2026 IEHC 275

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 275 [Record No. H.SA.2024/115] IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACTS 1954 – 2008 AND IN THE MATTER OF DECLAN O’CALLAGHAN, A SOLICITOR FORMERLY PRACTISING AS PRINCIPAL OF KILRANE O’CALLAGHAN & CO. SOLICITORS, BALLAGHADERREEN, CO. ROSCOMMON AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY NIRVANNA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED TO THE SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL BETWEEN DECLAN O’CALLAGHAN APPLICANT/APPELLANT AND NIRVANNA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED RESPONDENT AND LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND NOTICE PARTY 1 EX TEMPORE Judgment of Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins delivered on the 23rd January 2026 Ruling in relation to sanction

1. In relation to the question of sanction, it seems to me that the order the court makes should obviously reflect, insofar as that is achievable, the somewhat unusual course the complaints have taken, and also the appropriate correspondence and submissions made on foot of that correspondence which have been made to the court this morning. The position is that, on foot of the court delivering its judgment in the substantive appeal, a finding of misconduct against the solicitor has been upheld, but in circumstances where the court dismissed (and I am going to use this word purely for brevity) three of the disciplinary ‘charges’, but upheld the charge relating to a conflict of interest - that is to say, participating in a land transaction as a solicitor in a situation involving a clear conflict of interest. So, what is the effect of all of that? Undoubtedly, it removes from the discussion slate the sanction that was recommended by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) - which was of course premised upon a finding of guilt on all four disciplinary charges. Therefore, it follows that that sanction is off the pitch.
2. The Law Society, the professional body with expertise in this matter, is content to draw a line under matters and has nominated a proposed sanction of a censure, and has taken the extra step of writing to the solicitors for Mr O’Callaghan to indicate their view that, in the overall outplay of the matter, that would be a just and appropriate order. As Mr. Ó Ciaráin correctly puts it, the court has to have regard, this being a regulatory matter, to the interests of the solicitors’ profession, the necessity to protect members of the public and other regulatory matters emphasised in the jurisprudence of the professional disciplinary list, in particular, the decision of former President Kelly in relation to these matters. I myself have occasionally taken that list and have a broad awareness of the matters to be taken into account in assessing the question of sanction. 2
3. I will also apply the jurisprudence as laid down by the current President (Barniville P.) regarding the various matters to be taken into account. In the overall circumstances of the case, it seems to me that the court should also have regard to what has been said by Ms. Bird BL concerning the past disciplinary record of the solicitor, which obviously, if you like, has an inflationary impact upon the proposed sanction - that is to say, these are matters on the ‘debit’ side of the ledger from the solicitor’s point of view. There are disciplinary matters from 1990 relating to what is said to have been an improper handling of client monies which involved a restriction being placed on Mr. O’Callaghan’s practice and ‘building in’ an element of supervision on the solicitor’s practice for three years. There is also a much more recent matter from 2019 relating to a finding that the solicitor concerned had retained for too long in the client account client monies, before ultimately handing them over. I take that matter into account as well.
4. I also take into account the difficult situation that presented itself for the solicitor who, it has to be said, following the SDT hearing had to contend with the prospect of a recommendation being made by the tribunal that he be struck off, which I think any member of the public, not to mind a solicitor, would understand is a matter of extreme concern for any practitioner, and the point that there was in play, more than in play, a recommended sanction by a tribunal that his profession should be brought to an end and his ability to earn a livelihood should be brought to an end. The solicitor has been successful in avoiding that outcome and in having four of the charges reduced down to one, albeit not successful in avoiding a misconduct finding.
5. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the justice of the case and the need to protect members of the public and the public interest, which the court should keep to the forefront of its mind, would be met by abiding by the recommendation now made by the Law 3 Society - that is to say, in leaving matters at a censure. Accordingly, that is the sanction order that I propose to make.
6. I also note that in the correspondence that passed between the solicitor’s current solicitors and the Law Society’s solicitors, Fieldfisher LLP, it was indicated that the Law Society would not seek its costs of the confirmation application and therefore I will abide that recommendation as well. That seems to be a sensible and reasonable position which has been reached between Mr. O’Callaghan’s advisors and those of the Law Society and I will follow that indication as well. So that is the order that I propose to make in relation to the confirmation application. Ruling in relation to costs
7. Now, this is my ruling on the issue of costs arising in this case. The court has been provided with helpful written submissions (as I mentioned earlier) by both parties in dispute and these have been supplemented by also helpful oral submissions made this morning. I will only summarise in a brief way the submissions made as they are fresh in everyone’s minds. I think it would be perhaps more helpful if I outlined some essential factors that in my view have a particular bearing on the costs issues.
8. Before doing that, I want to mention briefly the position of the Law Society, which, as I mentioned earlier, is the professional body that was directed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal to bring the report of the tribunal before the High Court. That brings about a situation where there are effectively two applications before the court this morning in a general sense. The first is the Law Society’s motion bringing the tribunal’s report before the court and seeking confirmation of the proposed sanction of a censure. I have already ruled on that aspect and decided that that indeed was the appropriate sanction to impose. 4
9. The second matter is Mr. O’Callaghan’s appeal from the findings of misconduct made by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. I heard the appeal over two days on the 23rd and 24th of July 2025, and there were four separate misconduct findings made by the tribunal, and I am going to paraphrase them somewhat. These were, firstly, that Mr. O’Callaghan purported to act for both the vendor and the purchaser in a transaction where there was a clear conflict of interest. Secondly, that Mr. O’Callaghan had failed to ensure that the consideration for the transaction in question had passed to the vendor company (the respondent herein) before title to the property passed to the purchaser. Thirdly, that Mr. O’Callaghan provided inadequate professional services and was in breach of his duty of care to the respondent, Nirvanna. And fourthly, that Mr. O’Callaghan continued to act for the purchaser in proceedings against him for recovery of the relevant consideration.
10. So, if you like, that four-point table of charges was found to have been proved by the tribunal. Mr. O’Callaghan appealed that finding to the High Court and the outcome of Mr. O’Callaghan’s appeal, as found in my judgment, was that the first charge of misconduct relating to his acting in a situation involving a clear conflict of interest was upheld, and was adjudged to have been proved to the criminal standard of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’. The remaining three charges were dismissed, and the appeal was allowed to that extent only.
11. Insofar as some of the respondent’s submissions reference the court reaching some of its findings with some hesitation, or by reference to the exacting standard of proof that was applicable, and I don’t mean this in any critical sense, I think the court should not get involved in distinguishing between the findings made or regard them as somehow carrying less weight where such language was used. In the view of the court, rules of legal certainty and fairness require that, in relation to the court’s finding on the specific allegations of misconduct, the options, if you like, are binary. The misconduct allegation is either upheld or it is dismissed. The applicable standard of proof is the applicable standard of proof, and accordingly, for costs 5 purposes, the resting place of the court’s findings is that the misconduct charge alleging the conflict of interest was upheld, and the other three charges were dismissed. The other three charges carried with them a somewhat explosive, or at least highly charged, context, including an allegation of dishonesty and wrongfully retaining clients’ monies.
12. Now, in correspondence passing between Fieldfisher LLP for the Law Society and Mr. O’Callaghan’s solicitors, Staunton Caulfield & Co., the parties (as I mentioned) reached agreement in light of the circumstances of the case and the court’s judgment that the appropriate sanction to be imposed was one of a censure. I have stated my satisfaction that this is indeed the appropriate sanction which takes proper account of the seriousness of the matter, the passage of time, the history of the matter, and most importantly, the regulatory concerns - the necessity to protect members of the public.
13. Moving then to the substance of the costs matters, I will address first the submissions of the parties. On behalf of the respondent, Nirvanna, the following points were urged: The core complaint was that Mr. O’Callaghan was guilty of misconduct. This has been upheld in the respondent’s favour. Full stop. Secondly, no personal benefit was available to the respondent from the litigation; the complaint was pursued in furtherance of a recognised public interest. Thirdly, the statutory aim of the Oireachtas in enacting section 7 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 (as amended) would, it is urged, be defeated in what is an important area of public interest. Fourthly, not giving the respondent its costs would operate as a practical deterrent, effectively barring litigants of ordinary means from pursuing complaints of this nature, particularly where, as here, there has actually been a finding of misconduct upheld.
14. Fifthly, it is urged that all of the disciplinary charges were closely interlinked in the evidence, and therefore, as a matter of reality, either no or only limited additional cost was incurred by the appellant, and, if you like, the ‘elongation of trial’ point does not have force because of the interlinkage of the charges and the evidence referable thereto. It is submitted 6 that the costs that would have been incurred in meeting the ‘conflict of interest’ charge would have been incurred anyway.
15. Sixthly, having regard to the statutory criteria set out within sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the issues raised by the respondent were in furtherance of the public interest in ensuring that the integrity of the solicitors’ profession was maintained and that clients everywhere were protected. The fact that the finding of misconduct was upheld demonstrates that the proceedings fulfilled an important public purpose.
16. And seventhly, it is urged that the proceedings meet many of the criteria for public interest proceedings as identified by Mr. Justice Murray in Little v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC
18. Finally, in counsel’s oral submissions, which were impressively concise, the point was pressed that, where a complainant succeeds in establishing misconduct, it would hardly be in the public interest that such a complainant would not be confident that he will recover his costs, all the more so where the complainant did not stand to gain financially from bringing the complaint. And it was submitted that it could not have been the intention of the Oireachtas in enacting the section that only very wealthy complainants would bring forward complaints, particularly in circumstances where the outcome here was the upholding of the finding of the complaint.
19. Moving then to the submissions made by Mr. Mullooly on behalf of the appellant, Mr. O’Callaghan: Firstly, it is urged that the issues could not have been more serious from the appellant’s point of view. The recommendation of the SDT was an order for strike off - a termination of Mr. O’Callaghan’s livelihood - which carries distinct reputational as well as financial and other connotations. Secondly, the appellant, it is submitted, has been entirely, or at the very least, substantially successful in the appeal in that three of the four misconduct charges have been dismissed and the findings of the court are such that the Law Society is 7 content to ‘draw a line’ under the matter at a censure, and the Society is not seeking costs either for the tribunal stage or for the appeal.
20. Thirdly, the ‘pith’, as it is put, of the respondent’s complaint was that the applicant had dishonestly failed to pass on the sum of €250,000 said to have been due to the respondent for an alleged sale of lands in County Mayo in
21. It is submitted that, on any view, the appellant’s appeal has been substantially successful, and that in accordance with sections 168 and 169 this reality must be reflected in the court’s order, particularly having regard to paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) within section 169