2026 IEHC 363

(1)an application by the defendants for an order under the Slip Rule (Order 28 Rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”)) requesting an amendment of my judgment of 31st July 2024, my order of 25th October 2024 and various other related orders; or, in the alternative,

(2)an application by the defendants for an order under Order 28 Rule 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (or, alternatively, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court) to amend the same judgment and same orders. 2. These applications arise because of two errors in documents. These are:- 2

(1)the original deed of novation of receivers – which was incorrectly stated in the affidavits to be dated 19th July 2019 when the correct date was 14th June 2019; and

(2)the original global deed of transfer which was incorrectly stated to be dated 14th July 2019 when the correct date was also 14th June

1. Background
2. The background to this application is that the plaintiff instituted these proceedings against Everyday Finance DAC (“Everyday”) and two receivers whom Everyday had appointed over his property. In these proceedings, he seeks to challenge the title of Everyday to the debt which he incurred with AIB, and the mortgage which he entered into with AIB in respect of this loan. He also challenges the right of the receivers to act in the manner in which they have done.
3. These proceedings are linked to two other sets of proceedings in which Everyday as the plaintiff is seeking to enter judgment against Mr. Wales in the sum of €1 million and is also seeking an order for possession.
4. The plaintiff also brought an application for an interlocutory injunction in these proceedings which was successful. In so doing, he sought equitable relief from the court.
5. These proceedings have been case managed by the court since the injunction application.
6. The plaintiff then brought an application for an order, under Order 31 Rule 18 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, compelling the defendants to produce two particular documents for inspection. The documents which the plaintiff sought to inspect as set out in his notice of motion were:

(1)a deed of novation of receivers dated 19th July 2019; and 3

(1)a cover page with an incorrect date (i.e. 19th July 2019); and

(2)an incorrect execution page. Both of these errors, she said at para.12: “are a consequence of an incorrect version of the deed of novation of receivers being circulated by the receiver's office". 18. She also states, at para. 13:"In March 2020 an incorrect copy of the deed of novation of receivers was created by a member of staff at EY by way of the incorrect dating and saving of an undated signed copy of the deed of novation of receivers to the EY server. This was a human error. This incorrect copy was the only copy saved to the EY server." 19. She states, at para. 14, that the “incorrect copy of the deed of novation of receivers was then provided to the solicitors for the defendants for the purpose of being exhibited to the affidavit of Raphoe Collins on 8 July 2022.” 20. She states, at para. 15:- 6 "The member of staff responsible for creating the incorrect copy of the deed of novation of receivers is no longer employed by EY therefore it is not possible to provide a more elaborate explanation in relation to the errors described above. The first defendant swore an affidavit averring to these administrative errors on 2 December 2024.” 21. It is clear, therefore, that the defendants’ position is that the correct date of the original deed of novation of receivers is 14th June 2019 and that a series of administrative errors resulted in the court being informed of an incorrect date of 19th July 2019, being assigned to the deed of novation. 22. I am satisfied, based on the affidavit evidence before the court, that the original deed of novation of receivers was the deed of novation dated 14th June 2019 and not one dated 19th July 2019. 23. However, it will always be open to Mr. Wales at the trial of the action to cross- examine the defendant’s witnesses as to how this error arose and to use this error for whatever litigious advantage he seeks to derive from it. (

1. ii)24. The error on the global deed of transfer Ms. O’Connor in her affidavit also set out how the original global deed of transfer (which was originally dated 14th June 2019) came to be incorrectly dated in the affidavits filed in the inspection motion (which errors were then carried through to my judgment and to subsequent orders). She states, at para. 16 of her affidavit of 16th April 2025, that:"The correct original global deed of transfer is dated 14 June 2019 a copy of which was correctly exhibited to the affidavit of Luke Charlton of 7 June 2022 at "LC2” and more recently exhibited to the affidavit of Brendan Keogh of 14 November 2024 at “BK2”. However the plaintiff's notice of motion for inspection dated 16th November 7 2022 contained a typographical error and incorrectly referred to the “deed of transfer dated 14 July 2019.” (Emphasis added.) 25. It appears therefore that this error was in fact caused by the plaintiff himself and not by the defendants. The original global deed of transfer was dated 14th June 2019 and the correct copy was exhibited to the affidavit of Mr. Charleton and the affidavit of Mr. Keogh of 14th November 2024. It was the plaintiff's notice of motion for inspection which is the source of this error as it incorrectly referred to the deed of transfer dated 14th July 2019. 26. It is noteworthy that the replying affidavit of Mr. Wales sworn in respect of the Slip Rule application dated 31st March 2025 does not address this issue or admit his own mistake in any respect. 27. I am satisfied, based on the affidavit evidence put before the court, that the correct date of the global deed of transfer was 14th June 2019 and not 14th July 2019 and that this error was caused by the plaintiff himself. (iii) 28. The plaintiff’s response Despite these explanations, the plaintiff complained to the court that the defendants had failed to bring an application to amend the judgment and order pursuant to the Slip Rule – which the plaintiff contended was ordered by the court on 15th November 2024. 29. However, the order of the court of 15th November 2024 did not in fact order the defendant to bring an application to amend pursuant to Order 28 Rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (i.e. the Slip Rule). Rather, on 15th November 2024, the court ordered that an affidavit be filed by the defendants to explain how the errors in relation to the dates of the two documents arose. 30. However, as a result of the plaintiff’s obduracy, the defendants were forced to issue their first application under Order 28 Rule 11 (i.e. under the Slip Rule) grounded upon the 8 affidavit of Ms. Niamh O'Connor dated 10th March 2025. Mr. Wales put in a replying affidavit (which in substance amounted to a legal submission) opposing this application. 31. When the matter was back before the court on 1st April 2025, counsel for the defendants indicated that the defendants would also rely on Order 28 Rule 12 (or, alternatively, the inherent jurisdiction of the court) in relation to the amendments being sought to my judgment of 31st July 2024 and to the various court orders. I then directed that the defendants should bring a second motion pursuant to Order 28 Rule 12 and that both motions would be heard together. Legal principles (
2. i)32. Order 28 Rule 11 RSC Order 28 Rule 11 RSC provides: “11. Clerical mistakes in judgments or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected without an appeal: (
3. a)where the parties consent, and with the approval of the Court, by the registrar to the Court, (
4. i)on the application to the registrar in writing of any party, to which a letter of consent to the correction from each other party shall be attached or (
5. ii)on receipt by the registrar of letters of consent from each party; or (
6. b)where the parties do not consent, by the Court, (
7. i)on application made to the Court by motion on notice to the other party or (
8. ii)on the listing of the proceeding before the Court by the registrar on notice to each party.” 9 33. I indicated at an early stage to both parties that I did not believe that this was a clerical mistake in the judgment or order or an error arising from any accidental slip or omission. In other words, the judgment and orders were drawn up in the light of the information and facts given to the court at that time. 34. In the circumstances, I indicated to the parties that I did not believe that this was an application which should properly be made under the slip rule. The real issue is whether an order should be made under Order 28 Rule 12. (
9. ii)35. Order 28 Rule 12 of RSC Order 28 Rule 12 RSC provides as follows: “12. The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court may think just, amend any defect or error in any proceedings, and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on the proceedings.” (iii) 36. Differences between interlocutory orders and final orders Mr. Wales’ submission on this application rests upon his argument that the court order which I made on 10th October 2024, directing the defendants to permit Mr. Wales to inspect two documents, are final and not interlocutory orders. Therefore, he says the court is functus officio in respect of this matter. I do not agree with this submission. 37. As is stated in Delany and McGrath on Civil Procedure (5th Ed.) at para. 25-48:"An ‘interlocutory’ order is generally understood to mean an order that is not final in nature. The distinction between interlocutory and final judgments and orders was considered by the Supreme Court in Minister for Agriculture v. Alte Leipziger [[2000] 4 IR 32] in the context of the admission of additional evidence on an appeal. Barron J stated that ‘an interlocutory application is one which is purely procedural in nature and an interlocutory order is an order made on foot of an interlocutory application, 10 whereas a final order would normally dispose of the action or proceedings.’ However, Hardiman J took the view that for an order to be considered final, ‘it is quite sufficient if the order in question finally disposes of a particular issue between the parties, at least where that issue is discretely raised by some proper procedure’.” 38. In Lismore Homes Ltd v. Bank of Ireland Finance Limited [2006] IEHC 212, Quirke J. stated that the court has jurisdiction to vary its earlier interlocutory orders which may be necessary if the administration of justice so requires it. 39. In IBRC v. Quinn [2015] IECA 84, Mahon J. in the Court of Appeal stated as follows:“It could never be the case that even in the absence of such (or any) misapprehension, a discovery or inspection process ordered by a court for the purpose of good management of the litigation could never be altered or varied by subsequent court order merely because the original process had been agreed by the parties. If this was the case, a court would be effectively prevented from exercising its inherent jurisdiction to oversee the management of litigation because of the fact the parties had entered into an improvident or unworkable discovery or inspection process, and thereby effectively rendered the litigation impotent." 40. As Delany and McGrath state at para. 25-55: "However, there is greater flexibility to seek a variation of an interlocutory order where it deals with a process such as discovery or inspection of documents where difficulties with the scope or terms of the order made may only become apparent after the process has commenced. (…) In Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v. Quinn [[2015] IECA 84], it was held that a court enjoyed a similar discretion as part of its inherent jurisdiction to alter or vary interlocutory orders and procedures directed 11 relating to inspection ‘to reflect and deal with legal or practical issues or difficulties that arise, as particularly might be expected to arise in lengthy litigation.’” 41. It is clear from the authorities that the court may, in its discretion, vary or alter an interlocutory order depending on the circumstances of the case. 42. I am satisfied that, on the facts of this case, the orders I made in relation to inspection on 31st July 2024 and thereafter, were interlocutory orders and not final orders, for a number of reasons. First, there were other matters which needed to be resolved even before the inspection took place – such as difficulties which arose in relation to the production of the original documents because they were in the UK. Secondly, issues arose in relation to the redaction of the documents which required my adjudication. Thirdly, the plaintiff at all times participated in these hearings and never sought to argue that the court should not become involved in these matters because the court was now functus officio as the inspection order was a final order. 43. Moreover, it is clear even on the wording of the orders themselves that these were interlocutory and not final orders. For example, the order which reflected my judgment of 31st July 2024 was perfected on 10th October 2024 and it provided that the defendants were to provide the relevant documents to the court by Friday, 25th October 2024, that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of this motion, and that the matter was to be adjourned until Friday, 25th October 2024 for mention before me. The fact that the matter was adjourned for mention to Friday, 25th October is also indicative that it is an interlocutory and not a final order. 44. On 25th October 2024, I made a further order that the defendants swear and file an affidavit within seven days exhibiting the originals of the deed of novation and the deed of transfer (and confirming that the said documents are the original documents) and also directing that the plaintiff should inspect both documents at the defendants’ solicitors’ office 12 and be permitted to take a photocopy of same and that such inspection was to take place on or before 7th November 2024. I then adjourned the proceedings to 8th November 2024. 45. The matter came back before the court on 8th November 2024, and I directed that the defendants should swear and file an affidavit, exhibiting certified copies of the originals of the two documents and confirming that said documents were the original documents and that the originals would be made available for inspection by the plaintiff within seven days. I adjourned the proceedings to 15th November 2024. 46. The matter came before the court again on 15th November 2024, when counsel for the defendants indicated to the court that the originals of both documents were both dated 14th June 2019 and references to any other date were in error. On 15th November 2024, I ordered that Brendan Keogh, on behalf the defendants, swear an affidavit before 27th November 2024 setting out the circumstances as to how this error came to be made and I adjourned the proceedings to 12th December 2024. 47. When the matter came back before the court on 12th December 2024, I was informed that the plaintiff had not yet inspected the documents and I adjourned the matter to Friday, 7th February 2025. 48. It is clear, therefore, that at all stages the court made a series of interlocutory orders and was managing the inspection process. 49. I am satisfied based on the above reasons that none of the orders made by me in this case were final orders; all were interlocutory orders dealing with the principle of inspection and then subsequently the mode and conditions of inspection. I am satisfied, therefore, that the court does have jurisdiction to amend such interlocutory orders and that I am not functus officio in respect of these matters. 50. In the present case, it is clear that my judgment of 31st July 2024 and the order of 10th October 2024 which gives effect to that judgment were only the start of this process of 13 inspection and could not, in any way, be construed as a final order. I had decided that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had a legal right to inspect the two documents in question but the mode, timing and conditions of such inspection were matters which were held over for another day. 51. I would also say that this court has been engaged in actively case managing this case – and the two linked cases – and this case has appeared on numerous occasions for mention before me for case management. I do not accept, therefore, that I am functus officio in relation to these proceedings or indeed on the issue of inspection. (
10. iv)52. The application under Order 28 Rule 12 It is clear, that the courts have jurisdiction to amend a judgment or order if the judgment or order does not accurately reflect what the court actually decided or intended. 53. In Belville Holdings Ltd v. The Revenue Commissioners [1994] 1 ILRM 29, Finlay C.J. stated at page 36 and 37:"There is, however, I am satisfied, a wider and more fundamental jurisdiction in a court to amend an order which it has previously made, even though that order is in the form of a final order and has been perfected. We have not been referred to, nor have I been able to discover, any decision of this Court or of the Irish courts dealing with this question. The position in principles appear, however, to be accurately stated in the judgment of Romer J in Ainsworth v. Wilding [1896] 1 Ch 673, where, at p. 677, he stated as follows: ‘So far as I am aware, the only cases in which the court can interfere after the passing and entering of the judgment are these:

(1)Where there has been an accidental slip in the judgment as drawn up, in which case the court has power to rectify it under O. 28, r. 11; 14

(2)When the court itself finds that the judgment as drawn up does not correctly state what the court actually decided and intended. ‘ Having referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Swire 30 ChD 239, Romer J quoted from the judgments in that case as follows at p. 678: ‘Cotton LJ says: ‘It is only in special circumstances that the court will interfere with an order which has been passed and entered, except in cases of a mere slip or verbal inaccuracy, yet in my opinion the court has jurisdiction over its own records, and if it finds that the order as passed and entered contains an adjudication upon that which the court in fact has never adjudicated upon, then, in my opinion, it has jurisdiction, which it will in a proper case exercise, to correct its record, that it may be in accordance with the order really pronounced.’ Lindley LJ says: ‘If it is once made out that the order, whether passed and entered or not, does not express the order actually made, the court has ample jurisdiction to set that right, whether it arises from a clerical slip or not.’ And Bowen LJ says: ‘An order, as it seems to me, even when passed and entered, may be amended by the court so as to carry out the intention and express the meaning of the court at the time when the order was made, provided the amendment be made without injustice or on terms which preclude injustice.’’ I am satisfied that these expressions of opinion validly represent what the true common law principle is concerning this question. I would emphasise, however, that it is only in special or unusual circumstances that an amendment of an order passed and perfected, where the order is of a final nature, should be made by the court. The finality of proceedings both at the level of trial and, possibly more particularly, at the 15 level of ultimate appeal is of fundamental importance to the certainty of the administration of law and should not lightly be breached.”

1. This decision of Finlay C.J. was quoted with approval in In Re Greendale Developments Ltd (No 3) [2003] 2 IR 514 by Hamilton C.J.
2. In McMullen v. Clancy [2002] IESC 61, Murray J. (as he then was) referred to the court's inherent jurisdiction as well as an express jurisdiction to amend final orders. He stated at p. 502:“There is a fundamental public interest in the due administration of justice which requires that the order of a court should accord with what the court has decided and that the decision of a court should not be thwarted by an accidental slip or error or clerical mistake.”
3. And later he also stated: "It seems to me in the public interest and in the interest of the due administration of justice that the High Court at all times retains its jurisdiction to amend its own orders where, due to accidental error, they do not correctly state what the court actually decided."
4. I am satisfied, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Order 28 Rule 12 (and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court) to correct errors which arose, in part, due to the mistakes of the defendants and, in part, due to the mistake of the plaintiff. Assessment
5. The defendants’ position is that the originals of both documents were dated 14th June 2019 and any reference to other dates was incorrect. They also say that these are the original documents applicable to this case, that no documents with the incorrect dates exist, and that they are willing and able to provide the correct documents for Mr. Wales to inspect. 16
6. The plaintiff's position is that my judgment of 31st July 2024 (and the relevant orders compelled) directed the defendants to produce these two documents for inspection (i.e. the deed of novation dated 19th July 2019 and the global deed of transfer dated 14th July 2019). He wants to inspect these documents even though he has been told that these documents do not exist and that the relevant documents to his case which do exist are both dated 14th June
8. When stated in these terms, it is clear that Mr. Wales’ position is entirely contrived and obstructive. Mr. Wales insists on seeking to inspect non-existent documents because that is what he says, my judgment entitles him to do. When questioned by the court as to how he proposed to inspect non-existent documents, Mr. Wales refused to provide a coherent – or any – answer.
9. Mr. Wales’ position is that both applications brought by the defendants should be refused and that my judgment and orders should remain unchanged. It is a wholly unreasonable and indefensible position for him to adopt and, in my view, was a position adopted by him to delay the proceedings.
10. I am satisfied, that the true substance of my written decision was that the court decided that the plaintiff had a right to inspect the original deed of novation of receivers and the original global deed of transfer. There is only one original deed of novation of receivers and that is dated 14th June
11. There is also only one global deed of transfer and that is also dated 14th June
12. The deed of novation of receivership dated 19th July 2019 and the global deed of transfer dated 14th July 2019 are documents which simply do not exist.
13. It is clear, that the plaintiff and the defendants made errors in the presentation of the papers to the court upon which the court made its decision of 31st July 2024 and upon which the orders were drawn up. I am satisfied, however, that these were administrative or human errors. In the circumstances, the court's judgment (and order) would be rendered nugatory if 17 the court were to refuse the defendants’ application to amend the judgment and order to reflect the true date of the documents. That cannot be in the interests of the proper administration of justice; it cannot be in the interests of the proper management of litigation and it cannot be in the interest of the proper management of judicial time. I am quite satisfied, therefore, that the mistakes were minor and administrative and that my judgment and orders should be amended accordingly.
14. The court should always lean against any interpretation of its judgment or orders which would make its entire judgment or orders nugatory when it can be rendered operable simply by means of correcting the dates of two documents which were incorrectly dated.
15. Moreover, Mr. Wales can point to no prejudice at all by allowing the judgment and orders to be amended by the substitution of the correct dates for the two documents. On the contrary, this will allow him to inspect the documents and allow the matter to continue to trial. Conclusion
16. I would, therefore, conclude as follows:

(1)I will make an order pursuant to Order 28 Rule 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (and/or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court) amending my judgment dated 31st July 2024 to reflect the fact that the correct date of the deed of novation of receivers is 14th June 2019 and to reflect the fact that the correct date of the global deed of transfer is 14th June 2019;

(2)I will also make an order pursuant to Order 28 Rule 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (and/or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court) amending my order dated 25th October 2024 (and all other orders made by me in respect of this matter including my order of 9th March 2023) to reflect the fact that the correct date of the deed of novation of receivers is 14th June 2019 18 and the fact that the correct date of the global deed of transfer is 14th June 2019.