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2026 IEHC 299

COMMERCIAL COURT [2026] IEHC 299 RECORD NUMBER HP 2026/1064 THE HIGH COURT BETWEEN GOLDSTEIN PROPERTY ICAV PLAINTIFF AND RELM LOAN OPPORTUNITIES 2 DAC, RELM LOAN OPPORTUNITIES 3 DAC, RELM LOAN OPPORTUNITIES 4 DAC, KEN FENNELL AND BRENDAN O’REILLY DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Twomey delivered on the 13th day of May, 2026 INTRODUCTION

  1. In this case, a borrower (the plaintiff [“Goldstein”]), decided to take the law into its own hands (not in the sense of doing anything unlawful), but in the sense of preventing the sale of a property, not by obtaining a court order, but by attempting to intimidate an auctioneer into ceasing to act for receivers in relation to that sale. 1
  2. The property in question is a commercial building in Ballsbridge, Dublin 4 (“Shelbourne House”). Goldstein provided it as part of the security for its borrowings of circa €143 million from the first, second and third-named defendants (“RELM”). The auctioneer in question has no connection with the underlying dispute between Goldstein and RELM and is, in this sense, an innocent or unconnected third party. This is because that dispute concerns a challenge by Goldstein to the validity of the appointment, by RELM, of the fourth and fifth named defendants (“Receivers”) as receivers to 47 commercial properties (“Properties”) owned by Goldstein. The attempt to intimidate the auctioneer
  3. The attempt to intimidate the auctioneer arises from Goldstein instructing a large law firm to write to the auctioneer on 19 February
  4. This letter contains a threat that the auctioneer could be sued by Goldstein in the future, if the auctioneer did not stop acting for the Receivers in relation to the sale of Shelbourne House, in light of Goldstein’s challenge to the validity of their appointment.
  5. The defendants submitted that the letter, which Goldstein instructed William Fry to send to the auctioneer in question, was: ‘sent purely with the purpose of attempting to intimidate the sales agent from acting in relation to this particular transaction.’1 It is relevant to note that Goldstein did not dispute the defendants’ description of the letter as an attempt by it to intimidate the auctioneer in this manner.
  6. This Court was not informed whether the attempt to stop the auctioneer selling the property was successful, but a month later, on 18 March 2026, Goldstein issued this motion seeking 1 Transcript, Day 2, pg. 34 lines 12-17 2 an interlocutory injunction preventing the Receivers from selling all the Properties (including Shelbourne House).
  7. It is relevant to note therefore that a month before seeking this injunction, and so without having the benefit of a court order to stop the sale of Shelbourne House, Goldstein had sought to stop that sale by means of this letter threatening an auctioneer with the prospect of litigation. In the real world of very expensive High Court legal costs, the effect of this letter was to say to the auctioneer: stop acting for the Receivers in the sale of Shelbourne House or else you risk having to spend a lot of money in legal costs.
  8. Many auctioneers in such a situation might simply do as demanded, irrespective of the merits of Goldstein’s challenge to the appointment of the Receivers. This is because High Court costs can, in many cases, be in the hundreds of thousands of euros and also because it is clear that the party making the threat, Goldstein, has access to sufficient money to fund expensive High Court litigation. Weaponising High Court costs in an attempt to intimidate an auctioneer
  9. For this reason, this letter could be seen as amounting to a weaponisation of High Court costs by Goldstein in order to achieve its objectives. The reason law firms are paid to issue such threats is because they can be very effective. This is because the very first thing this type of letter does is that it forces the recipient to spend money on getting legal advice, which it otherwise would not have to spend. However, the letter’s real power is the size of the ‘stick’ which is being wielded by the law firm, i.e. the threat of legal costs, which a former President of the High Court has described as being at ‘millionaire’2 levels. 2 Interview with former president of the High Court Kelly P., The Bar Review

(2018)Vol. 23, No. 1, pg. 11: ‘under the current system, as they say, the only people who can litigate in the High Court are paupers or millionaires!’ 3
  1. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that there is nothing unlawful in issuing this type of letter, since it falls well short of the current understanding of what constitutes ‘lawfare’. However, it does share one important ingredient with lawfare. This is because, irrespective of the strength of the legal claim underlying the threat, the letter seeks to get the recipient to do what is demanded, out of a fear that the recipient might otherwise have to incur significant legal costs.
  2. While such a letter may be lawful, it may not, in fact, assist the sender. This is particularly so, if, as happened here, the sender subsequently comes into court claiming that ‘justice’ is on its side, and that the ‘balance of justice’ supports its application for an injunction. This is because, in deciding whether it would be ‘just’ or ‘equitable’ to grant an injunction, a court will take account of the conduct of the parties. Such conduct includes the fact that one party decided to take the law into its own hands, in the sense of weaponising the ‘prohibitive’3 level of High Court costs, in an attempt to intimidate an unconnected third party into not selling a property, but without a court order to that effect.
  3. In this instance, this conduct was not a determinative factor in the Court’s decision, but it certainly was not helpful to Goldstein’s case. BACKGROUND
  4. Goldstein is acting in respect of Goldstein Property Fund II, a sub-fund of Goldstein. Uncontroverted submissions4 were made by counsel for the Receivers and RELM that Mr. 3 In the words of another former President of the High Court, see Bourbon v Ward [2012] IEHC 30, at pgs. 3940, per Kearns P. 4 Transcript, day 2, pg. 31, lines 2-4 and day 2, pg. 75, lines 17- 20 4 Mel Sutcliffe (“Mr. Sutcliffe”) beneficially owns Goldstein, that Goldstein is insolvent, but that it has access to considerable sums to pursue this litigation.
  5. The RELM defendants are alternative lenders and advanced certain loan facilities to Goldstein. Between 2019 and 2022, RELM lent approximately €143 million in total (“Loan”) to Goldstein and its predecessors.
  6. The relationship between Goldstein and RELM broke down in 2024, with the loan facilities expiring on 30 September
  7. However, the Loan was not repaid on 30 September 2024 and as a result RELM appointed the Receivers to the Properties by separate Deeds of Appointment dated 13 November
  9. The Properties were valued in June 2025 at approximately €120 million and as of the date of this hearing, RELM says that it is owed circa €146 million. The key issue at the hearing before this Court
  10. The key issue at the hearing before this Court was Goldstein’s application for an interlocutory injunction against the Receivers, to prevent them from selling the Properties. It is relevant to note that this is not the first attempt by Goldstein to stop the Receivers from selling the Properties.
  11. The first arose because Goldstein maintains that RELM was not entitled to call in the Loan and appoint the Receivers in November 2024 and that it is estopped from doing so. For this reason, Goldstein is currently challenging RELM’s actions in separate proceedings, the estoppel proceedings (the “Estoppel Proceedings”) which were issued in August
  13. In a judgment delivered in a preliminary application in those proceedings, on 21 January 2026 (Goldstein v RELM [2026] IEHC 29, [“Estoppel Judgment”]), this Court dealt with an application by RELM to strike out the Estoppel Proceedings. In that judgment, this Court 5 noted that the claims made by Goldstein in those proceedings were 'very weak’ (at para. 49). However, despite this, this Court refused to strike out the proceedings, since it concluded that the application did not meet the test for striking out cases (i.e. allowing the case to continue did not amount to an abuse of process). On this basis, this Court concluded that Goldstein should not be denied the opportunity to make its case, albeit a very weak one, at a plenary hearing. The first attempt to stop the sale of the Properties
  14. As part of the Estoppel Proceedings, a lis pendens was registered by Goldstein in respect of the Properties. In the Estoppel Judgment, it was noted that the lis pendens would operate as an effective injunction on the sale of the Properties. In that judgment, this Court vacated the lis pendens because it concluded that a borrower, such as Goldstein, which was allegedly in default on repayments on its borrowings, should not be entitled to effectively prevent a receiver from selling secured properties, by the simple act of issuing proceedings (and registering a lis pendens), without any court intervention or oversight (see paras. 9092).
  15. It is clear from that judgment that this Court felt that if a borrower, such as Goldstein, wanted to obtain, what in effect, was an injunction, it should have to satisfy a court that its legal arguments justified restraining a receiver/lender from exercising its prima facie rights to enforce their security – rather than by simply registering a lis pendens. At para. 91, this Court stated: ‘[W]hile Goldstein’s case is not ‘bound to fail’, in this Court’s view it is a very weak case (based on the evidence before this Court, at this stage in the proceedings). As such, it is not a case which is likely to merit an injunction preventing a receiver from selling the property. Nonetheless, this would be exactly what Goldstein would 6 effectively have, if this Court were not to interpret s 121
(2)(a) in the narrow manner suggested by Clarke J. For all these reasons, this Court would respectfully prefer, what this Court sees as Clarke J.’s interpretation of s 121
(2)(
  1. a)over that of Butler J. In this Court’s view Clarke J.’s interpretation is that litigation contesting the authority of a receiver is not litigation which is registrable as a lis pendens, because a receivership by its very nature does not grant a receiver an estate or interest in land.’ (Emphasis added) 21. Goldstein did not appeal that judgment or any of its findings. The second attempt to stop the sale of the Properties 22. After failing to achieve an effective injunction by registering a lis pendens in the Estoppel Proceedings, what did Goldstein do next to prevent the Properties being sold? 23. Within a matter of weeks of the Estoppel Judgment, Goldstein’s second attempt to thwart the sale of the Properties by the Receivers, was to have its solicitors (William Fry) send a letter dated 19 February 2026 to Savills, who were acting as sales agent for the Receivers in the sale of one Shelbourne House. 24. Savills, as merely the sales agent for the sale of that property, clearly has no involvement in the dispute between Goldstein and the RELM about the validity of the appointment of the Receivers. However, in this letter (set out below) there is a clear threat that Savills will face the risk of significant High Court legal costs, if it does not stop acting for the Receivers in the sale of Shelbourne House (assuming Goldstein is correct in its claim that the Receivers were invalidly appointed). In this letter Goldstein does not state that the High Court, just weeks previously, had noted that this claim, that the Receivers were invalidly appointed, is very weak. 7 The third attempt to stop the sale of the Properties 25. A week or so later, on 27 February 2026, Goldstein began its third attempt to prevent the sale of the Properties, by issuing these proceedings. 26. In these proceedings, Goldstein seeks to redeem the mortgages it provided as security for the Loan (“Redemption Proceedings”). The dispute at the heart of this case is the difference in opinion between Goldstein and RELM regarding the sum to be paid to redeem the mortgages (“Redemption Sum”). Goldstein claims that the sum is either €124,015,213 or €125,843,040, and RELM claims that it is €146,642,491. 27. However, on 18 March 2026, in these Redemption Proceedings, and so not in the Estoppel Proceedings, Goldstein issued a Notice of Motion, seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Receivers from selling the Properties, pending the resolution of the differences between the parties regarding the Redemption Sum. 28. While the key relief sought in the Notice of Motion is the injunction preventing the sale of the Properties, the Notice of Motion also seeks a mandatory injunction requiring RELM to provide a list of financial documents relating to the Loan, which Goldstein says it requires to interrogate the redemption sum for the mortgages (“Information Relief”). 29. In addition, the Notice of Motion seeks a mandatory injunction requiring RELM to facilitate the drawdown of a new loan from Goldstein’s incoming funder (“Due Diligence Relief”). In this regard, it is to be noted that the incoming funder, Earlsfort Capital (“Earlsfort”), has agreed, in principle, to lend the sum of €120,000,000 to Goldstein, albeit that RELM says that the sum required to redeem the mortgages is €146,642,491. However, even on Goldstein’s own calculations, an additional €5 million approx. is required to redeem the mortgages (i.e. at total of circa €125 million, according to it its expert Mr. Luke Charleton of EY [“Mr. Charleton”]). Goldstein has provided sworn evidence that this will 8 be provided by an unidentified third party (which RELM seems to suggest is Mr. Sutcliffe).5 30. It was this third attempt by Goldstein, to prevent the Receivers/RELM from selling the Properties, which was heard by this Court over two days on 28 and 29 April 2026. ANALYSIS 31. There was no dispute between the parties regarding the test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction, which is set out in Merck Sharpe and Dohme v. Clonmel Healthcare [2019] IESC 65 at para. 65, per O’Donnell J., as he then was, and it does not need to be restated in any detail here. In light of this decision, it is clear that for Goldstein to be granted an interlocutory injunction, it must establish that: • if it was to succeed at the trial, a permanent injunction, in the same form sought pending the trial, might be granted by the trial judge; • there is a fair issue to be tried; and • if so, that the balance of justice (or balance of convenience) favours the grant of an injunction pending the trial. The Supreme Court in Merck also made clear that the primary task of the court is to do justice between the parties pending the trial and the most important element is usually, but not always, the question of the adequacy of damages. However, the Supreme Court also noted that, in commercial disputes, a court should be robustly sceptical of a claim that damages are not an adequate remedy. 5 Transcript day 2, pg. 75, lines 17- 20, counsel for the defendants said as follows: ‘The balance required to pay the Redemption Sum is available to the Fund from a third party. We know not who, but we can perhaps guess.’ 9 Does the balance of justice favour an injunction stopping the sale by the Receivers? 32. Assuming, for present purposes, that Goldstein has established a fair issue to be tried regarding the differences between the parties in relation to the Redemption Sum, the key issue is whether the balance of justice (including the issue of whether damages would be an adequate remedy) favours the grant/refusal of the injunction. What dispute is at the heart of the Redemption Proceedings? 33. To answer this question, one must consider what dispute is at the heart of the Redemption Proceedings, which could justify the granting of an injunction, which would prevent the Receivers from selling the Properties? 34. The dispute between the parties in the Redemption Proceedings is one over differences in calculations of the Redemption Sum to be paid by Goldstein to RELM in order to redeem the mortgages, under which the Receivers were appointed. 35. According to Mr. Sutcliffe, this dispute first arose after RELM rejected Goldstein’s offer for a sum of €120,000,000 ‘in full and final settlement of all claims and disputes between the parties howsoever arising’. This offer was rejected by letter dated 26 February 2026 from RELM’s solicitors. In this regard, Mr. Sutcliffe states, at para. 62 of his affidavit, dated 18 March 2026, that: ‘When [RELM] rejected [Goldstein’s] open offer and indicated that they intended to proceed with the sale of Shelbourne House to a third party for a sum less than that offered by [Goldstein], [Goldstein] became gravely concerned. [Goldstein] therefore took preliminary advice regarding the Redemption Sum and instructed its solicitors to issue proceedings to redeem the RELM Facilities. Due to the emerging urgency of the situation, the proceedings were issued on the same day as the letter of claim.’ 10 36. In its letter dated 26 February 2026 rejecting the offer to settle all claims between the parties, RELM explained that it did not regard the sum offered as acceptable. This was because RELM believed that the proposed sum fell short of the claimed indebtedness of €146 million; the offer appeared to be based on guide prices for the Properties procured in June 2025 which were not up to date; the offer was subject to a 90-day due diligence period for the new lender (Earlsfort), and the offer did not make any provision for certain excluded assets, which are the subject of another set of related proceedings taken by Goldstein against RELM/the Receivers (“Excluded Assets Proceedings”). In the latter regard, it is relevant to note that in those Excluded Assets Proceedings, Goldstein claims that certain assets should be excluded from the receivership. 37. RELM provided Goldstein with redemption statements by letter from its solicitors dated 2 March 2026. These indicate a Redemption Sum of €146,642,491. However, as is clear from Mr. Sutcliffe’s affidavit, Goldstein instructed Mr. Charleton to calculate the Redemption Sum, and he has come up with a different Redemption Sum for the mortgages. He opines that the Redemption Sum is either €124,015,213 or €125,843,040 (derived from two slightly different scenarios in Mr. Charleton’s report). Thus, there is a difference of approximately €20 million between Goldstein’s and RELM’s Redemption Sums. What is at the heart of this difference in the Redemption Sums? 38. Crucially, when one considers what might be at the core of this difference, one sees how the Redemption Proceedings (about a difference in redemption figures) and the Estoppel Proceedings (about whether Goldstein defaulted on the Loans and so whether the Receivers were validly appointed) are, in fact, inextricably linked. 11 The inextricable link between the Redemption Proceedings and the Estoppel Proceedings 39. This is because Goldstein bases its calculations, of the lesser Redemption Sum, on the assumption that it will be successful in the Estoppel Proceedings. For this reason, Goldstein (and so its expert Mr. Charleton) assume that it is not in default on the repayment of the Loans and so, that the Receivers were not validly appointed. 40. On the other hand, RELM bases its calculations for the larger Redemption Sum on the fact that there was a default, and that the Receivers were validly appointed. Accordingly, unlike Goldstein, its Redemption Sum takes account of default interest and other fees and charges but also the Receivers’ fees and expenses. 41. In this regard, it is not disputed that Clause 14.5 of the Amended and Restated Facility Agreement dated 26 May 2021, signed by Goldstein, provides for cross-default so that a default on one of Goldstein’s facilities will be deemed to be a default on its other facilities. Similarly, it is not disputed that Clause 3.3 of that Agreement provides that in event of any such default and cross-default, default interest of an additional 2% is chargeable, not just on the interest, which is unpaid, but on the entire loan outstanding from Goldstein. Furthermore, as is clear from the Estoppel Proceedings, there appears to be no dispute between the parties that Goldstein did not meet its full interest repayments in August, September and October of 2024 (albeit that RELM says that this amounts to default, while Goldstein claims that it is estopped from making this claim). The additional amounts due if there is default and the Receivers were validly appointed 42. RELM points out that, on its case, there is an additional 2% interest which became payable on the entire loan of circa €140 million, as a result of Goldstein’s alleged default in making these interest payments. This is a significant amount of default interest which is not included in Goldstein’s calculation. However, this is only the default interest. 12 43. In addition, it is clear from para. 63.10 of the Statement of Claim that Goldstein’s calculations do not take account of several other charges. This paragraph states that: ‘[Goldstein’s] calculations of the Redemption Sum does not include any of the following charges: 63.10.1 PIK interest; 63.10.2 Default interest; 63.10.3 Exit fees; 63.10.4 Extension fees; and 63.10.5 Prepayment fees.’ 44. Furthermore, RELM’s Redemption Sum takes account of the Receivers’ fees, and their costs and expenses, while Goldstein’s does not. In this regard, counsel for RELM specifically referenced the legal costs the Receivers have had to incur in defending the Estoppel Proceedings, the Excluded Assets Proceedings and now these Redemption Proceedings, all taken by Goldstein. Unfortunately, as one is dealing with High Court costs, where the costs have been described as at ‘millionaire’ levels, these sums can be very significant. 45. Thus, the default interest and the litigation costs alone (quite apart from the other costs, charges, Receivers fees etc.) are likely to be a significant part of difference in the two Redemption Sums. In this Court’s view, all of this means that at the heart of the dispute in the Redemption Proceedings (over the difference between the two Redemption Sums) is in reality the dispute, in the Estoppel Proceedings, about whether there was, in fact, a default on the repayment of the Loan (and so whether default interest etc. should be included) and whether the Receivers were, in fact, validly appointed (and so whether their fees and expenses should be included). 13 The only real dispute between the parties in Estoppel and in Redemption Proceedings 46. To put it another way, the only real dispute between the parties, in both the Estoppel Proceedings and the Redemption Proceedings, is whether the Receivers were validly appointed (i.e. the dispute in the Estoppel Proceedings), and the resolution of that issue is likely to resolve, to a significant degree, what might be termed, the ancillary issue, of what the correct Redemption Sum is (in the Redemption Proceedings). (
  2. i)The strength of the underlying case as a factor in the balance of justice 47. All of this means that, if this Court were to grant an injunction in the Redemption Proceedings, preventing the sale of the Properties (because of a dispute over Redemption Sums), in reality it would be an injunction preventing the sale of the Properties (because of a dispute over the validity of the appointment of the Receivers in the Estoppel Proceedings). This is because the two sets of proceedings are inextricably linked, with the key issue in both sets of proceedings being whether the Receivers were validly appointed. However, the reason all of this is relevant is because this Court has observed that the claim, that the Receivers were invalidly appointed, is very weak. 48. In these circumstances, where does the balance of justice lie, in deciding whether to grant an injunction, in the Redemption Proceedings, over a dispute, on its face, over Redemption Sums, but in reality, over the validity of the appointment of the Receivers? 49. In determining where the balance of justice lies, this Court is entitled to take account of the strength of the underlying substantive case. Of course, in this instance, this means taking account of the strength of the challenge to the validity of the appointment of the Receivers, which challenged, this Court found to be a very weak. 50. Authority for the view that this Court can take account of the strength of the underlying case (in deciding an interlocutory injunction application) is to be found in the judgment of 14 O’Donnell J. (as the then was) in Merck Sharpe and Dohme Corporation v Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2019] 2 I.R. 1, IESC 65. At para. 63, he stated that: ‘In cases where the balance of convenience may be finely balanced, it may be appropriate to have regard, even on a preliminary basis, to the strength of the rival arguments as they may appear to the court. [...] It is recognised in the decision in American Cyanimid v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396 that if the question of adequacy of damages is evenly balanced, it may not be inappropriate to consider the relative strengths and merits of each party's case as it may appear at the interlocutory stage. Courts are correctly reluctant to express views on cases which are to come to trial. However, it would be absurd if this rule of abstention were to result in a court conducting an agonised and necessarily imperfect assessment of a number of variable factors in a field with which it has little familiarity and where the evidence is indirect, written, and untested, all the while averting its attention from the area (perhaps of pure law) in which it can justifiably claim expertise. For this reason, I consider that Hogan J., taking the view he did of the balance of convenience, was quite correct to form some tentative view of the merits.’ 51. In summary, therefore, this Court is being asked by Goldstein to grant an injunction in the Redemption Proceedings, even though this Court previously observed that Goldstein’s claim in the Estoppel Proceedings (that the Receivers were invalidly appointed) is very weak. As the challenge to the validity of the appointment of the Receivers in the Estoppel Proceedings is at the core of the dispute in the Redemption Proceedings, the weakness of this claim in the Estoppel Proceedings means that the Redemption Proceedings are similarly weak. This is a significant factor in the balance of justice weighing against the grant of the injunction in the Redemption Proceedings. 15 (
  3. ii)Delay in applying for the injunction as a factor in balance of justice 52. Another significant factor, weighing in the balance of justice, against the grant of an injunction is the delay, which has arisen in seeking an injunction in the Redemption Proceedings. Since the challenge to the validity of the appointment of the Receivers in the Estoppel Proceedings is at the core of the dispute in the Redemption Proceedings, the effective delay is calculated by reference to the Estoppel Proceedings. 53. Thus while the injunction in the Redemption Proceedings was first sought on 18 March 2026, the relevant date, for the purposes of any delay, is not February 2026 (when Goldstein might have become aware of an issue regarding differences on calculation of the Redemption Sum). Instead, the start date for the calculation of any delay in this case, is the one referenced in the Estoppel Judgment at paras. 28-29, i.e. 13 November 2024. This was when, after RELM demanded repayment of the Loans (the final repayment date of 30 September 2024 having not been met by Goldstein), it appointed the Receivers. 54. As noted in the Estoppel Judgment, the Estoppel Proceedings were issued on 1 August 2025. This amounts to a delay of 8 months and 18 days. The reason this is the appropriate delay period to consider is because, as already noted, the real dispute between the parties is whether the Receivers were invalidly appointed (and the effect this allegedly invalid appointment has on the Redemption Sums is ancillary to that core dispute). Thus, this is the primary delay on the part of Goldstein, when it comes to resolving its dispute with RELM over Redemption Sums. To put it another way, the difference in the calculation of the Redemption Sums, is just another manifestation of that dispute over the alleged invalidity of the appointment of the Receivers. 55. However, there is also a secondary delay, namely the period between 1 August 2025 and 18 March 2026, which is the date when the application in the Redemption Proceedings, to 16 injunct the Receivers from selling the Properties, was issued. This is a further delay of 7 months and 17 days. 56. Thus, combining these two periods, there is a delay of 16 months and 4 days after the appointment of the Receivers (during which they have sold four of the Properties: see para 63.4 of the Statement of Claim), before Goldstein seeks to injunct the Receivers from selling the Properties. It seeks to do so on the basis of a difference of opinion, regarding Redemption Sums, even though this is, in reality, a dispute over the validity of the appointment of the Receivers. 57. As noted at para. 98 of the Estoppel Judgment, Goldstein’s claim that the Receivers were invalidly appointed, because it allegedly had an agreement with RELM to extend the final repayment date for the Loans, is very weak, because: ‘[I]f RELM really had agreed an extension of the Final Repayment Date, why was this not the first thing that Goldstein said, when the Receivers were appointed?’ Instead, it left it for 8 months and 18 days to make this claim in the Estoppel Proceedings. And now, it has left 16 months and 4 days, to make a claim in the Redemption Proceedings, which is, in effect, the same claim (i.e. that the Receivers have been invalidly appointed). 58. The reason this delay is a factor in the grant of an interlocutory injunction is because, as noted by Clarke J., as he then was, in Dowling v Minister for Finance [2013] 4 I.R. 576, at pg. 599: ‘[T]he jurisprudence of the Irish courts (and those in many if not all common law countries) leads to the courts scrutinising the expedition within which a party moves for interim or interlocutory relief, for failure to do so runs a significant risk both to the Court having a reasonable opportunity to give 17 adequate consideration to the issues and the defendant having a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to why the measures sought should not be imposed. The factors, therefore, which come into play in assessing whether a party has moved with reasonable expedition in applying for an interim or an interlocutory injunction are different, and are governed by much stricter scrutiny, than those which apply when the Court is considering whether a party has lost all entitlement to bring proceedings at all as a result of laches or delay, or where it is said that a party has been guilty of inordinate or inexcusable delay in the conduct of proceedings once commenced.’ (Emphasis added) 59. Accordingly, the delay in this case, in Goldstein seeking an injunction, is a second significant factor in the balance of justice against the grant of that injunction. 60. Another way to view this issue, is that there was nothing to stop Goldstein seeking to redeem the mortgage immediately after its alleged default in meeting interest repayments in October 2024 (referenced in the Estoppel Judgment), rather than 16 months and 4 days later. If it had, there would not have been the sale of four properties in the intervening period. In addition, there would have been much less, if any, default interest, Exit fees, PIK interest, Extension fees, Prepayment fees, Receivers’ fees and expenses, and litigation costs (all of which are at the core of the difference in the Redemption Sums). 61. Thus, if Goldstein had not delayed and had sought to redeem the mortgages in November 2024, it is possible that there might have been little or no difference between the parties on the Redemption Sum. Yet it is this difference, which was caused by Goldstein’s own delay, which is the substantive claim between the parties, and so is the basis for the interlocutory injunction Goldstein seeks pending the trial of that substantive claim. This Court does not 18 believe that Goldstein can rely on its own delay to support a claim that RELM should be denied its prima facie entitlement to sell the Properties under its security documentation. (iii) Properties likely to be sold at undervalue as a factor in balance of justice? 62. It appears to be suggested by Goldstein that one of the reasons that it should be granted the injunction, and so a factor in the balance of justice in its favour, is that the Properties are likely to be sold at an undervalue by the Receivers. At para. 5.1.8 of its written legal submissions, it states that: ‘If the court refuses an injunction, however, then [RELM] will proceed to sell the Properties (for an undervalue and less than the redemption sum computed by [Goldstein]).’ 63. The alleged value of the Properties, according to Goldstein (using valuations from June 2025), is circa €120 million. This is less than the sum which RELM says it is owed, of circa €140 million. Goldstein believes it would be prejudiced by a sale at less than this €120 million value. This is because Goldstein would be liable to RELM for a greater shortfall, than if the Properties were not sold at an alleged undervalue (albeit that uncontradicted submissions were made that Goldstein is, in fact, insolvent). 64. In any event, no cogent evidence was provided that the Properties were likely to be sold at undervalue. In particular, no evidence was provided that experienced professional receivers would be likely to sell at undervalue or indeed that experienced professional auctioneers would recommend a sale at undervalue. 65. Furthermore, to take the reverse scenario, if the value of the Properties was in excess of the value of the outstanding debt, then the surplus would go to Goldstein. In those circumstances, one might argue that the Receivers/RELM had nothing to gain by aggressively seeking the highest possible price (since the benefit accrues to Goldstein). 19 However, this is not the case here. The value of the Properties is considerably less than the outstanding debt. Accordingly, the Receivers/RELM have, in fact, an incentive not to sell the properties at undervalue, so as to minimise the shortfall on its recovery of the outstanding debt (which it will not be able to recover from the insolvent Goldstein). 66. If anything, therefore, the fact that the properties are ‘under water’ means that the Receivers/RELM will be anxious to get the best possible price, so as to reduce anyshortfall. Thus, if there is any party which will be prejudiced by a sale at undervalue, it is likely to be RELM, not Goldstein, 67. For these reasons, the claim that the Properties might be sold at undervalue is not a factor that weighs, in the balance of justice, in favour of the grant of an injunction preventing the Receivers from selling the Properties. In any event, Goldstein can bid on the sale of the Properties 68. Indeed, a related point is that if Goldstein truly believes that Shelbourne House, or indeed any other of the Properties, are being sold at undervalue, there is a solution, to ensure that it is not prejudiced. This is because Goldstein can itself buy those properties (and in this regard, it seems clear that it has been able to obtain funding, in principle, from a third-party funder to purchase all the Properties). 69. Accordingly, the alleged prejudice which Goldstein says it will suffer, if the sale by the Receivers is not stopped, can, not only be prevented, but it can be turned into a benefit for Goldstein (by it buying the Properties at a ‘bargain’). This same point was held by the Court of Appeal (per Murray J.) to be a factor against the grant of an interlocutory injunction, in Ryan v Dengrove [2021] IECA 38 at para. 88. Accordingly, this case provides further support for this Court’s conclusion that the claim regarding the alleged sale at undervalue, is not a factor weighing, in the balance of justice, in favour of the refusal of the injunction. 20 (
  4. iv)Adequacy of damages as a factor in the balance of justice 70. If damages were inadequate to compensate Goldstein (if it were refused the injunction at the interlocutory stage, but granted it at trial) or if damages were inadequate to compensate RELM (if the injunction was granted at interlocutory stage, but not at trial), then this could be a significant factor in the balance of justice. 71. From Goldstein’s perspective, it is important to note that this is not a family home, it is a portfolio of commercial properties and in this regard, this Court must be ‘robustly sceptical of a claim that damages are not an adequate remedy’ in commercial cases like this one (see Merck Sharpe and Dohme Corporation v Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2019] 2 I.R. 1, IESC 65 at para. 65, per O’Donnell J., as he then was). 72. In this case, Goldstein did not borrow from an established bank, but instead its lender is a special purpose vehicle set up for the purposes of the Loan. Goldstein argues that this means that, after all the Properties are sold by RELM (and any repayments made to its investors), RELM will be wound up, and so there will be no assets available to meet any damages claim, when that occurs. RELM points out that these proceedings are already in being against RELM and so if a liquidator was appointed, he/she would have to deal with any alleged obligations/liabilities owed by RELM to Goldstein as part of the winding up. Thus, RELM claims that this suggestion, that damages would not be an adequate remedy, is unsustainable. 73. It is true that there would not be the same risk of a winding up if the lender was an established bank, rather than a special purpose vehicle. Accordingly, there is a greater likelihood of there not being damages to meet a claim, in the case of a special purpose vehicle, than in the case of an established bank. Thus, this is a factor in the balance of 21 justice in favour of the grant of an injunction. However, it must be remembered that Goldstein chose to borrow from a special purpose vehicle rather than an established bank, which lessens the impact of this factor in the balance of justice. 74. Goldstein also claims that damages would not be adequate, as calculating them would be difficult, because it would require the carrying out of a full account and inquiries process to reconcile all the payments received since November 2024, and then a hypothetical assessment of how the Properties would have been managed had the Receivers not been appointed. However, as previously noted, this complexity, to the extent that there is complexity, was caused by the delay in Goldstein seeking to challenge the invalidity of the appointment of the Receivers/calculation of the Redemption Sum. Thus, the complexity of calculating damage, since it was caused by Goldstein’s delay, is not a factor which weighs in the balance of justice in favour of the grant of an injunction. 75. On the other hand, RELM submits, without contradiction, that Goldstein is insolvent. To counter this, Goldstein has offered to provide an undertaking as to damages in favour of RELM, which would be fortified by a deposit of €2 million to be provided by a third party. The giving of a ‘fortified undertaking’ like this could indeed be significant in ensuring that damages are an adequate remedy, so as to support for the grant of the injunction. 76. However, RELM points out that this sum represents just 1.5% of the value of the Properties. Thus, if the value of the Properties (of circa €120 million) were to drop by, say, even as little as 5% (€6 million) during the period for which the injunction might be in place, €2 million in damages would be plainly inadequate. Thus, even with this fortified undertaking, the granting of the injunction could still cause loss to RELM that would not be covered by the undertaking. For this reason, damages might not be an adequate remedy for Goldstein. 22 77. In summary, regarding the adequacy of damages, it seems to this Court that while both parties can claim that, in certain circumstances, damages might not be an adequate remedy, applying the scepticism which this Court must, to such claims in commercial cases like this, the balance of justice does not swing decisively in favour of, or against, the granting of an injunction under this heading. (
  5. v)Conduct of Goldstein as a factor in balance of justice 78. Since the granting of an injunction is an equitable remedy, the Court has a discretion in deciding whether it is equitable to grant same. In exercising its discretion, this Court can take account of a party’s conduct, 79. One factor, which was not determinative but nonetheless, did not assist Goldstein, was the letter from Goldstein’s solicitors (William Fry) dated 19 February 2026 to a third-party auctioneer (Savills). It states: ’We act for [Goldstein], the plaintiff in the Proceedings. We are instructed that you have been appointed to market and sell our client's property at Shelbourne House, Shelbourne Road, Dublin (the "Property") and that you or the Joint Receivers have entered into an exclusivity agreement with a potential purchaser in respect of the Property. We are instructed to inform you that our client is challenging the validity of the appointment of the Joint Receivers in the Proceedings. Furthermore, our client, as owner of the Property, objects to any sale of the Property. We are instructed that our client has been contacted by a number of large-scale international purchasers who are interested in the Property, but they have been unable to obtain information in respect of the sale of the Property. If the Joint Receivers were 23 validly appointed, which our client denies, they would be required to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable for the Property. The Joint Receivers, whose validity of appointment if contested, will be unable to demonstrate that they obtained the best price reasonably obtainable if they have not engaged with the prospective purchasers who have an interest in the Property. In the event that the sale of the Property proceeds, and our client's position is subsequently vindicated in the Proceedings, our client fully reserves its rights to take any action necessary against any party involved in the sale and purchase, including seeking an Order declaring any transfer void and seeking the return of the Property to our Client.' (Emphasis added) 80. Counsel for RELM and the Receivers made the following submission in relation to this letter: ‘So no real basis for any claim is articulated against Savills and it’s entirely unclear why this letter is being sent, but it appears to us that it’s sent purely with the purpose of attempting to intimidate the sales agent from acting in relation to this particular transaction.’6 (Emphasis added) 81. From this Court’s perspective, the threat in this letter, that Goldstein, ‘reserves its rights to take any action necessary’, if Savills continue to act for the Receivers in the sale of the Properties, needs to be seen for what its real-life effects are. (
  6. i)A threat to an innocent or unconnected third party 82. Firstly, it is a threat of litigation against an innocent third party, in the sense that the auctioneer has no involvement in the dispute between Goldstein and RELM about the 6 Transcript, Day 2, pg. 34 lines 12-17 24 validity of the appointment of the Receivers (‘our client is challenging the validity of the appointment of the Joint Receivers’). In this sense, Savills could be described as an innocent or unconnected third party that has been brought into this dispute between Goldstein and RELM, by this letter from Goldstein threating litigation. (
  7. ii)Letter from a large law firm with expertise in expensive High Court litigation 83. Secondly, it comes with the authority and imprimatur of a large and established law firm with expertise in expensive High Court litigation, albeit that it makes clear that it is acting on ‘instructions’ from Goldstein. It is a threat which any person would therefore take seriously and the demand that the auctioneer stop acting for its client, is clearly intended to be followed. (iii) Threat made by company with access to resources to fund expensive litigation 84. Thirdly it comes from a party, which is has already instituted High Court litigation and appears to have access to significant resources, since it has sufficient resources to instruct a large corporate law firm to issue such a letter (and indeed to provide security for costs in the sum of €723,000 in this case7 as well as €5 million to make up the shortfall in the Redemption Sum). Thus, it would appear to have the resources to carry out the threat to litigate against the auctioneer, if necessary. (
  8. iv)Attempt to interfere in everyday commercial relations of the innocent third party 85. Fourthly, this letter is clearly intended to interfere in everyday commercial relations by ensuring that a third party stops acting for one of its clients, and that the auctioneer does not assist the Receivers in their prima facie entitlement to sell the Properties. (
  9. v)7 Intention is to prevent sale of the property but without a court order to that effect See letter dated 27 April 2026 from William Fry to McCann Fitzgerald. 25 86. Fifthly, the letter refers to an exclusive agreement with a potential purchaser and refers to unnamed third parties not being able to obtain information in relation to the Properties. However, this reference appears to be a diversion, and this Court agrees with counsel for RELM that it is ‘entirely unclear’ why this reference is contained in the letter. This is because it is clear that Goldstein does not want the Property to be sold to these unidentified third parties. On the contrary, the aim of the letter is to prevent the sale of the Property to anyone (‘our client […] objects to the sale of the Property’), even though Goldstein does not have a court order to that effect. Indeed, as already noted, this is one of three attempts made by Goldstein to prevent the sale of any of the Properties by the Receivers. (
  10. vi)Omission of relevant facts in the letter 87. Sixthly, in issuing, in effect, a threat, that Savills may have to face a large legal bill as a result of Goldstein’s claim that the Receivers were invalidly appointed, the letter omits one important detail. The legal challenge, which underpins that threat of legal costs (i.e. that the Receivers were invalidly appointed) was held by the High Court, just a few weeks previously, to be ‘very weak’. Thus, the risk of Savills facing a significant legal bill is considerably undermined by a fact, which Goldstein chose not to disclose to Savills. (vii) It weaponises legal costs in order to achieve Goldstein’s commercial objectives 88. Seventhly, and crucially, the letter weaponises the fact that High Court costs are ‘prohibitive’ in order to achieve Goldstein’s commercial objectives. It does so by seeking to get Savills to fear that it might have to spend High Court legal costs defending its position in acting for its client. Some observations on the weaponisation of High Court costs 89. There are several general observations which can be made about this type of weaponisation of High Court costs: 26 Receipt of letter per se can lead to recipient incurring legal costs • The simple act of receiving a letter like this will inevitably force the recipient to spend money on getting legal advice on what they should do next (unless of course, the recipient simply obeys the demand in the letter). Thus, a person with no connection with a dispute, is effectively put financially into the ‘red’ by the simple fact that it had the misfortune to receive such a letter. In this way, this type of letter shares one important ingredient with ‘lawfare’ (considered below); it is one party forcing another to spend money on legal costs to seek legal advice, unless they do what is demanded of them, and irrespective of the rights or wrongs of the demands. For this reason, in this Court’s view, care should be taken in issuing these types of letters, particularly to parties who have no connection with a dispute. Many recipients will simply do as demanded to avoid risk of incurring costs • Many recipients of such a letter will simply do what is required, in order to avoid, even a slight risk of incurring significant legal costs. Thus, the real leverage in this type of letter is the threat of legal costs having to be incurred by Savills, even if Savills end up being proved right in acting for the Receivers. Furthermore, what makes letters like this so effective is the fact that they weaponise High Court costs (rather than District or Circuit Court costs) and so amount to, what might be termed, a ‘high-grade weaponisation’ of costs. This is because these costs have remained at ‘millionaire’ levels, despite calls from the judiciary over many decades for their reduction.8 In 8 See the cases referenced at paras. 22-26 of Propiteer v Castehaven [2025] IEHC 451. 27 contrast, if one were dealing with District Court costs, in the hundreds of euros, this letter would not be so effective. High-grade weaponisation of costs is particularly easy in Ireland • Unfortunately, this type of high-grade weaponisation of costs would appear to be much easier in Ireland than in other jurisdictions. This is because of the concentration of civil litigation in Ireland in the High Court (rather than in the much less expensive District or Circuit Courts), which concentration is out of step with international norms.9 This is starkly highlighted by the fact that minor criminal matters are never heard in the criminal division of the High Court (as it hears, in effect, only rape and murder). Yet, in minor civil disputes plaintiffs can issue their proceedings in the civil division of the High Court,10 and therefore easily weaponise those costs. Thus, in the absence of a reduction in the concentration of civil litigation in the High Court, and a reduction of the costs in that court, this high-grade weaponisation of legal costs will continue. Weaponisation of legal costs is both effective and lawful • The real value of this type of letter, and indeed the reason why clients pay law firms to issue them, is that they are, not only effective, but also legal. This is because there is nothing unlawful in a party, like Goldstein, who can afford to pay a big law firm, weaponising legal costs in order to achieve its objective. Indeed, the letter falls a long 9 As noted in Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291 at paras. 15-16, there were five times more High Court judges in Ireland, per head, than in England and Wales. Similarly, at para. 14, it was noted that in England and Wales there were 700% more County Courts (the equivalent of our Circuit Court) than High Courts there, while in Ireland, it was actually the reverse (with 11% more High Courts than Circuit Courts). However, it is important to note, as pointed out in that judgment, that they are not too many High Court judges for the amount of litigation heard in the High Court, rather there is too much litigation heard in the High Court, particularly relatively minor cases, where costs are multiples of the value/importance of the disputes. 10 This was most recently illustrated in Joyce v National Transport Authority [2025] IECA 290 at para. 9 where Meenan J. in his dissenting judgment noted that a ‘challenge to a clamping fee of €125 has no place [the Judicial Review List of the High Court]’. Yet this is exactly where this case ended up, because of the concentration of so much civil litigation (major and minor) in the High Court. 28 way short of the type of ‘lawfare’ which has been criticised by Irish courts (in M v M [2026] IESC 2 and in Morgan v Labour Court [2025] IECA 2.)11 In this regard, lawfare could be described as the weaponisation of court proceedings, in an attempt to intimidate another, by draining their resources, in order to achieve a given objective. While Goldstein does not deny that the letter was an attempt to intimidate, it is just a threat to issue proceedings (rather than the issue of proceedings) and similarly, there is a just threat of a drain on the estate agent’s resources (rather than an actual drain on those resources). Weaponising costs is not without its downsides • However, issuing such a letter is not without its downsides. This is because, when a court is being asked to grant equitable relief to a party, it can take account of the conduct of the parties. In this case, the weaponisation of legal costs by Goldstein in the manner it did so in this case, did not assist its application for this Court to exercise its discretion in favour of Goldstein. 90. In summary therefore, in this letter Goldstein weaponises legal costs against a completely innocent third party (in the sense that it has no involvement in its dispute) in order to get it to cut its commercial ties with RELM, on the basis of undisclosed facts. In doing so, Goldstein is saying, in effect, that it would be in Savills’ financial interests to stop acting for the Receivers in the sale of Shelbourne House. Any reasonable person on receipt of this letter might conclude that, in light of the ‘prohibitive’ level of High Court costs, it would be wiser to simply stop acting for the Receivers. 11 There is no settled definition of lawfare in this jurisdiction, as of yet. For example, in M v M [2026] IESC 2 at para. 1, Collins J. described lawfare as a situation in which, ‘the processes of the court are misused by one party to oppress, harass and destabilise the other’, while in Morgan v Labour Court [2025] IECA 2 at para. 138, Whelan J. stated: that ‘”Lawfare” might be described as availing of legal processes, remedies, applications and litigation to harass, delegitimise, harm, interfere with or damage the reputation of another.’ 29 91. Yet, if Goldstein wanted to prevent the sale of Shelbourne House by more orthodox means, it could have left matters to this Court to decide whether to grant the injunction to stop the sale. Indeed, if the matter was very urgent (and bearing in mind that the letter to Savills was issued on 19 February 2026 and the interlocutory injunction was sought on 18 March 2026), there are ways in which it could have been before the courts more quickly. Thus, in this Court’s view, Goldstein did not need to weaponise legal costs, to seek to get its way, against a third party, with no involvement in the dispute, and without having the benefit of a court order to that effect (in fact it had the contrary, namely the view of the High Court that its case was ‘very weak’). 92. It is important to note that there can be no criticism of William Fry as the firm is Goldstein’s agent and is merely doing what Goldstein has ‘instructed’ it to do. In legal terms therefore, it is Goldstein that made the threat of future litigation and it is Goldstein that failed to disclose facts which undermined that threat. 93. While this letter did not assist Goldstein when this Court came to deciding where the balance of justice lies, it was not a determinative factor in this Court’s decision. This is because the determinative factors in this Court’s decision are (
  11. i)the weakness of the substantive claim that the Receivers were invalidly appointed and (
  12. ii)the delay by Goldstein in seeking the injunction. For these reasons, the balance of justice favours the refusal of the injunction. Remaining two ancillary reliefs sought 94. It is clear that the primary relief being sought by Goldstein is to stop the sale of the Properties. It also seems clear to this Court that the dispute over the Redemption Sum (and the issue of the Redemption Proceedings) was a means to injunct that sale. Since this 30 injunction has now been refused, this Court proposes to deal briefly with the other two reliefs Information Relief 95. Under this heading, Goldstein wants a court order requiring RELM to provide certain information to Goldstein to enable it to challenge the calculation by RELM of its Redemption Sum, before RELM has filed its Defence to these proceedings (rather than the usual way, by way of discovery, after the Defence has been filed (see Craddock v RTE [2014] 1 IR 591, [2014] IESC 32 at para. 7 where Fennelly J. stated that the ‘normal rule is that discovery may not be sought until after the pleadings have been closed’.) 96. Because the relief is mandatory in nature, Goldstein must establish that it has a strong case that it is likely to succeed in the substantive case, in order to obtain such an injunction, see Ryanair DAV v Skyscanner Limited [2022] IECA 64 at para. 124(i), per Murray J. 97. As observed by Goldstein in its written submissions: ‘The only question is whether or not [Goldstein] is required to formally seek this information by way of discovery or whether it can do so at an earlier state by way of injunction.’ (Emphasis added) 98. In reaching its decision on the injunction application, this Court’s view is that a primary purpose of the Redemption Proceedings was to injunct the sale of the Properties by the Receivers, which injunction has now been refused. 99. It is also relevant that there is no evidence that Goldstein has the funds to redeem the Redemption Sum of €146 million which RELM says is needed to redeem the mortgage. Accordingly, this Court cannot see why the ordinary manner in which this type of 31 information is provided (i.e. by means of a letter seeking discovery of the required information) is not followed in this case. 100. Crucially however, for this court to grant a mandatory injunction, it would have to conclude that Goldstein has established a strong case that it is likely to succeed at trial, i.e. that the Redemption Sum is in or around €124/€125 million. However, the evidence that has been provided, to support this claim, is a calculation from Mr. Charleton which is based on the Receivers having been invalidly appointed (a claim which this Court regards as ‘very weak’). Thus, Goldstein has not established that it has a strong case, such as to justify the grant of a mandatory injunction, and so this relief is refused. Due Diligence Relief 101. Again, this is a mandatory injunction which is being sought, namely obliging RELM to provide what Goldstein states, in its written submissions, is: ‘the minimal level of co-operation [with the proposed new lender to Goldstein] that would be required for any refinance in a commercial context’. Since, as already noted, the evidence that has been provided by Goldstein does not establish that it has a strong case that the Redemption Sum is in or around €124/€125 million, this Court cannot see how it could grant a mandatory injunction, before the trial of that case, requiring RELM to co-operate with Earlsfort in relation to a refinancing of the Loan at that level. Thus, this relief is refused. CONCLUSION 102. This is Goldstein’s third attempt to prevent the sale of the Properties by the Receivers. The first attempt was its unlawful registration of a lis pendens. The second attempt was 32 when Goldstein threatened an estate agency with the risk of incurring very considerable High Court legal costs if it did not stop acting in the sale of Shelbourne House. 103. The backdrop to this third attempt is that Goldstein came up with its own calculation of the Redemption Sum for the mortgages. Its calculations are based on the assumption that it had not defaulted on the Loan and so the Receivers were not validly appointed. This was despite the fact that this Court had held in the Estoppel proceedings that the claim, that the Receivers were not validly appointed, was ‘very weak’. 104. In light of this assumption in its calculations, it is not surprising that Goldstein’s Redemption Sum differs dramatically from RELM’s figure, since RELM’s Redemption Sum is based on the Receivers having been validly appointed. 105. Because of the differences in these Redemption Sums, Goldstein issued these Redemption Proceedings to resolve those differences. Crucially, however, in this, its third attempt to prevent the Receivers selling the Properties, Goldstein sought to injunct the Receivers, pending the trial, at which the differences in the Redemption Sum are to be decided. 106. However, since the whole basis of the differences in the Redemption Sums was the ‘very weak’ claim that the Receivers were invalidly appointed, this Court concludes that it would be unjust to prevent the Receivers from selling the Properties on the basis of a very weak claim. Accordingly, the balance of justice does not support the granting of the injunction. 107. This matter will be put in for mention a week from its delivery at 10.45 a.m. to deal with any final orders and costs. However, on the assumption that it should not be necessary to expend costs on a further court sitting, and in order to facilitate the parties agreeing all outstanding matters, the parties have liberty to notify the Registrar if such a listing proves 33 to be unnecessary. This is particularly so in light of the clear implication from Word Perfect Translation Services Ltd v Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2023] IECA 189 at para. 94, that there is an onus on lawyers to take a broad-brush approach to costs and not to engage in the inefficient use of court resources and costly ‘nit-picking’. 34

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.