets. After she went to bed in the appellant’s house, he came into where she was sleeping and gave her £20 telling her that she was not to tell anybody.
8.C travelled to the island the following day. When she arrived at her grandmother’s house, she had a pain in her stomach, felt nauseous, had pain going to the toilet, and was crying and upset. Her grandmother called the doctor, who was a locum, and he attended at the grandmother’s house.
She did not make a complaint to the doctor about the sexual assaults.
However, she informed her sister about what happened on the journey to the appellant’s house. Her sister told her not to tell anyone.
9.C’s sister gave evidence of her recollection of C arriving to the island on the morning sailing. She remembered the doctor being called to come in the afternoon after C arrived on the island.
10.While there was a statement served as part of the Book of Evidence from the GP who ran the practice on the island, this doctor was not called, nor was there a request from the appellant to tender this witness. At the time of the incident, the GP on the island had a male locum standing in for her, as C had recollected in her evidence. Apparently, the practice records of the GP did not record an attendance with C during the summer of 1991.
This was put to the C in the course of her evidence, which C accepted.
11.C made a complaint to An Garda Síochána on 22 November 2015. On 1 December 2015, a formal statement was taken from C. Her initial recollection was that these incidents occurred at a much earlier date, just after she had made her communion.
12.On 19 January 2016, the guards called to the appellant’s house to arrest him for the purpose of questioning him with respect to C’s allegations.
3 Garda Conneely stated in evidence that she informed the appellant that she was investigating an allegation that C made against him to the effect that he had sexually assaulted C when she was a young girl (remembering that C’s initial allegation related to a time just after she had made her communion, when she would have been 6 or 7 years old). In response, the appellant stated he understood why the guards were there but that he was caring for his wife who was ill and that he needed to make arrangements for someone to mind his wife. He made an arrangement to attend the Garda station later that day. He was arrested, detained and interviewed when he arrived at the station.
13.In the course of his interview, the appellant answered the following questions, amongst others:- Q Would [C’s family] family have stayed in your B&B in the eighties …?
A They would have, yes. We would meet them at weddings and that.
I haven't a great memory of them. I was out fishing a lot and the fishing is a hard way to make a living.
Q How often do you recall [C’s family] and [C] stayed with you and your family in …?
A I wouldn't say I do. I was busy. I had a lot on my mind. I don't remember [C] coming to the house. How old would she have been?
Four or five. I don't recall. I would have memories of her as a bigger girl in her tens….
Q Do you remember spending time on your own with [C]?
A Not at all. In the house, is it, you mean?
Q At any point?
4 A No. I went through it today with [the appellant’s wife], my wife.
Just the lift down.
Q Which lift are you talking about?
A I brought her down from [the Midlands] to her grandmother's on the … [i]sland…. She was working on the island…. I can remember we were running late and I was booting it to make the ferry …. When I'm driving like that, fast, I cannot hold a conversation. I concentrate on the road.
Q Did you make the ferry?
A I cannot remember for the life of me…. I have a feeling that she made the ferry. I cannot be sure. [The appellant’s wife] would recall this. You should ask her…. . I did not touch the girl on the way down.
I had no chance to touch her. I was delayed above [in] [the Midlands]. I had to rush down…. Did she say the stayed in the house that night? I hope [the appellant’s wife] remembers that because I am 100% sure she made the boat."
14.The appellant subsequently gave evidence at trial. He said nothing happened on the journey to his house with C. He then proceeded to give evidence about speaking with his late wife after he returned home from the Garda station and subsequently ringing Garda Páidí O’Shea (one of the guards present for his arrest). He said:“When I was arrested that evening I went home to [the appellant’s wife]. They asked me to ring in and tell them if [the appellant’s wife] -- if [C] went to the … [i]sland that evening and Páidí O'Shea gave me his number… And I rang him and I told him… He gave me his number to ring. The following day when I asked [the appellant’s wife], surely you know well she went to [the island], she said. So I rang and I said [the appellant’s wife] -- I said you can come out and take 5 -- will you take her in and I said I will not be taking her to a garda station. She is not able. Come out and take the statement. Okay.
We'll be out to get it.”
15.The appellant said that he kept the piece of paper with Páidí O’Shea’s name and number and that his solicitor had it. The appellant also said that on 16 July 2017, his wife’s situation deteriorated, and he was advised to bring his wife to the doctor. As he was getting his wife into a wheelchair to bring her to the hospital, Garda Conneely rang him asking could they come that day to take a statement from his wife. He said that he explained to her that he was bringing his wife to the hospital. His wife remained in hospital and died on 19 August 2017. None of this was put to Garda Conneely when she was cross examined.
16.The appellant also stated in evidence that ferries to the island departed at 10.30, 12.00 and 18.30. He said that on the journey with C, he was aiming for the 18.30 ferry. He indicated that he got to his house about 17.00/17.30 and left C with his wife, who took over looking after her. He had other jobs to attend with respect to his fishing job. He said that he had no memory of C once he got home.
17.A statement was not taken from the appellant’s wife. When questioned about the failure to do this, Garda Conneely stated that this was because the appellant’s wife was unwell.
18.The appellant’s assertion that C made the ferry on the evening she travelled to his house was not put to C, although C’s sister was challenged as to her recollection that C arrived on the morning ferry.
19.The defence also called evidence from another witness, Mr Ó’F. He stated that he recollected an occasion of meeting the appellant’s wife at the late 6 sailing of the ferry. In his conversation with her she indicated that she was bringing the daughter of C’s mother (who he would have known from the island) to the ferry.
20.Counsel for the appellant made an application to withdraw the case from the jury after the evidence concluded. The trial judge classified this as a PO’C/Braddish application. This application was refused by the trial judge on the following basis:- “[T]here was a missed opportunity or alternatively a failure by the prosecution in its duty to seek out evidence relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused, where that evidence could provide information, at the very least, concerning an issue central to the case.
The Court must note that this duty to seek out evidence extends only to evidence which might realistically afford the accused a real opportunity of defence. So just for the moment, ignoring the issue of delay, and just specifically looking at the Braddish issue on its own, i.e. looking at the period of January '16 to July '17. The evidence is that no statement was taken from [the appellant’s wife] and the evidence before the jury is that that was a decision that was taken by the prosecution, a positive decision, because the prosecution authorities deemed that she was unwell for that period. There is no evidence before the Court or the jury to say that she was so unwell as to be incapable of giving a statement, so that accordingly the Court cannot accept that the evidence as it presently stands is sufficient as an acceptable reason for not taking the statement.
Once again, the Court must remind itself when looking at this issue, the suggestion, or the contention strongly made that there is this missing evidence, that the focus for the Court must be on avoiding any prejudice to the accused in the preparation of his defence, rather than looking at it from the point of view of disciplining of any member of the Garda 7 Síochána for any possible oversight. So therefore, ignoring the second part and focusing on the issue of prejudice, the Court notes that as it happens, the evidence from the accused to the jury includes hearsay which he got in from the witness box under oath, to the effect that when he, the accused, returned from his garda interview on asking her, the accused said to the jury that his late wife, or his since deceased wife … told him that she put the complainant on the evening ferry. The jury have this evidence, albeit improperly put, and not from the witness herself. And the jury has that evidence along with evidence relating to this handwritten note by Garda O'Shea, which again is before the jury by way of oral evidence…. [I]t is for the jury to make of it, should the case proceed, as it deems appropriate.
Accordingly, on pure Braddish grounds, I find that the failure to take a statement from the [the appellant’s wife] has not, in the circumstances of all of the evidence, resulted in a specific prejudice to the accused, such as necessitates withdrawing of Count No. 1 from the jury… However, I must also continue to consider that Braddish point and that Braddish argument in the context of the delay POC application to which I now return. … [Considering DPP v. CCE], this Court must look at the totality of the evidence before the jury, including, let it not be forgotten, not just the evidence of the accused or the complainant, but also the evidence of the complainant's two sisters, N and J. The accused cannot say himself, or has not said himself, whether the complainant was brought to the ferry that evening for the 6.30 ferry. In effect, and I'm here paraphrasing, he says that on landing [at this house] from his journey, he basically handed the complainant over to his good wife to deal with and he carried on to do his work.
And we all must acknowledge that fishermen, especially during the summer, month of July, have a timeline all of their own. And the Court can understand what the accused says in that 8 regard. But furthermore, the accused cannot say, nor does not say, whether or not she stayed in his home that night. Nor does he say whether he had any discussion with his wife concerning the complainant that evening. On his own evidence he has returned after a period away from home, being up in [Northern Ireland]. And he took a detour on the way home to collect this young lady, young child. It appears from his evidence that the only time he discussed anything concerning this young girl was not that evening or the following morning, but it was only when he had been arrested and went home to his wife after being interviewed many, many years later. The Court finds it a little bit odd that the accused person was unable to say categorically in his own evidence that not only did he not commit the offence, but that the complainant did not stay in the house. All he said was that the sitting room was not used for sleeping. But what I mean is he was not able to say that she did not stay in the house and therefore did not take the ferry the following morning. On another occasion, on being asked a similar question, he appeared to suggest that she did not stay in his home, but he was less than emphatic. And in that regard, the Court has reviewed his evidence.
The Court must also look at the possible cumulative effect of the delay in making the complaint, the passing of [the appellant’s wife], and the failure to take her statement, which of course could have been entered into evidence through a garda witness, being the garda who took the statement, if the trial had commenced after her death, which no doubt it would have in any event.
The Court is satisfied that it has been established that there was a real prospect that the evidence concerned, [of the appellant’s wife], could have been tendered and that it would have been material. Thereby, as Ms Silke acknowledged, creating a conflict of evidence between the complainant, her sister J, and the accused's wife …. That conflict has been opened to this jury in the manner that I previously referred to and is now before the jury. It is something that can be addressed not only 9 in a charge, but in closing arguments. It is there. So, accordingly, it is for this Court to determine whether the absence of the [appellant’s wife] as a witness in this trial has deprived the accused of a realistic opportunity of an obviously useful line of defence. I hold that it has not deprived him because he has put the matter into evidence, albeit not in a proper evidential, by way of proper evidential procedure. That with the evidence presently before the jury, including the evidence of the accused, of what he says his wife said to him results in this Court determining that both Counts 1 and 2 should continue before the jury and that to allow them to go ahead before the jury would not constitute an unfair trial.”
Grounds of Appeal 21. By notice of appeal dated 12 August 2024, the appellant indicated his desire to appeal against his conviction on the following grounds:1. “The Honourable trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to accede to the application made by the defence in respect of the passage of time since the commission of the alleged offences and the prejudicial effect resulting therefrom.
2.The failure of the investigative authorities to take a statement from the accused wife which would have substantiated the Appellant’s claim that the complainant did not spend the night of her trip from [the Midlands] to … the Appellant’s House, and that the prejudicial effect of this failure was such that with the passage of time he was unable to get a fair trial.
3.The Honourable trial judge erred in law in whilst saying there was a failure under the Braddish Principles to seek out and preserve evidence, that the prejudicial effect of this failure if it was such, that it was corrected by the accused giving evidence and the accused giving evidence which was not proven of a piece of paper, where he 10 had written the name of Garda P O’Shea who was to call and take evidence from […] the deceased’s wife. The judge erred in law in holding that whilst same was hearsay it cured the prejudicial effect of not seeking the statement.
4.The Honourable trial Judge erred in law in respect of an application under the POC/Braddish and AC cases, in failing to take the matter away from the jury resulting in the accused man in not getting a fair trial.
5.The Jury sought a copy of the Statement the complainant as there was a number of time-frames given by her in respect of the alleged complaint and the complainant changed the dates from those given in her original statement, this was not provided to the jury.
6.The Prosecution failed to call the doctor to give evidence when the doctor had no actual record of the complainant attending her practice or having visited her on the island in respect of a constipation complaint.
7.There was evidence given by a Mr. [Ó’F.] of sighting […] the accused’s wife and a young girl at the pier and the jury had a question as to the time that he was at the pier and seen the complainant with [the accused’s wife]. The Judge checked his note and said no time was given, however the witness[..] had said that he was dropping someone to the boat to stay with his mother and that he had to leave work. This fuller explanation and re-cap of the evidence would make it more likely that it was the evening as opposed to the morning.
8.The jury sought a copy of the DAR, of the evidence of the complainant and of the accused man the appellant. The judge initially sought the views of counsel as to whether this should be done in the jury room and then considered that it could be done in the court room. The judge then ascertained that the court staff were unable to play the relevant portions of the DAR and in respect of a transcript same would 11 not be available until the following week as the following Monday was a bank holiday the trial would have to be adjourned to Tuesday. The judge then informed the jury that if they could formulate questions he would endeavour to answer them. At which juncture the jury indicated that they had answered their own questions. The jury were thus denied the opportunity to listen to the DAR, and so they had to consider this crucial evidence, without its aid, when they clearly had questions in their minds in relation to same.
9.Despite the fact that the jury had indicated that the they had a verdict on Court [2] relating to the trip in the car and that they had not reached a verdict on Count [1] and in spite of all the questions and issues that were raised by the jury the Learned Judge nevertheless asked for a majority verdict on this count. The jury did not come back with a unanimous verdict but may have been unnecessarily pressurised to so do.
10.The[..] verdict of the Jury was against the evidence and the weight of the evidence.
22.At the hearing before us, Counsel on behalf of the appellant made oral submissions with respect to the Braddish/PO’C grounds of appeal and relied on his written submissions with respect to the remaining grounds of appeal.
Braddish/PO’C Application Grounds 1 - 4 The Parties Submissions 23. The appellant submitted that the trial judge erred by failing to withdraw the case from the jury in light of missing evidence in this case, namely the evidence of his late wife. This arose because of the length of time which had elapsed since the alleged commission of the offences. In addition, the investigating guards failed in their investigative duty to take a statement from the appellant’s wife. It was submitted that these circumstances 12 resulted in the appellant suffering a real possibility of an obviously useful line of defence.
24.The respondent submitted that in circumstances where the potential evidence of the appellant’s wife was unknown, the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant the PO’C application. It was submitted that the failure of the investigating guards to obtain a statement from the appellant’s wife had not resulted in a specific prejudice to the appellant, due to the fact that evidence had been given by the appellant as to what his wife had said to him about this issue and this was open to comment by counsel in closing speeches.
Discussion and Determination 25. In DPP v. CCE [2024] 3 IR 291, the Supreme Court considered the effect of missing evidence in a trial and the question of assessing when an unfairness arises such that a trial should not proceed to jury verdict.
O’Donnell J (as he then was) stated at para. 18 of his judgment:“18.
Few trials, however, are perfect reproductions of all the evidence that could possibly exist. The absence of a witness or a piece of evidence does not render such trials unfair. A trial judge has therefore a vantage point which allows him or her to consider whether what has occurred crosses the line between a just and an unjust process. In shorthand terms, this involves considering whether the evidence which is no longer available is “no more than a missed opportunity” … or by contrast whether the applicant has “lost the real possibility of an obviously useful line of defence” … adopting in this regard the language of Hardiman J. in S.B. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] IESC 67, (Unreported, Supreme Court, 21 December 2006) (“ S.B.“), at para. 56. These judicially adopted phrases seek to identify either side of the dividing line: it is inevitable that many cases will proceed to trial without all the evidence that was 13 potentially available at the time of the alleged offence, but that in itself does not prevent a trial occurring. There is a point, however, at which the deficiencies are of such significance and reality in the context of the particular case that it can be said that it is no longer just to proceed.”
26.O’Malley J. stated at paragraph 4 of her judgement:“[C]onsidering an application of this nature, will involve an assessment of the prosecution case. There must, of course, be sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict the accused, since otherwise he or she will be entitled to a direction in any event. Assuming that this threshold is met, the trial judge must next consider the evidence said to be missing. What is required here, if the accused is to succeed in the application, is a legitimate basis on which it can be said to be reasonable to infer that particular evidence, potentially favourable to the defence, might have been given had the trial taken place at an earlier stage. If the prosecution case is very strong, then the evidence said to be missing would need to be such that there was a real possibility that it could influence the decision of the jury notwithstanding the strength of the prosecution case. A theoretical possibility that the absence of some tangentially material piece of evidence might render the trial unfair is not enough. It is necessary to look at the case in the round, to have regard to the likelihood of evidence favourable to the defence being genuinely lost by reason of the lapse of time and also to have regard to the role which the evidence might reasonably have been expected to play at the trial, in the light of the prosecution case as it actually appeared at the trial. The issue to be determined is whether the accused has lost the real possibility of an obviously useful line of defence. The task of the trial judge is to determine whether the trial is fair, rather than whether the accused is guilty or innocent. The burden in such an 14 application is on the accused, who may be able to make the case on the basis of the evidence already adduced by the prosecution or may need to adduce defence evidence. It may be necessary to call evidence in absence of jury”.
27.Clarke CJ set out guidelines with respect to how a trial judge should approach an assertion of unfairness arising from missing evidence in a criminal trial. He stated at paras 9.2 – 9.4 of his judgment:“9.2 ….the trial judge must (a) first consider the prosecution case as it has actually developed at trial. Thereafter, the trial judge must (b) consider whatever evidence is available as to the testimony which might or could have been given but which is said to be no longer available.
This exercise will generally involve two principal considerations. First the court must (c) consider the available evidence about what might have been said by the missing witness or what might have been contained in the missing physical evidence, such as documents or objects. The trial judge will be required to have regard to the degree of confidence with which it can be predicted that the particular evidence would have been available, while recognising the very fact that the evidence is no longer available means that the exercise must be speculative at least to some extent.
9.3 If the trial judge is satisfied that it has been established that there was a real prospect that the evidence concerned could have been tendered, next he or she will be required to (d) assess the materiality of any such evidence. The materiality of that evidence will need to be considered in light of the prosecution case as it evolved at the trial.
9.4 In light of all of those factors, the court must finally (e) reach an assessment as to whether the trial is fair. The assessment of whether the trial is fair involves a conscientious determination by the trial 15 judge whether, on the basis of all of the materials before the Court, it can be said that the test identified by Hardiman J. in S.B. has been met, being that the absence of the missing evidence has deprived the accused of a realistic opportunity of an obviously useful line of defence.”
28.In the instant matter, the prosecution case was that two sexual assaults occurred: the first on a journey in the appellant’s motor car from the Midlands to his house and the second on the following morning in the appellant’s house.
29.The missing evidence asserted by the appellant was from his late wife. The import of his evidence was that his wife would have said that C had not stayed in their house overnight, although he does not definitively state that in his evidence. Such evidence would have been a direct challenge to C’s claim of a sexual assault occurring in the appellant’s house on the morning before her departure on the ferry and an indirect challenge to her claim of a sexual assault occurring during the journey in the car, on the basis of her credibility.
30.In terms of what evidence was available with respect to what the appellant’s wife would say, that emanated solely from the appellant whose evidence in this regard has been set out earlier. This is clearly hearsay evidence as to the truth of what his wife was claimed by him to have recalled to the appellant. However, no objection was taken to this evidence, and it was before the jury.
31.The reason there is not a statement from the deceased’s wife is the fault of the investigating guards who did not seek to take a statement from her.
The reason proffered for not seeking to take a statement was that she was unwell. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that an effort should have been 16 made, after the appellant’s interview, to take a statement from the appellant’s wife, whatever the outcome of that approach might have been.
32.The missing evidence of the appellant’s wife was not the only evidence relied upon by the appellant regarding C not staying the night in the appellant’s house. Evidence was called from Mr Ó’F. about meeting the appellant’s wife at the late sailing. He gave evidence, which again was hearsay, about being told by the appellant’s wife that she was at the ferry because she was bringing the daughter of a named person (who was C’s mother) to the ferry.
33.In these circumstances, the jury were fully aware of what the appellant asserted his wife would have said, had she still been alive. In addition, there was the supportive evidence of Mr Ó’F., although this also included hearsay evidence of what the appellant’s wife said to him. The judge did not give the jury any direction to disregard this hearsay evidence.
34.Evidence from the appellant’s wife was never going to be available at trial as she had passed away by the time the trial took place. Accordingly, the spectre of evidence missing from the case which the appellant might have sought to rely upon arises.
35.As already indicated, the investigating guards should have taken steps to take a statement from the appellant’s wife. However, had a statement been taken from her, the question arises as to what use could have been made of the statement. The appellant, and indeed the trial judge, were of the opinion that such a statement could have been admitted into evidence pursuant to s. 21 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, we are of the view that this was not a definite outcome and depended on the respondent not objecting to this course of action. Accordingly, the consequence of failing to take a statement from the appellant’s wife is uncertain.
17 36. One issue that the taking of a statement from the appellant’s wife would have addressed, however, is that an indication of the proposed evidence of the appellant’s wife would have been formally recorded. As it is, we are instead reliant on what the appellant said his wife had said, which in its terms is somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation.
37.Although an issue might properly have arisen as to what the missing evidence actually was, the trial judge was prepared to accept, for the purpose of the PO’C/Braddish argument, that the missing evidence was what the appellant asserted it to be, namely that his wife would have said that the C did not stay in their house overnight.
38.In terms of the materiality of the missing evidence, it was directly material to the sexual assault of C in the appellant’s house and indirectly material to the sexual assault of C in the appellant’s car. However, the jury also had the additional evidence of the other defence witness who gave evidence of meeting the appellant’s wife, in a relevant context, in the evening time at the ferry terminal.
39.Accordingly, the case which the appellant wished to pursue was before the jury through the evidence of another witness. In addition, there was contradicting evidence from C’s sister about the time of arrival of C to the island. This was connected to a visit from a GP which the sister recollected happening on the same day of C’s arrival on the island, and in the afternoon.
40.Of greater significance, however, is that C was never challenged that she was incorrect about staying in the appellant’s house on the night of her journey to his house. While the appellant asserted, for the purpose of his application to withdraw the prosecution from the jury, that he wished to pursue a case that his wife’s death impeded his ability to present her 18 evidence in his defence, he did not make this case to C, or challenge her evidence that she stayed overnight before taking a ferry to the island. The only question asked of C’s sister was a suggestion to that witness that C arrived the night before on the late boat. She testified that she was almost sure that her sister arrived in the morning and that they called the doctor to examine C in the afternoon. Neither was there any attempt by the appellant to challenge the circumstances in which a statement was not taken from his wife in a voir dire. The appellant bore the onus of establishing that there was a real risk that his trial was unfair by reason of absence of material which was unavailable to him, yet his case was not put to relevant witnesses, nor did he seek to litigate the issue in an appropriate manner before the trial judge.
41.The rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R. 67, formulated by Halsbury L.J. states:“To my mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity often to defend their own character, and not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.”
42.This fundamental procedural rule applies where, in the course of a trial, an accused wishes to advance and establish, by evidence, a point which would lead to a conclusion that the trial should be stopped on grounds that there is a real possibility of a miscarriage of justice by reason of non-availability of potential evidential material through passage of time.
43.We are of the opinion, that the failure to cross examine C regarding whether she stayed in the appellant’s house overnight is an insuperable difficulty for 19 the appellant in terms of the PO’C/Braddish grounds of appeal. An accused who does not contest the evidence of the main witness for the prosecution relating to the very issue on which the missing material is said to have a bearing, cannot advance the point that it is unsafe to allow the case to proceed because of the absence of such material.
44.In addition, as there was other evidence regarding this matter before the jury, and as the jury were aware of the nature of the asserted missing evidence, and received a delay warning from the trial judge which specifically referred to evidence lost to the appellant, to include the evidence of his wife (and in respect of which there was no requisition), we are of the view that the trial judge did not err in his detailed and reasoned conclusion that the appellant did not lose a realistic opportunity of an obviously useful line of defence. The jury were fully aware of his line of defence and evidential rules which may have hindered their consideration of this material were not enforced by the trial judge.
45.In the circumstances of this case, while this was not a perfect trial in terms of the calling of a live witness, it cannot be said that an unfairness arose with respect to the appellant advancing his case, in light of the manner the evidence unfolded before the jury.
46.The appellant relies on the dicta of O’Malley J. in CCE to the effect that culpability on the part of the prosecuting authority may mean that prejudice to the appellant does not have to be as significant. Whilst we note these dicta, this does not appear to be the ratio of the majority of the Supreme Court. Regardless, we remain of the view that the failure of the guards to take steps to take a statement from the appellant’s wife did not result in the appellant losing a realistic opportunity of a useful line of defence.
47.Accordingly, we dismiss these grounds of appeal.
20 The Remaining Grounds of Appeal 48. The appellant did not make an oral argument with respect to the remaining grounds of appeal but rather sought to rely on his written submissions. We are of the opinion that nothing of concern arises with respect to these grounds and will deal with them in short order.
49.Ground 5 - The trial judge refused to provide the jury with copies of the various statements made by C, having been asked by the jury for these statements. The trial judge was correct to refuse to provide the jury with C’s statements. The evidence given in a case is what is to be considered by a jury, not the statements made by a witness. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in refusing to provide the statements of C to the jury.
50.Ground 6 - The prosecution did not call the GP on the island to give evidence. As already noted, this GP did not attend C, nor did C allege that this GP attended her. At the relevant time, the GP had a locum standing in for her which both C and her sister gave evidence of. Whilst the GP was a witness on the book of evidence, the respondent chose not to call her, which was within her right so to do. The appellant did not seek to have her tendered. Accordingly, a complaint cannot be raised at this stage that she was not called. Furthermore, the fact that the GP did not have a consultation note on file with respect to this visit by her locum was entered into evidence as a result of C accepting that this was the case. No issue arises in this regard.
51.Ground 7 - The jury asked whether Mr Ó’F. had given a time in evidence as to when he spoke with the appellant ‘s wife at the pier. He had not, and the judge informed the jury of this fact. The appellant asserts that the inference to be drawn from Mr Ó’F.’s evidence was that it was later in the day.
However, this is not the question which was asked by the jury which was specific as to whether he gave a time. The trial judge did not err with respect to the manner in which he dealt with this question.
21 52. Ground 8 - The jury requested to have the DAR recording played back to them in respect of certain witnesses. It transpired that this could not done.
The facility of obtaining transcripts of the evidence was raised by counsel but the reality was that these would have taken some time to obtain. The trial judge determined to see whether he could assist the jury from his own notes in relation to whatever issue arose for them. He asked them to formulate questions with respect to the areas they wished to explore. The jury returned to indicate they had resolved the issue and did not need further assistance. Nothing arises with respect to this course of action adopted by the trial judge. It was within his discretion to deal with the jury enquiry in this manner and clearly the jury resolved the issue without the necessity of further assistance from the trial judge.
53.Ground 9 - The appellant complained that the trial judge gave the jury a majority verdict direction with respect to the incident in the appellant’s house after they indicated that they had reached a verdict in respect of the car incident. The jury subsequently returned a unanimous verdict on the incident in the appellant’s house also. It is asserted that the jury must have felt pressure to return a verdict. The trial judge was entitled to give the jury a majority verdict direction at the time he gave the direction. Nothing arises with respect to this course of action.
54.Ground 10 – The appellant claims the verdict was perverse. This is not established on the evidence.
Conclusion 55. In circumstances where we have not upheld any of the grounds of appeal, we hereby dismiss the appeal against conviction. The matters raised by the appellant did not render the verdict unsafe and the appellant did not demonstrate that there was a real risk of an unfair trial by reason of his wife being unable to give evidence.
22 Approved No Redaction Needed 23
AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.