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[2026] IESC 28

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH THE SUPREME COURT [2026] IESC 28 Supreme Court Record No.: S:AP:IE:2025:000080 Court of Appeal Record No.: A:AP:IE:2024:000236 High Court Record No.: 2023/216 JR O’Donnell CJ. Woulfe J. Murray J. Donnelly J. Between/ LACRAMIOARA AMARIEI Appellant AND THE CHIEF APPEALS OFFICER, THE SOCIAL WELFARE APPEALS OFFICE AND THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION Respondents RULING of the Court on costs dated the 12th May 2026

  1. On 25 March 2026, this Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the Court of Appeal. The Court found that the appellant ought to have exhausted the effective alternative remedy available to her under s. 318 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 as amended (“the 2005 Act”).
  2. Despite being unsuccessful in her appeal, the appellant seeks an award of costs, or at least partial costs against the State respondents (“the State”).
  3. The appellant submitted that the judgment brought to light issues of systemic importance with regard to the appellate remedies available to dissatisfied social welfare applicants 1 under Part 10 of the 2005 Act. The appellant pointed out that nine months after the High Court decision, new regulations (the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations 2024 (SI 744/2024)) were passed to establish a new power on the part of the Chief Appeals Officer to nominate an Appeals Officer under s. 318 to review and submit to her a recommendation in respect of a decision of an Appeals Officer in accordance with s.
  4. The appellant submitted that the original regulations made no mention of s. 318 or how a review might be commenced or conducted. She submitted that considering the timeline, the 2024 Regulations were addressing a lacuna identified in the High Court judgment. Furthermore, she submitted that the State’s websites had made no reference to using s. 318 but in the aftermath of the judgment they were changed to reflect the position. The appellant submitted that this perception that s. 318 was outside the appellate structure of the 2005 Act was reinforced by the decision of Geoghegan J. in Castleisland Cattle Breeding v Minister for Social Welfare [2004] 4 IR 150, [2004] IESC
  6. The appellant submitted that the judgment of this Court brings clarity to the s. 318 procedure, that the judgment is of considerable social benefit and that it serves the public interest. She submitted that there was no other judgment that addressed the matter in an authoritative, binding manner and that the only other precedent addressed the point in favour of the appellant.
  7. The appellant relied upon Dunne v Minister for the Environment [2008] 2 IR 775, [2007] IESC 60, Lee v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 114 (“Lee”) and Rahman v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2022] IEHC 354 in seeking an award of costs in her favour. The appellant submitted that the factors set out in Lee are present here. She said that the public interest is such as to justify an award of costs or a proportion of costs. She submitted that account must be taken of her personal circumstances, she is a foreign 2 national who does not speak English and who had particular medical difficulties affecting her. She also had particularly difficult personal circumstances at the time.
  8. The State contested much of the legal and factual circumstances and/or their relevance to the issue of costs as set out by the appellant above. The State submitted that: (a) This Court should make an order dismissing the appeal against the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal which: (i) substituted for the costs order of the High Court no order in respect of the costs of the proceedings; and (ii) made no order in respect of the costs of the appeal; and (b) The Court should make no order in respect of the appeal to this Court.
  9. In its submissions, the State explained the position on costs that it had taken before the Court of Appeal as follows: (a) The appropriate order in respect of the costs of the proceedings and the appeal in principle was an order awarding them against the appellant and in favour of the State; and (b) Without prejudice to the foregoing and in particular without accepting that an adverse costs order cannot or should not be made against an applicant who brought unsuccessful proceedings in circumstances such as those which were addressed in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the State consented in the particular circumstances of this case and appeal to: (i) An order substituting no order as to costs for the costs order of the High Court dated 15 April 2024; and (ii) No order regarding the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal.
  10. The State relied upon s. 169

(1)of the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015 and the presumptive entitlement that they have to be awarded their costs (Sobhy v Chief Appeals Officer & Ors [2022] IESC 16). The State referred in detail to the judgment of Murray J. 3 in Little v The Chief Appeals Officer & Ors (No 2) [2024] IESC 53 (“Little (No 2)”). Not only did the State submit that there is no basis for an award of the appellant’s costs, but they submitted that an award of the State’s costs in both the Court of Appeal and in this Court could have been made but for “the generous concession” of the State in the Court of Appeal and again in this Court.
  1. Given that the State is not seeking an award of costs, it is unnecessary to examine whether there is any basis for its claim that this is not a case covered by the statement of principle in Little (No 2). It is sufficient to say that the Little (No 2) principles require “a far stricter test in awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant in public interest litigation than to the decision whether to exempt such a litigant from an adverse costs order” (per Murray J. in Little (No 2)). Those kinds of situations will be a “genuine rarity” (per Charleton J. in Minister for Justice v McPhilips [2015] 3 IR 274, [2015] IESC 47). Such an award should only be made by the Court “in cases of real substance, in which there is a clear and significant public interest on a matter of fundamental importance served by the clarification brought to the law by the suit” (per Murray J. in Little (No 2)).
  2. This appeal was not taken as a test case in the true sense of that phrase. The appellant took these proceedings to advance her own position and persisted with them despite being told at an early stage of the proceedings that she could avail of an alternative remedy. On their own these may not necessarily be fatal to an award of costs in favour of an appellant, but they are of some significance.
  3. Most importantly, while this appeal concerned a matter of general public importance – the Court emphasised the default position that an applicant for judicial review has to exhaust alternative remedies and brought clarity to the issue of s. 318 procedures in social welfare appeals – that fact alone does not entitle the unsuccessful appellant to an award of costs (partial or whole) in her favour. There must be something additional which brings this 4 appeal into the type of category that is foundational, far-reaching or involves a matter of fundamental importance in the sense set out in Little (No 2). This appeal does not reach that standard.
  4. In the circumstances this Court will make no order for costs. The final order of the Court will be: An order dismissing the appeal against the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal and making no order in respect of the costs of this appeal. 5

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