2026 IEHC 222 | Europaius

THE HIGH COURT Record No. 2024/561JR [2026] IEHC 222 BETWEEN LOUAI HAMED APPLICANT AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 21st day of May

Introduction
The applicant is a Dutch national, who resides in this country. The applicant states that he was married to Ms. Alia Mohammed Osman Mohammed in Saudi Arabia in
This woman (hereinafter “Alia”) is a Sudanese national. She has resided in the State with the applicant. In 2017 she was granted a residence card. 2
The applicant is the sponsor in respect of applications that were submitted by Alia’s father, mother and sister, who sought visas to join him in the State on the basis of their family relationship and on the basis that they were dependent on the applicant and his wife for the provision of financial assistance to enable them to cover the essential necessities of life in Saudi Arabia.
In these proceedings, the applicant challenges the refusal of visas to the three members of his wife's family on various grounds. These grounds and the response of the Minister thereto will be examined later in the judgment.
In the impugned decisions the applicants for the visas, who were the father-in- law and mother-in-law of the current applicant and his sister-in-law, are referred to as the applicants. Rather than refer to two sets of applicants; in this judgment the visa applicants will be referred to collectively as “the beneficiaries” or individually in respect of the applicant’s purported father-in-law as “Mr. Ali”; his mother-in-law as “Ms. Suleman”; and his sister-in-law as “Azza”. As already noted, the applicant's wife will be referred to as “Alia”. Background.
The applicant has resided in the State since
He states that on 20 April 2015, he married Alia in Saudi Arabia. She has resided with him in the State since that time. She received a residence card from the respondent in
The applicant and Alia have one child, who was born in Dublin in May
The child's birth certificate names them as the mother and father of the child.
The applicant is employed by a company called Cognizant, earning approximately €38,000 per annum. Alia is employed by Accenture, earning approximately €31,000 per annum. 3
The applicant's purported father-in-law, Mr. Ali, was born in
He is a national of Sudan. He has worked for many years in Saudi Arabia as a gardener/driver for a gentleman known as Prince Faisal.
The applicant's mother-in-law, Ms. Suleman, is a Sudanese national. She has lived all her life in Saudi Arabia. She was born in
The applicant's sister-in-law, Azza, is a national of Sudan, having been born in January
She has always resided in Saudi Arabia.
In December 2022, Mr. Ali, Ms. Suleman and Azza applied for visas to enter the State for the purpose of visiting Alia and the applicant and their son. On 8 February 2023, those applications were refused. Those refusals were not appealed.
On 6 June 2023, visas applications were submitted by the beneficiaries pursuant to the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (“the 2015 Regulations”) and pursuant to Council Directive 2004/38/EC (“the Directive”). Those applications were made on the basis that the applicant was an EU national who was exercising his European Union Treaty rights (“EUTR”) and, in particular, his right of free movement by coming to Ireland. It was submitted that the beneficiaries were members of his family and were qualifying family members under the Directive and under the Regulations on the basis that Mr. Ali and Ms. Suleman were the parents of Alia, who was married to the applicant.
It was submitted that Azza would qualify under the regulations as a permitted family member given her relationship and dependency on Alia and the applicant.
It was submitted by the beneficiaries that they were reliant upon financial contributions which had been made over many years by the applicant and Alia to assist them cover the expenses of ordinary living in Saudi Arabia. 4
To that end, documentation was submitted which showed that Mr. Ali was employed as a gardener/driver by Prince Faisal, earning a net salary of approximately €603 per month.
It was submitted that neither Ms. Suleman, nor Azza, were entitled to work in Saudi Arabia. Their only entitlement was to reside in that country in the home maintained by Mr. Ali.
In support of the application made at first instance, a substantial quantity of documentation was submitted, including: the marriage contract between the applicant and Alia, together with a translation thereof; birth certificates and passports relating to the applicant, Alia and the beneficiaries. There was also a substantial number of photographs showing the various parties at the wedding ceremony between the applicant and Alia, which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 20 April
There were also photographs showing the applicant’s son in the company of his grandparents and aunt on various family occasions when they had visited Saudi Arabia. In addition, there was an entry in the passport of the applicant showing that he had been issued with a visa to enter Saudi Arabia for a month covering the period when he stated that he had been married to Alia.
In relation to proof of financial dependency, as already noted, it was submitted that Ms. Suleman and Azza were not permitted to work in Saudi Arabia; nor were they permitted to hold bank accounts there. The employment of Mr. Ali with Prince Faisal was proven by documentary evidence from the employer stating the capacity in which Mr. Ali was employed, together with a letter to the same effect from Mr. Ali.
A schedule setting out the monthly and annual expenses incurred by Mr. Ali and his family in Saudi Arabia was furnished, together with receipts in respect of certain of the items of expenditure mentioned therein. 5
The beneficiaries had also furnished copies of the Saudi Arabian residence identity documents in relation to Ms. Suleman and Azza which stated that they were “A dependent who is not allowed to work”.
There was also a substantial quantity of bank statements submitted showing payments from the applicant and Alia to Mr. Ali. His bank accounts were also furnished in this regard.
In a first instance decision dated 31 October 2023, the respondent refused to accept the documents that had been submitted as proof of the family relationship between the applicant and Alia and between them and the beneficiaries. This was primarily on the basis that the marriage contract and birth certificates that had been furnished had not been duly attested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that had issued the documents and because the certified translations had not been attested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the translation had taken place.
The first instance refusal of Azza’s application also noted a discrepancy in the spelling of her name in the translated birth certificate and noted that no reasons for that had been provided. In fact, her original birth certificate had been duly attested by the relevant Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The beneficiaries appealed the refusals at first instance. The visa appeals letter addressed the reasons that had been set out in the first instance refusal and resubmitted Alia’s duly attested birth certificate.
In the visa appeal decisions, the respondent refused to accept Alia's birth certificate as proof of her family relationship with her parents and her sister on the basis that her mother's name had been spelt slightly differently in one translation of Alia’s birth certificate and in her mother's passport, whereas the name was spelt slightly differently in a translation done by a different translation company of Alia's birth 6 certificate, with no explanation having been provided for that discrepancy. In addition, the appeal decision pointed out that there was a further slight discrepancy in the spelling of Mr. Ali's name, with no explanation being provided for that discrepancy.
The visa appeals refusals did not rely on the birth certificate not having been duly attested as stated at first instance. Instead, new discrepancies were the only reasons provided for questioning the veracity of Alia’s birth certificate. The discrepancies relied upon in this regard in the appeals decision had existed in the documents when submitted at first instance, but had not been the subject of adverse comment in that decision.
This contrasted with the fact that the respondent had raised a perceived discrepancy in the spelling of Azza’s name in her birth certificate at first instance, with the result that her solicitor had addressed the issue on appeal and it was not subsequently relied upon in the visa appeal refusal.
In addition, in the visa appeals decision, a further attested translation of the marriage contract between the applicant and Alia was submitted. In that translation, the name of the bride's father was completely different to that in the original marriage contract submitted in support of the application. The appeal decision maker stated that the absence of any explanation for this glaring discrepancy called into question the authenticity of the submitted marriage contract.
In the first instance decisions on the issue of dependency, in relation to Ms. Suleman and Azza it was stated that neither they, nor the sponsor had provided any documentary evidence to indicate the necessity for the sponsor to assist them in meeting their day-to-day expenses for their essential needs. In the documentation submitted in support of the appeal, there was copy of the Saudi Arabian residence identity cards in respect of these beneficiaries which had noted that they were not allowed to 7 work. However, the visa appeals refusals did not address the submissions that Ms. Suleman and Azza were not permitted to work in Saudi Arabia.
The decision maker had refused to accept the Saudi Arabian residence permit of Mr. Ali and, in particular, that it had expired, on the basis that the translator did not confirm in writing on the translation that the translation was true and accurate. However, the translation of Azza’s residence permit submitted on appeal had contained that confirmation from the translator. The applicant complained that the failure to highlight the deficiencies in Ms. Suleman’s residence permit at first instance had deprived her of any real or effective opportunity to address that perceived deficiency before the visa appeal was refused.
In relation to the question of Mr. Ali's financial dependency, there had been a significant development between the date of the first instance decision and the appeal decision; being that on 18 August 2023, Mr. Ali's employment with Prince Faisal had been terminated. He had furnished a letter to that effect from his employer.
The Minister had sought confirmation of this fact from the employer by email on 28 February
When no response was received to the request for a confirmation email, the appeal decision was issued on 15 March
It will be seen that subsequent to that, by email on 20 March 2024, Mr. Ali's former employer confirmed that Mr. Ali had been dismissed from his position of employment on grounds of age on 18 August
The beneficiaries had made the case that once the employment of Mr. Ali had ceased, their entitlement to reside in Saudi Arabia had also ceased. In support of that, a copy of Mr. Ali's residence permit was submitted with the word "Expired" stamped on it. In addition, it was submitted that Mr. Ali no longer had any access to his bank account. For that reason, transfers of money from the applicant and Alia had to be made 8 to three gentlemen, who were neighbours of Mr. Ali. Letters were furnished from these men stating that they had received the transfers on behalf of Mr. Ali and had transferred the money to him.
The appeals decision did not accept that it had been established that Mr. Ali had ceased employment on the date stated by him; nor had it been established by the beneficiaries that they had no other sources of income or savings or other assets from which they could support themselves.
In summary, the impugned decisions held that the beneficiaries had not established the necessary proofs, being their family relationship with the EU citizen or his spouse; nor had they established that that they were financially dependent within the meaning of the regulations on the applicant and/or his spouse. Accordingly, their applications for visas were refused. The Law.
It is appropriate at this juncture to set out a brief summary of the relevant legal principles that arise for consideration in this case. The provisions of Directive 2004/ 38/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states (hereinafter “the Directive”) has a number of relevant provisions. Recital 5 to the directive notes that if the right of all union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states is to be exercised under conditions of freedom and dignity, a right of entry should also be granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality.
Recital 6 provides that the member states must also consider the position of other family members who seek to join the EU citizen in the member state and in 9 particular must have regard to their relationship with the union citizen and to any other circumstances such as their financial or physical dependence on the union citizen.
Recital 25 provides that there should be procedural safeguards to ensure a high level of protection of the rights of the union citizen and safeguards to uphold the principle that any action taken by the authorities must be properly justified. Recital 26 provides that judicial redress procedures must be available to union citizens and their family members who have been refused leave to enter or reside in another member state.
The definition of “family member” is defined in Art. 2 of the directive. It includes the spouse of the EU citizen and the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in Art. 2 (b) of the directive. Article 3 provides that the directive shall apply to all union citizens and to their family members as defined in Art. 2 who accompany or join them in the state. The directive further provides that other family members, known as permitted family members, can also join the EU citizen in the state if they are, inter alia, dependent on the EU citizen. The directive provides that the host member state shall undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances of the applicant and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people.
As already noted, the directive was implemented into Irish law by the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations
It is not necessary to set out the provisions of these regulations in detail, as they mirror the provisions of the directive as outlined above.
The issue of what constitutes proof of financial dependency on the EU citizen or his/ her spouse, has been considered in a number of cases. In Reyes v Migrationsverket (Case C-423/12) the CJEU referred to its earlier decision in Yunying 10 Jia v. Migrationsverket (Case C-1/05) and held that the status of being financially dependent arose as a result of a factual situation characterised by the fact that material support for that family member was provided by the union citizen who had exercised his right of free movement, or by his spouse.
The court went on to hold that in order to determine the existence of such dependency, the host member state must assess whether having regard to his financial and social conditions, the direct descendant who is 21 years old or older of a union citizen, is not in a position to support himself. The need for material support must exist in the state of origin of that descendant or the state whence he came at the time when he applied to join the EU citizen. The court held that there was no need to determine the reasons for the dependency or the reasons for the recourse to that support. It held that the directive should be construed broadly.
The court held that the fact that a union citizen had regularly, over a significant period, paid a sum of money to the descendant, which was necessary in order for him to support himself in the state of origin, was such as to show that the descendant was in a real situation of dependence vis a vis the EU citizen. The court further held that the descendant could not be required, in addition, to establish that he had tried without success to find work or obtain subsistence support from the authorities in his country of origin and/ or had otherwise tried to support himself (see paras 21/25).
The issue of what constitutes financial dependency was examined by the Court of Appeal in VK v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] 1 IR 724, where Baker J. set out a summary of the relevant test. It was held that the test was one of EU law. An applicant must show, in light of his financial and social conditions, a real and not temporary dependence on the union citizen. The financial needs must be for basic or essential needs of a material nature without which a person could not support himself 11 or herself. The applicant does not have to be wholly dependent on the union citizen to meet their essential needs, but the needs actually met must be essential to life and the financial support must be more than merely welcome.
The court held that the concept of dependence had to be interpreted broadly in light of the perceived benefit of family unity and the principle of freedom of movement. The court held that for the purpose of making the assessment as to whether the applicant was financially dependent on the EU citizen or his spouse, the proofs required must not impose an excessively burdensome obligation on an applicant or impose an excessive demand for the production of documentary evidence. The court further stated that the requested member state must justify the refusal and must give reasons to explain and justify the refusal.
The court went on to hold that when the case law identified the requirement that the dependence must be “real” this meant that the dependence must be something of substance, support that is more than just fleeting or trifling, and support that must be proven, concrete and factually established. However, an applicant did not have to establish that without that real or material assistance he or she would be living in conditions equivalent to destitution. Dependence may be for something more than help to sustain life at a subsistence level and no more. The court summarised the test in the following way at para. 86: “What is to be assessed is whether a family member has a real need for financial assistance and not whether that person could survive without it. Thus stated, it is a test of the facts and not an interrogation of the reasons for the support.” 12
In support of the proposition that the beneficiaries had a right to be heard in the context of their appeal from the first instance decision, the applicant referred to the decision in Mukarubega v Prefet de Police (Case C-166/13) where it was held that the right to be heard in all proceedings was an intrinsic part of European law and was covered under the guarantee of the right to good administration and the right to put forward a defence. It was held that the right to good administration included, inter alia, the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him adversely was taken (see paras 41/50).
In this regard, the applicant also referred to the decision in GM v Orszagos Idegenrendezeti Foigazgatosag (Case C-159/21) where it was held that the right to sound administration and the right to an effective remedy meant that the addressee of a decision which significantly affected his or her interests must be placed in a position by the authorities of the member state when they take decisions which come within the scope of EU law, in which he or she can effectively make known his or her views as regards the information on which the authorities intend to base their decision (see paras 44 & 45).
Finally, in argument at the bar, counsel for the respondent referred to the decisions in Rehman v Minister for Justice [2018] IEHC 779 and Subhan v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IECA 330 as establishing that the burden of proof of dependency rests on the applicant and that the evidence presented had to be “cogent” and had to be, at least in part, documented and had to be evidence which could be tested.
Counsel also referred to the decision in Sishu v Minister for Justice & Equality [2021] IECA 1 as support for the proposition that while the directive and the 2015 regulations created the obligation to extensively examine the personal circumstances of the applicant, they did not go so far as to impose on the Minister any investigative 13 obligation, or an obligation to raise queries or concerns or seek additional evidence. It was submitted that that decision also stated that the process was not a joint venture in which there was some ill-defined obligation on the Minister to assist applicants. It was submitted that that had been endorsed in the decision in Khan v Minister for Justice [2025] IECA 230 where it was held that there was no obligation on the Minister to conduct a form of broad inquiry. It was submitted that the process envisaged by the 2015 regulations involved a fact finding exercise by the Minister on the basis of materials presented and the inquiries carried out by the Minister, and that it was for the applicant to respond to and satisfy the concerns of the decision maker, but it was not a “joint venture”.
Counsel also referred to the decision in Abbas v Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IECA 16 where it was held that the decision maker could not be expected to accept at face value either the contents of an unsworn statement or an affidavit sworn by the applicant for residency, in the absence of supporting documentation. It had been held that the quality of that documentation was central to the consideration of such applications. It had also been held that the mere transfer of funds from one party to another could not on its own establish dependence for the purposes of the directive and the regulations. Discussion and Conclusions.
The first issue which the court must determine is whether the applicant has locus standi to bring these proceedings. Relying on the decisions in Holland v Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 73 and Safdar v Minister for Justice [2023] 2 IR 217 it was submitted that these cases had established that the beneficiaries could bring proceedings where visa applications had been refused and it was not necessary for the sponsor in 14 Ireland to be a party to the proceedings. It was submitted that on this basis the present proceedings should have been brought by the beneficiaries who had lodged the visa applications.
The court is satisfied that on a correct reading of Holland v Minister for Justice, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that had been made on behalf of the Minister in those cases, which was to the effect that the beneficiaries or the visa applicants could not bring the proceedings, it had to be the sponsor who did so. When the court rejected that argument, that did not mean that the sponsor did not have a legitimate interest to maintain judicial review proceedings. This is also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Pervaiz v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] 2 IR
I hold that the EU citizen who has exercised his right to free movement within the EU by coming to the State, has a sufficient interest in the matter to bring judicial review proceedings where visa applications are refused in respect of his family members who wish to join him in the State.
Turning to the issue of proof of family relationship, the respondent had given Alia a residence card in
While that could have been on the basis that she was the mother of the EU citizen or was otherwise qualified under the regulations, that is not likely. I hold that on the balance of probabilities Alia obtained the residence card on the basis that the Minister was satisfied that she was the lawful wife of the applicant, who was the EU citizen exercising his EU Treaty rights within the State.
There was documentation before the Minister that the applicant and Alia had had a son born in Ireland in
The child's birth certificate had been exhibited, wherein the applicant and Alia were named as his mother and father. While that does not establish that they were married to each other, it is corroborative evidence that they were married. 15
The respondent stated that he had had regard to all documentation submitted when considering the issue of proof of family relationship between the applicant and Alia; and between Alia and the beneficiaries. The respondent has not shown in his decision how the grant by him of a residence card to Alia in 2017 and the birth certificate of their son, who was born in Ireland in 2017, are not corroborative of the fact asserted that the applicant and Alia are married to each other.
The marriage contract exhibited at first instance was not accepted because it was not duly attested, nor was the translation certified. That was corrected on appeal. Yet in the appeal decision it raised further problems with documentation over and above those identified in the first instance decision.
This applied not just to the marriage contract but to other documents where further discrepancies in the documentation were identified for the first time in the appeal decision, notwithstanding that such discrepancies in spelling had been apparent in the documentation submitted at first instance, yet these discrepancies in spelling had not been raised as a problem concerning the authenticity of the documents. The court has already outlined in the earlier section on the background to the case examples of where discrepancies in the spelling of various names between various documents were highlighted for the first time in the appeal decision.
The court accepts the submission made by Mr. O'Donnell BL for the respondent that an application for admission of family members under the 2015 Regulations, is not a collaborative exercise. Unlike in an asylum application, the people making the application had not had to flee their country of origin in circumstances of persecution or danger. Hence their ability to marshal the documentary evidence required to satisfy the requirements of the Directive and the 2015 Regulations has not been impaired. Applicants are free to present whatever documentation they wish in support 16 of their application; the essential proofs of which are proof of family relationship and proof of dependency.
Having said that, I also accept the submission made by Ms. Boyle SC on behalf of the applicant, that where a document has been submitted at first instance and where discrepancies or deficiencies in it have been pointed out in the first instance decision, the person appealing that decision is entitled to understand that if he/she addresses these matters on appeal, it is likely that they will be accepted.
I accept the submission that if new deficiencies are raised on appeal to deny the probative value of the document, when these alleged deficiencies had not been adverted to at first instance, that effectively deprives an appellant of an opportunity to address these concerns as part of his/her appeal; thereby constituting a breach of his right to be heard.
An appeal in an EU Treaty rights application is a form of appeal that is peculiar to asylum and EUTR applications. It is a de novo appeal, which is grounded on the documentation submitted at first instance. However, the appellant has the opportunity to submit either amended documentation, or further documentation, in support of their appeal. They can also submit further country of origin information and make further legal submissions. In addition, on the appeal the decision-maker can have regard to events that have happened since the date of the first instance decision.
I hold that insofar as fresh documentation is submitted which was not presented at first instance, the decision-maker on the appeal is at large in his/her examination of this documentation. If they find errors or omissions in it, they are entitled to comment on these matters. They are entitled to give such matters whatever evidential weight they think appropriate. 17
However, for documents that were presented at first instance, I hold that if the decision-maker on appeal wishes to rely on new discrepancies or omissions, that existed in the document when presented at first instance but were not adverted to in the first instance decision, they must give the appellant an opportunity to address these matters before reaching a decision on the appeal.
The reason for this is that if certain discrepancies or deficiencies had been pointed out at first instance, the appellants are entitled to assume that this represents the totality of the deficiencies in the documents that have to be addressed on the appeal.
For the appellate decision-maker to rely on deficiencies that had existed in the document when presented at first instance, but which were not the subject of adverse comment in that decision; that would effectively deprive the appellant of the opportunity to address them, thereby constituting a breach of his/her right to be heard.
In the present case, the decision-maker on the appeal relied on the discrepancies in the spelling of various names, in particular the spelling of the names of the mother and father of Alia in various documents as a means of discrediting the authenticity of those documents. As those discrepancies had not been highlighted in the decisions at first instance, the appellants were effectively denied the opportunity to address them on the appeal.
Insofar as there was a glaring new discrepancy in the attested version of the marriage contract submitted on appeal in relation to the applicant and Alia, being the totally different name of the father of the bride in the second translation of the marriage contract, the appellate decision-maker was entitled to have regard to that discrepancy, as it was a new discrepancy not contained in the version of the marriage contract submitted at first instance. 18
However, as the discrepancy in question was huge, being a totally different name to that contained in the original translation of the marriage contract, it was more likely to have been an error on the part of the translator, than an attempt to pass off a fake document. I am of the opinion that fairness required that the appellants should have been given some opportunity to address this glaring discrepancy.
Insofar as the other minor discrepancies in relation to the spelling of various names in various documents were used as a means of discrediting a large volume of otherwise authentic documents, when one looks at the totality of the documentation submitted, including the photographs of the applicants and Alia’s attendance at the wedding ceremony in Saudi Arabia; their attendance at various family functions and photos of their son with his grandparents; it is hard to escape the impression that the decision maker was searching for any tiny discrepancy as a means of discrediting the documentation submitted.
I hold that the impugned decision on appeal will have to be struck down on the basis that the appeal decision relied on discrepancies in documentation submitted at first instance, which discrepancies had not been raised in the decisions at first instance, thereby depriving the appellants of the opportunity to be heard on them.
I hold that the finding in the appeal decisions that it had not been established that the applicant was married to Alia, must be struck down as no reason was given why that conclusion was reached having regard to the weight of the evidence presented and in particular, having regard to the apparent acceptance by the respondent in 2017 that the applicant and Alia were married to each other.
In terms of the findings of a lack of proof of dependency, I have considerable sympathy for the decision-maker. The observation that the schedule of expenses allegedly incurred by the beneficiaries, was in large part simply a recital of costs 19 allegedly incurred on a monthly or yearly basis, was a reasonable one. There was very little documentary evidence to support the amount of expenses claimed. In particular, one would have expected fairly cogent documentary evidence to show expenditure on items such as rent, food, clothing and medical expenses.
The onus was on the applicant to establish that the beneficiaries were reliant on him and his wife for money to enable them to pay for at least some of the essential necessaries of life.
There were two key elements in the dependency claim. The first was that Ms. Suleman and Azza did not have any right to take up employment in Saudi Arabia. Their only right was to reside with Mr. Ali. Thus, the evidence was that they had no source of income. They did not have any bank account in Saudi Arabia. They were entirely reliant on whatever Mr. Ali could provide for them.
The initial claim of dependency was based on the fact that having regard to the alleged level of outgoings of the family, Mr. Ali's monthly net salary of approximately €603, was not sufficient to cover these basic necessary expenses.
The second key element was that from the beginning, it had been highlighted that Mr. Ali would lose his employment in Saudi Arabia in the near future as he was approaching 70 years of age. That was stated in the initial visa application in June
It was repeated in correspondence dated 17 July 2023 and 10 August 2023, when the applicant’s solicitor requested an expedited decision on the grounds that Mr. Ali would soon lose his job.
The applicant's case is that on 18 August 2023, Mr. Ali was dismissed from his employment with Prince Faisal on grounds of age. The employer had provided a letter to that effect. The consequences of losing his position of employment were stark for 20 Mr. Ali. He lost the right to reside in Saudi Arabia. This was established by production of his residence card with the word "Expired" stamped on it.
Mr. Ali also put in a statement that he had lost access to his bank account when his employment had ceased. This was the reason why transfers from the applicant and Alia had been made to three neighbours of Mr. Ali. Those neighbours had provided letters stating that they had received the transfers of money and had given the money to Mr. Ali.
The respondent did not accept that the level of dependency on the applicant and on Alia had changed since the first instance decision. This was because when the respondent sent an email to the former employer of Mr. Ali requesting confirmation that Mr. Ali had been dismissed, no response had been forthcoming. In fairness to the respondent, he had sent that email request on 28 February
He had not received any response thereto by the time the appeal decision was handed down on 15 March
I accept the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the Minister is entitled to check the authenticity of documents submitted. It was appropriate for the respondent to have sent the request for confirmation by email dated 28 February
The respondent waited a reasonable time for the employer to respond. When he had not done so by 15 March 2024, it was reasonable for the respondent to proceed with his decision.
On 19 March 2024, being unaware that confirmation of the dismissal had been sought from Prince Faisal and that he had failed to respond to that request, the applicant’s solicitor had requested that the appeal decision be withdrawn on other grounds. 21
On the following day, 20 March 2024, a response to the original email was sent by Prince Faisal by email confirming that Mr. Ali had been let go from his position of employment. On 25 March 2024, the respondent refused to reopen the visa appeal as requested by the applicant’s solicitor, on the basis that there was no procedural error identified in relation to the appeal decision.
The court accepts that the Minister is dealing with hundreds, if not thousands, of asylum and international protection applications and EUTR applications and appeals at any one time. The Minister cannot be expected to reopen every appeal just because a particular document comes to hand after the appeal decision has been given.
However, where such a document can properly be described as being a "game changing document" and when there is a request that the appeal be reopened, I hold that fairness requires that the matter be looked at afresh in light of the highly relevant document that has come to hand.
The confirmation from Prince Faisal was such a document. It confirmed that Mr. Ali’s employment had been terminated. That tied in with the earlier statements that had been made some months previously that he was about to lose his job.
If the Minister accepted that Mr. Ali had lost his job, that meant that he was in the position of being a Sudanese national in Saudi Arabia who had lost his job; had lost his right of residence in the country; and had lost his right to operate a bank account in that country.
Given that there was evidence that his wife and daughter had never had the right to work in Saudi Arabia, and given his age, it was not unreasonable to assume that he had no source of income and little hope of securing alternative employment in Saudi Arabia once his employment with Prince Faisal had been terminated. 22
In these circumstances, the case being made that Mr. Ali and his family had become almost entirely dependent on the applicant and Alia since the first instance decision, was a matter that warranted consideration by reopening the appeal.
I hold that receipt of the letter from Prince Faisal confirming that Mr. Ali had lost his job, with the consequence that he had lost his right to reside in Saudi Arabia and very probably had no other source of income, constituted a new set of circumstances that had to be considered under the heading of dependency.
As the critical response only came to hand after the appeal decision was handed down, this is one of those rare cases where receipt of an important document warranted reopening of the appeal.
I hold that the appeal decisions in each case must be struck down so that this document can be considered in the context of the new financial circumstances experienced by Mr. Ali and his wife and daughter. Proposed Final Order.
For the reasons set out herein the court will grant certiorari of the respondent's decisions dated 15 March 2024 in respect of each of the beneficiaries.
As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the parties shall have three weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise.
The matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 24 June 2026 for the purpose of making final orders.

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