2026 IEHC 312

(1)(b) of the Naturalisation and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended (“s. 15

(1)(b)”) by reason of being party to a marriage of convenience. Background

1. The applicant is a 35-year-old Pakistani national who was born in
2. He entered the State on 10 July
3. He married MD, a Latvian national on 28 February
4. On 16 April 2014, he sought permission to remain in the State on the basis of his marriage to MD as an EU citizen. He was granted temporary permission to remain on 7 May 2014 which lasted until 19 November
6. On 8 October 2014, the Minister’s department wrote to the applicant stating that his wife, MD, the EU national, was previously married and sought a certificate of divorce. The 1 letter of 8 October 2014 also sought the reason why MD was listed as single on the marriage certificate submitted with their application, in circumstances where the Latvian authorities had informed the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) that MD had married a Latvian national in April
7. The applicant did not respond to this correspondence, nor did he respond to a follow up letter from INIS on 31 October 2026 and his application for EU Treaty Right (“EUTR”) residence permission was refused by INIS on 19 November 2014 on the basis that the applicant failed to submit satisfactory evidence that he was a family member of an EU citizen in accordance with the relevant regulations.
8. It is of relevance to the issues in these proceedings to note that the EUTR permission application was not refused on the basis that the applicant was in a marriage of convenience. The real concern of INIS at that point was that the applicant was in a potentially invalid marriage given that MD had been previously married and had not divorced.
9. The applicant’s then solicitors wrote to INIS on 17 April 2015 informing them of a change of address by the applicant but also asking them to note that they were:- "…in the process of bringing nullity proceedings for our client in the Family Law Circuit Court as he was unaware that [MD] was previously married in Latvia. We will keep you informed of the progress of this case…".
10. It does not appear that there was any follow-up correspondence by the applicant to INIS in relation to the nullity proceedings and the applicant stated in an affidavit in these proceedings that he did not proceed with his application for a decree of nullity "due to my poor financial condition".
11. On 9 June 2015, the applicant applied for residency in the State as a permitted family member of his brother, who was a British national. The applicant was granted temporary permission again, which was valid from 11 November 2015 to 8 January
12. On 20 January 2016, the applicant obtained a stamp 4 EU permission to remain, valid for a period of five years commencing on 19 January
14. On 15 December 2020, the applicant was informed by the Minister of his intention to remove his residence card as his brother, the EU citizen, was not exercising his rights in the State. On 15 August 2021, the applicant's permission was revoked from 31 December 2019 when his brother stopped exercising his rights in the State. 2
15. The applicant submitted an application to the Minister for a certificate of naturalisation on 22 March
16. Mandamus proceedings were instituted to compel the Minister to make a decision in relation to the application and subsequently those proceedings were compromised.
17. In September 2021, the applicant submitted an application for residency based on the CJEU’s decision in Chenchooliah v. Minister for Justice (94/18, 10 September 2019). On 12 August 2022, he was granted permission to remain in the State for a period of one year. On 5 April 2023, the applicant was granted a further permission valid for a period of two years.
18. In the application form filled out by the applicant for his naturalisation application, he described his relationship status as "separated" and also stated that his civil status at the time of his marriage was "single". He stated that his spouse’s civil status at the time of his marriage was "married". He gave MD as his spouse.
19. In the context of evaluating his naturalisation application, the Minister's department wrote to the applicant’s solicitors on 22 March 2024 stating (in bold) that "It has come to the attention of the Minister that on 28/11/2016 in the Riga, Latvian court [MD] pleaded guilty for her involvement in a marriage of convenience to [the applicant]".
20. The letter stated that it was considered “that this matter could have potential reference [sic – that should have been “relevance”] to an assessment by the Minister as to whether the applicant was of "good character" as required by s. 15

(1)(b) of the 1956 Act” and that the purpose of the letter was to allow the applicant an opportunity to provide "any relevant factual and/or contextual information in connection with the matters outlined in the Garda vetting report as well as any submissions you may wish to make as the basis upon which these matters should now be assessed in deciding whether your client is of good character".

1. As I shall come to, the applicant complains that this letter did not invite submissions as to whether he was knowingly a party to a marriage of convenience.
2. The applicant replied by way of detailed letter from his solicitor of 26 March
3. The thrust of this letter was a legal submission to the effect that the Minister's concern about MD pleading guilty in Latvia to involvement in a marriage of convenience to the applicant was irrelevant to the Minister's determination of the application on the grounds that the applicant 3 had fulfilled the five-year residence in the State requirement at the time of filing his citizenship application, that the applicant was "not aware of any court prosecutions in Latvia" and that his permission to remain in the State was granted in 2016 on the basis of him being a family member of an EU citizen (i.e. his brother). The letter submitted that the applicant had not been granted a residence card on the basis of the marriage to MD.
4. By letter dated 28 March 2024, the applicant’s application for naturalisation was refused under the good character criterion pursuant to section 15

(1)(b) on the essential basis that the applicant had been a party to a marriage of convenience and that this reflected adversely on his trustworthiness and honesty to the extent that it outweighed positive factors in his favour in assessing the question of good character. This decision is the subject matter of these proceedings. The applicant’s case

1. In summary, the applicant contends that the Minister failed to consider whether the applicant may not have been knowingly a party to a marriage of convenience; that the decision made an unreasonable – and unreasoned – jump to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty of dishonesty; and that there was a failure to have regard to the relevant considerations of the statements made by the applicant in 2015 and 2024 to the effect that he was not aware that MD was previously married and he intended to apply for nullity and that he did not acquire any EUTR rights on the basis of reliance on a marriage of convenience. He also submitted at the judicial review hearing that the Minister had regard in arriving at the decision to an undisclosed Garda report which contained material errors and which the applicant did not get an opportunity to address. The impugned decision
2. The basis for the Minister's decision to refuse the applicant naturalisation was set out in a submission prepared for the Minister which was attached to the covering letter communicating the decision. For ease, I will refer to this submission document as the "decision".
3. In order to assess the applicant’s arguments in context, it is necessary to step through the terms of the decision in some detail. 4
4. The decision is structured as follows. It sets out, correctly, the applicant's history of residence in the State including the fact that he was refused an EUTR permission to remain on the basis of his marriage to an EU citizen as he had "failed to submit satisfactory evidence that he was a family member of an EU citizen" in accordance with the relevant regulations.
5. The decision recorded the documentation that had been considered in deciding on the application. I will come back to the question of the documentation in fact considered by the decision-maker later in this judgment, as the applicant says that the list of documentation referenced as considered in the decision is materially incomplete.
6. The decision notes that vetting searches conducted by the National Vetting Bureau of An Garda Síochána confirmed that the applicant had no criminal charges or convictions recorded against him in the State, and, likewise, a Pakistani Police Character Certificate showed that he had no criminal charges recorded against him in Pakistan. The decision noted that the applicant had resided in the State for a total of 10 years, which was to his credit and reflected positively on his character, with the result that it was to be weighed favourably in assessing his character.
7. The decision then noted the information made available to the Minister as to the guilty plea of MD in Latvia to a charge of being involved in a marriage of convenience with the applicant. It referenced the fact that correspondence issued to the applicant's solicitor on 22 March 2024 giving him an opportunity "to provide any relevant factual and/or contextual information in connection with the above finding as well as any submissions that the applicant may wish to make on the basis upon which these matters should be assessed in deciding whether the applicant is of good character". The decision then quoted from the applicant's solicitor’s response of 26 March 2024 which I summarised at para 15 above.
8. The decision then stated: "While it is accepted that the applicant's permission to remain in the State from 2015 to 2020 was dependent on his brother, an EU citizen who was exercising his EU Treaty Rights in the State, it remains the case that the applicant’s spouse was found by the Latvian Courts to have entered into a marriage of convenience with the applicant for the purpose of conferring an immigration advantage on him. Accordingly, [for] the 5 purposes of the within decision, the facts as found by Court in Riga are relied upon in full. On this basis, it is clear that the applicant engaged in a marriage of convenience with [MD]. The fact that his attempt to gain an immigration advantage was ultimately unsuccessful does not detract from its relevance in an assessment of the applicant's good character. This is an extremely serious matter, which is considered to reflect adversely on the applicant's character."
9. The decision then stated that it was clear that the above conduct (i.e. the entry into a marriage of convenience) reflected negatively on the applicant's character for the purposes of the s.15

(1)(b) assessment: "The applicant attempted to mislead the immigration system of the State by engaging in a marriage of convenience with an EU national". 26. The decision went on to state:"Taking into account the above facts, the applicant has displayed a degree of dishonesty that weighs negatively in an assessment of his character under section 15

(1). Although the Minister will not automatically reject the applicant's application for naturalisation on the basis of findings of marriage of convenience the Minister is deeply concerned about deception of this magnitude in the context of the immigration system and has weighed the evidence against the applicant's character accordingly."

1. The decision went on to weigh to the applicant's credit his efforts to integrate successfully into Irish society including his employment history and his intention to live in the State and stated that these were matters to be weighed in his favour.
2. The decision, under the heading "Recommendation", in addressing the good character criterion in s. 15

(1)(b), stated as follows:“I have considered the entirety of the file including the vetting disclosure received from An Garda Síochána, the submissions from the applicant's legal representative in relation to Mr Shahzad’s marriage, the findings of the EUTR division, the applicant’s steady employment history and the fact that the applicant holds current immigration permission valid to 5/4/

1. 6 I have also considered that that the applicant attempted to mislead the immigration system of the State by engaging in a marriage of convenience with an EU national. The fact that his attempt to gain an immigration advantage was ultimately unsuccessful does not detract from its relevance in an assessment on the applicant's good character. Mr Shahzad has resided in the State since 2013 and has no criminal charges or convictions recorded against him. This matter is to the applicant's credit and reflects positively on the applicant's character. However, this must be weighed against the seriousness of the marriage of convenience and in his previous interactions with the immigration system, Mr Shahzad failed in both his obligations under the Regulations as well as his basic trustworthiness: the latter being a key element of good character."
2. Weighing the "serious and significant" negative factors against the positive evidence of good character, the decision-maker concluded that the overall balance favoured a conclusion that the applicant was not of good character and recommended a refusal of a grant of naturalisation as a result.
3. This recommendation was adopted by the Minister. Discussion Irrationality/lack of reasons/failure to consider
4. The applicant variously characterises his case in judicial review as one based on irrationality, lack of adequate reasons and a failure to have regard to relevant considerations.
5. There is no dispute as to the applicable legal principles. In particular, it is not disputed that the Minister was obliged to consider and analyse all relevant material and not to have regard to irrelevant considerations. The authorities relating to an assessment of good character under s.15

(1)(b), such as MNN v Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187 and Talla v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IECA 135 make clear, as was put by Haughton J. at para. 46 of Talla, that "in addressing the condition that an applicant be of good character the Minister 7 must consider and analyse all relevant material and a failure to do so makes the lawfulness of the decision susceptible to judicial review". 33. In my view, on the basis of the material the Minister had before her, she was perfectly entitled to arrive at a view that the applicant was a party to a marriage of convenience in circumstances where the other party to that marriage pleaded guilty to a criminal charge to that effect in Latvia and where the applicant, when he was given an opportunity to explain his perspective on the marriage, simply did not provide any explanation or context to the effect that either he believed the marriage to be a bona fide one or, if he accepted it was a marriage of convenience, that there was sufficient exculpatory context to diminish the weight to be attached to the matter when assessing his good character under s. 15

(1)(b).

1. The reality was that, beyond asserting that he had no knowledge of the Latvian proceedings, the applicant simply put no relevant material at all before the Minister addressing the core question which the Minister raised, namely whether he accepted the marriage was one of convenience and, if not, why not or if so, whether there was any mitigating context. He did not at any stage deny to the Minister that he entered a marriage of convenience or set out any exculpatory context as to the circumstances in which he came to marry MD.
2. The applicant complains that he is not aware of the facts as found by the court in Riga "in full". However, it is clear from the material before the court and, in particular, from the report from a Detective Garda in the GNIB as to an investigation into marriages of convenience involving Latvian nationals (which I will come to in more detail below), that all that the Irish authorities were provided with were details of the fact that MD had pleaded guilty to her involvement in a marriage of convenience with the applicant and the sentence imposed on MD. The applicant was fully informed of that guilty plea.
3. A key complaint of the applicant is that the Minister failed altogether to have regard to the relevant pieces of information which the applicant had either put before the Minister or which the Minister could have gleaned from the applicant's immigration file, namely that he had no knowledge of the Latvian proceedings (this was set out in his solicitor's letter of 26 March 2024 in response to the Minister's letter of 22 March 2024); the fact that the applicant had stated in his letter of 17 April 2015 in the context of his original EUTR application for residence that he was unaware that MD had previously been married and that he was in the 8 process of bringing nullity proceedings in the Family Law Circuit Court in relation to that marriage and the fact that he did not pursue his EUTR application based on his marriage to MD when he became aware of her previous marriage.
4. I do not see that there was a failure by the Minister to have regard to relevant considerations in not expressly referencing in the decision the statements made by the applicant in 2015 and 2024 to the effect that he was not aware that MD was previously married and he intended to apply for nullity, that he did not acquire any EUTR rights on the basis of reliance on a marriage of convenience and that he was not aware of the Latvian proceedings. The 2015 correspondence addressed a different point, namely whether the marriage with MD was a valid marriage in circumstances where MD appeared to have been married before. Quite apart from the fact that the applicant did not take the opportunity to explain what had happened in relation to his intended nullity proceedings, when replying to the Minister's query of 22 March 2024, or say anything further about the circumstances of the marriage, the 17 April 2015 letter was sent in the context of a concern by the Minister, in relation to an EUTR residence application premised on a valid marriage to an EU citizen, that the applicant’s marriage to MD was not a valid one because records from Latvia showed that MD had previously married in Latvia and had not been divorced. It was not sent in the context of a marriage of convenience allegation.
5. The applicant correctly says that this letter was sent at a time when he was not contesting a marriage of convenience allegation and where in fact no finding as to a marriage of convenience had ever been made by the Irish authorities. However, it seems to me that that cuts both ways. The fact that the applicant was unaware that MD was previously married or that he intended to bring nullity proceedings in relation to the marriage did not at all address the question of whether the marriage was one of convenience. Likewise, the statement in his solicitor's letter of 26 March 2024 that he was not aware of any Latvian proceedings did not address the core question of whether he denied that the marriage was one of convenience and, if so, on what basis.
6. The applicant contends that the letter of 22 March 2024 did not say he was implicated in the marriage of convenience or was knowingly a party to such a marriage and that he was therefore not invited to make submissions on that issue. With respect, that is an overly strained reading of the letter. The decision correctly, in my view, records that the letter provided the applicant with an opportunity to provide any relevant factual and contextual information in 9 connection with the marriage of convenience finding as well as any submissions he might wish to make on those matters in a good character context. In my view, there is an air of unreality to the contention that the Minister, on becoming aware that a Latvian court had found MD guilty of being party to a marriage of convenience with the applicant, should have framed her invitation for the applicant's submissions on that fact in terms of whether the applicant was knowingly a party to a marriage of convenience. Any fair reading of the letter of 22 March 2024 makes clear that the applicant was being invited to give his explanation for the marriage, and whether he accepted it was one of convenience and, if not, why not, and if so, whether there was any mitigating context. The fact that that he said he was unaware of the Latvian prosecution or that it was previously stated on file some 10 years beforehand, in a different context, that he was unaware that MD was previously married in Latvia and that he intended to bring nullity proceedings did not meaningfully address the core question of his position as to the circumstances in which he entered the marriage. He simply did not address that core question when expressly invited to do so.
7. Here, the Minister received information that the other party to the marriage pleaded guilty in Latvia to that marriage being a marriage of convenience. The applicant's attention was drawn to this clearly relevant fact and he was invited to make submissions. His submissions singularly failed to engage with the marriage of convenience allegation let alone deny it or provide appropriate context. In the absence of any such mitigating or refuting evidence context, the Minister, it seems to me, was entitled to conclude that the marriage was one of convenience on the evidence before her and that the applicant had attempted to gain an immigration advantage by applying in 2015 for EUTR residence permission based on that marriage. In my view, those are matters which the Minister was perfectly entitled to weigh against the applicant in an assessment of good character.
8. The applicant complains that there is an unreasoned leap from the (reasonable) statement in the decision that the Minister will not automatically reject a naturalisation application on the basis of a finding of marriage of convenience to one where the Minister assumed, without any basis in fact, that the marriage of convenience here involved deception of a significant magnitude.
9. I do not see that there is a gap in reasoning as alleged. In the absence of the applicant denying that the marriage was a marriage of convenience or explaining any mitigating context 10 if the marriage was one of convenience, the Minister was entitled to conclude that he knowingly entered a marriage of convenience where the other party to the ,marriage admitted to such and that this was a serious matter which adversely reflected on his character.
10. I accept the submission that the Minister was correct to state in the decision that the fact that an applicant for naturalisation was a party to a marriage of convenience could not of itself automatically deny the applicant to naturalisation. However, the reality here is that the applicant simply chose not to engage with the allegation that he had entered into a marriage of convenience and therefore provided no exculpatory or mitigating circumstances which might have led to the adverse weight to be attached to that factor being reduced. The letter of 22 March 2024 clearly called for an explanation from the applicant and he did not provide any. The applicant’s solicitor’s replying letter of 26 March 2024, other than stating that the applicant was not aware of the court prosecution in Latvia, did not deny the existence of a marriage of convenience with MD or otherwise seek to give either an explanation of the context of the marriage from his perspective or any other exculpatory evidence or material which would have been relevant to an assessment of the Minister's concern that he was a party to a marriage of convenience and the degree of deception involved.
11. I do not see that there was any unlawfulness in the Minister’s approach or findings in the circumstances. Reliance on undisclosed GNIB report re Latvian prosecution
12. The applicant complains that there was no reference in the decision to a GNIB report of 8 September 2020 which was before the Minister at the time of the decision but which the applicant only became aware of on receipt of the Minister’s replying affidavit in these proceedings.
13. This report referenced a parallel investigation between GNIB and the Latvian policing authorities investigating alleged marriages of convenience between Latvian females and nonEU males, primarily from Pakistan and India. The report noted that these non-European nationals then subsequent applied for EUTR in Ireland based on their marriages to European citizens. The report noted that, as a result of the investigation, details of the court outcomes of 24 cases relating to Latvian nationals who were prosecuted for a criminal offence relating to 11 the marriages of convenience were obtained by GNIB. The report notes that "these Latvian documents were translated by a member of An Garda Síochána and included the details of the offender, their marriage and the findings of the court". The report states that the applicant was granted an EUTR permission to remain in the State on 22 October 2014 on the basis of his marriage to MD (this is incorrect; while the applicant received a temporary permission to remain on 7 May 2014 on the basis of the marriage to MD, he was refused any final permission to remain once the fact of MD’s prior marriage came to light and he did not pursue the application further). The report notes that the EUTR permission was refused on 19 November 2014 based on the fact that MD was married to a Latvian national (which is a correct statement). The report notes that MD pleaded guilty to her involvement in a marriage of convenience to the applicant in the Riga Latvian court on 28 November 2016 and was subject to a suspended sentence of one year and six months. The report recommended, based on this information, “that all reckonable residency” accrued by the applicant "based on a marriage of convenience as found by a definitive court finding should be revoked and also any current or future permission should be refused or revoked" in relation to the applicant.
14. The Minister quite properly put this report before the court together with an additional note prepared by the Minister's official who also prepared the recommendation to the Minister to refuse naturalisation for the applicant. The note was a covering note for the report prepared by GNIB on the Latvian conviction of MD. It stated that:- "This additional note is attached to this applicant’s submission for information purposes only. While a copy of the submission with Minister's decision annotated thereon can be issued to the applicant, this additional note will not be disclosed.” The note is a short one. It stated that the GNIB Garda who authored the accompanying report had “carried out an investigation into the EU Treaty Rights granted to Mr Shahzad and forwarded a copy of his report outlining his findings and recommendations. No further investigations were carried out and the result of same is conclusive."
15. Darragh Brennan, an officer in the Immigration Service Delivery Section of the Minister's Department swore an affidavit in the proceedings exhibiting the report from the Detective Garda in GNIB and the accompanying note. He explained that the report was the basis for the information contained in the impugned decision which stated that "Information made available to the Minister details that [MD] pleaded guilty for her involvement in a marriage of convenience to the applicant in Riga, Latvian Court on 28/11/2016". 12
16. The applicant complains that he was not made aware until the proceedings of the fact that this report and accompanying note were before the Minister when the Minister's decision was taken. He says that these documents are not expressly referenced in the decision document. He complains, in particular, about the fact that the GNIB report was materially in error in stating that all reckonable residency accrued by the applicant was based on a marriage of convenience. Counsel for the applicant referred to this material as “secret documents” which contained materially misleading information, and which were before the decision-maker without the applicant's knowledge and in respect of which he did not get an opportunity to respond. Counsel for the respondent accepts that this statement in the GNIB report is an error but says that the error did not infect the decision as is clear from the terms of the decision itself.
17. While I accept that there was a material error in the GNIB report insofar as it recommended refusal of all future residence applications on the incorrect basis that all reckonable residency of the applicant in the past was based on a marriage of convenience, in my view, it is clear from the terms of the Minister’s decision that this error was not relied upon in arriving at the decision nor did it otherwise creep into the Minister's decision. The materially correct part of the report relied on by the decision maker in arriving at the decision was the fact that MD had been convicted in Latvia of being party to a marriage of convenience with the applicant; this fact was fully and properly put to the applicant and he was given an invitation to make submissions on it. I do not see that there was any breach of fair procedures or other legal impropriety in the circumstances.
18. The applicant contends that the reference towards the end of the decision to a lack of trustworthiness in "previous interactions with the immigration system" (as set out at para 28 above) appears to involve an acceptance of the erroneous statement of the GNIB report that all reckonable residency accrued by the applicant was based on a marriage of convenience. I do not believe that that is a fair reading of the passage in the context of the decision as a whole and, in particular, when read in light of what immediately precedes that paragraph. It is clear from reading the decision as a whole, including the paragraph immediately preceding the paragraph with the reference to "previous interactions with the immigration system", that the Minister was referring to the applicant’s reliance on his marriage to MD in the context of his initial EUTR residence application. That was the only occasion when the applicant sought to rely on his marriage to gain an immigration advantage. If it is accepted that the Minister was 13 entitled to reach the conclusion on the evidence before her that the marriage was one of convenience (and for the reasons outlined earlier, I believe the Minister was so entitled), it does not seem to me that the impugned line reveals any error in approach by the Minister or any reliance on erroneous statements in the GNIB report. Applicant’s entitlement to re-apply for naturalisation?
19. One matter which came up for discussion during the hearing before me was whether, if it was the case that the applicant was now in a position to put forward a body of refuting and/or exculpatory material in relation to the contention that the marriage was one of convenience, he could make a fresh application for naturalisation on that basis, notwithstanding the basis upon which the Minister refused his application in the decision challenged in these proceedings.
20. Counsel for the applicant was concerned that such an application would amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the impugned decision. Counsel for the Minister took the view that such an application would be permissible in principle.
21. The Minister’s covering letter informing the applicant of the decision notes that the applicant should be aware that he may re-apply for the grant of a certificate of naturalisation at any time: "When considering making such a re-application your client should give due regard to the reasons for refusal given in the attached submission. Having said this, any further application will be considered taking into account all statutory and administrative conditions applicable at the time of application."
22. The question is in truth an abstract one at this point in the absence of any evidence before the court as to what the applicant says were the true circumstances of the marriage. While I am not expressing any definitive view on the matter, it does seem to me on the face of it that if the applicant has genuine and compelling evidence as to why from his perspective the marriage was not one of convenience and has a good explanation as to why such evidence was not put before the Minister previously, the Minister, on the basis of the position adopted by his counsel at the hearing before me, is likely to consider that evidence when assessing any fresh application. It is difficult to understand why the applicant did not put forward evidence as to 14 the bona fide nature of the marriage from his perspective in the context of the decision before me in these proceedings, if he had such evidence; however, if he bona fide believed that he did not have to address that matter for legal reasons at the time, and such evidence exists it would seem in principle that he would be entitled to re-apply with such new evidence. Whether he makes such an application is of course a matter for the applicant and his advisors and, if such an application is made, it is for the Minister to assess such application in accordance with law as he sees fit.
23. The important point for present purposes is that there is no legal infirmity in the decision under challenge in these proceedings. Conclusion
24. In the circumstances, in my view, the applicant has not made out grounds for relief in judicial review against the decision and, accordingly, I refuse the reliefs he seeks. 15