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[2025] IECA 307

THE COURT OF APPEAL [2025] IECA 307 Record Number: 73/2023 Bill Number: CCDP0087/2019 Kennedy J.

Burns J.

MacGrath J.

BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT -ANDM.D APPELLANT Judgment of Mr Justice MacGrath for the Court, published on the day 7th of October 2025 1.

On the 29th July 2025, the Court informed the parties that the appellant’s appeal against conviction was dismissed and that written reasons would be published in due course. These are the court’s reasons for the dismissal of the appeal.

2.

The appellant was convicted on three counts of rape of his former wife and of the sexual assault of his daughter on 24 occasions. On the 1st December 2022 the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict in respect of counts 1-27 on the indictment. He was found not guilty by direction of the trial judge on counts 29-31. These concerned allegations made by his daughter. The appellant was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 12 years and six months on each of the three rape counts, and eight years and six months on each of the sexual -2assault counts – numbers 4-27 inclusive, with the sentences to run concurrently and backdated to the 1st December 2022.

3.

The rape allegations, which are the subject of counts 1 and 2, relate to offending on a date unknown in May 2009. The appellant was convicted of one count of rape and one count of rape contrary to s. 4, which were alleged to have occurred in the sitting room of the family home. The third count relates to a rape which it was alleged occurred in the bedroom of the family home on a specific date – the 5th November 2011.

4.

Counts 4-27 concern allegations of sexual assault against the appellant’s daughter committed at various locations, including in the family home, on dates between 2004 and 2011 when the appellant’s daughter was aged between 7/8 and 12/14 years. Count 4 relates to specific offending alleged to have occurred at the home of his daughter’s maternal aunt between the 1st August 2004 and the 30th November 2024. Count 5 relates to offending alleged to have occurred in a tent at another location between the 10th September 2009 and the 9th September 2011 Counts 6-15 concern sexual assaults which are alleged to have taken place at a particular place between the 1st May 2010 and the 30th September 2011. Counts numbers 16-27 concern sample counts of sexual assault allegedly committed in the bathroom of the family home every two to three weeks, between the 10th September 2008 and the 9th September 2011.

5.

Statements of complaint were made by the appellant’s wife on the3rd May 2016 and by his daughter on the 3rd March 2017. The evidence at trial consisted of the evidence of the complainants, the interview conducted with the appellant by members of An Garda Síochána following his arrest on the 23rd May 2017 and the evidence of the appellant. Evidence was also given by a consultant psychiatrist that the appellant had been receiving treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder since 2011 following an incident at work. All allegations were denied by the appellant.

Grounds of Appeal 6.

The appeal is based on the following grounds:

1)That the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the charges on the indictment in respect of the offending alleged to have been committed by the appellant against his former wife from those charges relating to the sexual assaults on his daughter. -32) The trial judge erred in failing to accede to an application to exclude prejudicial evidence of an alleged assault by the appellant on his wife in 1995. This was not the subject of any count on the indictment and was not subject to investigation.
3)The trial judge erred in law and in fact in permitting the prosecution to put certain propositions to the accused in cross-examination which ought not to have been permitted and were clearly prejudicial to the appellant.
4)The refusal by the trial judge to give a corroboration warning, which it is contended was required in the circumstances.
5)The trial judge failed to properly charge the jury in relation to system evidence.
6)Having regard to the circumstances relating to the charge and evidence heard by the jury including inappropriate outbursts from the complainant, the trial resulted in “substantial and impeccable prejudice to the appellant’s case”, rendering it impossible for him to receive an impartial, fair and safe verdict.

7.

Grounds 5 and 6 have not been pursued.

Summary of Facts and Evidence 8.

The facts and background have been helpfully summarised by the parties in submissions. The appellant and his former wife met at a young age. They completed their respective job training in England. They lived and worked in England after qualifying. They separated at the beginning of 1994, at a time when the first complainant was unaware that she was pregnant. Their first child, a boy, was born in 1994. Following the death of the appellant’s father in June 1994, they resumed their relationship. They bought a house in England where they continued to work for some years.

The 1995 Background Evidence 9.

The facts and background to the 1995 incident have been set out in the comprehensive submissions of the appellant. In 1995, the appellant’s wife, the first complainant, discovered that she was pregnant with a second child. The appellant was unaware of the pregnancy until Christmas Eve 1995. The first complainant gave evidence that on that day, the appellant physically assaulted her. The appellant contends that this evidence was given despite the allegation not having formed part of the offending alleged in the indictment, nor was it the subject of interview with gardaí but it was nevertheless admitted as “background evidence”.

The circumstances of that incident were that the appellant had been working on Christmas -4Eve. He was due home at 9:30pm to take their son to a carol service. The jury were told by the first complainant that the appellant did not come back until 11:30pm and was intoxicated when he returned. Her evidence was that he was annoyed because the child was up and that he attacked her in her pregnant state and knocked her to the ground. She gave evidence of rolling into a ball to protect her unborn child. The jury heard that she had been kicked several times in the stomach and head, and that while she was being kicked, she continually shouted at the appellant that she was pregnant. He then stopped kicking her and went into the kitchen.

She said that she heard a drawer opening and knives rattling. She ran up the stairs, grabbed the child and barricaded herself in the bedroom. The appellant followed her and kicked the door. He hit something against the door which became embedded in it. He eventually left when he could not get into the bedroom. When she opened the door sometime later, she saw a meat cleaver buried in it. The jury heard that the appellant went away for a week and when he came back, he acted as if nothing had happened. In 1996, the second complainant, their daughter, was born, after which the first complainant went back to work.

10.

The first complainant and the appellant married two years later in 1998. She became pregnant with their third child in January 2001. She worked with an agency. The appellant worked full-time in the community. A fourth child was born in 2004. By then, the relationship had deteriorated. The appellant stopped working in June and July 2004 because of a stress related illness. Their house was put up for sale. The family returned to Ireland and stayed for a week or two at the home of the first complainant’s sister until towards the end of September 2004, when they rented a house nearby. They subsequently purchased a house in Ireland in November 2005. The appellant obtained employment where he worked between April 2005 and the summer of 2011. He was assaulted during the course of his employment.

11.

The appellant’s mother died in 2009. He travelled to England in mid-May 2009 for her cremation. Counts 1 and 2 on the indictment are concerned with an incident in the family sitting room on the night before the appellant was due to travel to the cremation. The first complainant alleges that she was vaginally raped in the sitting room. The appellant had been drinking. He grabbed her from behind, twisted her around and forced her onto the couch. He climbed on top of her, pressed his body weight down on her and notwithstanding her saying no, raped her vaginally. The evidence was that he subsequently inserted the neck of a beer bottle (from which he had been drinking) into her vagina and poured its contents into her.

She gave evidence that she was told by the appellant that “that should take care of that”, which she understood to mean that it would prevent any pregnancy. The first complainant’s -5evidence was that, as a result of that incident, she became pregnant and gave birth to their fifth child in February 2010.

12.

Count 3 relates to an allegation of rape in the marital bedroom on the 5th November 2011. The evidence was that the appellant was asleep on the couch. The complainant had gone to bed. At 1:00am she heard him approaching the bedroom. She pretended to be asleep.

He removed the blanket and lifted her nightdress. She tried to turn. Her evidence was that he grabbed her by her right arm and twisted it behind her back. She struggled to resist. He then pressed her head face down into the pillows and raped her vaginally. She told the jury that she feared that she would die and that the next thing that she remembered was waking up on the bedroom floor, bleeding from below.

13.

The appellant left the family home at the end of 2012 following the intervention of Social Services. The house was repossessed because of mortgage default. The first complainant moved with her children into rented accommodation. The appellant had some contact with the children after he left the family home but all contact ceased in 2013.

14.

As previously recounted, complaints were made by the first complainant on the 3rd May 2016.

Offending against the Second Complainant, the Appellant’s Daughter 15.

Count 4 concerns a specific count of sexual assault after the family had returned to Ireland, at the home of the second complainant’s maternal aunt, between the 1st August 2004 and the 30th November 2004. The evidence was that the appellant carried his daughter to bed. She was wearing a nightdress but was without underwear. She pretended to be asleep.

He touched her vagina for a period of 10 to 15 minutes. She said that she was seven or eight years of age at this time.

16.

Count 5 concerns offending alleged to have taken place while they were camping near the family home on a date unknown between the 10th September 2009 and the 9th September 2011. It is alleged that the appellant put his hand down her clothing and started touching and rubbing her vaginal area when she was pretending to be asleep.

17.

Counts 6-15 relate to allegations of sexual assault at a lake between the 1st May 2010 and the 30th September 2011, specific incidences when the second complainant went swimming with the appellant. Her evidence was that he would make her swim naked and fondle her breasts and vagina. -618.

Counts 16–27 are sample counts regarding sexual offending alleged to have occurred two to three times per week between the 10th September 2008 and the 9th September 2011 in the bathroom of the family home when the appellant groped the second complainant in her private areas while she was showering. Her evidence was that this occurred when she aged between 12 and 14 and ceased when she was 15, when she began locking the bathroom door.

The second complainant made her statement on the 3rd March 2017.

19.

The respondent emphasises that the evidence of both victims was that the appellant exercised strict household control, forbade socialising, was physically abusive and used physical discipline against the children. There was also evidence that the appellant threatened to kill his wife and children if they left him. The first complainant gave evidence that she believed that threat.

Ground 1: Refusal of Application to Sever the Indictment 20.

The appellant relies, inter alia, on the decision of the Supreme Court in DPP v Clement Limen [2021] IESC 8. In submissions made at trial, repeated on appeal, it is contended that the appellant was prejudiced and embarrassed in his defence by the jury potentially inferring that by reason of him facing two accusers, he had the propensity to commit such offences, giving rise to the risk of an unfair conviction.

21.

While acknowledging that the complainants shared family ties and that the complaints relate to sexual offending and feature undue control over each of the complainants, it is submitted, however, that the probative value of the cross-admissibility of the evidence of each complainant, which is derived from the inherent unlikelihood of the two complainants making similar allegations, was diminished by the fact that there were only two accusers and that the allegations were not of a similar nature, albeit they were allegations of sexual misconduct. It is submitted that the alleged offending differs in a number of significant respects and that there is an absence of striking similarities between the allegations. The character of the offending against each victim is different. There is a different familial relationship in each case. There is a difference in the ages of the victims and the locations where the offences are alleged to have been committed.

22.

The respondent argued at trial that probative value may be found in the inherent unlikelihood that several people would have made the same or similar false allegations, that similarity may add to the probative value and that the greater the similarity, the greater the probative value. In particular, the respondent submits that there was an overlap in the time -7period in which the offending took place, the offending happened either in the family home, close to the family home or, on one occasion, in a house in which the family was staying.

The offences were committed against the common background of a difficult family dynamic involving physical abuse by the appellant. It was argued at trial that there were ample common factors that would permit the jury to hear the evidence of both complainants in the trial, and for it to be instructed on the basis of circumstances under which the evidence may be treated as supportive of one or other complainant.

23.

Emphasis is placed by the appellant on the fact that there are only two accusers in this case. Reference is made to the following extract from McGrath on Evidence (3rd edn, Round Hall 2020) at para. 9-71, where the authors wrote: “As the number of accusers falls, so the level of similarity required to maintain the required level of probative force based on the unlikelihood of coincidence arises, until the point is reached where in which there are only two accusers and the similarity must be very great indeed.”

24.

The appellant also relies on the decision of this court in DPP v P.P [2022] IECA 289.

Ní Raifeartaigh J emphasised that the concepts of severance, admissibility and cross support should be kept distinct from each other. Ní Raifeartaigh J observed that “an application for severing an indictment must be grounded on the test set out in the relevant provisions of the 1924 Act…” (para. 29). It was there accepted that the issue of admissibility of the evidence of complainants in each other’s trials is relevant to the severance test, being the test under the Act of 1924, but “it is not exhaustive of, or identical with, it. For example an indictment might need to be severed simply because of the large number of complainants, rendering a trial unwieldy, even though there are no evidence-admissibility problems”. The appellant emphasises this need to distinguish cross-admissibility from that of severance. In particular, it is submitted that the trial judge erred in blurring these distinct concepts. The following passage from the trial judge’s ruling is referenced as being indicative of her overlapping the test for severance and the test for cross-admissibility and/or background evidence. The trial judge stated: “What is important is that in that case (a reference to DPP v B (L) [2015] IECA 37), the learned trial judge indicated that to have severed the indictment would have meant that the jury would not get the full picture and it might be closer to McNeill type phraseology but in any case, it’s a matter that I have regard to.” -825.

The appellant also submits that the trial judge only referred once to the provisions of the 1924 Act and at no point did she apply the “prejudice or embarrassed” standard. Thus, it is argued that the ruling was based solely on the principles set down by O’Malley J in Limen, and due regard was not had for the underlying statutory test for severance.

26.

Relying on dicta in DPP v L.N [2024] IECA 100, it is argued that although each case is fact dependent, severance is more likely to be warranted where some complaints are made in respect of children while others are made in respect of adults. It is suggested that it was appropriate to refuse severance in L.N where the complaints related to a single complainant and where there existed a particular nexus between the events which formed a pattern of abuse starting in childhood and continuing thereafter. Contrariwise, it is submitted that in this case no such nexus exists between the complaints involving a child and those involving an adult. The complaints relate to two different complainants who were separated in age by decades, and it is therefore contended that the trial judge erred in the application of the principles set down in Limen by failing to take into account sufficiently, or at all, the significantly different nature of the complainant’s allegations including, but not limited to, what the appellant maintains are “the vastly different nature of the sexual assault on a child and the violent rape of an adult”.

27.

In oral submissions, counsel for the appellant argues that the case law and jurisprudence are secondary to the legislation governing severance and he stresses that in approaching the issue of severance, it is not about the rights of the complainant, rather it must be viewed from the position of the accused; and that a presumption arises to that effect.

He submits that Limen supports the proposition that that requirement for severance is not only because of the prejudice occasioned to an accused but relates to the presumption of innocence. The severing of the indictment was necessary because of the overwhelming prejudice which arises due to non-severance. He also repeats that the trial judge blurred the issues of cross-admissibility and severance and that it was a misunderstanding to suggest that cross contamination was not part of the application to the trial judge. It is emphasised that where, as here, there only two complainants, the court must exercise great care when determining whether the indictment ought to be severed. He highlights the age difference of the complainants, the nature and frequency of the alleged offending which, it is submitted, supports the contention that the alleged offending is not of the same nature, that the allegations in respect of the second complainant are of an incestuous type.

28.

In reply, the respondent maintains that the Superior Courts have made it clear that joinder may be appropriate if the counts are part of the series of offences of a same or a -9similar character and in this context reliance is placed on dicta of Charleton J in Limen where he observed that “what is not required is that all the charges be the same, for instance rape, and nor is it specified that these occur against the same victim” (para. 12). It is submitted that this demonstrates that joinder is not limited to offences founded on the same facts or of the same character. Reliance is also placed on Charleton J’s observations that it cannot “be the case that accounts from two or more victims may only be joined where each supports the other as to detail in circumstance and method. An accused is not prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence because there is more than one witness testifying to a similar crime which forms part of the same series of events or which are of the same or similar character. Each such count must be proven” (para. 15). The respondent also submits that in L.N there was no hesitation in holding that an allegation of rape and an allegation of indecent or sexual assault are allegations of a similar nature. Ní Raifeartaigh J stated at para. 35: “The difference between them lies only in the different points of gravity they represent within the spectrum of sexual assaults. They are not qualitatively different, in the way that say, an offence of fraud and rape would be. This disposes of the suggestion that the two rapes should have been tried separately from each other…”.

29.

It is also submitted that insofar as the appellant relies on L.N in support of the contention that severance is more likely where some complaints are made in respect of children while others are in regard to adults, the outcome of L.N was that the trial judge’s refusal to sever was upheld. It is submitted that “this vague notion of greater or lesser likelihood of severance fails to demonstrate an error on the part of the trial judge ruling against severance”.

30.

It is submitted that even if this Court is satisfied that there were dissimilarities, severance was not warranted because there were also sufficient similarities. It is contended that the appellant overstates any differences and understates the similarities, because –

1)While there is a difference in age, there is no blue line rule requiring severance in such circumstances.
2)That the victims were wife and daughter of the appellant was not meaningfully different as both were members of the nuclear family of the appellant and were persons to whom he had access in that context.
3)The offences were not in fact substantially different and their gravity on the spectrum of sexual offending did not render them as such.
-10 4) Any significance attached to the dissimilarity in location is not maintainable because such suggested dissimilarity was denigrated by this Court in DPP v H.S [2023] IECA 99; and,
5)The time span is a common feature in offending of this sort. In any event, the offending against each victim overlapped in time.

31.

The respondent disagrees with the appellant’s submission that the trial judge did not sufficiently engage with the statutory test of whether the appellant would be prejudiced or embarrassed by the joinder of counts and that an analysis of the trial judge’s ruling shows that she expressly considered the test. It is submitted that the trial judge was extremely familiar with the area of the law, engaged fully with submissions and authorities and that no error arose in respect of the consideration by her of the facts or in her analysis of the law.

Contamination 32.

The appellant states that the trial judge, in her ruling, noted that the application was not being made to sever on the basis of issues of collusion or contamination. It is contended that while the issue of contamination was not the primary basis of the application to sever, the trial judge misunderstood this aspect of the application and did not give due consideration to the possibility of innocent contamination. It is therefore submitted that the trial judge erred in the application of the principles set out in Limen by her failure to take into account, adequately or at all, the possibility of innocent contamination between the complainants. In this context, counsel for the appellant submitted to the trial judge that there were two possible grounds which may suggest that innocent contamination occurred. First was that the first complainant informed the second complainant of the statement which she had made to the gardaí prior to the second complainant coming forward with her complaint. Second, it is submitted that there are reference in records obtained from Tusla to the complainants having a particularly close mother/daughter relationship.

33.

The respondent refers to the trial transcript which it is argued supports the trial judge’s interpretation of, and the basis for, the application. Counsel for the appellant stated to the judge that while the complainants were mother and daughter, he was not suggesting and did not intend to suggest to either of them that collusion was taking place. Counsel continued: “…but the possibility and it is only a theoretical possibility of unconscious contamination or unwitting contamination, following from discussions which family

-11 members might have about traumatic events, can’t be altogether discounted, but I suppose ultimately, if that were to arise in the course of the evidence it is a jury matter but I am not in a position to make any submission to the court at this stage that that’s a basis for not allowing joint trial… so, I mean, one infers from that statement of principle that a very high degree of contamination, innocent contamination, would have to be established or a very high degree of collusion would have to established where family members are involved. That seems a very high bar, if I put it like it that.

And I don’t put that forward as one of my grounds because I’m certainly not in a position to cross that bar.”

The respondent also points to the following subsequent exchange: “JUDGE: I don't think that's [counsel for the appellant’s] case really. I don't think he's suggesting that this is a matter where there is contamination to the point where it should -- that issue should allow for severance. I think he's mentioned two matters that are relatively benign and seems to -[Counsel for the Director] : Yes.

JUDGE: -- from my understanding of his submission, accept that those matters largely fall on the side of accusations by family members against a relative, that though may not be independent of each other, have been discussed but that it still has probative value in terms of the second element of what Ms Justice O'Malley talks about in paragraph D. [Counsel for the Director] Yes. Yes. And essentially that's the submission that I make.

JUDGE: Am I right about that, [Counsel for the appellant]? [Counsel for the Appellant]: Yes”.

34.

In any event, on a substantive basis the respondent maintains that consistent with dicta in Limen, it is hardly unnatural for people in a family or in a school or who otherwise know each other to “discuss a hideous experience or to form support groups or offer friendship to each other”. It is submitted that this is not contamination, nor is it an undermining of the witness’ independence. Charleton J stated in Limen, para. 34 :“If the defence wish to explore how any such understandable support might lead to an inference of mutual concoction, that is of course permissible where circumstances or specific instruction reasonably suggests this. It should only, however, undermine

-12 admissibility where any contamination is so blatant as to render the evidence unworthy of belief.”

35.

It is submitted that nothing in the evidence of either complainant, nor any evidence independent of the complainants, was identified from which the trial judge could or ought to have concluded that collusion or contamination had occurred and that by reason thereof, severance was required.

36.

On an alternative basis, the respondent maintains that as this point was not argued at trial the appellant should not now be permitted to make it on appeal (DPP v Cronin (No.2) [2006] 4 IR 329). No explanation for failing to argue this point has been advanced on this appeal. Therefore, it is submitted that this ground cannot stand.

The Ruling of the Trial Judge and Arguments on Appeal 37.

In her considered and detailed ruling on the application, the trial judge took into account the relevant authorities which had been opened to her including and in particular Limen. She addressed the areas of similarities and dissimilarity to which her attention had been drawn by both parties. Having addressed the individual allegations of the complainants in some detail, the trial judge placed reliance on the judgments of O’Malley and Charleton JJ in Limen. O’Malley J, in her consideration of DPP v B.K [2000] 2 IR 199, noted that a key feature of that case was that a number of individuals, who during their childhood had been in the care of the accused, had alleged that he abused them when opportunities presented themselves. The trial judge, when referring to this, considered it to be an important feature of the case. This was because of the similarities between both complainants.

38.

The trial judge also noted that it was apparent from the accused’s interview notes that he stated that both complainants were telling untruths and that what had been said amounted to lies. She felt that this was of significance in the context of dicta of O’Malley J in Limen regarding the relevance of such evidence where the accused simply asserts the complainant’s evidence is untrue. She noted and reiterated that where the accused is charged with multiple offences of the same nature against several individuals, some probative value may be found in the inherent unlikelihood that several people have made the same or similar false accusations. Each of the matters referred to by O’Malley J were given detailed consideration by the trial judge, including:

(1)Family ties.
-13 (2) Undue control over the complainants in light of the nature of the relationship.
(3)That many of the offences against the second complainant occurred in the family home, where the offending against the first complainant had taken place, with some other incidents occurring in a location proximate to the family home.
(4)That there was also an overlap in time relating to the offending behaviour. The trial judge considered that what was important about this timeline is the fact that during the period that the accused was allegedly raping his wife, he was also abusing his daughter. She referenced the counts in respect of which a temporal overlap existed.
(5)She considered that relevant to the issue of system was the nature of the relationship between the appellant and his wife and his daughter, his presence in the family home and its environs, and for a short time in the house of the first complainant’s sister/the second complainant’s maternal aunt. This, she described as providing the appellant with the opportunity to engage in the alleged conduct.

This was confirmed by the fact that when he left the family home on the 4th December 2012, no further incidents occurred. She described this is an important feature in light of the comments and observations of O’Malley J in the judgment in B.K.

(6)Further, the alleged offending had occurred in a family home which was full of tension, where there was a difficult family dynamic, where there were threats on the part of the accused and the use of control against the complainants, both of whom were of the same gender.

39.

The trial judge also addressed arguments concerning the suggested differences highlighted to her, including the nature of the alleged sexual offending (described as wholly different in character - that the allegations of rapes had elements of violence), that the sexual assaults occurred in four different locations and over a longer period.

40.

The trial judge had no hesitation in holding that this was a type of case envisaged by O’Malley J when she observed that where an accused was charged with multiple offences of the same nature against several individuals, some probative value may be found in the inherent unlikelihood of several people having made the same or similar false accusations and that the accusations need not be identical or strikingly similar, but must be of the same nature. She observed “similarity may add to probative value, and the greater the similarity, the greater the probative value” (para. 155). The trial judge continued:-

-14 - “Having considered, as I indicated, all of the similarities in the matter, I don’t have any difficulty in holding, as I indicated, that the probative value of this evidence far outweighs its prejudicial effect.”

41.

She noted that in DPP v T.P [2021] IECA 276, the court indicated that similarities added unity and coherence to the allegations which justified the trial judge in refusing the application for severance, and that the same could be said in this case. When referring to DPP v S.L [2020] IECA 129, she observed that the existence of dissimilarity in circumstances where there are significant similarities is not necessarily to be regarded as determinative. In particular, she placed some emphasis on dicta of O’Malley J in Limen, observing that “repeated incidents of sexual abuse by an abuser unlikely to be precisely similar in form or in nature and to expect them to be so flies in the face of common sense and, indeed, also, in the experience of the court”. Ultimately, she concluded that: “…this is entirely a case that falls within the type of case considered by Ms Justice O'Malley as being appropriate to have both complaints tried together. It is in my view a case where, as I indicated, the probative value of the evidence far outweighs its prejudicial effect. There is, in my view, sufficient similarity for me to take the view that the accusations are of the same nature to follows the words and comply with the words of Ms Justice O'Malley at paragraph 154(b) of her judgment and in the circumstances, notwithstanding the very thorough and extensive submissions by [counsel for the accused].”

Ground 1: Discussion and Analysis The Statutory Test and Applicable Principles 42.

Section 5 of the Criminal Justice (Administration) Act 1924 (“the 1924 Act”), provides:“Subject to the provisions of the rules under this Act, charges for more than one felony or for more than one misdemeanour … may be joined in the same indictment…”

Schedule 1, Rule 3 of the 1924 Act provides:-

-15 “Charges for any offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, may be joined in the same indictment if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character”.

Section 6(3) of the 1924 Act provides:“Where, before trial, or at any stage of a trial, the court is of opinion that a person accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the same indictment, or that for any other reason it is desirable to direct that the person should be tried separately for any one or more offences charged in an indictment, the court may order a separate trial of any count or counts of such indictment.”

43.

In her guidance for trial judges as to the principles applicable, O’Malley J stated as follows at paragraph 193 of Limen:“The following principles are intended as guidance to trial judges, subject at all times to the overriding requirement to ensure a fair trial: (a) A judge may in any case sever the indictment if of the opinion that it would be unfair to the accused to proceed with the indictment as drafted. (b) Where the accused is charged with multiple offences of the same nature against several individuals, some probative value may be found in the inherent unlikelihood that several people have made the same or similar false accusations. The accusations need not be identical or “strikingly similar” but must be of the same nature. However, similarity may add to the probative value, and the greater the similarity is, the greater the probative value. (c) The inherent unlikelihood of multiple false accusations, and therefore the probative value, rises in situations where the complainants are independent of each other and there is no reason to fear collusion or mutual contamination. (d) Where an application is made to sever the indictment (or, indeed, if the trial develops in such a way as to give rise to the issue), the judge will have to consider whether or not the complainants are independent of each

-16 other, and whether there are any grounds for concern that there may have been either collusion or innocent mutual contamination. This does not mean that, for example, accusations by a number of family members against a relative cannot be tried together. They may not be independent of each other and may very probably have discussed the matter together and with other family members, but there may nonetheless be probative value in the content of their various accounts.

Depending on the judge’s assessment of the situation either at the outset (based on the statements of proposed evidence), or during the trial (if the evidence raises concern) it may be necessary to either sever the indictment or give the jury an appropriately tailored warning about the possibility of collusion or contamination”.

44.

It is also clear from dicta of Charleton J in Limen that when considering the statutory test under the 1924 Act, “an accused is not prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence because there is more than one witness testifying to a similar crime which forms part of the same series of events or which are of the same or similar character”. Thus, while the admissibility of the complainants’ evidence is relevant to the severance test, it is not “exhaustive of, or identical, with it”. It is neither co-extensive nor co-terminus with the test of prejudice and embarrassment under the 1924 Act. It is, however, a relevant and an important consideration.

45.

When the arguments of the appellant are parsed and analysed into their individual components, it is clear from the authorities that when considered separately, they do not in and of themselves necessarily lead to a conclusion that the indictment ought to be severed.

Suggested dissimilarities based on gravity of offending (rape as against sexual assault) is not a basis, in and of itself, which necessarily warrants severance (L.N). Nor are differences in the ages of the complainants (adult or child (L.N)), or indeed the locations where the offending is alleged to have taken place (H.S). Nor does it necessarily follow that because the number of complainants is limited that the indictment should be severed.

46.

It is a matter for the trial judge’s discretion to determine whether the allegations are of a sufficient degree of similarity for the allegations to be tried together and to consider whether the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed by having them so tried. The decision in Limen post-dated the extract from McGrath on Evidence to which reference was

-17 made by the trial judge. Therefore, it is from dicta of Charleton and O’Malley JJ that guidance must be sought. The trial judge engaged the principles in Limen in her determination. She was satisfied that there was sufficient similarity to take the view that the accusations were of the same nature “to follow the words and comply with the words of Mr Justice O’Malley at paragraph 154 (b) of her judgment …”. She outlined the similarities which arose, as set out above at para. 38.

47.

Regarding the number of accusers, it is evident that the trial judge considered the application in the context of there being two complainants. She expressly referenced the submission of counsel regarding the number of accusers. It was clearly a factor to which she had regard. She considered T.P - which was also addressed by O’Malley J in Limen - in both of which there were only two complainants.

48.

Since the trial judge gave her ruling, this court has stated that different degrees and types of sexual offending do not necessarily provide a basis on which severance ought to be granted. The nature of the offending was sexual and we reiterate the observations of Ní Raifeartaigh J in L.N that the difference between such offending lies only in the points of gravity they represent within the spectrum of sexual assaults.

49.

With regard to the ages of the complainants, the first complainant was an adult at the time of the offending, and the second a child. While a factor to be taken into consideration, we do not accept that because one complainant was an adult at the time of the offending and the other a child, in and of itself, mandated severance of the indictment, particularly where there were otherwise strong and overwhelming features of similarity such as those identified by the trial judge. That there are differences in the ages of the complainants and their relationship with the appellant, do not, in our view, dictate that there was only one way in which the trial judge could have exercised her jurisdiction to sever the indictment in accordance with the provisions of s. 6(3) of the 1924 Act, or that she erred in the exercise of her jurisdiction on that account.

50.

While there may have been dissimilarities between the facts and allegations underpinning the charges, the fact remains that there were overwhelming similarities in relation to the nature and circumstances of the offending alleged by both complainants.

51.

We are not satisfied that it has been demonstrated that such differences as identified by the trial judge dictated that the charges ought to have been separated, or that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect such as to give rise to the risk of an unfair trial or prejudice or embarrassment to the accused in his defence by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the same indictment. We do not see any reason to

-18 disturb the trial judge’s refusal to sever the indictment, still less that the exercise by her of her discretion was such as warrants the intervention of this court on appeal.

52.

The issue of contamination has also been raised on appeal. It is not apparent that the force with which this issue is now advanced is reflected in a review of the trial transcripts.

Indeed, in her ruling, the trial judge observed that severance had not been sought on the basis of collusion. She did not express any undue concern with this although she stated that it may become a live issue to be addressed in her charge. The prosecution maintains that the appellant does not point to any particular evidence of contamination, or evidence from which the trial judge ought to have concluded that there was a risk or a possibility of contamination and that the appellant should not be entitled to advance this argument in support of his appeal, as it was not made at trial. They rely on the principles in DPP v Cronin (No.2) and submit that no explanation has been offered as to why it was not so addressed 53.

The appellant’s engagement on this point is at a somewhat high level. The submissions are based on the contentions that the first complainant may have informed the second complainant of the statement she made to the gardai prior to the second complainant coming forward, and they also refer to certain Tusla records where an entry indicates that there was a particularly close mother-daughter relationship.

54.

We reiterate the observations of Charleton J in Limen:“If the defence wish to explore how any such understandable support might lead to an inference of mutual concoction, that is of course permissible where circumstances or specific instruction reasonably suggests this. It should only, however, undermine admissibility where any contamination is so blatant as to render the evidence unworthy of belief.” (para. 34) 55.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant do not, in our view, approach a level warranting an inference of mutual concoction, or reasonable apprehension of concoction. We are not satisfied that there is a basis for intervention, even if the arguments now made are not captured by the application of the principles outlined in Cronin (No 2).

56.

We therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.

Ground 2: Refusal to Exclude Prejudicial Background Evidence Relating to the 1995 Incident

-19 - 57.

We have set out above the evidence concerning what might be termed the 1995 incident. The respondent submitted at trial that it was admissible as relevant background evidence. The appellant emphasised the prejudicial nature of this evidence and submitted that it was irrelevant and ought to have been excluded. It was argued that it concerned an isolated incident of alleged violence, occurring outside the marriage, separated in time by 13 ½ to 16 years, differed from the allegations of rape and did not feature sexual overtones. The incident was never disclosed to anyone or reported to the police.

58.

The respondent submitted that McNeill, and the caselaw relied on therein, was authority for the proposition that background evidence was admissible, even if it were to show uncharged misconduct, to demonstrate inter alia that a relationship central to the allegations involved “conditioning”, was “coercive and manipulative” or involved “grooming”. The respondent had contended at trial that the evidence was admissible because: (i) It showed the physically violent nature of the relationship between the appellant and the first complainant. (ii) In particular, it was the first incidence of physical violence in the relationship. (iii) It was indicative of the “conditioning” of the first complainant by the appellant; and (iv) It was also relevant to showing the physically abusive nature of the appellant’s relationship with the second complainant and the overall family dynamic.

59.

The respondent submitted that background evidence is not only admissible for rendering an offence intelligible or comprehensible, but inter alia, relying on the judgment of Denham J in McNeill, “to render comprehensible the relationship between the complainant and the accused”. It was contended that, absent evidence of this nature, the jury would be left wondering why, for example, the complainant did not complain or make an immediate complaint about events that happened subsequently in 2009 or 2011. It was argued that the offences charged could only be understood in the context of the broader relationship or history between the accused and the complainant.

-20 Ruling of the Trial Judge 60.

The trial judge considered the 1995 incident to be background evidence, the admission of which was necessary to make the evidence before the jury complete, comprehensible or coherent, in line with the reasoning in McNeill. In admitting the proposed evidence, the trial judge deemed it relevant and necessary to show and render comprehensible the true relationship between the parties. Despite the absence of complaint over many years, it gave a true picture of the relationship prior to the offences which were charged and she was satisfied that if this evidence was not adduced, it would create an unreal situation and lead the jury into a position where the evidence was incomplete and incomprehensible. She found that the evidence may relate to such issues such as consent or lack of complaint and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Having discussed the test in McNeill, and the facts of earlier cases from which the principles underlying the test were derived, she held that the evidence could be admitted “if it relates to issues such as consent or the absence of a complaint over many years…[and]…to give a jury a relevant picture of the parties in the time prior to the offences charged”. She referred to AG v Joyce & Walsh [1929] IR 526, an authority which had been referred to by Denham J in McNeill. In Joyce & Walsh, an incident which occurred a long time prior to the deceased meeting his death was held to be admissible.

The time lapse was relevant to the weight to be attached to it by the jury but was not sufficient to require its exclusion. She therefore ruled that she would admit the evidence and would give a very clear warning to the jury as to its purpose.

61.

The trial judge conducted a detailed analysis of the authorities. She reviewed the allegations, in particular by the first complainant, and referred to their violent aspects. She posed the following rhetorical question:“And the question is whether or not that is sufficient information to provide the jury with the real relationship that existed between the parties, and while there is no doubt that this issue of control, isolation, dominance is of course on(sic) reason why the complainant did not complain of the rapes, did not leave, there is of course another one, and that is the real fear of violence being used against her, a real fear of the capabilities of the accused, if, of course, what she says is true.”

62.

The trial judge then observed:-

-21 “…A very important feature of what [counsel for the accused] says is that it was a stand-out incident, but in my view, that, in fact, goes against [counsel for the accused]'s case, albeit very well made. Because if it's a stand-out incident, it's a stand-out incident, if true as I said, in the complainant's mind as well. It's an event that would leave a very -- significant psychological mark on a person, so that that person would ensure that they would not likely upset their partner again. And again, if true, potentially provides the jury with evidence that will enable them to understand, A, the true relationship between the parties, B, why the complainant did not complain to the authorities in relation to the rape allegations, and C, why, notwithstanding the fact that her children were being spanked, sometimes didn't have food and she was being treated in a miserable way, she did not leave. … So, No. 1, it is relevant to the offence charged; the consideration of the background evidence is, in my view, necessary to make the evidence before the jury complete, comprehensible or coherent. Without the background evidence, the evidence would be incomplete, incomprehensible or incoherent.

This Court considers that consideration of the commission of an offence with which the accused is not charged is not in and of itself a ground for excluding the evidence, and this Court takes the view that this evidence may be necessary -- or sorry, is necessary, rather, to show the real relationship between the relevant persons. In my view, the evidence is relevant and it is necessary, and in my view, is that this evidence -- the probative value of this evidence far outweighs its prejudicial effect. I will, of course, give a very clear warning to the jury to explain the purpose for which the evidence is received… ”.

Submissions on Appeal 63.

The appellant disputes the trial judge’s reasoning and submits that the threshold for admissibility of misconduct evidence in McNeill has not been reached. It is also disputed by the appellant that the jury would be given a false or misleading impression by hearing only about the events on the indictment. It is also argued that it could not plausibly be contended that it was necessary to admit the evidence to give the jury a general picture about the

-22 characters involved and the run up to the alleged offence. It is strongly argued that the proposed evidence was neither connected in time, place or circumstances to the facts alleged and that it was not necessary. Adducing evidence of an altogether different nature to the allegations to be tried, occurring many years earlier, in an entirely different familial, marital and geographic backdrop, did not establish “the true relationship between the parties…why the complainant did not complain to the authorities in relation to the rape allegations [nor] why…she did not leave”. It is submitted that this alleged prior incident of misconduct does not fall within the grounds defined in McNeill for admission of background evidence.

64.

In oral arguments counsel for the appellant submits that the admission of such evidence is of great concern. He accepts that background evidence is often given as a matter of fact, and that while he might be on less sure ground if there had been a count in respect of the 1995 incident on the indictment, there would not have been a contextual vacuum if the evidence of the 1995 incident had been left out. In this context, he points to the serious and ongoing nature of the allegations otherwise made and that this is not a case where the omission of the 1995 incident would have resulted in an evidential vacuum. He contends that the prejudicial effect of admitting this background evidence was so great that severance ought to have been granted and that the threshold in McNeill has not been met. He further submits that it does not amount to background evidence to explain delay.

65.

In reply, the respondent maintains the position taken at trial and relies on dicta of O’Donnell J (as he then was) in McNeill regarding admissibility of evidence of previous bad character. This is discussed below. It is submitted that the evidence was relevant and necessary and that it fits neatly within the parameters laid down in McNeill for the admissibility of background evidence notwithstanding that it revealed the bad character of the appellant. In particular, the following are highlighted and repeated:(a) That the evidence was necessary to show the real relationship between the parties. (b) That it was relevant to the lack of complaint by the victim over a number of years and necessary to render this comprehensible. (c) The jury would have been given an incomplete picture without it. (d) The jury would have been given an incomprehensible picture without it, or at least, one that could not accurately be comprehended. (e) It was not being admitted to show that, by reason of having done the earlier act, the appellant must be the type of person to commit the charged acts. Given the facts, such a construction would be implausible.

-23 - 66.

The respondent disputes the appellant’s arguments based on the passage of time between the 1995 incident and rape offences and also disputes the argument that it could not be relevant to the relationship between the parties at the relevant time. It is argued that while the incident may have been in the past, such an event would have an enduring psychological effect on its victim; “[t]hat a woman being subjected to a brutal assault at the hands of her partner would indelibly stain their relationship is, it is submitted, a common-sense proposition. It plainly would be capable of influencing whether a victim of rape, as in this case, might be reluctant to come forward, fearing what she knew her partner was capable of”. It is submitted that the trial judge, in recognising the enduring psychological effect on the victim of such an incident, properly identified this as a relevant factor in admitting the evidence. It is also submitted that the trial judge’s ruling was carefully considered. She was cognisant of the authorities and correctly applied them in exercising her discretion to admit the evidence. The trial judge had also clearly charged the jury that they could not infer from this evidence that the appellant was the type of person to commit rape. She explained the purpose for which the jury heard the evidence, namely, to understand the true relationship between the parties. In so doing, it is submitted that the trial judge did not err in fact or in law. The evidence, it is argued, was not admitted for the impermissible purpose of proving guilt by demonstrating the appellant’s propensity to commit offences such as those charged and that in this case, even more so than in McNeill, the jury could not so conclude from the evidence.

Ground 2 - Discussion and Analysis 67.

In McNeill, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial judge to admit background evidence on the basis that it was relevant and necessary to explain the relationship between the complainant and the appellant and rendered the complainant’s actions comprehensible. Denham J stated that “[t]he test to be applied by the court is whether the background evidence is relevant and necessary. The test is not that it would merely be helpful to the prosecution to admit the evidence” (para. 50). She considered the meaning of background evidence as follows at paras. 48-49:““Background evidence”, in the context under consideration, has a specific meaning. It is evidence which is relevant and necessary to a fact to be determined by the jury. It may be admitted to render comprehensible the relationship

-24 between the complainant and the accused. Thus it may relate to such issues as consent, or the absence of a complaint over many years. These examples are not exhaustive of the circumstances where background evidence may be admitted.

In such circumstances, even if the “background evidence” is of alleged criminal acts not charged on the indictment, such background evidence is not inadmissible and it should not be excluded as such.

Background evidence may be admitted to give a jury a relevant picture of the parties in the time prior to the offences charged. Background evidence may be admitted because if it were not admitted it would create an unreal situation. It arises in situations where if no background evidence was admitted, the evidence before the jury would be incomplete or incomprehensible. Background evidence is evidence which is so closely and inextricably linked to the alleged offences and/or the relations between the relevant persons so as to form part of the body of evidence to render it coherent and comprehensible.

Whether or not background evidence is to be admitted is a matter to be determined by the trial judge in all the circumstances of the case. The fact that the evidence tends to show the commission of other crimes does not render it admissible. The test to be applied is that of relevancy and necessity.”

As pointed out by the parties in their submissions, she added that “[i]n considering whether background evidence may be admitted, relevant considerations may include:i) Consideration of whether the background evidence is relevant to the offence charged.

ii)Consideration of whether background evidence is necessary to make the evidence before the jury complete, comprehensible, or coherent. Whether without such background evidence the evidence may be incomplete, incomprehensible or incoherent. iii) Consideration of evidence of the commission of an offence with which the accused is not charged, but that is not of itself a ground for excluding the evidence.
iv)Consideration of whether the background evidence may be necessary to show the real relationship between relevant persons.”
-25 - 68.

O’Donnell J, in his concurring judgment, observed that “the true position is that set out as long ago as 1894 in the landmark speech of Lord Herschell in Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales [1894] A.C. That decision established that evidence of previous bad character is inadmissible if introduced for a particular purpose; that of showing that such bad character alone makes it likely that the accused committed the offence for which he is tried” (para. 9). He continued, at paras. 10-13:“In any case, evidence which tends to show bad character on the part of the accused may nevertheless be adduced in a trial if it is adduced not for the purpose of proving guilt by propensity but rather for the purposes of tending to prove something that is an issue in the case. It follows that where such evidence is admitted, the jury should be informed as to the true purpose for which such evidence is admitted and warned of the danger of treating evidence of previous wrongdoing as itself proof of the wrongdoing charged. … It is clear that the evidence here is not being sought to be adduced for the purposes of inviting a jury to consider that the appellant was guilty of the offences charged because of a predisposition to commit such offences alleged to be shown by the evidence of other acts of indecent assault in respect of the complainant. Indeed it is hard to see how the jury could come to such a conclusion.”

69.

The respondent, in written submissions, when addressing the facts in McNeill, referred to Denham J’s acceptance that evidence of the appellant’s “grooming” and “abusive demands” of the victim were “all relevant to understanding the relationship between the complainant and the appellant when the offences charged where committed”, were “part of the relevant picture” without which the account would be “incomplete”, and that the nature of the relationship between the parties was key evidence “to render the actions of the appellant and the reactions of the complainant comprehensible and may be relevant to issues of consent and/or the absence of complaints over the years”. The respondent also refers to this passage where Denham J continued: “It is for a trial judge to decide whether or not to allow the admission of background evidence. In making that decision the trial judge has to determine whether such

-26 evidence is relevant and necessary to a fact upon which the jury is required to determine. For example, it may relate to the relationship of a complainant and an accused at the time of the commission of the crime(s) as charged on the indictment.

It may be relevant and necessary to explain the action or inaction of a complainant in the circumstances.” (para. 56) In his concurring judgment, O’Donnell J stated at paras. 17-18: “A jury might naturally wonder how it was that incidents had only occurred on, say, eight separate occasions over a protracted period, and why no complaint was made by the girl, why it was she still went to the barn or the church as the case may be, and yet on only these eight occasions. This process of reasoning could lead to a jury entertaining doubts as to the credibility of the complainant which would be derived from the fact that the evidence had been straitjacketed in ease of the accused. It is true that the evidence could be said to be relevant to issues which appeared to be live in the case, at least at the time the application in respect of the evidence was made, such as the absence of contemporaneous complaint by the complainant or some suggestion of consent contained in the accused’s statements, but it was also relevant by way of background.

A good example of the admission of such background evidence occurred in this case, without complaint, in a separate context. The complainant had sought to explain the fact that she had not complained of the sexual abuse earlier because she said she was in fear of the accused. She gave evidence that an incident had occurred in which the trough in the family farm had been vandalised and which she believed had been carried out by the accused because she said he had threatened her that if she disclosed the abuse he would do something to her family… The evidence was properly admitted because it was considered part of the background story and went to explain why the victim had not complained at any stage during her ordeal.

However, in my view, the same explanation applies to evidence of the other acts of sexual assault not covered by a charge in the indictment. It too is part of the overall story and goes to explain why the victim did not complain earlier.”

70.

The purpose for which background evidence is sought to be admitted is all important.

The background evidence, in our view, assisted in the explanation of the relationship

-27 between the parties as being one of fear and control which provided a background to the offending. If that evidence had not been admitted then the jury may have been left with the false impression of an apparently normal relationship and that, without necessary context, the incidents alleged at counts 1 and 2 occurred. We do not find any reason to disagree with the trial judge’s assessment of the psychological effect of such an incident on the first complainant, and the consequences of that psychological impact. We agree with the submission of the respondent that it is a commonsense proposition that a woman being subjected a brutal assault at the hands of her partner, married or not, fundamentally alters the relationship and we see no reason to disagree with the trial judge’s assessment that what was alleged to have occurred in respect of the 1995 incident shows an environment which may reasonably lead to a reluctance to come forward and make a complaint. The reasoning and ruling of the trial judge was comprehensive, not only in her review of the law but also of the facts. No issue is raised in relation to the trial judge’s charge to the jury on this aspect of the evidence.

71.

To the extent that it is contended by counsel for the appellant that there was ample other evidence, and that this evidence was unnecessary, we are persuaded by the response of counsel for the respondent that as the first significant incident in which violence was alleged, the 1995 incident set the tone for the relationship, despite evidence of the first complainant’s ultimatum that she would leave and their subsequent marriage.

72.

We are not satisfied that any error has been identified in respect of the trial judge’s consideration of the evidence, her consideration of the law or her application of the law to the facts warranting intervention.

73.

We therefore reject this ground of appeal.

Ground 3: Propositions Put to the Accused in Cross-Examination 74.

The appellant was cross-examined by counsel for the prosecution. Aspects of counsel’s cross-examination related to a notebook in the appellant’s possession. The questioning concerned the circumstances in which the notebook came into existence and that fact that the appellant had it with him in the witness box when giving evidence. It is submitted by the appellant that the trial judge failed to intervene to restrict or prevent a line of crossexamination relating to that notebook. An exchange which is took place on Day 14 of the trial is highlighted:

-28 “Q.

And what about looking down during your evidence, are you looking at anything in particular?

A.

No.

Q.

Are you flicking through pages?

A.

I have been today, yes.

Q.

And what pages are you flicking through?

A.

I'm flicking through some notes that I had made as the trial had gone on.

Q.

I see?

A.

Is that not permitted.

Q.

Can I have a look at the notes that you're reading in the witness box?

Are you suggesting to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that you didn't know that you couldn't bring notes, it's essentially about a third of this spiral notebook full of notes; isn't that correct?

A.

I'm not sure it's as full as that, but with regards to your initial question, yes, I'm absolutely stating I didn't know I could do that.

Q.

And yet you've been flicking through notes, handwritten notes, are they handwritten by you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've been flicking through those notes when I've been asking you questions, and you've been giving your answers; isn't that correct?

A.

No disrespect was in any way meant and I have already answered your question. I did not know that was not permitted. My apologies, Judge.

Q.

Can I suggest to you that the numerous occasions that you got into the box before everyone was assembled so that no one would see you bringing those notes into the witness box?

A.

The notes in question which you are going through presently today is the first and only time that I have brought anything up to the witness box, other than a pen, a highlighter and my phone.

Q.

I'm going to suggest to you that that is not the case, are you telling me that on what you anticipate is the last day of your cross-examination that that's the first occasion in which despite you not knowing, as you say, that it was improper to bring notes in with you, that it was the first time in over a week of giving evidence that you brought this notebook into the box?

-29 A.

I actually expected we might finish yesterday, but okay.

Q.

So, you waited until the day that you thought that you wouldn't be giving evidence to bring your notes into the box?

A.

To be perfectly honest [counsel for the prosecution] you're putting far more import on it that I gave it any credence to whatsoever, but again, I have extended my apologies, I'm not really sure what more I can say.

Q.

Very first entry. "[the first complainant] states that I alone made the decision to move home. We visited [the first complainant’s] family earlier in 2004 as her father was ill, we stayed with her sister [name redacted] They're your notes in answer to 2004; is that correct?

A.

They're the notes that I made as the days were going on, yes.

Q.

Well, as what days were going on? As what days?

A.

The trial, [counsel for the prosecution].” (Emphasis supplied in the appellant’s submissions) 75.

In addressing this exchange in the absence of the jury, then trial judge ruled, inter alia, as follows: “Witnesses are not entitled to bring documentation into a witness box with them and if that rule was not explained to [the accused], that is a concern, it is a concern that nobody saw him going into the witness box with the documents, but the question is now what comes of it? [the accused] has accepted that he had a document in the witness box with him. The jury now know him. It can be made clear to the jury that for very good legal reasons witnesses must give their evidence viva voce and they must do so without aids and [counsel for the prosecution] is right to make that clear to the jury, but [the accused’s] evidence is that he didn't know and was never advised that it was inappropriate to bring documents into the witness box. And there doesn't appear to be anything to dispute that or refute that, so he should be -- that is the evidence that the jury has, and it is not refuted, and they will bear that in mind I have no doubt. Whether anything further comes of this is another matter and in order to determine whether anything further comes of it is important that both counsel, both legal teams have an opportunity of reviewing the document.”

-30 76.

Another issue which has been raise concerns privilege, and the waiver thereof. This arose in the context of the following exchange, also on Day 14:“A.

Okay, thank you, Judge. The specific issues around me washing my daughter's back had been put to me previously by my legal team -[Counsel for the prosecution]: Let him finish, he's asking. [Counsel for the accused]:

Well, I'd concerned [the accused] wouldn't appreciate that communications between a lawyer and a client are privileged.

A.

Okay.

JUDGE: If he wishes to waive privilege he can, [counsel for the accused]…you have privilege as between yourself and your legal team, so you do not have to disclose any conversations that you had with [your counsel] or any member of your legal team. And once you are advised of that right which is my duty to advise you of that right, you are entitled to waive that entitlement and you can discuss or disclose any conversation that you've had with your legal team. But it's entirely a matter for you.

A. Thank you. Part of a conversation that I had with my legal team was around how difficult and incredulous the jury would find my trying to assert that I literally washed my daughter's back and nothing else. And despite that I am trying to get across to you, ladies and gentlemen, that I washed my daughter's back and nothing else.” (Emphasis supplied) 77.

The appellant also places emphasis on an exchange which took place during his continued cross-examination on the following day:“Q. [M.D], you had a notebook before you yesterday, and you permitted me to have a look at it; do you recall that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you still have the notebook?

A.

I do not.

Q.

Very good. I don't mean, do you still have the notebook in the box with you, do you have the notebook in court?

A.

It's in my bag in my possession, yes.

Q.

In your bag. And I'm not trying to trick you in relation to any aspect of this, a copy had been made of the notebook and we have taken the liberty of

-31 putting page numbers on it for ease of reference, so a copy of that might be provided to the witness, I've given copies to [your counsel] and there are further copies available.

A.

78.

Thank you.

An objection made by counsel for the appellant was upheld by the trial judge. This line of questioning was described by her as bordering on speculation.

Submissions on Appeal 79.

The appellant raises no issue with the trial judge’s ruling that it was inappropriate for the appellant to have his notes in the witness box, nor that cross-examination in respect of the notes was impermissible. It is submitted nevertheless that the trial judge erred in permitting counsel for the respondent to suggest in cross-examination that the appellant had tried to conceal his notebook and/or that he had lied in stating that he had only done so once.

It is contended that these propositions were prejudicial in that they made the appellant out to be a dishonest and/or unreliable witness, despite the fact that the appellant had given his apologies and explained that he was unaware that the notes were prohibited.

80.

The appellant relies on People (DPP) v Piotrowski [2014] IECCA 17 where it was held that that trial judges have greater discretion to intervene to ensure relevance of a line of questioning in cross-examination in respect of a topic which goes only to the credibility of a witness. Para 8.3 is highlighted in this regard: “…it is also true that the trial judge has an important role in ensuring that the case is confined to questions which are at least of sufficient relevance to the issues which the jury has to decide to make their pursuit material. If the issues being pursued by cross-examination are directly relevant to the facts of the case in the sense of the facts which are alleged to constitute the offence charged or the guilt of the accused in respect of that offence, then wide latitude must be allowed. Where the issues raised simply go to general credibility not directly connected with the offence but connected with matters which may have some indirect bearing on the credibility of witnesses in relation to the offence, then it seems to this Court that the trial judge is entitled to exercise a greater degree of control over the extent to which such issues can be pursued.”

-32 81.

Counsel also refers to People (DPP) v Cull (1980) 2 Frewen 36 where the former Court of Criminal Appeal stated at page 40:“[T]he Court should be alert to prevent the course of cross-examination being used in a manner inconsistent with the presumption of innocence or being abused by the introduction of prejudicial matter neither relevant not pertinent to the issue for trial”

82.

On this basis, it is contended that the trial judge should have intervened in cross- examination as soon as it was revealed that the appellant had a notebook and that he did not know that it was impermissible to do so, and that she should have been live to the issue that any further pursuit of this line of questioning served only to prejudice the appellant in a manner which was entirely irrelevant to the offences being tried. It is argued that the crossexamination should not have been allowed as to the contents of the notebook in circumstances where the notebook was not an exhibit in the trial. It is also submitted that the position as to the notebook should have been clarified prior to the commencement of cross-examination on Day 15 of the trial and that a ruling should have been delivered by the trial judge as to the permissibility of such a line of questioning prior to such questioning occurring before the jury.

83.

Additionally it is submitted that it was inappropriate to allow the appellant to waive his right to legal professional privilege in the course of a lively cross-examination without prior advice from his legal team, and that this failure prevented the appellant from receiving appropriate legal advice in the interests of a fair trial.

84.

The respondent argues that while the appellant now contends that the trial judge erred in allowing counsel for the respondent to suggest in cross-examination that the appellant had tried to conceal his notebook and/or that he had lied in stating that he had only done so once, at trial, however, counsel for the appellant, in objecting to a continued cross-examination of the appellant on the following day, stated “I allowed, without objection, [counsel for the prosecution] cross-examine to some degree before I intervened, on the cross-examine [sic.] on the notebook, in a robust style, if I might put it like that”.

85.

It is submitted that nothing capable of prejudicing the appellant before the jury was said before objection was raised. Insofar as the appellant sought a ruling from the trial judge, which was successful, it was to prevent a continued cross-examination on the notebook.

-33 86.

It is also contended that the appellant seeks to litigate an issue that was not raised at trial and that at no point was an application made to discharge the jury arising from the crossexamination that took place without objection. It is submitted that, if the cross-examination that was conducted was in fact incorrect and prejudicial, counsel for the appellant would have objected to it and/or applied to have the jury discharged. Not only was this not done, but counsel for the appellant accepted that he had acquiesced to the cross-examination that had proceeded without objection. It is submitted that this demonstrates that counsel for the appellant was alive to the cross-examination that did occur and did not consider it improper, prejudicial, or a risk to his client’s fair trial rights; and that no challenge is made regarding the appellant’s legal representation at trial. Reliance is placed on DPP v Cronin (No. 2). It is pointed out that the appellant has failed to explain why no such application was made at trial, that he ought to be precluded from advancing this ground of appeal, and that the issues complained of are not such as to give rise to a concern that a real injustice has occurred.

87.

It is submitted that the trial judge did not offend the principles referred to in Piotrowski.

The appellant impermissibly brought notes with him to the witness box and the jury were entitled to know of the circumstances in which this occurred. It is also submitted that the respondent is “a stranger” to the submission that the counsel for the prosecution was allowed to put certain propositions to the appellant “that were clearly incorrect”. The trial judge ruled that there was nothing to dispute or refute the appellant’s claim that he was unaware of the impropriety of his actions and accepted that explanation. It is contended that this is not the same as the argument now advanced that the trial judge allowed prejudicial, “clearly incorrect”, propositions to be put to the witness by the respondent and that such submissions are misconceived. It is further suggested that the appellant, in written submissions, has gone beyond the parameters of this ground of appeal, and that, without seeking or obtaining the leave of this court, he purports to introduce a new ground relating to the waiver of privilege.

It is submitted that this ought to be viewed in the context of the lead-up to that exchange where the following was said:“[Counsel for the prosecution]: You said, "I want to clarify that it was just [the second complainant]'s back I washed in the shower"; isn't that correct? [The accused]: Yes. While we are clarifying, if I may? Or can I not?

JUDGE: Yes.”

-34 It is contended the trial judge did not err and fairly explained the appellant’s rights, including that of legal advice privilege and that he could choose to maintain or waive it. This was a matter “entirely for [him]”. He chose to waive it and neither he nor his counsel sought time to consider this waiver. It is argued that the trial judge acted appropriately at all times in this regard. Further, it is contended that no prejudice can be shown.

Ground 3 – Discussion and Analysis 88.

As recorded above, no issue is raised by the appellant regarding the trial judge’s ruling on the inappropriateness of the appellant having notes in the witness box. The appeal is centred on the suggested prejudice to the appellant by reason of the issue of the notebook being ventilated before the jury through the line of questioning adopted. It is contended, in particular, that the trial judge erred in permitting counsel for the prosecution to suggest in cross-examination that the appellant had tried to conceal his notebook and/or that he had lied in stating that he had only done so once. In his submissions in the voir dire, counsel for the appellant accepted while it may have been correct for counsel for the prosecution to point out that the appellant should not have the notebook with him in the witness box, that was the extent of what was permissible. He protested that a much broader impression was being created that the appellant was behaving in some wholly improper way by taking notes and making notes, and he submitted that that should not be allowed to stand.

89.

While it appears to us that this line of questioning pursued by counsel for the prosecution might be said to have been somewhat overenthusiastic, we cannot agree that the accused was prejudiced to the extent that it was an error on the part of the trial judge not to intervene at an earlier time and prior to counsel for the respondent’s intervention. The appellant explained that he had made the notes during the trial, and that he was “flicking through some notes”. He asked whether that was permitted and was “absolutely stating that he did not know that he could do that”. Counsel for the prosecution suggested to him that on the numerous occasions he got into the witness box “before everyone was assembled”, so that he would not be seen bringing them in. He replied that this was the first and only time that he had brought anything to the witness box, other than a pen, a highlighter and his phone.

He stated that she was “putting far more import on it that [he] gave it any credence to whatsoever”. Counsel then asked a limited number of questions arising from extracts from those notes, at which point counsel for the appellant intervened and a voir dire took place.

-35 90.

The notebook was revisited with the appellant on the following day. A copy of the notebook had been made and page numbers were inserted for ease of reference. It was at that point that objection was raised. The trial judge stated that while there was a fine line between inference and speculation, she feared that counsel for the prosecution was inviting the court and the jury to engage in speculation that the appellant had used the notebook entries for the purposes of triggering his answers. She upheld the objection. That, it seems to us, was the end of the matter. We do not see that the counsel for the respondent’s questions prior to counsel for the appellant’s intervention which were limited and exploratory, were such as to give rise to the prejudice suggested warranting this court’s intervention.

91.

The trial judge addressed this issue in her charge as follows:“There was time during the case where there was a suggestion of notes in the witness box. There is a general rule in these courtrooms that witnesses do not take or do not use anything in the witness box, unless it is the exhibits that are in the case. And that is an important rule because the evidence that is given on whatever side, should be a free and flowing narrative. It shouldn't be prompted or influenced by anything. Because then, it is difficult to test it and challenge it.

So if it's prompted and influenced by anything, it's not coming freely.

Now in this case there was a notepad, it would seem - and I am explaining the general rule to you - that there didn't appear to be anything of any note utilised from the notepad, save from the suggestion from [the accused] himself, that he used the distance between [place] and [place. I think, and that was the height of it.

So that is something that you have heard. I am explaining the rule. A matter for you entirely, but it may well be the case that there is not much that you need to be concerned about in that regard. As I said, the height of the use of notes is the evidence that you have heard, which is that he used it to for the purposes of assessing the kilometres. And again, we have to, and always will, judge the case on the evidence that is presented to us. ….

And I think the final matter that I omitted to tell you and I meant to tell you, is that when I was dealing with the issue of the notes in the witness box, I meant to say to you that [the accused] had said that he didn't realise that there was this

-36 rule, and that is understandable in circumstances where a person without legal training would perhaps not know that there is a rule that you cannot take documents into the witness box with you, and his legal team have not disputed that. So that is something just to take into account as well in assessing that aspect of the trial.

The trial judge later noted:“ In relation to the use of notes, he said that he has notes, observations, some made in court, some on the train down, they were not meant to assist him in making points whatsoever. But he had his notes in front of him. …. He had made notes, but it was not with the intention of preparing evidence.

He explained…that he had referred in evidence to [the first complainant] being more isolated in [England] and he gave evidence of the distance from [town name redacted] to [town name redacted], and that was his only reference to the notes.”

92.

It has been suggested by the respondent that in submissions, on the second day on which this issue arose, counsel for the appellant allowed cross-examination to some degree before he intervened. We should observe that trials are, of their nature, dynamic. There is no suggestion that counsel for the appellant was aware that this issue would be re-canvassed or that his client was in possession of a notebook in the witness box on that day. We cannot accept that any momentary delay in intervention by counsel for the appellant is sufficient to engage the Cronin principles. We note, however, that no application was made to discharge the jury, properly so, because in our view, given the manner in which the trial proceeded, the discharge of the jury would not have been warranted. Any issue which may have remained was more than adequately dealt with by the trial judge in her charge and we are not satisfied that this ground of appeal has been made out.

93.

Finally, the appellant contends that it was inappropriate to permit the appellant to waive his right to legal professional privilege in cross-examination without prior advice from his legal team, a failure which prevented the appellant from receiving appropriate legal advice in the interests of a fair trial. The respondent objects to this being agitated on this appeal, as it was not a matter raised in the grounds of appeal. Ground 3, which is reproduced above, addresses alleged errors on the part of the trial judge in permitting the prosecution to put certain propositions to the accused in cross-examination. On the face of it, what is now

-37 argued goes beyond the stated ground of appeal. Nevertheless, it is obvious from a review of the transcript that counsel for the appellant expressed his concern that the appellant would not appreciate that communications between a lawyer and the client attract privilege. The trial judge stated that if the appellant wished to waive privilege he could, and she explained that privilege to him. She also stated that once she had advised him of that right, he was entitled to waive that entitlement and that he could discuss or disclose any conversation that he had with his legal team, but that was entirely a matter for him. He then answered the question. He said that part of the conversation he had with his legal team was around how difficult and incredulous the jury would find his trying to assert that he literally washed his daughters back and nothing else, and he reemphasised that to the jury.

94.

It is evident that the appellant was made aware of his right to legal professional privilege. Again, it is not apparent from the transcript that any significant issue was made of the contested exchange beyond what has been stated above. No application was made by the appellant or by his legal team to discuss matters and we think that in the particular circumstances which emerged, it would be going too far to suggest that the trial judge ought to have stopped the trial and informed the appellant that he should speak to his legal team before he answered any further questions. Thus, while we are not satisfied that this argument falls within Ground 3, we do not believe that there is, in fact, substance to it. If it had been a serious matter, then one would have anticipated further intervention and application by his counsel but, again, we do not believe that there would have been a basis for such intervention or indeed one which would have warranted the trial being stopped.

95.

In those circumstances, we are satisfied that this ground of appeal has not been made out.

Ground 4 – Refusal of Application for a Corroboration Warning 96.

Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 provides as follows: “(1) Subject to any enactment relating to the corroboration of evidence in criminal proceedings, where at the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence of a sexual nature evidence is given by the person in relation to whom the offence is alleged to have been committed and, by reason only of the nature of the charge, there would, but for this section, be a requirement that the jury be given a warning about the danger of convicting the person on the

-38 uncorroborated evidence of that other person, it shall be for the judge to decide in his discretion, having regard to all the evidence given, whether the jury should be given the warning; and accordingly any rule of law or practice by virtue of which there is such a requirement as aforesaid is hereby abolished.”

97.

Counsel for the appellant applied to the trial judge to give a warning due to the lack of corroboration of the allegations made by either of the complainants, and because of (a) significant delay which, it was submitted, prevented independent corroboration and (b) the presence of inconsistencies between the evidence of each complainant. The inconsistencies are said to include: (i) Whether the appellant was working during a certain period when living in the west of Ireland; (ii) The family dynamic while living in the west of Ireland; (iii) The nature of the farmwork which the first complainant was made to carry out; (iv) Whether the farm’s wheelbarrow was missing a tyre or wheel; (v) Whether friends and neighbours of the appellant’s family visited the farm; (vi) Whether the first complainant blamed the second complainant for the appellant leaving the family home in November 2012; and (vii) Whether the relationship between the appellant and the first complainant was physically abusive.

98.

Reliance was placed on DPP v Wooldridge [2018] IECA 135 and DPP v Richard O’Mara [2021] IECA 243 by counsel for the respondent in resisting the application. It was submitted that the inconsistencies were not special or peculiar and, as such, a corroboration warning was not mandated.

99.

The trial judge refused the application to give the warning and her ruling is considered in more detail below.

Submissions on Appeal 100. Counsel for the appellant refers to the principles regarding warnings, summarised by Hedigan J in Woolridge: “(a.) The express legislative provision for the abolition of the mandatory warning must not be circumvented by trial judges simply adopting a prudent or

-39 cautious approach of giving the warning in every case where there is no corroboration or where the evidence might not amount, in the view of the trial judge, to corroboration. To do that would be to circumvent the clear policy of the legislature and that the courts are not entitled to do. (b.) The question of whether the jury should be warned about the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant is a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. The appeal court should not intervene unless it appears that the decision was made upon an incorrect legal basis or was clearly wrong in fact. (c.) The fact that there is a conflict of evidence between witnesses or between what one witness said on one occasion or on another occasion does not mean that a trial judge was required to direct the jury on the dangers of convicting on uncorroborated evidence. This remains a matter for the judge's discretion. (d.) It is not a requirement that the trial judge must always give a reasoned ruling where a corroboration warning is requested. In most instances, the arguments for and against a warning will be obvious to all concerned. There is no requirement that where the judge exercises the discretion by refusing to give a warning it must be by reference to detailed, specific and analytical reasons mentioning the evidence in the case. (e.) It is appropriate that it should be left to the unfettered judgement of the jury to decide where the truth lay. There must be something special or peculiar in the evidence which could give rise to the danger of convicting the person on the uncorroborated evidence of that other person before a warning is required.”

Reference is also made to dicta of Ní Raifeartaigh J in O’Mara.

101.

It is submitted that it could not be said that the giving of a corroboration warning was not required or would simply have been performed as a matter of routine. It is contended that the cumulative effect of the number of inconsistencies in the complainants’ evidence, when coupled with significant delay, constitutes “something special or peculiar’. Thus, it is submitted that even if each inconsistency could be given a plausible explanation in hindsight, the judge failed to give due weight to the number of inconsistencies, their importance and

-40 their cumulative effect, particularly in the context of the significant delay. It is also submitted that while that trial judge noted the delay in the making of complaints, she interpreted the application for a warning as being primarily based on inconsistencies between the complainant’s evidence.

102.

In reply, the respondent states that prior to refusing to a corroboration warning, the trial judge carefully reviewed the authorities and considered the inconsistencies relied on in support of the application. Having done so, she concluded that the inconsistencies were “part and parcel of every trial” and it is submitted that she was correct in reaching this conclusion.

103.

The respondent relies on O’Mara, where this court observed that given the non- mandatory nature of the corroboration warning, there must be “something in a particular case that warrants it being given… to the extent that a failure to do so would amount to an error of law which requires intervention by an appellate court (“incorrect legal basis or clearly wrong in fact”; DPP v. Ferris)”.

104.It is submitted by the respondent that the delay in this case, and the inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainants, even when taken together, come nowhere near the level of gravity required to amount to “something special and peculiar” requiring the trial judge to exercise her discretion in favour of a corroboration warning. It is contended that the inconsistencies concerned collateral matters and the memories of an adult and a child at the relevant times. Reliance is also placed on dicta in O’Mara, in which this court held that there was no error in refusing a corroboration warning even in circumstances where there were: “…discrepancies between a complainant’s statement and her oral evidence, or as between her evidence and that of other witnesses (such as, here, the appellant’s mother)…even when combined with the delay in making complaint to the Gardaí (and the absence of the clothing worn at the time of the alleged rape thereby caused)”.
105.Counsel for the respondent also relies on DPP v DC [2019] IECA 367, which concerned sexual offending, and in which there was delay. It was there stated that:“…the decision as to whether or not a corroboration warning ought to have been given or the terms of it are matters for the discretion of the trial judge, and this court has repeatedly stressed this fact; such a discretion being dependent upon the view formed by the trial judge on consideration of the entirety of the
-41 evidence. The trial judge, as we have previously said, is in a far better position than this court to make a judgement as to whether or not such a warning ought to be given or, if so, its terms. It is appropriate to stress again, however, that a judge must exercise care when determining whether or not a warning should be given, and if so in what terms, having regard to the abolition of the rule that a warning was essential. The giving of such a warning should not be something that occurs as a matter of course if the law is to be properly applied.” (para.
272)106. Reference is also made to DPP v Garvey [2018] IECA 280, where it was held that the appellate court ought to be slow to intervene with the decision of a trial judge not to give a corroboration warning, and should only do so only if the decision is made on an incorrect legal basis or was clearly wrong in fact.
107.It is further submitted by the respondent that the trial judge had a broad discretion in respect of making this decision. This discretion was exercised appropriately. It is submitted that this ground of appeal should be rejected.

Ground 4 - Discussion and Analysis 108. The appellant contends that a warning was required in this case because of inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainants, because of delay and/or a combination of all of these.

109.When counsel introduced the issue of a corroboration warning, he stated as follows: “So, I just want to be clear that I can do that. Now, that raises then the question, Judge, as to whether, if we're all agreed, as there's no corroboration, that it's a case which warrants a corroboration warning. Now, I very much take the view, generally speaking, that's entirely a matter for the discretion of the Court, and should not be really canvassed unless it is necessary, but there is one concern I have, which is that, and it's entirely natural that it might happen, where two complainants' give evidence to the same jury independently of one another, but on what I would characterise are certain important issues in the background, evidence given by [the second complainant] contradicted evidence that was given by [the first complainant]. And that married with the delay in the case, though it's not of the order of excessive delay or unusual delay of the sort of
-42 delay we can get in cases, but nevertheless, married to the issue of delay raises a concern for me that it is a case where there ought to be a corroboration warning. Now, had that not happened at all, had there been no inconsistencies whatever, I wouldn't be asking for a corroboration warning, but I would be thinking to myself that it would be strange that there would be no inconsistencies between them, but there were inconsistencies I think on some important points, and for that reason I'm concerned that the Court might consider giving a corroboration warning. And I can highlight the inconsistencies if the Court wishes me to do it, there are about five or six, Judge.

Later, when formally making the application, counsel submitted: “My application is for a corroboration warning in this case and I make the application on the basis that, in my respectful submission, there is no corroboration of the allegations being made by either of the two complainants… There are many reasons for that. One of them is the fact that delay is a feature of this case”.

Counsel for the appellant then outlined the timeline of complaints the subject matter of the counts in the indictment and continued: “The reason I seek the corroboration warning in particular, Judge, is because in my respectful submission there are some inconsistencies on somewhat important matters between the evidence given by the first complainant… and that given by the second complainant…and that, in my respectful submission, is a relevant matter. There's no suggestion in any way from me in making that submission that either of the two witnesses are inherently unreliable and I don't put forward that there is any inherent unreliability in respect of their evidence per se. I'm not suggesting deliberate falsehoods or anything of that which would impinge on their character. There's no suggestion of either person having made any previous false complaints or anything of that nature but there are as I say inconsistencies which have arisen on the evidence as between both complainants and I might just indicate what, in my submission, those are. There are about five or six.

-43 He then outlined the suggested inconsistencies.
110.In her ruling, the trial judge summarised the position as follows:: “So, bearing in mind those words and bearing in mind the guidance from both JEM, Makanjuola, O'Mara, Casey and Wallace, [counsel for the accused] says that the corroboration is sought as delay is a feature but ultimately he says that the reason why or the inconsistencies on some important matters as between the complainants he says that there's no suggestion that either witness is inherently unreliable, she's not suggesting deliberate falsehoods or previous false complaints, he says there are five or six”.
111.When addressing the inconsistencies highlighted by the appellant, the trial judge stated: “Now, in relation to those matters and the particular issues themselves. First of all, in relation to the issue of staying in bed and going to the pub in the evenings and while [the second complainant] said that she was working during the day but was around in the evenings, I think it has to be said first of all that first of all these are matters that relate directly to the allegations themselves. Separately, these are events that come from the perspective of a child in relation to [the second complainant] and perspective of adult. So, they're going to be different and they're going to have different focus. And it can be understandable that persons will have a different view of potentially the same timeframe.

Secondly, in relation to [location], [the second complainant] saying that it was not perfect but happier, "Was the best year they had in Ireland," again that is from the perspective of a child. It is clear that she's saying it wasn't perfect, it wasn't utopian, but it was the best that they had. It's not materially at odds from, I think, what her mother has said. And while the mother does refer to times when the children were brought in from the house at 3 or 4 pm, I did not understand her evidence to be that that was all the time. Again, these are inconsistencies between two people at different stages of life, giving different perspectives on the same timeframe.

In relation to the issue of transport of bales, yes, that is an inconsistency of that there is no doubt, but equally there are many, many consistencies as between

-44 these people. For instance, in relation to the issue of [the first complainant] did not drive a tractor, that she did not drive at all. There is consistency between [the second complainant] and her mother in that regard. There is consistency between [the second complainant] and her mother in relation to the issue of money. There's consistency between [the second complainant] and her mother in relation to who was the cause of the fights the house, et cetera.

So, while there is this distinction and there is this inconsistency, that is quintessentially a matter for the jury to take into account and does not in and of itself in my view warrant a corroboration warning.

In relation to the issue of the wheelbarrow she said, [the second complainant] said that it was old, does not remember a wheel missing. But that was never the issue, the issue was whether there was a tyre missing and she wasn't specifically asked that question.

And in relation to the issue of neighbours and people coming over, the evidence of [the first complainant] was that people could come over but when her husband would allow that. So, it ultimately was not necessarily a matter for [the second complainant] to be privy to or be aware of what [the appellant ] would have allowed or not allowed. In any case this is similar to the first number of matters in circumstances where you are talking about the perception of a child as against the perception of an adult looking over a prolonged length of time and period.

So, in relation to again the issue of blame being apportioned to [the second complainant] and [the first complainant] saying that she did not blame [the second complainant], again that is an inconsistency but can potentially be explained, if it can be explained on the basis of again perception.

And whilst [the second complainant] indicates that she never saw violence to her mother in relation to point seven, it has never been the evidence of [the first complainant] that her children witnessed the punches on the left-hand side of her ribs, and it may well be that this consistency can be explained on the basis of these events occurring in private.

-45 I could be, my interpretation of all of those matters, or indeed explanations could be completely incorrect, and it could be the case that the jury will take the view that there are very clear inconsistencies as between these witnesses. And they would be, that is a matter quintessentially for this jury.

I am drawn back to the summary of the law in relation to corroboration warnings as set out in Casey part C which is that, "The fact there is a conflict of evidence between witnesses or between one witness said on one occasion and on another occasion does not mean that a trial judge is required to direct the jury on the dangers of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence. This remains a matter for the judge's discretion."

112.It is evident that the trial judge was aware of the basis on which the application was made. Having considered her ruling, we do not believe that she erred in the manner in which she approached the application. We also note in this context that the trial judge gave a delay warning about which there is no complaint.
113.The court reiterates dicta of Hedigan J in Woolridge that whether the jury should be warned about the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant is a matter for the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. This court should not intervene unless it appears that the decision was made upon an incorrect legal basis or was clearly wrong on fact. In DC, this court also stated that “the trial judge… is in a far better position than this court to make a judgement as to whether or not such a warning ought to be given or, if so, its terms”. The trial judge’s consideration of the application was careful. She reviewed the authorities and analysed the inconsistencies relied on in support of the application. She clearly had regard to the discrepancies arising from the evidence but, having considered them, she determined not to give the warning. In so concluding, we are satisfied that no error of principle has been identified regarding the manner in which the trial judge exercised her discretion. That there were a number of inconsistencies in the evidence did not mandate that a warning be given, nor did the issue of delay. With regard to the delay aspect of the application, the trial judge’s ruling should be viewed in the context of the manner in which the application was made and the fact that the trial judge gave a delay warning about which there is no complaint.
114.We must therefore reject this ground of appeal.
-46 Concluding Observations 115. We conclude by noting that on the hearing of this appeal, counsel for the appellant brought to the court’s attention the contents of a note written by his client concerning, inter alia, issues relating to the number of complainants, the nature of the evidence, the absence of the reporting of the 1995 incident and that there ought to have been a reasonable doubt.

The issues so raised do not impact on the court’s ruling on this appeal which was advanced on the grounds addressed in this judgment and which were very ably and skilfully presented by his legal team.

116.As all grounds have been rejected, we must dismiss this appeal.

Legal guide

1

AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.