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2026 IEHC 331

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 331 THE HIGH COURT H.P.2025.0000466 BETWEEN SEAN DUNNE, HARRISON DUNNE A MINOR (SUING BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SEAN DUNNE), RYAN EMMET DUNNE A MINOR (SUING BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SEAN DUNNE) AND THOMAS JOSEPH DUNNE A MINOR (SUING BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SEAN DUNNE) Plaintiffs -and- CHRISTOPHER LEHANE, MICHAEL IAN LARKIN, MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON, INSOLVENCY SERVICE OF IRELAND, MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND IRELAND Defendants JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Nolan delivered on the 22nd day of May 2026 Introduction 1. The Plaintiffs in this case are Mr. Sean Dunne, a prominent businessman, and his children. For the purposes of this judgment, I shall refer to them collectively as “Mr. Dunne”, since he represented both himself and his family and the reliefs sought are to their benefit. 2. As Kennedy J. noted, Mr. Dunne’s bankruptcy has been a long running saga (In the Matter of Sean Dunne [2024] IEHC 685). Suffice to say that on 12 February 2013, a creditor sought an order adjudicating him a bankrupt. On 29 March 2013, he filed his own bankruptcy application in the United States of America. On 29 July 2013, he applied to stay the Irish bankruptcy proceedings on the basis of the US proceedings. The High Court dismissed his application and proceeded to adjudicate him bankrupt. It also dismissed his “show cause” application on 6 December 2013, and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on 15 May 2015. 3. His bankruptcy, which should have been discharged in 2014, was extended for an unprecedented fourteen years and nine months by Costello J. (as she then was), due to his failure to make full disclosure regarding his assets and general failure to co-operate with the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy (“Official Assignee”). His new discharge date is the 29 April 2028 (Re: Sean Dunne (a bankrupt) [2018] IEHC 813). 4. Between July and October 2024, he issued six motions disputing the validity of the appointments of two former Official Assignees, the First and Second Named Defendants, (“Mr. Lehane” and “Mr. Larkin”), who dealt with his bankruptcy estate over the years. He had raised this issue in earlier proceedings, although it first emerged in correspondence in 2024. Kennedy J. dismissed the motions on the basis that such challenges should instead be brought by way of plenary proceedings. 5. Accordingly, he issued these proceedings, in which he challenges the legitimacy of the State’s entire bankruptcy regime, as well as other reliefs. In particular, he challenges the validity of what he calls the “purported” appointments of Mr. Lehane and Mr. Larkin, as Official Assignees, as well as the appointment of the Third Named Defendant, Mr. McNaughton, as Director of the Fourth Named Defendant, the Insolvency Service of Ireland (“ISI”). 6. He points to a dearth of documentation, to such an extent that the appointments are, in his words, “void”. 7. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Named Defendants, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (“the Minister”), and the Attorney General and Ireland were subsequently joined to the proceedings. 8. The Defendants all deny the claims and assert that, at all material times, the appointments were valid and in accordance with law. An application was made to this Court by the Defendants for a modular trial on 30 July 2025, in regard to the validity of the various appointments, to which I acceded. 9. This is my judgment arising from that application. The Pleadings 10. By Plenary Summons dated 30 January 2025, Mr. Dunne, on his own behalf and on behalf of three of his children, sought 26 reliefs concerning his bankruptcy estate. At the start of the hearing, however, he informed the Court that his eldest son, Harrison, who has come of age, wished to be released from the proceedings. The Defendants do not object but reserve their position in respect of any costs application which may arise. 11. In his Statement of Claim, which makes for interesting reading, he pleads at para. 16: “on foot of reports that the first and second name defendants appointments as Official Assignee in bankruptcy in Ireland pursuant to statue and Bunreacht na hEireann were being questioned, the First Named Defendant wrote to Clark Hill Solicitors for the First and Second Defendants… requesting copies of their appointment documentation pursuant to statute and Bunreacht na hEireann”. 12. It is not pleaded who had questioned the appointment of Mr. Lehane or Mr. Larkin, as Official Assignees, but in Replies to Notice for Particulars, dated the 19 March 2025, at reply 1, he answered that the appointments were being questioned by himself and Mr. Blake O’Donnell, a solicitor registered to practice law in the United Kingdom, who somewhat surprisingly, is acting his McKenzie friend in these proceedings, without payment I presume. Mr. O’Donnell has not entered an appearance or filed any of the pleadings yet was present in court every day of the trial. I emphasise that he must be acting without pay, because to do otherwise would be to act in contravention of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. As the courts have often said, McKenzie friends are not entitled to charge for whatever services they purport to give. 13. He pleads that he requested “warrants of appointments”, which were not produced, thus necessitating the issuing of these proceedings. 14. At para. 20, he pleads that only the Minister possesses the authority to appoint the Official Assignee, and that this power cannot be delegated. He further pleads that the Defendants have failed to publicly disclose the statutory process required for such appointments. He claims that there is a constitutional official appointment procedure which requires to be followed regarding the appointments and sets out seven steps that should be adhered to. He further pleads that the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the Courts Service at the relevant time, Mr. PJ Fitzpatrick, never possessed the statutory or constitutional authority to appoint the Official Assignee and that documentation produced purporting to validate the appointment is ineffective, invalid, and void ab initio and therefore Mr. Lehane and Mr. Larkin were not properly appointed, pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1988. 15. At para. 21 he sets out, what he describes as, the “Constitutional OA Appointment Procedure”, which he pleads includes the following requirements: (

  1. i)Public advertisement for the vacancy role of Official Assignee; (
  2. ii)Competition, examinations and interviews conducted by the Public Appointment Service (“PAS”); (iii) A letter of recommendation from the Director of PAS to the Minister confirming the person nominated possesses appropriate experience, suitability, qualifications, training and expertise for the position of Official Assignee; (
  3. iv)The proposed appointment being raised at Cabinet by the Minister and no objections made, properly recorded; 16. (
  4. v)An oath of office which requires to be administered; (
  5. vi)A warrant of appointment both in English and Irish under seal by the Minister; (vii) A valid notice of appointment published in Iris Oifigiual. He pleads the Official Assignee is a quasi-judicial officer which requires a warrant of appointment to assume office and that he is obliged to produce the warrant when challenged, to prove his entitlement to exercise the powers conferred upon him by the State. 17. He says the appointments do not comply with the provisions of statute and the Constitution. 18. On that basis he pleads that every act carried out by the Official Assignees, including the seizing of cash and property, the search of his home or the possession of rents were all carried out illegally. 19. Somewhat ironically, among the grievances he alleges, is Mr Lehane’s contact with the Rugby Football Union of England, asserting ownership of debenture tickets registered in his name, which he claims he had transferred to Michael Fingleton Jr. Given all the misfortunes he complains of, one might have expected this issue would rank low in significance; nonetheless, it is expressly pleaded. 20. In his case against Mr. McNaughton and ISI, he seeks a declaration that the appointment of the Mr. McNaughton, as Director of the ISI, was not made in compliance with statute, Bunreacht na hÉireann and the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), and too, is invalid, unlawful, null and void ab initio. 21. He pleads that there is a director appointment procedure which requires “warrants” to evidence that Mr. McNaughton can act as the sole Director of the ISI. This procedure seems to mirror the pleaded procedure regarding the Official Assignees “Constitutional OA Appointment Procedure”. At para. 48 he set out the requirements for this position which include: (
  6. i)Public advertisement for the role of Director of the ISI; (
  7. ii)A competition, examinations, interviews and tests run by the PAS; (iii)A letter of recommendation from the Director of PAS to the Minister confirming the third named Defendant possesses appropriate experience, qualifications, training and expertise for the appointment; (iv)The proposed appointment being raised at the Government Cabinet, with no objections being made, properly recorded; (v)An oath of office which requires to be administered; (vi)A warrant of appointment in English and Irish issued under seal by the Minister; and (vii)A notice of appointment published in Irish Oifigiúil. 22. He pleads that Mr. McNaughton’s reliance upon certain documentation (described as the “MM Appointment Documentation”) to ground his appointment as Director of the ISI is invalid, as none of the procedures set out in the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 were followed. 23. He further pleads that Mr. McNaughton’s re-appointment in 2024 was invalid because he was not validly appointed in the first place. This has the knock-on effect that he could not appoint the Deputy Official Assignee, under the Bankruptcy Act 1988, as amended, and that there was no deed of assignment or transfer of assets held by Mr. Lehane to the Deputy Official Assignee between 20 July 2020 and 16 November 2020. 24. He pleads that the provisions of statute were not complied with and therefore all actions taken thereafter were unlawful, which all the defendants knew, but proceeded nonetheless, to his and his family’s detriment. As well as the various declarations he seeks damages. 25. In their Defence, delivered on 31 March 2025, Mr. Lehane and Mr. Larkin raise a number of preliminary objections including, but not limited to: 1. Mr. Dunne, having been adjudicated in 2013, is guilty of laches and inordinate and inexcusable delay; 2. The proceedings are an abuse of process since they are a further attack on the Order of Adjudication; and 3. The Second to Fourth Named Plaintiffs do not possess the required locus standi, since they have not been adjudicated bankrupts and cannot have any interest in the proceedings. 26. They further plead that no matter what the outcome of the proceedings, Mr. Dunne has been divested of his assets and has no interest in them. Thereafter the defence denies the claims in full, as do the other Defendants. 27. In essence, his case boils down to the allegation that crucial documents, which are necessary to make the appointments valid, are missing or more likely never existed in the first place and therefore the various appointments were invalid. It is on that basis he wants his property back and damages. The Issues 28. Pursuant to the order directing a modular trial, the issues before the Court are, firstly, whether Mr. Dunne is entitled to a declaration that the appointments of Mr. Lehane and Mr. Larkin as Official Assignees in Bankruptcy were not made in compliance with statute, Bunreacht na hÉireann and the ECHR, and are therefore invalid, unlawful, null and void ab initio. 29. Secondly, whether he is entitled to a declaration that the appointment of Mr. McNaughton as sole Director of the ISI was not made in compliance with statute, Bunreacht na hÉireann and the ECHR, and is therefore invalid, unlawful, null and void ab initio. The Relevant Statutory Provisions 30. To understand the issues more clearly, it is important to set out the statutory framework with some precision, as the position of the Official Assignee has, over the course of the last century, undergone significant institutional change, particularly over the last twenty years. 31. At the creation of the State, the Official Assignee was a civil servant attached to the Courts, which at that time, fell within the remit of the Department of Justice (“the Department”), as is evident from the Courts Officers Act of 1926. 32. Section 3

(2)of the Courts Officers Act 1926 (the “1926 Act”) provides: “
(2)There shall be attached to the High Court, the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice respectively the following officers (in this Part of this Act collectively referred to as principal officers), that is to say: — To the High Court An Official Assignee in Bankruptcy” 33. Section 3
(3)of the 1926 Act provides: “
(3)The Master of the High Court and the Taxing-Masters shall be appointed by the Executive Council and every other of the said principal officers shall be appointed by the Minister, …” (Emphasis added)
  1. Section 12 of the 1926 Act provides: “12.—The Official Assignee in Bankruptcy shall have and exercise all such powers and authorities and perform and fulfil such duties and functions as shall from time to time be conferred on or assigned to him by statute or rule of court and in particular (unless and until otherwise provided by statute or rule of court) shall have and exercise all such powers and authorities as were formerly vested by law in the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice in Ireland and shall perform and fulfil such duties and functions as were formerly required by law to be or were in fact performed or fulfilled by the said Official Assignee.”
  2. Section 29
(2)of the 1926 Act provided for the transfer to the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy of all property previously vested in the Official Assignee of the High Court, under the pre-independence regime. At all material times, the Official Assignee was not only a civil servant, but a senior civil servant, classified as a Principal Officer (“PO”), a very high grade within the Civil Service with its own governing rules. This has a statutory basis by virtue of Section 3
(2)of the 1926 Act (as amended). The Bankruptcy Act 1988 36. That position remained unchanged for over 60 years, until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1988 (“the 1988 Act”). The Act placed the Official Assignee on a more robust statutory footing. It clarified that the property of a bankrupt vests in the Official Assignee, but it did not alter the provisions of Section 3
(3)of the 1926 Act, concerning the manner of appointment. 37. Section 6
(1)of the Bankruptcy Act 1988 (the “1988 Act”) provided as follows: “6.—
(1)The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column of that Schedule.” 38. Section 12 of the 1926 Act was included in the Second Schedule as a repealed provision. It was replaced in the 1988 Act by s. 60
(1)which provided: “60
(1)The Official Assignee shall have and exercise such powers and authorities and perform such duties and functions as are from time to time conferred on or assigned to him by statute (including this Act) or rules of court.” 39. Section 44 of the 1988 Act provided, at subsection
(1), that: “44
(1)Where a person is adjudicated bankrupt, then, subject to the provisions of this Act, all property belonging to that person shall on the date of adjudication vest in the Official Assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt.” 40. The 1988 Act did not alter the provisions of Section 3
(3)of the 1926 Act concerning the appointment of the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy. That provision was, however, amended by Section 29 of the Court Service Act
  1. The Courts Service Act 1998
  2. The Courts Act of 1998 was a revolutionary piece of legislation in many respects. Not only did it create a stand-alone civil service agency, under the aegis of the Department, thereby strengthening the constitutional imperative of independence of the judiciary, but it also transferred the role of the Official Assignee from the Department to the newly created Court Service. This may be as good a point at any to deal with the term “under the aegis” of the Minister or Department. Under “the aegis” of a government department means that the government department has formal oversight, with policy responsibility and accountability for the agency, but does not manage its day-to-day operations.
  3. Section 29
(1)of the Courts Service Act 1998 provides: “29
(1)On and after the establishment day a function of the Minister under each of the provisions mentioned in column 3 of Schedule 2 of the Acts mentioned in column 2 opposite the mention of that provision shall be a function of the Service to the exclusion of the Minister, and the provision shall be construed accordingly.” 43. Column 3 of Schedule 2 of the Act, specifically identifies Section 3
(3)of the 1926 Act, as an affected provision. The reference to the “Service”, as appears from Sections 2 and 4 of the 1998 Act, is a reference to the Courts Service. 44. Section 24
(1)of the 1998 Act provides for the transfer to, and membership of, the Service, as and from the establishment day, of every person listed in Schedule 1 to the 1988 Act. Included in this list were the following: “Every principal officer within the meaning of Part I of the Court Officers Act, 1926, other than the Master of the High Court and the Taxing Masters.” 45. As already noted above, the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy was a PO by virtue of Section 3
(2)of the 1926 Act (as amended). Accordingly, as and from the establishment day of the Service, the Official Assignee automatically became a member of the Service. As a result, responsibility for the Official Assignee was transferred to, and thereafter vested in, the Courts Service. The Personal Insolvency Act 2012
  1. The power of appointment of the Official Assignee changed again with the coming into operation of the Personal Insolvency Act
  2. The majority of the 2012 Act was commenced on 1 March 2013, the same date as the establishment of the ISI, pursuant to Section
  4. Under Section 11, the Minister for Justice was given the power to appoint the Director of the ISI. Section 11
(2)provided: “Subject to subsections
(12)and
(13), the Director shall— (a) be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Director of the Public Appointments Service after a competition for that purpose under section 47 of the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act 2004 has been held on behalf of the Minister…” (Emphasis added) 48. Subsections
(12)and
(13)permit the Minister to designate a person to be Director in advance of the establishment day and then to appoint that person as the first Director, with the date of that person’s designation as Director deemed to be the date of their appointment as Director. 49. Section 12
(1)also provides for the Minister to appoint members of the ISI:“The Minister may, after consultation with the Insolvency Service, appoint such number of persons to be members of the staff of the Insolvency Service as may be approved by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform.” 50. As initially enacted, the 2012 Act made no express reference, in Section 12 or elsewhere, to any change in the manner of appointment of the Official Assignee. The power of appointment, initially conferred on the Minister for Justice by Section 3
(3)of the 1926 Act and transferred by Section 29 of the 1998 Act to the Courts Service, was left untouched. The Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 51. However, within months the position changed again. Under the provisions of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, (the “2013 Act”), the Official Assignee became a member of staff of the ISI, with the power of appointment vesting in the Minister. 52. Section 27 of the 2013 Act, amended the definition of “Official Assignee” in Section 3 of the 1988 Act as follows: “‘Official Assignee’ means a person standing appointed for the time being— (
  1. i)to the position of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in the Office of the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy on the day before the coming into operation of section 29 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, or (
  2. ii)to the position of Official Assignee pursuant to section 12 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012;”. 53. Section 29 of the 2013 Act (which came into force on 3 December 2013), amended Section 60 of the 1988 Act, by substituting the old Section 60, with an entirely new text relating the functions and office of the Official Assignee, - Section 60A and provides as follows: “60A.
(1)This section applies to— (
  1. a)the person who immediately before the coming into operation of this section held the office of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy (otherwise referred to as the Official Assignee), and (
  2. b)every person who immediately before the coming into operation of this section was a member of the staff of the Courts Service assigned to the Office of the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy.
(2)On the coming into operation of this section every member of the staff of the Courts Service to whom this section applies shall be seconded to the Insolvency Service for a period of 2 years.
(3)On the expiry of the period of secondment referred to in sub-s
(2)each person seconded under that subsection shall— (
  1. a)transfer definitively to the staff of the Insolvency Service, or (
  2. b)subject to subsection
(4), exercise a right to return to a suitable vacancy on the staff of the Courts Service …”
(2)Subject to subsection 3(
  1. a)— (
  2. a)the person who immediately before the coming into operation of this section held the office of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy shall continue in office as Official Assignee …” 54. Section 38, amended Section 9 of the 2012 Act, by giving the ISI a new function as follows: - “(
  3. ja)subject to section 60
(3)of the Bankruptcy Act 1988 , administer the functions assigned to the Official Assignee by the Bankruptcy Act 1988 or any other enactment.” 55. Section 41
(2)of the 2013 Act, amended the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (which had in turn amended the 1926 Act), by deleting the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy from the list of principal officers in the Eighth Schedule. Consequently, following the introduction of the 2013 Act, the Official Assignee was no longer appointed by the Chief Executive of the Courts Service.
  1. Therefore, the functions of the office of the Official Assignee, which had previously constituted a stand-alone function within the Court Service, were transferred to the ISI, which in many respects provided a natural intuitional home for it.
  2. Section 41
(4)amended Section 2 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 to provide that: “Official Assignee” has the same meaning as it has in the Bankruptcy Act 1988”.
  1. The effect of the 2013 Act is that from that date the power to appoint the Official Assignee, under the Bankruptcy Act 1988 (as amended), rests solely with the Minister, pursuant to Section 12 of the 2012 Act (as amended).
  2. In many ways, the statutory journey has had the effect that the Official Assignee is now, from the 1 March 2013, appointed by the Minister, or to put it another way has “come home”.
  3. Before turning to the evidence called by the Defendants, it is worth addressing a relevant legal principle concerning the operations of Government, known as the Carltona Principle. Carltona Principle
  4. The principle has been well explained in WT v Minister for Justice and ors, [2015] 2 ILRM 225 and derives from the case of Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Public Works [1943] 2 All E.R.
  6. In WT, MacMenamin J. noted: - “It is now well recognised in the law that each minister must both bear political responsibility to the Dail, and legal responsibility in the courts, for actions taken by their own departments. In law, ministers are regarded as being one and the same as the government departments of which they are the political heads. Conversely, department officials act in the name of the minister.”
  7. MacMenamin J. went on to say as follows: “In making administrative decisions, therefore, discretion is conferred on a minister, not simply as an individual, but rather as the person who holds office as head of a government department, which collectively holds a high degree of collective corporate knowledge and experience, all of which is imputed to the political head of the department… Part of this arrangement, identified as the eponymous Carltona principle, is that the functions entrusted to departmental officials are performed at an appropriate level of seniority, and within the scope of responsibility of their government department. No express act of delegation is necessary.
  8. In Devanney v Shields [1998] 1 IR 230 at 261 Denham J. (as she then was) noted: “The core of the Carltona principle is that as a matter of statutory construction responsible officials may exercise some of the statutory powers of a minister. The officials would not consult him but may yet recite words such as “I am directed by the minister”. They are the alter ego of the minister. They exercise devolved power.”
  9. In reality it represents a judicial recognition of the complexity of the administration of the modern state, where it would be impractical for a minister, as political head of a department, to personally take every decision. This fundamental point was never refuted by Mr. Dunne in all his many submissions to the Court. Witness - PJ Fitzpatrick
  10. While it might appear more logical to consider the witnesses in the order they gave evidence in court, it makes more sense, when analysing Mr. Dunne’s case, to consider their evidence by following his narrative, or as they appear on stage, so to speak. This is because Mr. Dunne’s thesis is based upon his assertion that from the commencement of his bankruptcy, the Official Assignee was not validly appointed.
  11. In those circumstances, I consider it helpful to set out in some detail the case advanced by him in relation to Mr. Fitzpatrick. He submits the Mr. Fitzpatrick was never validly appointed as CEO of the Courts Service and, therefore, could not have validly appointed Mr. Lehane to the role of Official Assignee. He contends that the approval or consent of the Minister was not obtained in respect of Mr. Fitzpatrick’s appointment, nor was his approval under Section 23 of Courts Service Act, in respect of staffing numbers, or in regard to his reappointment in
  12. He further disputes that the Courts Service held a recruitment licence, since he has not seen it. He argues that, in the absence of such a license, the Courts Service lacked the authority to conduct a Principal Officer (“PO”) competition, which would have permitted the promotion of Mr. Lehane to the position of PO. He also asserts that no documentation has been furnished under the Civil Service Regulation Acts 1956-2005 and the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act 1997-
  13. In addition, he contends that there was no statutory basis for Mr. Lehane to move from PO to Official Assignee and that key documents relating to his appointment to the role of Official Assignee in 2008, are missing or do not exist, including the advertisement, competition, or application process for the position. He further questions the validity of the Courts Service Board minutes on the basis that none of them were signed. Finally, he says that Mr. Fitzpatrick’s appointment itself was invalid, since it was not published in Iris Oifigiúil, confirming his appointment under Courts Service Act.
  14. Mr. Fitzpatrick gave evidence on the second day of the hearing. He outlined the establishment of the Courts Service, in particular the creation of a transitional board, and referred to the minutes of the Board meeting of the 9 November 1998, which he attended and was offered the role of Chief Executive Designate, subject to contract. The minutes of the 4 February 1999, confirm that the formal approval of the Minister was received on the 2 December
  15. On the 3 of December 1998, he signed a contract of employment, which was before the Court. On the 16 November 1999, the Minister appointed him Accounting Officer for the Vote of the Court Service, a formal title akin to a secretary general of a government department. The letter enclosing the appointment described it as his “warrant of appointment”. The significance of this is that the statutory duties of accounting officers are prescribed in Section 19 of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act,
  16. In particular Section 3 provides for the Comptroller and Auditor General’s audit of accounts of monies administered by, or under the control of the Oireachtas, including the Appropriation Accounts. (By way of background the Appropriation Accounts arise in circumstances where Dáil Éireann provides money for the ordinary services of government departments and offices, both capital and non-capital, by approving estimates for those services in the course of each year and by giving statutory effect to the estimates in an annual Appropriation Act.) He explained that the Courts Service had a separate vote, meaning that its budget is voted directly by the Dáil, unlike most State agencies, who receive their budget from their parent department. He said that all the rest of the staff of the Courts Service were civil servants, other than himself. Initially, he served as CEO designate, but pursuant to Section 17 of the Courts Service Act 1998, he became the first CEO, for a 7-year period.
  17. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Lehane as Official Assignee, he discussed the matter with the then President of the High Court, Mr. Justice Richard Johnston. Thereafter Mr. Lehane received a letter dated the 21 December 2000 from Moling Ryan, Head of HR of the Courts Service, dated the 21 December 2000, appointing him to the position of PO, within the Courts Service, with an initial assignment to the regional Office in Tullamore. Mr. Lehane signed a Form of Acceptance on the 31 December 2000, agreeing to act, initially in an acting capacity as a PO. He said it was standard practise for such letters to be sent under Mr. Ryan’s name. He said that the appointment was sanctioned by the Board at its meeting of the 19 February
  18. As it transpires the minutes of that meeting were before the Court and were under seal.
  19. He gave evidence that, pursuant to Section 29 of the Courts Service Act, 1998, various functions of the Minister were transferred to the Board of the Courts Service (“the Board”) and, in 2002, from the Board to the CEO. These functions were set out in a framework document, which was before the Court. He explained that while the document was entitled “Draft Framework Document” and dated September 2002, it was approved by the Board and operated as the working template for the Courts Service and was continually updated. The word “draft” was never removed during his time as CEO. Pursuant to the Framework Document, and in particular at pages 10 and 11, the Board determined that certain functions were to be carried out by the CEO, these included the appointment of POs, but not directly the appointment of the Official Assignee,
  20. He gave evidence that, in 2005 he was reappointed as CEO, by resolution of the Board, dated the 3 November
  22. He was robustly cross-examined by Mr. Dunne on all matters but in particular as to why he felt obliged to consult with the President of the High Court, since there was no legal requirement to do so, he replied that, given the importance of the role, he considered it his duty to liaise with the presidents of each court.
  23. Having considered all the evidence, including all the documentation, which was before the Court, I make the following findings of fact: - • I am satisfied that Mr. Fitzpatrick was validly appointed CEO of the Courts Service in 1998 and re-appointed in 2005 by the Board of the Courts Service. Not only was his evidence compelling but it was supported by the documents introduced and proven in court. These include the Board minutes, his contract, the formal approval of the Minister dated the 2 December 1998, his appointment as the Accounting Officer for the Courts Service by the Minister. Therefore, there is no doubt whatsoever that he had the approval of the Minister and was validly appointed. • The Framework Document is valid and encompasses the functions which were transferred to the CEO, including the appointment of POs of the High Court. • Mr. Fitzpatrick had lawful authority to appoint Mr. Lehane as a Principal Officer, and that appointment was authorised by the Board of the Courts Service, as evidenced by the letter of 21 December 2000, the written acceptance, and the Board minutes of 19 February
  24. • This is a delegated power which is legally correct and lawful, in accordance with the legislation establishing the Courts Service. • There was a lawful and sufficient statutory basis for the appointment of Mr. Lehane as Official Assignee, including the authority delegated under the Framework Document and the letter dated 19 December
  25. At that time, the position of Official Assignee was a Principal Officer position. • There was no requirement for further documentation to be furnished pursuant to the Civil Service Regulation Acts 1956-2005 or the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Acts 1997-
  26. • I find that there were no relevant missing documents relating to his appointment or re-appointment in 2008 and no requirement for any advertisement, competition, or application process beyond what was established in evidence. • The Board minutes were properly maintained and were perfectly in order. • Mr. Fitzpatrick’s re- appointment was published in Iris Oifigiúil in 2008, although no such publication requirement arose at the earlier time. • The issue of a recruitment licence, or authority to run a PO competition, did not apply at that time. • There was nothing improper about Mr. Fitzpatrick’s discussion with the then President of the High Court, Johnson P. at the time of the appointment. It was simple courtesy on his part, as his evidence confirmed.
  27. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the documentary challenges advanced by Mr. Dunne are without substance and that the documentary record is complete, coherent, and fully supports the validity of the appointments in issue. Witness - Christopher Lehane
  28. The next witness, in Mr Dunne’s narrative, but the first give evidence, was the First Named Defendant, Christopher Lehane. Mr. Dunne’s case against him is again based upon alleged missing documentation. These include an instrument appointing him as Deputy Probate Officer, his CV and professional references, signed minutes of the Courts Service Board meeting of the 24 October 2002, an executed and sealed Framework Agreement delegating appointment powers with a Courts Service seal on both the Framework Agreement and the minutes, expressly authorising the CEO to appoint the Official Assignee. He also sought sight of Mr. Lehane’s Candidate Information Booklet and PAS competition records together with records or minutes of what he described as the “Supreme Court and High Court Directorate” selection process.
  29. He raised further documents in either the pleadings or written submissions. These include Mr Lehane’s contract of secondment to ISI (2013–2015), his contract of transfer to Department in December 2015, together with the authority for the Department to issue such contracts, any proof that ISI held a State Recruitment Licence and the statutory basis for appointment of Mr. Lehane as a temporary Director of ISI. Finally, he sought his HR file, complaining that it may contain vital information.
  30. Mr. Lehane gave evidence as to his background and joining the Civil Service, having completed a clerical officer competition in the Civil Service Commission. His first day of work was the 20 March
  31. He was then assigned to the High Court as a Clerical Officer in the Probate Office, as part of the Department staff, since the Courts Service had not yet come into existence. He progressed through the promotional ladder while undertaking the Bar examinations in 1983, ultimately being appointed Assistant Probate Officer (Finance), acting as a court registrar. In that role, he often acted as a registrar and indeed served as registrar with the Moriarty Tribunal.
  32. He told the Court that, following the establishment of the Courts Service, new promotional opportunities arose. He had previously sat a PO competition and had been successful. He was assigned as Manager of the Midland Region within the Courts Service, based in Mullingar. He signed a Form of Application dated the 31 December
  33. While that form dealt with salary scales, I am satisfied it was executed for the purpose of maintaining his status as a civil servant and was in response to the letter of offer from Moling Ryan, Head of HR, dated the 21 December 2000, referred to above, offering him appointment as a PO.
  34. After 2005, for family reasons, he returned to Dublin as Assistant Probate Officer. Having reached the highest position available to him within that office, and following discussions with Nuala McLaughlin, a senior registrar in the Courts Service, he was offered the role of Official Assignee. This offer arose by virtue of his seniority within the Courts Service. I am satisfied that this conversation, which was no more than a meeting with a senior colleague, did not have any formality surrounding it. Therefore, when Mr. Dunne refers to a “Supreme Court and High Court Directorate”, he is grossly overstating the matter. There was no such entity as the “Supreme Court and High Court Directorate”.
  35. He brought the Court through his application for appointment to the Courts Service as a PO in
  36. Thereafter, he applied for appointment as Official Assignee in 2008 and was successful.
  37. Upon that appointment, he received a letter dated the 19 December 2008, signed by Mr. Fitzpatrick, that has become central to Mr. Dunne’s arguments. It simply states: “Appointment of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy; In accordance with the determination of the Courts Service Board of the 24th October 2002, made in accordance with section 13 of the Courts Service Act, 1998, as amended by section 40 of the Courts and Court Officers Act, 2002, specifying the functions of the court service referred to in Section 29 of the Courts Service Act, 1998 and listed in the second schedule of that Act, to be performed by the Chief Executive of the Courts Service and following consultation with The President of the High Court, the Honourable Mr. Richard Johnson, I hereby assign and appoint Mr Christopher D. Lehane, Principle Officer to the statutory position of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy with effect from 1st of January
  38. The assignment of Ms. Geraldine Hurley, Official Assignee in Bankruptcy, is terminated with effect from the 31st December 2008.”
  39. The document was an important one, as it allowed him open bank accounts, however it had no official status. As can be seen from it, there is a reference to the discussion which Mr. Fitzpatrick had with the then President of the High Court. No doubt this is where that line of questioning arose from. But as I have noted above, it is of no relevance to the issues in this case.
  40. In 2014, he was seconded from the Courts Service to a new agency, within the Department, namely the ISI. The Civil Law (Miscellaneous) Act 2013 transferred the post of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy to it, as I have set out above. By letter dated the 21 January 2014, he was assigned to that service, with an option to return to the Courts Service after two years. By letter of the 1 January 2015, he was permanently transferred back to the Department.
  41. He was subjected to robust cross-examination at length by Mr. Dunne. Given that he is a litigant in person, it is unsurprising that he merged cross-examination with some form of submission. Nonetheless, notwithstanding that dual role and the confusion which could and did arise at times, Mr. Lehane was clear in his evidence as to his appointment.
  42. His principal response was that Mr. Dunne fundamentally misunderstood the nature of civil service employment. That characterisation is difficult to dispute. As Mr. Lehane was a civil servant, he did not receive a formal contract of employment upon entering the service, nor at any stage during his subsequent promotions, including his appointment as Official Assignee. There is nothing irregular, sinister or untoward in this, notwithstanding the inferences Mr. Dunne appeared to suggest. Rather, it reflects the structure and operation of the Civil Service.
  43. Mr. Dunne focused on his alleged missing HR file, relying on a Freedom of Information schedule from the Department showing documents which were withheld. I find that all relevant documents relating to Mr. Lehane’s employment were before the Court. Mr. Dunne is not entitled to see documents merely to determine whether they might be relevant, that is not the law (Tobin v Minister for Defence [2019] IESC 57).
  44. His repeated assertion that Mr. Lehane lacked terms and conditions in respect of his roles as Principal Officer or Official Assignee is again incorrect. As a civil servant, his terms and conditions are governed by law, namely the Civil Service Regulation Acts 1956-2005 and the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act 1997-
  45. Unlike employment in the private sector, civil servants do not necessarily receive a formal contract of employment.
  46. While Mr. Dunne questioned the authenticity of certain documents, including original copies of key letters including the Moling Ryan letter, dated the 21 December 2000, offering him appointment as a PO and the Fitzpatrick letter of 19 December 2008, appointing him Official Assignee, I have no such concerns. I am satisfied that the copies produced in Court are genuine and authentic. When I asked, on a number of occasions, if he was alleging fraud, he resiled from that suggestion.
  47. Having considered all the evidence, including all the relevant documentation, I make the following further findings of fact: • There was no requirement for a PAS or Civil Service Commission advertisement or competition in respect of Mr. Lehane’s appointment, as he was already a civil servant and the applicable law did not require such a process at the relevant time. • Mr. Lehane had already been validly appointed a Principal Officer by the Courts Service Board on 19 February 2001, and his subsequent appointment as Official Assignee represented a reassignment within the same grade. • On that basis there was no requirement for the submission or production of a CV, references, Candidate Information Booklet, PAS application materials, ranking, interview records, or any competitive process documentation since he was already a PO and the role of the Official Assignee was that of a PO. He was simply changing direction within the same civil service grade. • In fact, there is a record of the Courts Service Board appointing him a PO on the 19 February 2001, and his position as Official Assignee was published in Iris Oifigiúil on the 23 December
  48. • There was no requirement for approval by the Civil Service Commissioners, as Mr Lehane was already a civil servant. In those circumstances, there was no requirement for either the Ministers of Justice or Finance to approve his appointment under Section 29 of the Courts Service Act
  49. • I find that there was no requirement for an advertisement for the role of Official Assignee at the time of Mr. Lehane’s appointment or his reappointment in
  50. Mr. Dunne’s assertion that “The Courts Service can’t find a statutory basis for your appointment in '08.” makes no sense. • As I noted above, there was authorisation from the Courts Service Board allowing the CEO (Mr. Fitzpatrick) to appoint him. It was there in black and white. There was no legal requirement for a seal to be used in the December 2008 appointment letter. • I find that there is no requirement for a letter or deed of transfer from one Official Assignee to another and therefore, the absence of such a document is of no import. • I am further satisfied that all remaining documentary objections advanced by Mr. Dunne are without substance. Witness - Michael Ian Larkin
  51. The next witness was the Second Named Defendant, Michael Ian Larkin, who served as Official Assignee from the 16 November 2020 until 7 February
  52. As with Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Lehane, it would be helpful to set out in some detail the case advanced by Mr. Dunne against him. Mr. Dunne again submits that are a raft of documents missing in regard to his appointment as Official Assignee. These include evidence that PAS ran the competition for the position of Official Assignee on behalf of ISI and not the Department, evidence that ISI held a State Recruitment Licence, his PAS application, his CV and references submitted in
  53. Further alleged missing documents include a Ministerial appointment instrument or warrant in Irish under seal, documented consultation with the ISI, the written consent of Minister for Public Expenditure, any record demonstrating that the Minister personally approved the appointment, any Cabinet memorandum and or notification or any oath and or affirmation or civil service compliance declaration and an Iris Oifigiúil notice of appointment. He further submits that there is no executed permanent ISI employment contract, no Ministerial decision retaining him after his probation or evidence of a valid ISI staff appointment, rather than a Department contract and no valid appointment instrument under Section 12 of the Personal Insolvency Act
  55. Finally, he submits that there are no deed or instrument transferring his bankruptcy estate from Mr. Lehane to Mr. Larkin, no evidence that the Official Assignee is a corporation sole, thereby negating need for a deed, nor any documents addressing an alleged obvious conflict arising from Mr. McNaughton, the Director of the ISI, sitting on his interview panels.
  56. Mr. Larkin then gave evidence. He confirmed his professional qualifications. He holds a Bachelor in Business Studies degree (BBS) from Trinity College Dublin and a postgraduate Diploma in Legal Studies from the Dublin Institute of Technology (now Technological University Dublin), Augier Street. He then qualified as a solicitor and spent 17 years with KBC Bank, working in corporate and project banking and in the Bank’s legal department. Through this experience, he gained substantial exposure to business, law, insolvency matters, and team management.
  57. He gave evidence regarding the application process for the role of Official Assignee at the time of his application. This involved using an online candidate portal established by PAS. It was accompanied by a Candidate Information Booklet, setting out the role of the Official Assignee and the required qualifications. The entry requirements included a professional qualification, significant experience, significant relevant knowledge of insolvency, and a strong track record of managing relationships, all of which he had.
  58. He attended two interviews in June and July 2020 and was successful, receiving a letter from Eimear Lane (who gave evidence) of the Department, dated the 29 September 2020, offering him the position of Official Assignee. He then received and signed a one-year probationary contract, dated the 29 November 2020, with the Department and was assigned to the ISI, Bankruptcy Division. No subsequent contract was issued. All this documentation was before the Court.
  59. During his probation period, Mr. Larkin had quarterly review meetings with Mr. McNaughton, Director of the ISI. He stated that no issues arose during that period and that he continued in the role.
  60. Mr. Larkin referred to a letter dated the 23 November 2020, from the Director of the ISI confirming his appointment as Official Assignee, pursuant to Section 12 of the 2012 Act effective from 16 November
  61. He regarded this letter as a factual confirmation of his appointment.
  62. He was crossed-examined by Mr. Dunne as to whether he had received any documentation directly from the Minister, pursuant to Section 12, on the basis that Mr. Dunne believed that such documentation was required. Mr. Larkin’s evidence was that he had not received any such documentation, as he had been appointed by the Minister, acting through the Department. He said that no further instrument was required.
  63. He stated that the contract was not a fixed-term contract, but a permanent appointment, subject to probation. He accepted that there is no document confirming completion of probation, but said none was required. As no action was taken before the expiry of the probationary period, and he continued in office. He believed that he became a permanent civil servant, following the completion of the process.
  64. He accepted that day-to-day supervision and the probationary process were carried out by the Director of the ISI, not by Department officials. He confirmed that the ISI does not recruit its own staff, and that staff are provided by the Department.
  65. By operation of law, upon appointment as Official Assignee, he automatically became a member of staff of the ISI, without a separate application or contract. There were approximately 78–80 staff in the ISI at the time he took up office. He did not produce a CV or his PAS application, stating these are deleted in the portal system. He accepted that his direct bankruptcy experience prior to appointment was limited, comprising one case in private practice. He had no prior experience as Official Assignee. His references included two external law-firm partners and a further senior professional reference, though he could not recall all the details.
  66. He confirmed that a CV was part of the information uploaded onto the portal and that upon his appointment, he became an established civil servant. He was asked about his contract, which is described as a one-year probationary contract. He said that once this year had passed, he was confirmed in the position. It was put to him that his contract was a fixed term contract, but he disagreed.
  67. He was questioned as to whether the ISI had a recruitment licence. He confirmed that it does not have, but stated that, as it is part of the Department, it does not require one.
  68. Mr. Larkin accepted that the letter confirming his appointment did not refer to any probation. He said that this was not significant, as the letter confirmed the fact of his appointment rather than contractual terms. He believed that he used the letter shortly after it issued, likely in connection with the completion of a property transaction initiated by his predecessor.
  69. In essence Mr. Larkin’s evidence was that he was lawfully appointed through the PAS competition, employed by the Department, assigned to the ISI, supervised by its Director, and confirmed in office by continuation after probation—without a ministerial warrant, formal probation confirmation, or a separate ISI recruitment process. Mr. Larkin stated that, upon his appointment as Official Assignee, property vested in him automatically by operation of statute as “Official Assignee for the time being,” even where the property had previously been registered in his predecessor’s name. He confirmed that no deed of transfer, power of attorney, or vesting instrument was executed when he assumed office, and that he lawfully signed conveyancing documents in his own name as Official Assignee, relying on statutory authority under the bankruptcy legislation.
  70. While he accepted that there was no ministerial warrant, no document signed personally by the Minister, no Iris Oifigiúil notice, nor a sealed statutory appointment instrument, and no written delegation of authority shown authorising named Department officials to issue the appointment documents, he maintained that none of these documents were legally required. He said this was because the Department acts on behalf of, and as the alter ego of the Minister, and that his authority flowed directly from statute, not from the appointment letter. The letter of 23 November 2020 was said to be confirmatory only, not constitutive of his authority. Finally, in response to questioning by the Court, Mr. Larkin clarified that his employment was not pursuant a probationary contract, but rather a contract containing a probationary period, after which he regarded himself as fully appointed.
  71. Following his cross-examination and from a careful assessment of the documents proved in Court, I make the following further findings of fact: • Mr. Larkin was employed by the Department under a contract of employment containing a one-year probationary period, following which he became permanent without any requirement for a new contract. • Upon signing his contract, Mr. Larkin became a civil servant. • He received a valid letter of appointment from the Department, acting on behalf of the Minister, and that letter, together with his contract of employment were sufficient evidence of his appointment. There was no requirement for a ministerial warrant, personal signature, seal, Cabinet approval, or publication in Iris Oifigiúil. • There was no requirement for any sealed statutory instrument or written delegation of authority to Department officials issuing the appointment documentation. The Minister was entitled to act through the Department in accordance with established administrative law principles; the Carltona principle. • Mr. Larkin was supervised by Mr. McNaughton during the one-year probationary period, by way of an online portal computer system, which was used. Had there been any issue of relevance, the portal would have highlighted any deficiency in his employment status. • There was no legal requirement for a sealed statutory appointment instrument nor a written delegation of authority authorising any named Department officials to issue the appointment documents. • There was no requirement for a ministerial warrant or document signed personally by the Minister, or Iris Oifigiúil notice, or sealed statutory appointment instrument, since his appointment was made pursuant to the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 • I find that the correspondence signed by Ms. Lane (whose evidence I shall deal with below) was in fact a letter from the Head of HR and that there was nothing irregular, or more importantly, illegal about the correspondence signed in a “pp” fashion. • The portal system would not have operated had his application, CV and references not been uploaded and therefore there is no deficiency in his appointment by virtue of the fact that the documents were not available before the Court. • The PAS competition was run for the Department since ISI operated under its aegis and therefore ISI does not need its own State Recruitment licence. • There was no requirement that he receive any letter of appointment from ISI as his appointment letter signed by Ms. Lane on behalf of the Department was sufficient in law • There was no conflict arising from Mr. McNaughton, the Director of the ISI, sitting on both interview panels in June and July 2020, nor was it put to the witness that there was any. • There was no requirement for a civil service compliance declaration, consultation with the ISI, or consent from the Minister for Public Expenditure in respect of his appointment. • There is no legal requirement for any deed or instrument transferring Mr Dunne’s bankruptcy estate from Mr. Lehane to Mr. Larkin or the Deputy Official Assignee. • The position of Official Assignee is a statutory office, and upon appointment, property vests automatically in the holder of that office by operation of law. Accordingly, there was no requirement for any deed, transfer instrument, power of attorney, or documentation establishing the office as a corporation sole. • He lawfully entitled to execute conveyancing documents in his own name, in his capacity as Official Assignee, relying on statutory authority under the bankruptcy legislation.
  72. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that all documentary objections advanced by Mr. Dunne are without substance and that the documentary record is complete, coherent, and fully supports the validity of Mr. Larkin’s appointment. Witness - Michael McNaughton
  73. The next witness was the Third Named Defendant, Michael McNaughton. As with the previous witnesses, the case Mr. Dunne makes about Mr. McNaughton’s employment relates to alleged missing or non-existent documents, which he says are relevant and the failure to produce them makes his appointment invalid. He submits Mr. McNaughton’s PAS application, dated 28 February 2019 and CV have not been produced. There is no documentary evidence showing that PAS ran the competition on behalf of the Minister nor was there evidence that the Top Levels Appointment Committee (“TLAC”) acted with Ministerial authority. He submits that a letter of recommendation letter from the Director of PAS is not valid since she was not the CEO, as required by the legislation. There was no ministerial warrant of appointment in Irish, under hand and seal or a record of Cabinet notification or memorandum approving the appointment. There is no oath or declaration confirming adherence to Civil Service Code of Standards and Behaviour and no Iris Oifigiúil notice of original appointment in 2019 or re-appointment
  74. There is no contract of employment with the ISI as his employer. There has been no valid appointment instrument of Mr Larkin under Section 12 of the Personal Insolvency Act
  75. Finally, there is no evidence that ISI possessed a State Recruitment Licence.
  76. Mr. McNaughton then gave evidence. Before applying for the role of Director of the ISI, he held positions in the private sector, most recently with Ulster Bank, where he was involved in restructuring corporate and other loans. While he had extensive professional experience, in his role as Director of ISI, he was not involved in any bankruptcy files. In particular, he never dealt with any of Mr. Dunne’s debts. He saw an advertisement for the Director role in February 2019, which was run by PAS, and he applied. While the application deadline of the 21 February was extended by one week, in my view nothing material arises from this. He was furnished with a Candidate Information Booklet which set out the role of the ISI in the following terms: - "The Insolvency Service of Ireland (ISI) is an independent statutory body established under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 operating under the aegis of the Minister for Justice and Equality."
  77. He had both the qualifications and experience for the job. He registered on the Public Jobs candidate portal, was shortlisted (as evidenced in the documents before the Court), and was called for interviews. By letter dated the 11 of April 2019, he was informed that he was under consideration for the post of Director. Subsequently, by letter of the 12 of June 2019, Shirley Comerford, the CEO of PAS informed him that he was being recommended to the Minister for appointment to the post of Director.
  78. He then received a letter from the Minister, dated the 11 July 2019, notifying him of his appointment. Although the starting date was initially said to be the 26 September 2019, it was, by agreement, changed to the 30 September 2019, as evidenced by a letter dated the 12 August 2019, signed by Ms. Lane on behalf of Ms. Down, Head of HR in the Department. For the avoidance of doubt, I find this to be of no relevance.
  79. He received his contract of employment on the 12 September 2019 and signed the acceptance on the 28 September
  80. His employer was the Department, and the appointment was for a five-year term. In September 2024, his term was extended by the Minister, and he was so informed by email dated the 30 September 2024, together with a further letter from the Minister dated the same day. He was furnished with a new contract, which he accepted on the 7 October
  81. All the documentation was proved in evidence before the Court, and I accept them in full.
  82. In relation to his role in the appointment of Mr Larkin, he told the Court that he sat on his interview panels, and that he conducted quarterly reviews. He noted that Mr Larkin’s contract contained a probationary period, but once that period had passed, he was satisfied with his performance. At that point, Mr Larkin became permanent in the role, with the existing contract continuing in effect. Other than the passage of time, nothing changed.
  83. He gave evidence, which I accept, that the letter he wrote, dated the 23 November 2020, as the Director of ISI confirming Mr. Larkin’s appointment as Official Assignee, was not, as argued by Mr. Dunne, in some way a warrant of appointment or an instrument of appointment. It was, as he said, simply a statement of fact. It was an administrative letter rather than an instrument of appointment, which would enable him to open bank accounts as the Official Assignee and with his dealings with third parties, such as solicitors buying property from the Official Assignee.
  84. Again, he was robustly cross-examined by Mr Dunne. He was questioned about the requirements of Section 11 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012, that he be appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Director of the PAS. He confirmed that the PAS letter came instead from its CEO, Ms. Sherley Comerford. I am satisfied that she held that position, having seen the Annual Report of PAS for
  85. As such, she was the most senior executive of the service. While Section 11 says that the Director of PAS should make the recommendation, I am satisfied that in substance, or to put it another way, applying a purposive interpretation of the section, Ms. Comerford was the correct person to notify the Minister of the outcome of the process and to make the recommendation. There is nothing mandatory in the section which would make the recommendation invalid because it was made by a CEO and not a Director, in circumstances where there was, in fact no Director of ISI, only a CEO. It may well be the case that in fact the CEO is also a director of the service. Nonetheless the matter is a non-issue.
  86. He was also asked whether the competition had been conducted under Section 47 of the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act 2004 as required. He confirmed the Candidate Information Booklet did not state this and instead referred to TLAC.
  87. He gave evidence regarding his function as the sole Director of the ISI, and particular the regulation of personal insolvency practitioners. He confirmed, and I accept, that ISI is an independent statutory body, established under the Personal Insolvency Act, operating under the aegis of the Minister and that pursuant to Section 11, he reports to and is accountable to the Minister.
  88. I am satisfied that he was appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the CEO, who was a director. Therefore, the statutory provision has been satisfied. Nothing of relevance arises from the fact that the the Candidate Information Booklet did not say it was conducted under Section 47 of the 2004 Act, since it clearly was. The Act does not require that fact to be stated in the official documentation.
  89. He was asked about the dual role of Mr. Lehane as both the Official Assignee and a role within ISI and Section 11 of the Act which says that
(6)The Director shall not hold any other office or position in respect of which remuneration is payable...", but this matter was not further developed. Either way it is not of relevance and does not affect his authority or in some way make his appointment invalid.
  1. He confirmed that he replaced Lorcan O’Connor as Director, and that Mr. Lehane was the interim Director. He was questioned about his supervisory role during Mr Larkin’s oneyear probationary period. He confirmed that he had no role regarding Mr Larkin’s actions as the Official Assignee, and that his involvement was limited to ensuring that he had all he needed from an administrative perspective. He reviewed his performance in an administrative capacity, including his conduct, his general performance in the role (such as the management of staff etc.) and matters such as sick leave etc, using a department portal. I am satisfied, and find as a fact, that notwithstanding that the appraisal documents were not produced, they were filed, as the system would not permit the appraisal portal to be closed unless this had occurred.
  2. He confirmed that he reported to the Minister in the performance of his functions and in the performance of the ISI generally, as the Minister also provides the staff, the budget, the information and communication technology services and other services. He was questioned about his CV; however, I am satisfied that he was appropriately qualified for the position, and in any event, this was not an issue in the pleadings.
  3. He was asked about Section 60C of the Bankruptcy Act and the appointment of a Mr. Ryan as Deputy Official Assignee and his qualifications, but again nothing further arose from that line of questioning. He was asked about his letter of the 20 November 2020, relating to the role of Mr. Larkin referencing Section 12 of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 Act. Mr. Dunne sought production of evidence of the Minister’s approval. Mr Dunne’s contention was that, at the time that letter was written, the witness did not have any confirmation from the Minister personally in relation to the appointment.
  4. The witness was clear and I accept that, having sat on the interview panel and made its recommendation to the Minister, he was informed by the Department officials that the Minister intended to appoint Mr. Larkin to the position, which the Minister subsequently did. This sequence of events does not invalidate the appointment in any way. I find that the Minister is not required to personally oversee the probationary period of Mr. Larkin’s contract under the provisions of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956 or any other statutory provision, and that any suggestion otherwise is unsustainable. Applying the Carltona principles, the act of the Department was an act of the Minister. The Minister did not have to personally engage in the appointment.
  5. I am also satisfied that the ISI, is not a standalone entity, but forms part of the Department. On that basis, it does not require a separate appointment licence.
  6. Mr Dunne put a guideline document to the witness concerning probationary contracts which has no statutory basis. While I allowed the document to be admitted, it did not advance his case in any respect.
  7. In summary, having considered the entirety of the cross-examination and all of the documents proven in evidence, I make the following further findings of fact: • Michael McNaughton had no involvement whatsoever in Mr Dunne’s bankruptcy or debts, either before or after his appointment as Director of the ISI. • Prior to his appointment, he had substantial and relevant private-sector experience, most recently with Ulster Bank in corporate loan restructuring. • His qualifications and experience were appropriate for the role of Director of the ISI. • He went through a public competition for the role of Director of the ISI which was run by PAS in early
  8. For the avoidance of doubt, I am fully satisfied that the competition took place, pursuant to Section 47 of the Public Service Management Act
  9. • Mr. McNaughton applied through the PAS process, was duly shortlisted, was interviewed, was informed on 11 April 2019, that he was under consideration and was formally recommended for appointment to the Minister by PAS on 12 June
  10. • The recommendation to the Minister was made by Shirley Comerford, CEO of PAS, who was the most senior executive of PAS, and was the properly authorised person under Section 11 of the PAS Act to make that recommendation. • The fact that Ms. Comerford held the title “Chief Executive Officer” rather than “Director” is legally irrelevant. • Mr McNaughton was duly appointed by the Minister by letter dated 11 July
  11. The start date was amended by agreement from 26 September to 30 September
  12. The absence of direct personal communication from the Minister to Mr. McNaughton at the time of writing does not invalidate the appointment as a matter of law, in particular the Carltona principles. • He was employed by the Department on a fixed-term 5-year contract, which he duly accepted, which was lawfully extended in September 2024, and he signed a new contract on 7 October
  13. • His contract contained a probationary period, which he successfully completed. Upon completion of probation, he became permanent in the role, with his existing contract continuing unchanged. • Mr. McNaughton’s supervisory role of Mr. Larkin was administrative only and did not extend to his statutory functions as Official Assignee. • His PAS application and CV were not before the court but existed and were considered in his application. • There was no legal requirement to show that PAS ran the competition on behalf of the Minister nor that TLAC acted with Ministerial authority since the PAS Act is the authority. • There is no legal requirement for a Ministerial warrant of appointment in Irish under hand and seal or record of cabinet notification or memorandum approving appointment or oath or declaration confirming his adherence to Civil Service Code of Standards and Behaviour nor publication of his appointment in Iris Oifigiúil in 2019 or re-appointment in
  14. • There was no legal requirement to sign a Civil Service Code of Standards and Behaviour. Even if there was such a requirement failure to do so does in any way make his appointment invalid. • He was informed by officials of the Department that the Minister intended to appoint Mr. Larkin, and that the Minister subsequently did so appoint him. • The letter dated 23 November 2020 authored by Mr. McNaughton, was not a warrant, instrument, or act of appointment of Mr. Larkin, but rather an administrative confirmation of fact and not a legal act. The letter served practical administrative purposes (e.g. dealings with banks and third parties). • The Minister is not required, pursuant to the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956, to personally supervise probationary periods, and any suggestion to the contrary is unsustainable and legally misconceived. • I am fully satisfied that the ISI is an independent statutory body established under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012, operating under the aegis, or administrative control of the Minister. • The Director of the ISI reports to and is accountable to the Minister and is the sole Director of the ISI. • The ISI is not a standalone entity separate from the Department, rather it is an independent part of that Department. • On that basis, the ISI does not require a separate recruitment licence but instead procures its resources through the Department. • I am equally satisfied that Mr McNaughton sat on the interview panel for Mr Larkin and conducted quarterly performance reviews during Mr Larkin’s probationary period and that there was no conflict in so doing. • There is nothing of significance arising from he being the sole Director of the service. • All appointment and contractual documentation were proven in evidence and accepted it in full.
  15. The administrative reviews covered the management of staff, conduct, attendance and sick leave, and general performance. Although the appraisal documents were not produced, the Court finds as fact that the appraisals were completed and filed as the electronic system would not have permitted the process to be closed otherwise.
  16. The Court finds that Mr. McNaughton was appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of PAS, thereby satisfying Section 11 of the Personal Insolvency Act
  17. Witness - Sharon O’Brien
  18. The next witness was Ms. Sharon O’Brien, who has been the Head of HR (Principal Officer) in the Department’s Home Affairs and Migration division since March
  19. She confirmed that she holds a Master’s degree in Human Resource Management and a Master’s in Communications and Culture Studies and had 15 plus years’ experience.
  20. She spent two years as Head of Organisation Design and Development within the Department, having previously worked as Head of HR (Appointments) in the Policing Authority, and earlier as HR Manager in CORU, the regulator under the Department of Health.
  21. While she was not in post at the time of the appointments directly at issue before the court, her knowledge of the workings of the Department and her review of all the relevant documents are invaluable.
  22. She explained that HR maintains both paper and electronic records documenting key points in an employee’s career including contracts, Official Secrets Act forms, etc. Historically personnel files also contained payroll records, but these are now managed through electronic systems. Most documents retained are copies rather than originals.
  23. She told the Court that the Department recruits an impressive number of staff, approximately 1,000 in 2024 and about 840 in 2025, resulting in a net increase of roughly 600 staff. Across the Department and its agencies, there are approximately 4,000 staff in total. Given this scale, the Minister cannot personally sign or oversee individual contracts, probation decisions, or day-to-day HR matters.
  24. Appointments are signed either by the Head of HR or “pp” by authorised members of the recruitment team. This is a longstanding practice supported by the Public Service Management Acts. She noted Ms. Lane, as a Higher Executive Officer, was one such authorised signatory.
  25. She confirmed that the Department has approximately 26 agencies under its aegis. Some of these (including the ISI, Forensic Science Ireland, and the Probation Service) are staffed by departmental employees. Others (e.g., An Garda Síochána, the Courts Service, the Policing and Community Safety Authority) have their own votes and HR functions.
  26. The HR department works very closely with PAS. The Department meets with the PAS Client Relations Manager every two weeks to discuss competitions and recruitment needs. PAS may conduct specialist competitions with the Department providing role specifications and engaging throughout the process. Senior PAS letters, as occurred in the ISI Director competition, are signed personally by the PAS CEO, who is its most senior official.
  27. In relation to TLAC, she confirmed that it conducts competitions for senior civil service posts (Assistant Secretary and above), operates with PAS support, and functions within the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (“DPER”), framework. TLAC conducts merit-based assessments for these top roles.
  28. The Department works in consultation with DPER, because budget and staffing matters are largely addressed through annual budgeting processes, revised estimates, and the Department’s delegated sanction to recruit within its pay ceiling, since
  29. DPER approves overall pay budgets but does not issue person-specific staffing approvals unless creating a new post above Principal Officer level.
  30. Suspension powers are delegated, in that the Head of HR may suspend staff below Principal Officer level, while the Secretary General has responsibility for suspending those above that level only and also has the authority to dismisses staff below PO, whereas dismissal of staff at PO level and above is a matter for the Minister. Probationary periods are monitored by HR through an online portal system. Final decisions not to confirm an employee on probation are taken either by the Secretary General or the Minister, depending on grade of the employee concerned.
  31. Mr. Dunne crossed-examined her regarding the IT system used to record probationary information, known as the e-probation system. She confirmed that at the three-month point, the employee is informed that probation is to continue, with similar notifications at the six-month stage and so on. At the conclusion of the process, normally one year, a HR sign-off is required. While there is no single document confirming completion of probation, the process nonetheless requires the HR Department to sign off on it. Every civil servant is subject to a probationary contract for a period. In this case, Mr. Larkin was on a one-year probationary period contract. She confirmed that at the end of that one-year period, and in the absence of any negative appraisal, he ceased to be on a probationary contract and became permanent, although he did not receive a new contract. Instead, he would have received an e-mail confirming that his or her manager, in this case, Mr. McNaughton, had signed off his probationary period. At that point, the function of the e-probation system was completed. The Director of the ISI is an Assistant Secretary, as noted in the Candidate Information Booklet.
  32. She confirmed that Mr Lehane had been a civil servant since 1978 and, accordingly, did not have a contract of employment per se, since he was appointed pursuant to statute. The only relevant document in this regard was the letter from Mr. Moling Ryan, Head of HR of the Courts Service, dated the 21 December 2000, appointing him to PO within the Court Service.
  33. Mr. Dunne repeatedly asked why he did not receive Mr Lehane HR file. She replied that she had read it and disclosed only the material relevant to this case. Those documents included the Moling Ryan’s letter, the PJ Fitzpatrick letter, dated the 19 December 2008, the letter of secondment in 2013, and the letter of transfer back to Department in December
  34. She explained that due to GDPR reasons further disclosure was precluded. I am satisfied that no injustice has been caused to Mr. Dunne, particularly as the HR file did not fall within the scope of the discovery sought. It is difficult to see how the file itself, which would naturally contain personal information, is relevant to the issues arising in this case. He has been given all of the relevant documents.
  35. In reply to further questioning she confirmed that under the Public Service Management Act, appointment powers can be delegated from the Minister to the Secretary General and further to designated officials, with HR—typically the Head of HR—handling and signing appointments as a matter of practice. As previous witnesses had stated the ISI operates independently in function but is not administratively separate, as its staff are Department employees and it depends on the Department for HR, payroll, and funding. While the Minister formally holds the power to appoint ISI members under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012, this can be delegated without a formal written notice. HR has authority to make appointments up to Assistant Secretary level without ministerial involvement, including senior roles following established processes such as TLAC, whereas only Secretary General appointments require Government approval. Finally, staff such as Mr. Lehane became Department employees through statutory transfer provisions that moved personnel from the Office of the Official Assignee into the ISI within the Department.
  36. Arising from her evidence and from a careful examination of all relevant documents, I make the following findings of fact: • The HR Unit of the Department manages recruitment, competitions, and appointments for all employees. Senior employees are employed following competitions run by the PAS. • The scale of recruitment and turnover makes hands-on Ministerial involvement in individual appointments or contracts impracticable, supporting reliance on delegated processes. • The signing of appointment documents “pp” for the Head of HR reflects established and lawful administrative practice. • Ms. Lane was an appropriate and authorised official to sign such documents. HR personnel files are record-keeping tools, storing copies of key documents rather than original decision instruments. • PAS operates as the principal recruitment body for departmental senior appointments, acting in close coordination with the Department. The Director of the ISI role is a TLAC position. • TLAC was established in 1984 and recommends candidates to Ministers and Government, dealing with Assistant Secretary level and above and works in conjunction with PAS. It is supported administratively by PAS under its recruitment licence. • The Department oversees approximately 26 agencies or bodies. Some bodies have staff who are employees of the Department, which include the ISI and other services, while others such as the Probation Service, have independent HR structures and votes and are governed, but not staffed by the Department • Since 2015 The Department operates under delegated sanction with staffing decisions made within budget ceilings. Engagement with DPER occurs mainly through the budgetary processes and is focused on pay and ceilings, not individual appointments. • Individual sanction from DPER is required only for new posts above PO level. Therefore, there is no requirement for individual DPER approval or documentation for routine appointments within existing sanctioned posts, which would include Mr. McNaughton’s position as Director of ISI. • Probation decisions are managed through an e-probation system with recommendations made by management or HR, while a final decision is made by the Secretary General or Minister depending on grade. • She accessed Mr. Lehane’s HR file and correctly identified the relevant documents required in this case. Witness - Eimear Lane
  37. The second-last witness was Ms. Eimear Lane. She confirmed the evidence of Ms. O’Brien in relation to the operation of the HR department within the Department. She confirmed her role as a Higher Executive Officer in the Civil Service since 2015 and that, at the relevant time, she worked on the recruitment team within HR. Her duties included issuing contracts, sending correspondence to candidates and signing letters on behalf of senior HR officials, as part of standard HR procedures using an electronic signature. She confirmed that she did so on behalf of Roisin Down, Head of HR in the Department and signed the letter to Mr. MacNaughton dated the 12 August 2019, in that capacity. She sometimes used an electronic signature, on behalf of Ms. Down. This was a routine HR practice, without seeking case-by-case permission, as she had standing authority to do so.
  38. Ms. Lane confirmed she did not make the underlying decisions but was simply communicating or implementing decisions made elsewhere. The decisions originated from senior management or HR decision-makers, and not from Ms. Lane personally.
  39. Ms. Lane recognised and confirmed each document, identified dates accurately, including the letters of the 12 August 2019 and the 29 September 2020, and confirmed that the contents reflected the correspondence she sent or signed.
  40. She confirmed that her email correspondence was purely administrative and confirmatory, not deliberative or discretionary.
  41. While she was crossed-examined by Mr. Dunne, nothing significant arose. Therefore, accepting her evidence in full, I make the following findings of fact: • Ms. Lane was an Executive Officer in HR carrying out standard administrative duties. • She was authorised to sign and send documents on behalf of the Head of HR under accepted procedures. • All documents bearing her signature or emails were authentic and properly issued, including the letters of the 12 August 2019 and the 29 September
  42. • She did not make, influence, or originate any of the decisions reflected in those documents. • Her role was purely administrative. Witness - Michael Walsh
  43. Michael Walsh was the final witness. He is a retired senior official in the Department and gave evidence in relation to the secondment of Mr. Lehane from the Courts Service to the Department on the 3 December
  45. He explained that the secondment arose from the establishment of the ISI, pursuant to the relevant legislation, the person holding the office of Official Assignee, immediately prior to the commencement of the ISI legislation, was transferred on secondment to the ISI for a period of two years.
  46. At the conclusion of that period, Mr. Lehane had a statutory choice: he could return to the Courts Service—thereby ceasing to hold the office of Official Assignee—or he could remain as Official Assignee, which required him to transfer definitively back to the Department.
  47. Mr. Walsh explained that a definitive transfer meant that Mr. Lehane became a permanent and pensionable civil servant of the Department again. Such interdepartmental transfers were and are routine within the Civil Service.
  48. He noted that these events occurred during the post-recession period, when recruitment restrictions were in force. If Mr. Lehane had elected to return to the Courts Service and no suitable PO post was available, he might have been subject to redeployment under the general civil service redeployment arrangements. However, redeployment was only a contingency and was not inevitable. It did not arise because Mr. Lehane chose to remain as Official Assignee at ISI.
  49. Mr. Walsh further clarified that, while the ISI is a statutory body independent in the exercise of its functions, its staff—including the Official Assignee—are administratively employees of the Department. HR, pay, and personnel matters are managed by the Department. He drew a parallel with the Courts Service, whose officers exercise independent statutory functions but are administrative employees of the Service.
  50. Mr. Walsh confirmed that he was an authorised personnel officer acting within the scope of his functions when issuing the letter dated 1 December
  51. The letter recorded and gave effect to Mr. Lehane’s prior decision to transfer permanently to the Department; it did not constitute a decision made by Mr. Walsh or the Department. The decision was made by Mr. Lehane pursuant to his statutory entitlement.
  52. Mr. Walsh was cross-examined by Mr. Dunne, but nothing of relevance arose from it. On that basis, I make the following findings of fact from his evidence and documents proven by him: • Mr. Walsh was an authorised personnel officer acting within the scope of his official functions when issuing the letter dated 1 December
  53. • The letter of 1 December 2015 formally recorded and implemented Mr. Lehane’s election to transfer permanently to the Department, at the conclusion of his secondment, which reflected his decision, rather than a decision made by Mr. Walsh or the Department at that time. • Mr. Lehane’s transfer to the Department was the legal and practical consequence of his decision to remain as Official Assignee, after the expiry of his secondment. From 3 December 2015, Mr. Lehane became a permanent member of the staff of the Department, rather than remaining on secondment from the Courts Service. • While the ISI is operationally and statutorily independent, its staff—including the Official Assignee—are administratively employees of the Department. • Mr. Lehane elected to transfer back to the Department in order to continue as Official Assignee. • The transfer was not imposed by the Department but resulted from Mr. Lehane’s statutory election. The letter effected a transfer to the Department, with the ISI being the functional location of the post rather than the employer. • The Court is satisfied that the wording of the 1 December 2015 letter is clear and unambiguous. It records a transfer to the Department, not to a separate employer. • Any ambiguity suggested in cross-examination was resolved by the text of the letter itself; and the clear evidence of Mr. Lehane and Mr. Walsh as to civil service practice.
  54. That concluded the evidence adduced by the Defendants. Submissions and Discussion
  55. While Mr. Dunne referred to a case which he called R v Adams in relation to the Carltona principle. In fact, he is referring to the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adams [1958] AC
  56. He submits that this case, which is a leading authority on the Carltona principle, is not relevant on the basis that Mr. Lehane was not appointed Official Assignee by the Minister. However, as I have found above, Mr. Lehane was lawfully appointed, through the process applicable at the time, namely by Mr. Fitzpatrick, CEO of the Courts Service, with the authorisation of the Courts Service Board, to appoint him.
  57. Mr. Dunne also submitted that Whelan v Min for Transport [2023] IEHC 586, a case in the book of authorities, is not relevant because Mr. Larkin was not a civil servant, yet on the face of it, the case is clearly relevant, for two reasons. In that case the plaintiff, Mr. Whelan, was a civil servant who was promoted to Principal Officer in the Department of Transport, subject to a 12-month probationary period. Problems arose when his probation was allowed to expire. No decision was taken during the probation to terminate the appointment but months later, the Minister attempted to revoke the promotion and revert him to his former grade. Mr Whelan argued that this was unlawful, and he sought judicial review and was successful in preventing it.
  58. The case is authority for the proposition that senior civil service probation decisions are reserved to the Minister personally and fall outside the Carltona principle, and that once a statutory probation period expires, the appointment takes effect automatically.
  59. The second reason it is relevant is that it relates to his assertion that Mr. Larkin was not a civil servant. But I have found, on the evidence, that upon signing his contract, Mr. Larkin became a civil servant.
  60. He reiterated his argument that Mr. Larkin’s contract was probationary only, on the basis that no new contract issued at the conclusion of the one-year period. However, the overwhelming evidence was that once that period expired, his position was confirmed. He also sought to draw an analogy with the position of County Registrars. That comparison is misplaced. There is no equivalence between the role of the Official Assignee and that of a County Registrar. One is a civil servant while the other is a legal officer of the State.
  61. He constantly asserted that documents had been withheld or never came into existence in the first place and relied, in particular, on the letter from Mr. Ryan appointing Mr. Lehane, which emerged shortly before the hearing. He contended that its late emergence demonstrated that further documents exist and have not been disclosed. He also pointed to the absence of the HR file relating to Mr. Lehane. But I have found that all documents relevant to the issues in this case were proven before the Court.
  62. The law is clear: only documents that are relevant may be sought and only where the court is satisfied as to their relevance can their production be directed. The additional categories of documentation identified by him, including CVs, references relating to Mr. Larkin and Mr. McNaughton, documentation concerning Mr. Lehane's dual position as Director of the ISI and Official Assignee, documentation regarding Mr. Lehane's pension dispute with the Department and internal memoranda addressing the validity or constitutionality of appointment under Section 29, are not relevant to the matters that fall for determination in this hearing.
  63. He maintained that there was no documentation supporting the purpose of the letter of the 23 November 2020, which identified Mr. Larkin as the Official Assignee. But that is to ignore the evidence of Mr. McNaughton who confirmed that its purpose was administrative. His complaints fall away in the face of the findings of fact which I have made. I again state that all relevant documents were before the Court. In the event that there may have been a missing document, which I do not believe there was, I am satisfied that all legally required procedural steps were taken in the appointment of the various officials, in accordance with the law, as it was, and the Carltona principle.
  64. His repeated references to alleged missing documents reflect a misunderstanding of the legal framework as it evolved over the course of his bankruptcy, and of the manner in which government functions are exercised in a modern society. While he described the powers of the Official Assignee as draconian, he ignored the fact the Official Assignee acted on foot of court orders, as is only correct in a jurisdiction where the rule of law prevails. There is no reality to his continual assertions of missing documents.
  65. He sought to rely on a code of practice which he procured from the internet. However, the code relied upon is only a code and no more. Where it may differ from the strict legal requirements. in any given situation. it cannot trump the law. Either way I am satisfied that the code is of no relevance to the issues arising in this case.
  66. He complained of the absence of a witness, Ms. Down, who was head of the HR during the relevant period. I am satisfied, however, that any evidence she might have given was comprehensively addressed by Ms. O’Brien, Ms. Lane and Mr. Walsh and that her evidence would not have added anything further to the known facts.
  67. He submitted that ISI does not exist in law. That contention is, quite frankly ludicrous and again reflects a misunderstanding of how the ISI was established, at best. In any event I have found, as a matter of fact, that it was lawfully created. He sought to analyse and equate the matters in issue by reference to his own personal experience in business. Understandably this submission has no merit. One does not have to be a student of law to appreciate that the employment in the civil service is fundamentally different to private industry or business. He further submitted that he was not provided with Circular 12/19, which is a civil service HR circular issued by DPER, which sets out policy requirements governing probationary periods in the civil service. Yet it did not feature to any significant extent, if at all, in the evidence. In fact, it is easily accessible online.
  68. He sought to equate the role of an Official Assignee with that of a judge, relying on Shelly v District Justice Mahon [1990] 1 I.R.
  69. That reliance is misplaced. The role of a District Court judge is not in any way comparable or analogous to that of the Official Assignee. That case related to the failure on the part of the judge to correctly notify the department as to his correct age in order to seek a warrant of extension to act as a district judge. When, he sought and received the warrant, he had already passed his statutory retirement age and therefore the High and Supreme courts held, it was invalid. On that basis any convictions he found too were invalid. That is not the position in this case. For the avoidance of doubt, the role of the Official Assignee is not a quasi-judicial role or position.
  70. He further asserted that there is no assignment of the assets from one Official Assignee to another. That submission too has no merit. Where an Official Assignee retires or otherwise vacates office, his or her successor, whether a deputy or a newly appointed Official Assignee, assumes the role, as a matter of law. The assets attach to the position, not to the individual officeholder.
  71. I have considered the remainder of his submissions in full, but they too are without merit. By way of example, he questioned the recollection of Mr. Lehane and Mr. Fitzpatrick as to where interviews were held, suggesting that perhaps no interviews took place. This issue is immaterial unless accompanied by a clear allegation that the witnesses were in fact lying. He was afforded an opportunity to advance such an allegation, but he declined to do so but simply let the insinuation hang in the air.
  72. Again for the avoidance of doubt, I reject any suggestion that any witness failed to give truthful evidence. Each witness answered the questions put to them in cross-examination by Mr. Dunne, with clarity and truth.
  73. There is one final matter which was not actively canvassed during the hearing but was mentioned in passing and relates to observations made by Humphreys J. in Lehane v Wymes [2021] IEHC
  74. In his opening Mr. Dunne sought to characterise the judges’ comments as a finding that the letter of the 23 November 2020, was invalid and of no effect, and that the judge had dismissed the letter, saying it was not evidence of a valid appointment. On day 1 of the transcript at para. 21 he said “..and Justice Humphreys says he did not believe that ...the document from the ISI stating that Mr Larkin has been appointed (by the minister)…” and later at para. 37 he made selective quotes from the judgment relating to the letter and its import.
  75. There is no doubt in my mind that the use of selective quotes from Humphreys J.’s judgment was an attempt to persuade the Court that the appointment of Mr. Larkin was invalid and a fraud.
  76. But it is both a misquotation and a misrepresentation of the judgment. The matter before the court related to an application to substitute Mr. Larkin for Mr. Lehane as a plaintiff acting in his capacity as the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy and no more. The full quote reads as follows: “
  77. The bankrupt argued that there was no evidence that the Minister had appointed Mr. Larkin. But he is not entitled to demand such evidence for the purposes of an application of this kind, which is determined on a prima facie basis. In such a context, the averments of the moving party are generally sufficient. 42.However, while the Official Assignee submitted that a letter from the Insolvency Service of Ireland (ISI) stating that Mr. Larkin had been appointed was prima facie evidence, I do not think that s. 8
(5)of the 2012 Act has the radical effect the Official Assignee contended for. Section 8
(5)only makes documents of the ISI prima facie evidence. It does not mean their contents are presumed to be true. Thus, a sealed document constituting a performative act of the ISI is evidence of that act. For example, a sealed agreement would be evidence that the ISI had entered into that agreement. But a sealed document containing a factual representation is not prima facie evidence that the fact so stated is true. 43. Thus I do not believe that the document from the ISI stating that Mr. Larkin has been appointed (by the Minister) is actually evidence that he has been appointed for the purposes of s. 8
(5)of the 2012 Act. As noted above, the appointment wasn’t made by the ISI, so the document isn’t performative, it is just a factual representation. A sealed document which constitutes an appointment made by the ISI itself would indeed be evidence of the appointment. But what is evidence is Mr. Larkin’s own affidavit, and that to my mind constitutes prima facie proof for present purposes. If the bankrupt thinks that Mr. Larkin was not appointed by the Minister for Justice in accordance with the correct procedure, no doubt he can look into that by way of correspondence or under the Freedom of Information Act 2014 or in some other manner in due course. (Although it can be surprising to discover that not all appointments are reduced to writing by way of a formal warrant signed by the appointing Minister (which I think would be best practice), but omitting to do so, while slightly unsatisfying, doesn’t mean that an appointee wasn’t appointed.) For present purposes, the bankrupt’s beliefs about the appointment being procedurally questionable were not a reason not to make the order; doubly so since no plausible basis for those beliefs was apparent.” (emphasis added)
  1. Therefore, entirely contrary to what Mr Dunne implied, the judge made no finding that the letter was of no effect. All he said was for the purposes of the application before him, the letter of itself was not prime facie evidence of his appointment. Further he fully accepted the sworn evidence of Mr. Larkin that he was appointed the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy. Conclusion
  2. I have had the benefit of a full hearing on the subject, with witnesses examined and cross examined together with documents, fully proven before the court and I am fully satisfied that Mr. Lehane. Mr. Larkin and Mr. McNaughton were all validly appointed in accordance with law and have found that as a fact. In those circumstances the matter is closed, subject, of course, to any appeal that might be brought.
  3. For sake of completeness in his opening Mr. Dunne referred to other allegedly missing documents but which did not feature in the evidence, however, as I have stated above, in my view there are no further missing documents. However, if for some reason I have failed to refer to an alleged missing document or some alleged procedure, that does not mean that his allegations have any merit, they do not. Again, for the sake of completeness, he has not demonstrated any breach of his rights under the ECHR.
  4. I am satisfied that the functions entrusted to departmental officials were performed at the appropriate level of seniority, and within the scope of responsibility of their authority and that of their department or agency, whether it be the Court Service or ISI.
  5. I have no hesitation in finding that the case put forward by Mr. Dunne has no foundation in law or fact and consists of unfounded conjecture and a misunderstanding of the law. In fact, they amount no more than fantasy AI generated submissions, which have no merit.
  6. This whole exercise has, from the outset, been a complete waste of court time and legal resources. He did not engage in any meaningful way with the legal submissions advanced against him.
  7. At its core, the principal basis of his claim, as pleaded, was an alleged failure to comply with what he termed, the “Constitutional OA Appointment Procedure” (see para. 21 of Statement of Claim). He contended that there were defined statutory and constitutional requirements governing the appointment of the Official Assignee, and they had not been met. Those requirements have been set out in detail at para. 15 above.
  8. Quite remarkably, in his closing submission, he conceded that there was no such “Constitutional Official Assignee Appointment Procedure” (Day 4 Pg. 99-100). Nor was there a “Director Appointment Procedure”, in respect of Mr McNaughton, acting as sole Director of ISI (para 48 of the Statement of Claim). On that basis the same must apply to what he described as “MM Appointment Documentation”. For the avoidance of doubt, I find that there never was any such procedures or a requirement for such documents in the formal way suggested.
  9. In fact, it is difficult not to accept the submission of Mr McCann SC, on behalf of Mr. McNaughton and ISI, that Mr. Dunne’s submissions amounted to no more than “makey up law”. There is no basis in either law or fact for any of the submissions advanced by him, which I have carefully considered.
  10. In conclusion, I find that the case advanced by Mr. Dunne, both on his own behalf and on behalf of his children, must fail.
  11. In those circumstances I find that Mr. Dunne is not entitled to a declaration that the appointments of Mr. Lehane and Mr. Larkin as Official Assignees in Bankruptcy were not made in compliance with statute, Bunreacht na hÉireann and the ECHR, and are therefore invalid, unlawful, null and void ab initio.
  12. Nor is he entitled to a declaration that the appointment of Mr. McNaughton as sole Director of the ISI was not made in compliance with statute, Bunreacht na hÉireann and the ECHR, and is therefore invalid, unlawful, null and void ab initio.
  13. I shall list the case for mention on Thursday 4 June 2026 for final orders.

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