THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT [2026] IEHC 302 [H.MCA.2007.0000076] IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 160 OF THE PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF THE COUNTY OF MEATH APPLICANT AND MICHAEL MURRAY AND ROSE MURRAY (No. 2) RESPONDENTS Date of decision refusing permission: 29 June 2006 Date proceedings commenced: 25 June 2007 Date of s. 160 order: 27 July 2010 Date appeal dismissed: 25 May 2017 Date of undertakings: 24 September 2020 First listed in Planning & Environment Court: 13 February 2026 Date of main hearing on contempt: 23 March 2026 Date draft judgment circulated: 11 May 2026 JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday 15 May 2026 1. In Πρὸς γραμματικούς/ Adversus Grammaticos (mid-to-late 2nd century CE), the Skeptic Hellenistic philosopher Σέξτος Ἐμπειρικός/ Sextus Empiricus cited a saying of an unknown 1st century CE poet: Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά/ “Slowly grinds the mill of the gods but it grinds fine”. The gods and the legal system have that much in common, so inevitably the same point has been made more recently about the wheels of justice (although the definitive source of that adaptation is elusive). While there can be no argument about the fact that 20 years to remediate an unauthorised structure constitutes slow grinding by any standards, and without taking from the fact that the outcome is uncomfortable for the respondents or wishing to add unnecessarily to that discomfiture, it is ultimately a vindication of the rule of law, the principle of equal justice and the integrity of the planning system that the law got there in the end. Judgment history 2. This is the tenth written decision in this matter. The respondents have been unsuccessful in all decisions, achieving that home run before the High Court, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The earlier decisions were as follows. (
- i)In Meath County Council v. Murray (No. 1) [2010] IEHC 254 (Unreported, High Court, 29 June 2010), Edwards J. granted a s. 160 injunction in the present proceedings requiring demolition of the unauthorised structure, with a stay of 24 months. (
- ii)In Meath County Council v. Murray [2017] IESC 25, [2018] 1 I.R. 189, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 297 (McKechnie J.; Denham C.J., O'Donnell, Laffoy and Dunne JJ. concurring), this was affirmed on appeal with a stay of a further year. (iii) In Murray v. Meath County Council [2024] IEHC 658 (Unreported, High Court, 20 November 2024), Dignam J. dismissed as “frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process” separate proceedings (“the 2022 proceedings”) brought by the respondents to set aside the s. 160 orders and refused interlocutory relief. (
- iv)In Murray v. Meath County Council [2025] IESCDET 39 (10 March 2025, O’Malley, Murray and Donnelly JJ.), the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal a procedural ruling of Costello P. on the appeal from that order. (
- v)In Murray v. Meath County Council [2025] IECA 164 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Allen J.; Butler and O’Moore JJ. concurring, 5 August 2025), the order of Dignam J. was affirmed. (
- vi)In Murray v. Meath County Council [2025] IESCDET 143 (10 November 2025, O’Malley, Hogan and Donnelly JJ.), leave to appeal was refused in relation to issues regarding the refusal of interlocutory relief. (vii) In Murray v. Meath County Council [2025] IESCDET 144 (10 November 2025, O’Malley, Hogan and Donnelly JJ.), leave to appeal was refused in relation to issues regarding the dismissal of the 2022 proceedings. 2 (viii) In an unpublished decision letter in Murray v. Ireland (Application no. 9012/26, Rule 39 Site #8847, ECtHR, 20 March 2026), the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) rejected the respondents’ application for interim measures under rule 39 of the Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights that the demolition of the unauthorised structure not be carried out. (
- ix)In a further unpublished decision letter in Murray v. Ireland (Application no. 9012/26, Rule 39 Site #8847, ECtHR, 23 March 2026), the ECtHR rejected correspondence making continued request for rule 39 relief, having regard to the decision letter of 20 March 2026. 3. The purpose of the present judgment is to outline for the record the background to the order ultimately made regarding contempt in relation to the respondents’ failure to comply with their undertakings regarding the unauthorised structure. It outlines the position as it appeared to the court based on the material submitted up to 23 March 2026, and without predetermining the respondents’ motion seeking to vacate and revisit prior orders and decisions to be heard in due course. Of course the issue of a motion to effectively vacate an order does not retrospectively nullify a court’s reasoning for having made such an order or inhibit the court from setting out that reasoning. That doesn’t mean that the motion will not be objectively examined on its merits in due course subject to the preliminary objections. Everything in this judgment needs to be read in that sense – i.e., it is essentially a statement for the record of how matters appeared to me as of the relevant dates but without prejudging the respondents’ motion to revisit matters in due course. The respondents didn’t need to propose that I specifically caveat the (no doubt extensive) matters in this judgment that they disagree with – the foregoing general caveat will apply to everything to the extent that if they succeed in their motion, anything to the contrary in this judgment will not preclude any order that would otherwise follow. 4. As the respondents have been keen to dispel any doubt, perhaps in that vein I should also repeat that succeeding in their motion involves, per the order discharging the respondents from attachment, also overcoming the preliminary objections from the council that they are not entitled to pursue the motion. The agreed order records both positions: “And the Court noting the position of the Respondents that they propose pursuant to the said Notice of Motion to revisit the issue of contempt And the Court noting the position of the Applicant that the Respondents are not entitled to apply for the relief sought in the said Notice of Motion and that if which is denied the Respondents are entitled to apply for the said relief the Respondents are not entitled to be granted the said relief” 5. In a further spirit of avoiding doubt, while the present judgment records matters as I saw them at the time, that doesn’t imply that I see matters differently now. Whether anything should be seen differently at this point will depend potentially on submissions made on the respondents’ motion, so phrases such as “at the time” don’t involve prejudgment of the motion by indirect implication. 6. In the draft judgment process the respondents asked for the following change: “Paras to note suggested amendments: 2. (viii) the words indication to restrain the demolition... should be replaced by the words an order for interim measures to be made ...etc..” 7. I think this is just a semantic point but for the avoidance of doubt, a rule 39 indication is not an “order” in the sense familiar in domestic law. However hopefully the rewording above will meet the concerns of the respondents, if I have understood them correctly. 8. As regards para. 3, the respondents commented as follows in the draft judgment process: “In response to your email of 26th April attaching the Draft Judgment of the Court, we are instructed to state as follows:= [sic] Whilst it is noted that the email states :‘the draft judgment will include a clause that nothing in the judgment will preclude any relief under the motion that the Court would otherwise be minded to grant. It will not be necessary or appropriate for the respondents to object to any and every part of the judgment with which they disagree at their position overall will be acknowledged in line with the order’ The draft judgment itself in extract states:Para 3. The purpose of the present Judgment is to outline for the record the background to the order -ultimately made regarding contempt in relation to the respondents’ failure to comply with their undertaking regarding contempt in relation to the respondents’ failure to comply with their undertakings in relation to the unauthorised structure. It outlines the position as it appeared to the court based on the material submitted up to the 23rd March 2026, and, without predetermining the respondents’ motion seeking to vacate and revisit prior orders and decisions to be heard in due course..... 3 Everything in this judgment needs to be read in that sense - i.e. , it is essentially a statement for the record of how matters appeared to me as of relevant dates, but without prejudicing the specific caveat (the no doubt extensive) matters in this judgment that they disagree with - the foregoing general caveat will apply to everything to the extent that if they succeed in their motion, anything to the contrary in this judgment will not preclude any order that would otherwise follow. With the utmost respect to the Court, and in full appreciation of the acknowledgments that have by caveat, been made. The respondents are obliged for the record, to make certain observations and express some concerns before dealing with the proposed factual corrections and clarifications in the paragraphs as numbered which are suggested to the Court in its draft judgment. This response is neither exclusionary nor exhaustive but is prepared with limited time to deal with the matters which arise in the draft judgment. Insofar as there is omission or failure to comment on any particular issue, such is not tantamount to an admission or concession in relation thereto. The respondents are at all times conscious and respectful of the Courts inherent jurisdiction generally and specifically in relation to contempt proceedings to determine its own procedures.” 9. It is not totally clear whether the foregoing is suggestive of a change to the draft judgment, but if it is to be construed as suggesting any ambiguity in the draft, the statement in the covering letter and the statement in the judgment are not meant to be contradictory. Attempting to paraphrase that point in a third way might only create further confusion so it is best to leave it at that. 10. Insofar as the foregoing is a statement that the respondents want additional more specific caveats, notwithstanding that I don’t think that is necessary, I am happy to record their caveats albeit that these are repetitive of the general saver for their motion. Steps in the procedure for coercive civil contempt 11. The sequence of steps required in relation to coercive civil contempt can be broadly summarised as follows: (
- i)The court makes an order, or receives an undertaking, that is either prohibitory or mandatory, which may be made against persons unknown. (
- ii)The order is served on the persons concerned, although service of an order does not appear to be necessary in the case of an undertaking to the court made personally by the alleged contemnor. Such service, where required, should be personal, subject to the possibility of an order for substituted service or an order deeming service good in the event that personal service is not possible or is being evaded. Such an order should be marked with the penal endorsement. It should, ideally, be served as so endorsed prior to the expiry of the time-limit for any mandatory steps, although this is not an absolute rule. (iii) In the event of non-compliance, the moving party either seeks leave ex parte to issue a motion for attachment, and if permission is granted, issues the motion (which would be appropriate at least in highly case-managed litigation as in the Planning & Environment Court), or simply issues a motion for attachment if procedures in the relevant List so allow – apparently there is a diversity of approaches on this in practice. (
- iv)On the return date, subject to the court being satisfied as to the contempt following any submissions or evidence from the parties, the court can order the attachment of the contemnor, if not present, or can order the committal of the contemnor, if present. The court can also make a declaration of contempt as well as or instead of attachment, or can impose financial penalties such as a fine or sequestration if appropriate. (
- v)In the case of attachment, the moving party then obtains an order for attachment from the Central Office on foot of the order of the court, which is in the nature of a warrant addressed to the Garda Commissioner and members. Normally this is issued from the Central Office by way of execution of the court’s order but in principle it may be issued directly by the court if for example the Central Office is closed. The moving party then serves the order of attachment on the Gardaí for enforcement. (
- vi)The order is executed by the Gardaí, the contemnor is arrested and brought before the court. (vii) The court will again satisfy itself as to whether contempt has been committed. If so satisfied, the court has enforcement options having considered what is appropriate in the circumstances. 4 (viii) Enforcement option 1 is to receive all appropriate undertakings, information and/or cooperation from the contemnor, and if satisfied, the court can release the contemnor either absolutely or on conditions. (
- ix)Enforcement option 2 is that if the court is not satisfied with the undertakings/information/co-operation, the contemnor can be committed to prison until the contempt is purged. (
- x)In the event of committal, an order of the court will be perfected in the ordinary way. (
- xi)Subject to the Central Office being open, the moving party will then obtain an order of committal from that office by way of execution of the order of the court. Otherwise the order of the court will suffice. (xii) This order is then transmitted by the moving party to the Gardaí. (xiii) The Gardaí then execute the order of committal by lodging the contemnor in prison. (xiv) The court, in making the order of committal, will fix a date to review the detention. (
- xv)If the contemnor wishes to purge his or her contempt prior to the review date this should be facilitated where practicable. (xvi) If the contempt is not purged, a new review date should be fixed and so on. 12. It will assist in understanding the background to this matter if we follow the foregoing steps insofar as they played out in this case. Step 1 – the undertakings 13. The applicants were refused permission for a dwelling at the site almost 20 years ago on 29 June 2006. They then proceeded, without permission, to construct an unauthorised structure about twice the size of the one refused. As put by Allen J. at 154 in Murray v. Meath County Council [2025] IECA 164 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 5 August 2025): “In 2006 the Murrays built a 6,220 ft2 house at Faughan Hill, Kells, County Meath. They did so without planning permission. They well knew that they needed planning permission but hoped that they would get away with it. It was an aggravating factor that the Murrays had very shortly previously been refused permission for a much smaller house.” 14. These proceedings were instituted on 25 June 2007. 15. On 29 June 2010, Edwards J. granted the s. 160 injunction with a stay of two years. 16. For some reason not altogether clear this was not perfected until 3 March 2011. The notice of appeal is dated 24 March 2011. For reasons also not totally clear from the papers it then took a further six years for the matter to proceed through the appellate process. The council commented as follows in response to the foregoing in the draft judgment: “Meath County Council has no comments to make as regards the Judgement save to highlight that the six years that it took for the matter to proceed through the Appeals process, that this occurred at a time before the establishment of the Court of Appeal when there were very significant backlog of cases before the Supreme Court and despite numerous requests by Meath County Council to the Supreme Court to list the matter for hearing.” 17. On 17 October 2016, the Supreme Court heard the appeal. 18. On 19 May 2017, the appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by McKechnie J. (Denham C.J., O’Donnell, Laffoy and Dunne JJ. concurring) with a one year stay. The order is dated 25 May 2017, perfected 30 May 2017. 19. One year on, 25 May 2018, was the date for compliance. But instead of compliance there was simple defiance of the order. 20. On 4 March 2019, the council issued a first motion for attachment and committal due to non-compliance. 21. On 24 September 2020, Meenan J. received an undertaking from Mr and Ms Murray “to vacate the property on or before the 24th September 2022 and to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the County Council or its agents” and on that basis made an order granting Meath County Council possession of the unauthorised structure for the purpose of carrying out demolition works and extended the stay granted by Edwards J. in 2010 for a further two years (i.e. from 24 September 2020). The order provided that “in the event of the undertakings provided by the Respondents not being complied with, such Order to take effect on the 25th September 2022 and such demolition works to be completed as expeditiously as the circumstances allow”. 22. He also made an order for Meath County Council’s costs with a permanent stay on that order in the event of the undertakings by the Murrays being complied with. 23. The order was not perfected until 3 December 2020. 24. Three days before the expiry of the period of the undertaking and the stay granted by Meenan J., the respondents issued the 2022 proceedings 2022 4576 P (later struck out as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process). 25. On Friday 23 September 2022, the respondents applied for and obtained ex parte in the 2022 proceedings an order from Heslin J. that “that the Defendant the County Council of the County 5 of Meath be restrained until the 7th Day of November 2022 from taking any further action in the proceedings entitled the County Council of the County of Meath and Michael Murray and Rose Murray 2007/MCA 76 and Appeal 127/2011”. On its face this purports to prevent the council from taking steps not just in High Court proceedings but in a Supreme Court appeal, albeit one that had ostensibly concluded in 2017. 26. The deadline of 24 September 2022 came and went without compliance. The respondents have been in breach of their undertaking since then – about three and a half years. They state that the order of Heslin J. (given ex parte for a two-week period) had the effect of supplanting their undertakings to the court (given on oath in an inter partes contempt application). For the purposes of the orders discussed in this judgment I did not see any basis at the time to conclude that such an argument prevented a finding of contempt, but I appreciate that the respondents propose to argue this matter further in the proposed notice of motion. 27. The respondents commented as follows on the draft judgment: “Parsa [sic] 18 19, the submission that the respondents following the Order of Heslin J. have been in breach of their undertaking since then - three and a half years. This is a matter to be determined by the 23rd March motion pending and yet to be heard.” 28. I don’t think this point amounts to a disagreement. The proper legal effect of the order of Heslin J. is an issue the respondents want to agitate on their motion and that can be addressed in due course. All I am saying here is that at the relevant time I did not see the order of Heslin J. as affecting anything I was dealing with. That is a historical statement. The general saver for the respondents’ motion applies. 29. On 20 November 2024, Dignam J. dismissed the 2022 proceedings. 30. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. 31. On 14 February 2025, Costello P. declined to allow an amendment, a stay, or the addition of the Attorney General. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal as noted above. 32. On 5 August 2025, Allen J. dismissed the appeal from Dignam J. Costs were proposed to follow the event. 33. On 10 November 2025, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal therefrom. Step 2 – service 34. As we are dealing with undertakings given personally by the respondents on oath rather than imposed by order, I did not consider that service of the order recording the undertakings was in fact required. But if I was wrong about that I did in any event satisfy myself as to service. 35. The second named respondent was served with copies of the orders made in the within proceedings, with the penal endorsement attached thereon, on 22 November 2012 and 9 June 2025 respectively (see affidavits of Martin Barrins, sworn on 27 November 2012, affidavit of David McGlynn sworn on 27 June 2017 and affidavit of Patrick Tully sworn on 4 September 2025 and supplemental affidavit of Patrick Tully sworn on 5 February 2026). 36. The applicant was unable to achieve personal service on the first named respondent of any of the orders made in the within proceedings (see affidavits of Mr Barrins, Mr McGlynn and the affidavits of Patrick Tully sworn on 4 September 2025 and sworn on 5 February 2026). 37. This necessitated an application for substituted service. 38. The council’s ex parte docket dated 9 February 2026 sought the following relief: “1. An Order pursuant to Order 10 Rule 1 of the Superior Court Rules, as amended (RSC) and/or Order 103 Rule 18 of the RSC for an Order of substituted service, granting the Applicant liberty to serve the first named Respondent, Michael Murray (otherwise known as Christopher /Chris Murray ), with the Orders made in the within proceedings, namely the Order made by Mr Justice Edwards on the 27th July, 2010, the Order made by Mr Justice McKechnie 25th May 2017 and the Order made by Mr Justice Meenan Order dated 24th September, 2020 respectively (‘the Orders’), with the penal endorsement attached thereon, by the following means, namely;
- i)The affixing of the Orders, with the penal endorsement attached thereon, to the entrance gates of lands, situate at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen, Navan, County Meath, being part of the lands previously comprised in Folio No 14049 of the register of Freeholders for the County of Meath and which lands are now registered in Folio 59360F of the Register of Freeholders, County Meath and which lands relate to the Orders made in the within proceedings (‘the lands’).
- ii)Service of the Orders, on the first named Respondent, by means of ordinary prepaid post addressed to him at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen, Navan, County Meath. iii) The service of the Orders on the Respondents solicitors, Messrs McNelis & Company Solicitors, The Square, Milltown Malbay County Clare, A95 K259, Email: … by email and ordinary pre-paid post 2. An Order permitting service of any further applications brought by the Applicants against both Respondents in the within proceedings, seeking enforcement of any or all of 6 the Orders made herein in the manner provided for at paragraphs 1(i), 1(
- ii)and 1(iii) herein 3. Such further or other Orders as to this Honourable Court seem meet and just. 4. Order for costs.” 39. On 13 February 2026, the matter was first mentioned in the Planning & Environment Court. I admitted the case to the list and granted an ex parte application for substituted service on the first named respondent. 40. The affidavit of John Sweeney of 2 March 2026 sets out the service effected on foot of the order: “11. I say that in accordance with the Substituted service Order, this your deponent attended the premises on the 19th February, 2026, at approximately 10.15am. On that occasion, I confirmed that the unauthorised residential dwelling remained on the premises and the entrance gates were closed and secured by a chain. On that date, I fixed the following ‘Court Orders’ to the gate, namely: (
- a)Order of Mr. Justice Edwards dated 27th July 2010 with penal endorsement thereon., (
- b)Order of Supreme Court, dated 25th of May 2017 with penal endorsement thereon, (
- c)Order of Mr. Justice Meenan dated 24th of September 2020 with penal endorsement thereon. I also confirm that I served a copy of the Substituted consent order, dated 13th February 2026, by affixing same on the closed entrance gates situate on the lands. In that regard I beg to refer to copies of the aforementioned ‘Court Orders’, with the penal endorsement thereon and ‘Substituted consent Order’ that I served by affixing on the entrance gates to the premises on the 19th February, 2026 which appear at TAB 8 in the booklet of exhibits herein. I also beg to refer to photographs taken by this your deponent on the 19th February, 2026 of the ‘Court Orders’ and ‘Substituted consent Order’ affixed to the entrance gates of the premises which appear at TAB 9 in the booklet of exhibits herein. As can be seen from the penal endorsement attached to the ‘Court Orders’, the penal endorsement thereon stated as follows‘If you the within named Michael (otherwise Christopher) Murray and Rose Murray neglect to obey this Judgment or Order by the time therein limited, you will be liable to process of execution including imprisonment for the purpose of complying you to obey the same judgment or Order’ I say there was a typographical error in that the word ‘complying’ should have read ‘compelling’, for which I apologise. 12. I say that while at the entrance gates to the premises on the 19th February, 2026, I also Pressed the intercom at the entrance and identified myself as being from Meath County Council and advised that I was there to request vacant possession of the premises. I did not receive a response from the intercom. I then proceeded to post a letter, dated 19th February, 2026 addressed to Rose Murray and Chris Murray with a copy of the Court Orders and a copy of the Substituted service Order into the letter box attached to the wing walls of the entrance gate. I beg to refer to a copy of this letter and a photograph of this your deponent inserting it into the letterbox which appears at TAB10 in the booklet of exhibits herein. 13. I say and I am advised that the Council’s solicitors, Messrs Regan McEntee & Partners Solicitors, High Street, Trim, County Meath, had previously posted to the First named Respondent by ordinary pre-paid post a letter dated 18th February, 2026 with copies of the Court Orders, with the penal endorsement thereon and Substituted service order and I beg to refer to the affidavit of David McEntee Solicitor, sworn on the 2nd day of March 2026 in that regard when produced. 14. I say that this was the third time this your deponent had attended at the premises in recent years to seek possession of the premises to facilitate [its] demolition, the two prior occasions to my attendance on the 19th February 2026 being as follows, namelyi) On the 4/4/2025 at 10.40am I attended the premises. On arrival I approached the gated entrance and identified two intercoms on the gate pier and a letter box on the entrance wing wall. I pressed both intercom buttons and identified myself as John Sweeney from Meath County Council planning enforcement section and stated I was there requesting possession of the property, asked for a response. After a few minutes, again I pressed the intercoms, repeated who I was, again received no response. While waiting at the gates for a response I observed that the gates had a motorised opening mechanism, but this had been disconnected and that there was a metal chain securing the gate closed. On closer inspection I noted that the chain was looped around the gates on the inside and there was a pad lock placed on the kerb to the driveway on the inside of the gates. 7 41. I pressed intercom one more time when there was no response I then placed a letter into the letter box and left the premises.
- ii)On the 5/9/2025 at 9.45 am I attended the premises. I approached the two intercoms on the gate pier which are positioned below a security camera and pressed both buttons identified myself as John Sweeney from Meath County Council. After a few minutes again I pressed the intercoms, repeated who I was, again received no response. I did observe that there was a robot lawn mower cutting the grass and that there were two padlocks [one] with key still inserted on top of the gate pier. I took photos and left the premises. 15. I further say and I am advised that the Council and the Council’s solicitors also made numerous written requests to the Respondents and to the Respondent’s Solicitor, Messrs McNelis & Company Solicitors, The Square, Milltown Malbay, County Clare A95K259 to furnish possession of the premises to the Council in compliance with the undertaking given to the Court by the Respondents on 24th September 2020 and to enable the Council to take possession of the premises to carry out demolition works in accordance with the Order of Mr Justice Meenan dated 24th September 2020, such requests have not been acceded to. To date the Respondents, in breach of their undertaking given to the Court on the 24th September, 2020, remain in possession of the said premises and have not vacated the premises and have not facilitated the demolition of the premises by the Council or its agents. In that regard I beg to refer to correspondence which has ... been issued by the Council requesting that the Respondents furnish vacant possession of the property which appears at TAB11 in the Booklet of exhibits herein and to the affidavit of David McEntee, Solicitor sworn on the 2nd of March 2026 when produced which details and exhibits further correspondence which was sent to the Respondents by the Council’s solicitors requesting the Respondents to offer vacant possession of the premises to the Council of which there has been no reply, save for without prejudice correspondence received from the Respondents solicitors. 16. I say that despite the Respondents undertaking, given by both the First and Second named Respondents individually under oath to Mr Justice Meenan on the 24th September, 2020, on their own behalf and on behalf of any persons occupying the premises with their permission, to vacate the premises on or before the 24th September 2022 and to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the Council or its agents, the Respondents have failed and or refused to vacate the premises and have failed and/or refused to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the Council, thereby preventing the Council from obtaining vacant possession of the premises for the purpose of carrying out demolition works at the premises, as ordered by Mr Justice Meenen by Order dated 24th September 2020 and despite further service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, with the penal endorsement thereon on the Respondents, which recited the Respondents sworn undertaking given to the Court on the 24th September, 2020. 17. I further say that despite the Order of Mr Justice Edwards requiring the Respondents to remove the unauthorised residential dwelling from the premises and to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use, and the expiry of the stay placed by Mr Justice Edwards on his Order of two years, which order was affirmed and the stay extended for a further year by Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May 2017 and a further extension of the stay of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan to the 24th September 2022 the Respondents have failed and/or refused to remove the unauthorised residential dwelling from the premises and restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use and as of the date of my attendance at the premises on the 19th February, 2026, the unauthorised residential dwelling remains at the premises, in breach of the Court Orders made and duly served on the Respondents.” The affidavit of David McEntee of 2 March 2026 avers: “3. I beg to refer to the Order of Mr. Justice Humphreys on the 13th of February 2026, when produced (‘Substituted Service Order’), providing for [Substituted] service of documents on the First Named Respondent and in particular to paragraph 1(
- ii)thereof which provided for service by ordinary prepaid post addressed to the first named Respondent at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen, Navan, Co. Meath (‘the lands’). I say and I believe that consequent upon the Substituted Service Order, on the 18th day of February 2026 Regan McEntee & Partners Solicitors for the Applicants herein served the First named Respondent by prepaid ordinary post a letter enclosing copies of the following Orders made in these Proceedings, with the penal endorsement attached thereon (‘ the Orders’ ), namely:1. High Court Order of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys dated the 13th of February 2026. (‘Substituted Service Order’) 8 2. Order of Mr. Justice Edwards dated 27th of July 2010, with penal endorsement thereon. (‘Order of Mr Justice Edwards’) 3. Order of Mr. Justice McKechnie of the 25th of May 2017 with penal endorsement thereon. 4. Order of Mr. Justice Meenan dated the 24th of September 2020 with penal endorsement thereon. (‘Order of Mr. Justice Meenan’) And I beg to refer to a copy of the letter dated 18th February, 2026 with the Orders enclosed which appear at Tab 1 in the Book of Exhibits. 4. I say that the said Substituted Service Order also authorised service on the first name Respondent by service on the first named Respondent’s Solicitors namely Messrs. McNelis & Co., Solicitors of The Square, Miltown Malbay, Co. Clare A95K259 by email to … and by ordinary pre-paid post. I say that Regan McEntee & Partners as Solicitors for the Applicant wrote to the Respondents Solicitors McNelis & Co., on the 17th of February 2026 enclosing the Orders. I say that the said letter was sent by email and ordinary pre-paid post to the said Solicitors and was followed by an email of the 18th of February 2026 furnishing a copy of the attested Substituted Service Order and a copy of Regan McEntee’s letter to the first named Respondent dated the 18th of February 2026. I beg to refer to copies of the letter of the 17th of February 2026, with the Orders enclosed and the email of the 18th of February 2026, with a copy of the Substituted service Order, appearing at TAB 2 in the Book of Exhibits. 5 I say that following the Respondents sworn Undertaking of the 24th of September 2020 to this Honorable Court, Regan McEntee & Partners in correspondence dated the 15th of October 2021 sent a copy of the Order of Mr. Justice Meenan dated 24th September, 2020, with a Penal Endorsement thereon, which duly recited the sworn undertaking given by the Respondents to the Court, to the Applicant’s Solicitors, Messrs. McNelis & Co and I beg to refer to a copy of the said letter appearing at TAB 3 in the Book of Exhibits. I further say that prior to the date for compliance by the Respondents with the said Undertaking, namely the 24th of September 2022, Regan McEntee & Partners again wrote in correspondence dated the 28th of February 2022, 12th of May 2022, 13th of July 2022, 25th of August 2022 and 22nd of September 2022 respectively to the Respondents Solicitors, Messrs. McNelis & Co, seeking to put in place arrangements for the delivery of possession of the premises to the Applicant. I beg to refer to copies of the said letters which appear at TAB 4 in the Book of Exhibits. I confirm that there was no response to the aforementioned correspondence. 6 I say that on the 14th of February 2025 the Court of Appeal in proceedings entitled’ The High Court, Record No 2022/4876, Between Chris Murray and Rose Murray, Plaintiffs v Meath County Council, Defendant’ the Court vacated a previous stay on the operation of the Order of Mr. Justice Dignam on the 12th day of December 2024 and following which Regan McEntee & Partners as Solicitors for the County Council wrote on the 20th day of February 2025 to the Respondents Solicitors, Messrs. McNelis & Co seeking possession of the property on foot of the Respondents undertaking to the Court on the 24th of September 2020. Thereafter, there followed an exchange of correspondence between the respective Solicitors for the parties wherein the Respondents sought a deferral of any enforcement action on the part of the Applicants pending, inter alia, the determination of their Appeal and their parallel Application to the Supreme Court for reinstatement of the Stay on the Order of Mr. Justice Dignam I beg to refer to copies of the said correspondence appearing at TAB 5 in the Book of Exhibits.” Step 3 – liberty to issue motion for attachment and committal 42. On 23 February 2026, I gave liberty to issue a motion for attachment and committal (the second such motion – the first one having been noted above). 43. The motion was dated 2 March 2026, and seeks the following relief: “1. A Declaration, that the First and Second named Respondents are in Contempt of Court, having failed and/or refused to comply with the undertaking given under Oath, to Mr. Justice Meenan on the 24th September 2020, by the said first and second named Respondents on their own behalf and on behalf of any persons occupying the premises with their permission, being the premises situate at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen, Navan, County Meath, comprised in Folio No.14049 of the Register of Freeholders for the County of Meath and which lands are now registered in Folio 59360F of the Register of Freeholder, County Meath (‘the premises’), that the first and second named Respondent vacate the premises on or before the 24th September 2022 and [facilitate] the demolition of the premises by the County Council or [its] agents, in circumstances where the first and second named Respondent have failed and/or refused to vacate the premises and have failed and/or refused to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the Council, preventing the Council from 9 obtaining vacant possession of the premises for the purpose of carrying out demolition works at the premises, as Ordered by Mr Justice Meenan by Order dated 24th September 2020 (‘the Order of Mr. Justice Meenan’) and despite further service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, with the penal endorsement thereon, on the Respondents. 2. An Order pursuant to Order 44, Rule 1, 2 and 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended, (‘RSC’) and/or pursuant to the inherent Jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, giving liberty to the Council to issue an Order for Attachment and/or Committal to prison of the first and Second named Respondents for failing and/or refusing to comply with the undertaking given under Oath to this Honourable Court on 24th September, 2020, and recited in the Order of Mr Justice Meenan therein, whereby the first and second named Respondent undertook to vacate the premises on or before the 24th September 2022 and to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the Council, in circumstances where the first and second named Respondent have failed and/or refused to vacate the premises and have failed and/or refused to facilitate the demolition of the premises by the Council, in breach of their undertaking to the Court dated 24th September, 2020 and recited in the Order of Mr Justice Meenan and despite personal service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan on the second named Respondent, with the penal endorsement thereon, on the 9th June, 2025 and service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, with the penal [endorsement] thereon, on the first named Respondent on the 19th February, 2026, pursuant to the Order of Substituted service made by Mr Justice Humphrey dated 13th February, 2026 (‘Substituted service Order’), together with service of the Substituted service Order on the first named Respondent . 3. Further or in the [alternative], a Declaration that the first and second named Respondents are in Contempt of Court, having failed and/or refused to comply with the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, made on the 27th July, 2010 (‘Order of Mr Justice Edwards’) by the time provided by the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, which Order was affirmed and extended by the Order of the Supreme Court, dated 25th May, 2017 and further extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan dated 24th September, 2020, in that the first and second named Respondents were Ordered to remove the unauthorised residential building constructed by the Respondents at the premises and to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use, by the 24th September 2022 and in circumstances where that time frame has now expired and despite [its] expiry, the Respondents have failed and/or refused to remove the unauthorised residential building constructed at the premises and have failed and/or refused to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use, in breach of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, as affirmed and extended by Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May 2017 and further extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, despite due service of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, the Order of the Supreme Court, dated 25th May, 2017 and the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, with the penal endorsements thereon, on the Respondents. 4. Further or in the [alternative], an Order pursuant to Order 44, Rule, 1, 2 and 3 of the RSC and/or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, giving liberty to the Council to issue an Order for the Attachment and/or the Committal to prison of the first and second named Respondents for failing and/or refusing to comply with the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, within the time frame therein provided, the Order of Mr Justice Edwards being [affirmed] and extended by the Order of the Supreme Court, dated 25th May 2017 and further extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, in that the Respondents were ordered to remove the unauthorised residential building constructed on the premises and to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use on or before 24th September 2022 and the Respondents have failed and/or refused to remove the unauthorised residential building from the premises and have failed and/or refused to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use, in breach of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, within the time frame provided, as affirmed and extended by Order of the Supreme Court, dated 25th May, 2017 and further extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, and despite personal service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan with the penal [endorsement] thereon, personal service of the Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May 2017 with the penal [endorsement] thereon and personal service of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, with the penal endorsement thereon, on the second named Defendant on the 9th June 2025 and service of the Order of Mr Justice Meenan with the penal [endorsement] thereon, service of the Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May, 2017 with the penal [endorsement] thereon and service of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, with the penal endorsement thereon, on the first named Respondent, pursuant to the Substituted service Order, together with service of the said Substituted service Order on the first named Respondent. 10 5. If necessary an Order directed to the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana to attach the first and second named Respondent and to bring the first and second named Respondent to this Honourable Court on such date as to this Honourable Court appears just. 6. An Order committing the first and second named Respondent to Prison for such period as to be determined by this Honourable Court for failure to comply with the undertaking given to this Honourable Court dated 24th September, 2020 under oath by the Respondents and recited in the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, which said Order was personally served on the second named Respondent with the penal endorsement thereon on the 9th June 2025 and which said Order, with the penal [endorsement] thereon was served on the First named Respondent, in accordance with the Substituted service Order on the 19th February, 2026, and which undertaking was for the Respondents to vacate the premises on or before the 24th September 2022 and to [facilitate] the demolition of the premises by the Council or its agents and which undertaking the Respondents have failed and refused to comply with in that the Respondents have failed and /or refused to vacate the premises and have failed and/or refused to [facilitate] the demolition of the premises by the Council or its agents, in breach of the undertaking given to the Court on the 24th September 2020 and recited in the Order of Mr Justice Meenan duly served on the Respondents. 7. Further or in the alternative, an Order, pursuant to Order 44 Rule 4 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, directing the first and second named Respondents to remove their personal belongings from the premises and to provide vacate possession of the premises to the Council by delivering to the Council’s Solicitors office, situate at Messrs Regan McEntee & Partners, Solicitors, High Street, Trim, County Meath, within a period of 48 hours of the Order being served on the [Respondent], all keys to the premises, to include the entrance gates, so as to enable the Council carry out demolition works at the premises, in lieu of imprisonment for failure to comply with the Undertaking given to this Honourable Court dated 24th September, 2020 and/or for failure to comply with the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, dated 27th July 2010, which order was affirmed and stayed by Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May, 2017 and which stay was further extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan, dated 24th September, 2020, to 24th September 2022. 8. Further or in the alternative, an Order, if necessary, pursuant to Order 42 Rule 24 giving the Council leave to issue the within proceedings seeking an Order for Attachment and Committal of the first and second named Respondents for failure to comply with the Order of Mr Justice Edwards dated 27th July, 2010, such Order having been affirmed and a further stay granted by Order of the Supreme Court dated 25th May, 2017 to 30th May 2018 and thereafter stayed by further Order of Mr Justice Meenan, dated 24th September, 2020, to the 24th September, 2022, whereby the first and second named Respondents were ordered to remove the unauthorised residential building constructed on the premises and to restore the premises to a condition suitable for [agricultural] use, in circumstances where the first and second named Respondents have failed and /or refused to remove the unauthorised residential building on the premises and to restore the premises to a condition suitable for agricultural use in breach of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards, as affirmed by Supreme Court Order dated 25th May, 2017 and extended by the Order of Mr Justice Meenan dated 24th September 2020, despite service of the aforementioned Court Orders on the first and second named Respondent. 9. Further or in the alternative, an Order extending the time for the first and second named respondents to comply with the undertaking given to the Court on the 24th September 2020 by the first and second named Respondent, to vacate the premises, so as to enable the Respondents to vacate the premises on or before the 16th March, 2026 and to [facilitate] the demolition of the premises by the Council or its agents. 10. Further or in the alternative, an Order that the stay on the Order of Mr Justice Edwards made on the 27th July 2010 be extended until the 16th May, 2026 and that service of any Order so extending the stay, together with service of the Order of Mr Justice Edwards and the Supreme Court Order, dated 25th May, 2017, is permitted by means of the said orders being affixed to the gates of the premises. 11. Further or in the alternative, an Order that the Respondents deliver up possession of the Premises within 48 hours of the service of such an Order on the Respondents and with service of said Order to be effected by means of affixing a copy of said Order to the entrance gates of the premises. 12. An Order declaring service of the within application/proceedings on the first and/or second named Respondent good and sufficient, having regard to the evidence of attempted personal service of the within [proceedings] on the Respondents and the evidence of 11 alternative methods of service effected by the Council, its servants or agents, on the Respondents. 13. Such further or other Orders as to this Honourable Court seem just and meet. 14. Costs.” 44. On 7 March 2026, the respondents’ solicitor stated that applications had been lodged with the ECtHR, described inaccurately as appeals (emphasis added): “We are instructed to advise that Chris Murray and Rose Murray have lodged their Appeals in time, to the European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg, in respect of, breaches of their rights under Articles of the convention. The Council is therefore requested to adhere to due process and to respect the fact that, there are now two live Appeals lawfully filed and pending before that Court. The response from the European Court of Human Rights is awaited. The Murray’s have been forced to Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights where, the Council opposed their appeals in relation to violations of articles of the convention, being admitted by leave to appeal, to the Supreme Court, and to the denial by determinations of that Court to their efforts at domestic level, to have their complaints of breaches of their fundamental rights under the Convention assessed and heard. The Murray’s are exercising, in the only way they can, their rights to seek redress for several violations of the said fundamental rights under several Articles of the convention and are doing so in the only way which is left open to them, to seek redress, having exhausted all domestic legal remedies, to which they have been denied. The Murrays reserve their rights to be allowed pursue their Appeals without in the interim being prevented from doing so, or enduring harm, loss or irreparable damages pending the determination of the said Appeals process.” 45. My view of this letter at the time was that the most immediately striking thing about it was the implicit acceptance (presumably in the light of the 2022 proceedings having been dismissed as an abuse of process) that the “only way” the applicants could seek to vindicate their rights was in Strasbourg. That noted, there appeared to me to have been a number of immediate problems with the ECHR-based submission. Section I (arts. 1 to 18) of the ECHR is headed “Rights and Freedoms” and sets out the most well-known rights in that instrument. Section II (arts. 19 to 51) is headed “European Court of Human Rights” and sets out institutional and procedural provisions, one of which is Article 34 which allows “individual applications”. Section III (arts. 52 to 59) relates to “Miscellaneous Provisions”. The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 in s. 1
(1)defines “Convention provisions” as only referring to “Articles 2 to 14 of the Convention” and certain protocols, all subject to reservations. The Act does not give effect to the ECHR as a whole, only to the “Convention provision” as so defined. Thus the fact that someone has availed of art. 34 to make an application (not an appeal as phrased by the respondents) does not in itself create domestic legal effects. Even if it did, they would not be such as to constitute a stay on an order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the ECtHR did in a given case issue an interim measure under rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a domestic court should sit up and take notice of that as a relevant factual development within the scope of such discretion as it might have under domestic law to hold fire on a given matter. Discretion should ideally not be exercised in a way that puts the State in breach of international law, even if that law is not directly enforceable. Should that happen in relation to the respondents’ application to Strasbourg, I would of course give it immediate and serious consideration. But no such interim measure was brought to my attention here. In any event should the respondents win their application in Strasbourg, their losses are not wholly “irreparable” as alleged because the ECtHR has jurisdiction to grant just satisfaction. Finally, the overall problem is that since the 2022 proceedings were an abuse of process and thus not a legal basis to revisit the s. 160 order, the correct time to apply to Strasbourg would appear to have been six months from the Supreme Court decision in 2017, not in 2026 after the respondents incorrectly sought to reagitate matters. My view at the time of having my attention drawn to this letter was that an application to Strasbourg from a final order in the 2022 proceedings doesn’t restart the clock to challenge a final order made at an earlier date. So my view was that the ECHR application was not a reason to hold fire on enforcement of the orders and undertakings. 46. On the issue of nomenclature, the respondents commented as follows in the draft judgment process: “The following clarifications and suggested corrections are made. Generally, the Applicants, Meath County Council, were referred to as ‘the Applicants’ as they appear as such parties in the 2007 MCE 76 proceedings. The respondents Chris and Rose Murray are referred to as such in those proceedings. Because the reference to Applicants in different contexts could arise, in drafting the email of the 7th March 2026, to avoid confusion by reference to ‘the Applicants’ who are Meath County Council, and where they are also ‘Applicants’ in the Contempt proceedings, and where the Murrays (were referred to as ‘the 12 Applicants’ in respect of the ECHR application. As stated to avoid confusion, the Murrays as the Applicants to ECHR were referred to as the Appellants in respect of their Appeals (such were referred to by not using the word ‘applications’ so as not to confuse) and so as to distinguish them from references to the Council otherwise as ‘the Applicants’. For that reason in the email of the 7th March, the words Applicants was replaced by the word ‘Appellants’ and the word Application(
- s)was replaced by the word Appeals. This is the explanation for the wording in the email of the 7th March.” 47. I don’t mean to unduly parse the respondents’ correspondence and I appreciate the potential confusion that can arise with overlapping terminologies and capacities as pointed out by them. I am simply pointing out that an application to Strasbourg is not in fact an appeal from the domestic courts, albeit that it is frequently referred to as such, including by lawyers speaking informally. 48. On the issue of substance the respondents comment as follows: “Para 36 ....Thus the fact that someone has availed of art 34 does not in itself create domestic effects. It is submitted that this is matter to be determined on the 23rd March motion in terms of the effect of an action taken in violation of Art 34 arising. The correct time to apply to Strasbourg would appear to have been six months from the Supreme Court decision in 2017. This is a matter to be determined by legal submissions on the 23rd March motion pending.” 49. Again the general saver applies above – nothing in the judgment should preclude any relief the court would otherwise be minded to grant on the motion. As I say above, the foregoing was just how the respondents’ position appeared to me “at the time”. Step 4 – order of the court for attachment 50. On 9 March 2026, the council’s second motion for attachment and committal came before the court. It would appear that one or both of the respondents and their solicitor on record were listening in online but did not make themselves known to the court. I don’t need to get into the rights and wrongs of that for present purposes but all that needs to be said is that if an on-notice application is made without the thus-notified parties choosing to attend and to make themselves known to the court, such a situation has a significant effect on the approach of the court towards the application because the court can take it that it is unopposed. That situation applies here up to the point when the respondents did appear. Had they wanted their views taken account of earlier that would have been no problem but it would have required the minimal step of making their online or counterfactual physical presence known to the court. 51. I deemed the application duly served and there was no appearance from the respondents. I made a declaration as to contempt and ordered the attachment of the respondents, the matter being returnable to 16 March 2026. Step 5 – order of attachment from Central Office 52. The formal order of attachment was issued out of the Central Office on 11 March 2026. The applicant then served this on the Gardaí for enforcement. 53. On 16 March 2026, the council appeared on the return date. The registrar then asked whether there was an attendance from Michael Murray or Rose Murray. There was no such attendance. 54. Again, a general point needs to be made about all that follows from that. The respondents knew about the hearing of 16 March 2026 but chose not to attend – one or both of them and their solicitor on record tried to log into the muted non-participating observation channel, but for some technical reason that did not work. Had there been any attendance in court, matters would have proceeded in a completely different manner. But in the absence of any objection I had to engage with the council on the basis that no counter-arguments were being put up against immediate enforcement. Had the respondents attended and made such arguments, they would have been given attention – not having done so meant that I had to simply get on with enforcing the Supreme Court order and consequent undertakings as rapidly as possible. I did of course remain conscious of the respondents’ rights, for example by not ordering any costs against them in their absence, but such rights do not include a right not to have an unauthorised structure demolished as soon as possible, doubly so if they don’t show up to make any arguments. What followed needs to be seen as having been entirely conditioned by that context. 55. Even apart from the imperative for a trial court to enforce orders of the Supreme Court, the foregoing was also influenced in my mind by the correspondence from the respondents’ solicitor that the “only” lawful avenue open to them was Strasbourg. That restrained position was to be abandoned at a later stage when the motion was issued without leave, but at the time (i.e., on 16 and 18 March 2026 in particular) the articulated stance of the respondents that there was no domestic legal answer to the council’s position. As I read it at the time, that logically implied that if there was any resistance to the council from that point onwards, it would not have a domestically lawful basis, which strongly reinforced the imperative, as I saw matters, to render the unauthorised 13 structure uninhabitable immediately, such as by knocking its roof, and to complete the demolition as soon as possible. 56. Any concerns I had in that regard about the extra-legal obstructions that would be incentivised by delay were massively amplified by the evidence of serious criminality that was to emerge. 57. Thus, to anticipate somewhat the subsequent listings, and as I indicated to the respondents when they did eventually appear at a later stage, I was of the view that the quicker the council implemented the orders and undertakings the better. My encouragement to do so immediately and decisively even if things had to be tidied up later was based on a number of factors, of which the following would be the main points: (
- i)As the remediation had been upheld by the Supreme Court it was the role of a trial court to implement that without delay. (
- ii)The initial correspondence from the respondents seemed to acknowledge that they had no remaining domestic legal answer to the council. (iii) The respondents’ failure to appear also meant that there was no contrary argument to be considered against immediate demolition. (
- iv)In the light of previous obstruction (claims of being in London that were contradicted by the evidence, letters being implausibly sent back, trucks being parked, dogs being unleashed outside the unauthorised structure), failure to immediately demolish the unauthorised structure or at least render it uninhabitable say by removing the roof in whole or in part would only act as an incitement and provocation for further obstruction, or to put it another way, leaving the unauthorised structure intact while heart was being given to criminal actions by its continued existence would be a form of fiddling while Rome burned. (
- v)There would also be the risk of re-occupation if the unauthorised structure was not rendered uninhabitable as has happened in many repossession cases. (
- vi)This could also lead to escalation of the obstruction – which it did in terms of criminal behaviour although I am not attributing responsibility for that. Ultimately I was concerned that having heard evidence of a van being burned out, a contractor’s home being visited threateningly, and other threats being made by phone, the next step one could anticipate was somebody being injured, so urgent action to demolish the unauthorised structure was preferable to taking any risk of letting that happen. Again I am not finding that the respondents are answerable for the process of escalation. (vii) From an efficiency point of view, leaving the unauthorised structure in place for any period could lead to a proliferation of further unnecessary and potentially pointless applications to the court. 58. With that context firmly in mind we can turn to the events following the order of attachment. 59. In relation to the above, the respondents commented on the draft judgment: “Para 44. ‘...claims of being in London that were contradicted by the evidence ...’ such contradictions in the evidence are and were the subject of the 23rd March motion and as such a matter for evidence and legal submissions.” 60. Again the general saver applies. This is a historical statement of how I viewed the matter at the time. Nothing in this judgment should stand in the way of relief if the court on hearing the motion would be minded to grant such relief, but for the judgment. 61. Counsel for the applicant said that Sergeant Bowens from Kells Garda Station was present and she proposed to call him so that he could update the court on the situation. 62. Counsel for the applicant said that the court would see that there were two affidavits uploaded on ShareFile on Friday, one from John Sweeney on behalf of the council as regards service, and one from David McEntee for the applicant, both relating to the service of the orders of this court by affixing and by various other means of service. 63. Counsel for the applicant said that, notably, when Mr Sweeney attended the unauthorised structure on Friday he found that three articulated trucks had been placed at the entrance to the unauthorised structure together with an additional steel lock placed on the front gate. She said that the Sergeant would update the court on what was found that morning in relation to the matter, namely that the lock and the three articulated vehicles were still blocking the entrance to the unauthorised structure. 64. She said that the court would also note from David McEntee’s affidavit that there had been a further return of documentation, namely the notice of motion and grounding affidavit in respect of the attachment proceedings, which had again been returned with a note on the envelope stating “not at this address”, and that there appeared to be a repeat performance, as the court may have seen previously, of the returning of documentation. 14 65. Counsel for the applicant said that she could inform the court that the council had engaged the services of agents who were in position that morning to remove the three articulated trucks at the unauthorised structure. 66. Counsel for the applicant said that, together with a locksmith who was in a position to remove the bolted lock currently on the gate, the council’s agents were also in a position to attend the front door, having securely managed to get through the entrance gate, and to break the lock on the front door with a view to changing the lock, entering the unauthorised structure, seeing if the unauthorised structure could be secured by way of boarding windows and similar measures, and also to be in a position to identify with the Gardaí whether or not anyone was currently occupying the unauthorised structure. 67. Counsel for the applicant then called Sergeant Bowens, who was sworn. Counsel for the applicant asked the Sergeant to confirm whether he was in receipt of an order of attachment from this court directing that he attend at the premises the subject matter of the order for the purpose of bringing Rose Murray and Michael Murray before the court that morning. 68. Sergeant Bowens confirmed that that was correct. 69. Counsel for the applicant asked the Sergeant to tell the court what efforts he had made for the purposes of fulfilling that attachment order. 70. Sergeant Bowens said that the previous morning at 9:30 am he and a colleague, Sergeant Dennis O’Brien, attended at the Murray premises at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen, and observed that there were three 40-foot articulated lorry containers outside the main gate, which was secured with two padlocks. He said that there had been a prior report from another colleague that there were two Dobermann dogs within the curtilage of the premises, that the premises were very well secured, and that unless one physically hopped the wall into the garden there was no way of getting access. 71. He said that he rang the intercom system, observed another camera system at the gate, and that there was no answer whatsoever. He said that at 16:30 the previous afternoon he had obtained two phone numbers for Michael Murray and Rose Murray and rang both numbers with a view to speaking to them, but there was no answer and the phones simply rang out. He said that that morning he and another colleague, Garda David O’Callaghan, attended at the premises again. I asked him what time that was. Sergeant Bowens said that it was at 07:25 that morning and that there was no answer whatsoever from the residence, that if anyone was present there was no sign of life whatsoever, and that they rang the intercom and called out but nobody made themselves known to them. 72. Counsel for the applicant asked whether, in those circumstances, they were not in a position to attend at the front door of the property. 73. Sergeant Bowens said that they did not enter the curtilage of the building that morning, nor on the previous morning. 74. Counsel for the applicant said that the council had engaged a locksmith together with agents who were in a position to remove the articulated containers blocking the entrance and the padlocks, and asked whether that would assist the Sergeant’s efforts. 75. Sergeant Bowens said that it would assist in gaining entry and also referred to the mention of a dog warden. 76. Counsel for the applicant confirmed that a dog warden would be in attendance for the purposes of the animals currently on the grounds. 77. Sergeant Bowens said that that would assist with their mission. 78. Counsel for the applicant further said that the council would be in a position to remove the lock at the front door in order to gain entry and asked whether that would assist. 79. Sergeant Bowens confirmed that it would definitely assist. 80. There was then some further discussion during which I said that counsel could take it that I had no interest in punitive orders. 81. Counsel for the applicant said that that was made very clear and that the council did not have an interest in punitive orders either, they simply wanted the orders complied with. 82. The order was then along the following lines: (
- i)without prejudice to the existing powers of the applicant whether under the orders of the court or otherwise to authorise the applicant to remove and detain any and all vehicles, animals and/or movable property at the premises or obstructing access thereto and retain them pending further orders of the court and authorise the applicant to change any locks or close or alter any openings; (
- ii)requiring the An Garda Síochána to attend with the council at any attendance by the council at the property, by the council and/or any servants or agents at the property and prevent the obstruction of the orders of the court and endeavour to execute the order for attachment and otherwise assist within the scope of their functions; (iii) permitting the An Garda Síochána to use such reasonable force as they consider appropriate to comply with the orders of the court and to attach the respondents; 15 (
- iv)(
- v)adjourn the matter to 1300 today or such later time as convenient to the court; for the avoidance of doubt, the existing order for substituted service will apply to service of this order; and (
- vi)costs reserved. 83. The matter returned before me at 14:00 on the same day. 84. I directed that the respondents be called again. The registrar called Michael Murray and Rose Murray, and there was no appearance for either respondent. 85. Counsel for the applicant informed the court that the respondents had still not been located for the purposes of effecting the order for attachment, but the council had secured the property, and in that regard they had removed the trailers, removed the bolt that was on the gate, replaced the council’s lock at the front gate, and also changed the lock on the front door and the back door of the unauthorised structure and gained access to the unauthorised structure. When they were doing that, Tadgh Murray, the youngest son of the respondents was in the unauthorised structure, and he has voluntarily left the property, taken the two dogs that were on the property with him, and he was facilitated by the council and the Gardaí to take some of his personal belongings with him. He had also advised that his sister, Shauna Murray, was at work and that she would also potentially need to come back to the property. Shauna Murray then also made contact with the council and was facilitated to enter the unauthorised structure for the purposes of removing some of her personal belongings from the unauthorised structure. The council now had security at the front door, back door and at the gate, and security was there for the purposes of 24 hours/ 7 days a week until the demolition of the unauthorised structure commenced. 86. Counsel for the applicant then asked that Sergeant Bowens be called again to confirm what had occurred and said next steps could be discussed after that. Sergeant Bowens returned to the witness box. Counsel for the applicant asked the Sergeant to outline what he saw when he attended the property that morning. 87. Sergeant Bowens said that he attended the premises personally at 12:05 pm and spoke to his colleagues who had gone straight to the premises with Meath County Council employees as soon as they got the court order. The only occupant of the house when they arrived was the son, Tadhg Murray, and he voluntarily left the house upon the arrival of the Gardaí. While Sergeant Bowens was there, Tadhg Murray’s sister arrived and picked him up. The house was fully furnished, the locks were being changed as he arrived, and the security personnel were on site and the premises were pretty much secured by Meath County Council and Sergeant Bowens instructed the Gardaí to stay there until the council were free to leave and hand it over in its entirety to the security team. 88. Sergeant Bowens said that Rose and Christopher, who also goes by the name of Michael Murray, were not present and he believed from speaking with the council that Rose Murray had been seen last Thursday. The son had said they were out of the country, but Sergeant Bowens did not believe that to be the case personally. 89. I said that the Gardaí did not need to be very vigorous regarding enforcement of the attachment order, but that my inclination would be not to discharge it as that would be premature. Counsel for the applicant said that it certainly would not be her application to discharge it simpliciter. 90. The order was then along the following lines: (
- i)direct An Garda Síochána to furnish the respondents’ phone numbers for the purpose of notification of orders and applications; (
- ii)adjourn generally with liberty to apply with 24 hours’ notice in accordance with the order for substituted service and via the phone numbers as so furnished or ex parte in the case of urgency; and (iii) reserve costs. 91. Counsel for the applicant said that that was it. 92. Matters then moved into a phase of significant criminality, although I need to make clear that not least because the evidence for this was in an interlocutory context I am not placing personal responsibility on the respondents. 93. On 18 March 2026, the matter came before the court on an ex parte application by the applicant. 94. The registrar asked whether there was an appearance for Rose Murray or Michael Murray. There was none. 95. The respondents’ commented on the draft judgment: “Para 78 Whilst it was initially claimed that the Respondents and their legal representative did not appear in Court for the ex parte hearing on the 18th March, they were not notified of this hearing at all, but only of the order that was made thereafter. This is a matter for evidence.” 96. I was approaching matters on the basis that this was an ex parte application, but if this is an issue on the hearing of the respondents’ motion then so be it and the court will presumably deal with that as it thinks appropriate. 16 97. Counsel for the applicant said that, firstly, she wished to thank the court for facilitating the application that day and said that she had been required to make the application ex parte in circumstances where the council had been advised that there had been further acts of contempt by the respondents in relation to the court and the council’s enforcement of the orders. She said that she again had Sergeant Bowens present, but that she wished to outline by way of background what had occurred since the court made its order on the previous Monday. 98. Counsel for the applicant said that, as she had advised previously, the council had secured security personnel to attend at the unauthorised structure for the purpose of ensuring the council retained possession. She said that the locks had been changed and that the security company were present securing the unauthorised structure so that no one would enter. 99. She said that at 20:40 the previous night, one of the security vehicles had been burned out. 100. She said that thereafter the owner of the security company retained by the council had been contacted, as she understood it, by Michael Murray asking him to leave the unauthorised structure and the premises. She said that when that did not occur, the owner was advised that someone else would be attending, and that the owner of the security company had persons unknown attend at his home and make threats which he took very seriously. 101. She said that, as of 10:00 that morning, all security staff had left the property and that, as she understood it, a member of An Garda Síochána was currently present at the site. She said that she had also been advised that as of that morning there were a number of protesters, approximately six, who appeared to be neighbours who had attended at the property. She said that, as she understood from Sergeant Bowens, they were not causing difficulty to Gardaí entering or exiting the property but that they were present nonetheless. She said that she proposed to call Sergeant Bowens to formally give evidence as to what was unfolding on the lands and said that she also had a representative from the council present, who could be called if necessary, acknowledging that some of the information was hearsay. I said that it was hearsay but that the matter was interlocutory and that this was not a major problem. 102. Counsel for the applicant then asked Sergeant Bowens to outline his understanding of what had unfolded on the lands since Monday. 103. Sergeant Bowens said that at approximately 20:40 the previous evening Gardaí in Kells had received a call about a vehicle on fire outside the house at Faughan Hill, Bohermeen. He said that from investigations it was determined that the vehicle, a transit van used by security personnel, had been deliberately set alight, and that examination by a scene of crime investigator indicated that the fire began in the passenger seat, ruling out a battery fire. He said that the van had broken down the previous day and could not be moved. 104. He said that local neighbours were protesting in a peaceable manner but that their presence caused concern for the security personnel, who had contacted Gardaí three times in the previous 24 hours requesting Garda presence when coming and going from the site. 105. He said that the security personnel had since withdrawn following alleged threats received by the owner of the company. He said that the detective sergeant based in Navan had spoken with the owner who declined to make a statement or complaint to Gardaí in relation to the threats. He said that the owner had withdrawn his staff and that two Garda members were currently positioned outside the premises while awaiting further instructions. 106. Counsel for the applicant said that it would certainly assist the council if the Gardaí were present while councils’ servants or agents were moving or relocating movable property from the unauthorised structure, and asked whether the Gardaí would have any difficulty with that. 107. Sergeant Bowens said that this would be a good course of action, noting that the protesters were amicable toward Gardaí. 108. Counsel for the applicant asked whether the Gardaí would have any difficulty with being present during the demolition works. 109. Sergeant Bowens asked about the anticipated timeframe. 110. Counsel for the applicant said that initial instructions were that the removal of property would commence the following day and that demolition was hoped to occur within a number of weeks, subject to the circumstances and the need to inform contractors of the threats that had occurred. She said that it was important that Gardaí be present whenever demolition occurred. 111. Sergeant Bowens said that he would be very favourable to that approach but that advance notice would be required to arrange Garda resources. 112. Counsel for the applicant said that there would be no difficulty with that. 113. Counsel for the applicant then asked whether Sergeant Bowens would see a difficulty if protesters were directed to remain approximately 500 metres from the property. 114. Sergeant Bowens said that many of the protesters were neighbours living within a few hundred metres but that a restriction of 500 metres from the entrance would facilitate access by security or council staff without interference. 17 115. Counsel for the applicant said that she had no further questions. I asked about the location of the burned out vehicle. Sergeant Bowens said that it was parked on the public road just outside the wall of the property, approximately 10 to 20 metres from the house. 116. Counsel for the applicant called Mr Brian Murphy, who was sworn. Counsel for the applicant asked Mr Murphy to outline his position within the council. Mr Murphy said that he was Senior Executive Officer in the Planning Department and Acting Director of Services. 117. Counsel for the applicant asked him what contact, if any, he had received in relation to the property in the previous 24 hours. 118. Mr Murphy said that the owner of the security company had contacted him that morning to say that he had received a number of threats the previous afternoon and into the evening in relation to his operations on behalf of the council securing the property. He felt the second threat in particular was serious enough to effect his livelihood and the future operations of the business that he felt necessity to pull his services out. He had negotiated until 10:00 that morning to remain in situ until he had made relevant contact with Mr Murphy and other officials in the council so Mr Murphy had spoken to the owner twice that morning between 08:00 and 09:00. 119. Counsel for the applicant asked Mr Murphy if he was aware whether the owner had made a complaint to the Gardaí at that stage. 120. Mr Murphy said that at that stage he wasn’t, but subsequently the owner had informed him that he wouldn’t be making a formal complaint because he felt to do so and to name those who had contacted him may escalate the threat that was made to him initially. 121. Counsel for the applicant asked Mr Murphy to confirm whether security staff had left the premises. 122. Mr Murphy said that the owner had contacted him just after 10:00 to say that he had removed all personnel from the property and was standing down. Mr Murphy said that normally the owner is reputable and able to secure sites but unfortunately in this instance he was unable to remain in situ. 123. Counsel for the applicant asked whether Garda presence would be of assistance to any future security, removal of furniture, or demolition operations by the council’s servants or agents. 124. Mr Murphy said that Garda presence would be of great assistance given the fire and the physical threats. 125. Counsel for the applicant asked whether the two threats mentioned came from two different people. 126. Mr Murphy said that the first threat was a phone call purporting to be Michael Murray and the second involved persons attending at the security company owner’s home. 127. In the draft judgment process, the respondents stated: “Para 109 the allegation made against Mr Murray, is a matter for evidence on the 23rd March Motion.” 128. Again the general saver applies, the foregoing is just recording what happened in the witness box, and the court will presumably deal with this as it thinks fit at the appropriate time. 129. Counsel for the applicant then said that the council and undoubtedly the court take very seriously what has occurred over the last 24 hours on the lands, and in particular the council was very concerned that without direction from the court requesting in the first instance the Gardaí to be at attendance at the property when any of its future servants or agents are engaged in any actions for the purposes of removing property and/or securing the property and/or demolishing the unauthorised structure in accordance with the orders of this court that they would be prevented from so doing. She asked for the court to make an order requiring the Gardaí to attend the premises for the purposes of assisting the council, its servants or agents in the removal and/or relocation of any moveable property on the lands and for the purposes of assisting the council, its servants or agents to demolish the unauthorised structure. 130. She said she fully appreciated that the Gardaí would need advance notice and that would obviously be facilitated from the council’s perspective. 131. Counsel for the applicant asked the court to direct that any protesters would be limited to protesting at least 500 meters way form the entrance gates of the property to facilitate the council and its servants or agents in entering safely, exiting with vehicles for the purposes of removing, relocating and demolition purposes on the lands together, which personnel may find somewhat intimidating if there were people protesting at close proximity to the gates of the property. 132. Finally, counsel for the applicant asked that in these circumstances where there was evidence before the court that there had been further acts of contempt by the respondents and/or agents on their behalf, the court would direct the Gardaí to use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that the order for attachment is executed and that the respondents are brought before the court. 133. After some discussion the order was along the following lines: (
- i)direct the council to commence demolition works within 48 hours; 18 (
- ii)the council are not under further obligation regarding removing moveable property that the applicants have failed to remove to date; (iii) the Gardaí are directed to be present to assist when the council, its servants or agents were removing property or carrying out works; (
- iv)in the event of any person being present at the property, the gardai be directed to remove such persons from the property using reasonable force if necessary and prevent them from re-entering and remove them from the property; (
- v)that any protesters remain 500 m from the entrance; and (
- vi)direct the Gardaí to use all reasonable endeavours to execute the order of attachment. 134. Counsel for the applicant then said that she would ask for her costs. I said that she could certainly ask, but I wouldn’t do that ex parte. I said I would give her a return date instead. 135. I said if the respondents were attached between then and the return date, the council should come back to court. 136. Thus, in the light of the evidence, I ordered as follows: (
- i)The council was to commence demolition works within 48 hours. While it is not necessary or even appropriate to make any concluded factual findings as to responsibility for the serious criminality reported to the court, it is a matter of extreme concern and made it imperative in my view that the works ordered by Edwards J. and the Supreme Court and the subject of sworn undertakings were carried out as soon as possible, especially when placed in a context of ongoing escalation of the response to the situation. (
- ii)The council were not under any obligation to remove moveable property that the respondents had failed to remove to date. In an ideal world it would have been preferable to arrange for a more leisurely clearing out of the unauthorised structure but the respondents had already had an inordinate time to do this – their last legal excuse ran out three and a half years ago. The urgent need to commence works meant that the respondents rather than the applicant will have to carry the loss for the respondents’ failure to have removed any moveable property lost in the process, but the applicant did assure me that it would take steps to remove what it could within the constraints available. Again it was my view, which I emphasised to the council, that further delay would lead to further escalation and problems, and that the matter had dragged on for far too long. That was most certainly not an attempt to thwart any application to the ECtHR and I didn’t see it as such an attempt on the council’s part either. There has to be a line drawn sometime – and in fact the line being drawn did appear to stimulate action by the respondents to remove all property. (iii) The Gardaí are directed to be present to assist when the council its servants or agents were removing property or carrying out works. The Gardaí had no difficulty with this. (
- iv)In the event of any person being present at the property, the Gardaí be directed to remove such persons from the property using reasonable force if necessary and prevent them from re-entering the property. An order of this nature is essential given that security has been driven off the property by mafia-type tactics. (
- v)That any protesters remain 500 m from the entrance. The effect of the evidence was that such an order would assist the execution of existing orders. (
- vi)Direct the Gardaí to use all reasonable endeavours to execute the order of attachment. Any previous latitude about enforcement has dissolved given the matters that took place and the respondents will have to be brought before the court to be dealt with appropriately. (vii) Reserve costs. The council asked for an order for costs but I declined that on the basis that it should be sought on notice rather than ex parte. The other orders were of a sufficiently urgent nature to warrant being made ex parte especially in the context of the need for enforcement of orders already made on notice. (viii) Liberty to apply per previous order. (
- ix)The matter returnable on 23 March 2026 with the respondents to be notified. 137. At 15:06 that day, the solicitor on record for the respondents in the proceedings made his first communication to the court since the reactivated contempt process began in February 2026. He requested that the matter be listed at 11:00 the following day as “there appears to be no provisions made to ensure the orderly removal of our clients (the respondents) and their family members, personal effects and belongings including certain fixtures in the property. Viral [sic] private papers are still in the property”. The problem with that email was, of course, that it came after five and a half years of opportunity to comply with the undertakings of 2020, not to mention 19 all of the previous opportunities. If parties fail to avail of opportunities that have been afforded to take appropriate steps then those parties themselves may have to bear the consequences of that. 138. In the draft judgment process, the respondents commented: “Para 118 The problem with the email, was of course that it came after jive [sic] and a half years of opportunity to comply with the undertakings of 2020. This is disputed by the 23rd March Motion and will be a matter for further evidence.” 139. Possibly I am misunderstanding this point but it seems to be linked to the legal submission to be made that the order of Heslin J. nullified the undertakings, or as it was put in oral submissions, rendered them “moot”. Again I may be misunderstanding things but that seems to be the central (albeit in fairness not only) point of the respondents’ motion. All of that will be debated when the motion is dealt with subject to the council’s preliminary objections. 140. It can also be noted at this point that the correspondence represents a slight escalation from the previous position of having no domestic options – the respondents were now concerned at the eleventh hour with “orderly removal” of property. 141. At 15:49 the applicant’s solicitor replied as follows: “Arising from occurrences at the property overnight it was necessary for the Council to make an Ex Parte application to the Court at lunchtime today and I attach a copy of the consequent Order. You will note from the Order that the Council are not obliged in advance of demolition to remove contents however without prejudice to this it will use its best endeavours to remove a limited numbers of your clients personal items and deliver them to a location provided by your clients PROVIDED WE ARE GIVEN A MANAGBLE [sic] LIST BY 6PM TODAY. Arrangements have been made for agents of the Council to attend the property at 6.30am tomorrow the 19th March and a maximum of 2 hours up to 8.30am can be allocated to address such list as your clients may provide and thereafter arrangements will be made to implement the Court Order. Should your clients wish to avail of this proposal it may remove the need for your proposed Court application tomorrow For the avoidance of doubt should your clients not take up this offer demolition will proceed without the removal of any contents . Finally for the purpose of enforcement of the Court Orders please provide current addresses and contact details for both of your Clients the Respondents in these proceedings.” 142. The registrar replied stating that the court urged parties to resolve the matter by agreement but failing that I would facilitate a remote mention at 09:15 on 19 March 2026. 143. When the matter was called on the latter date, the solicitor on record for the respondents appeared. He indicated that he had been online on 9 March 2026 (when the order for attachment was made). He also knew about the hearing of 16 March 2026, but was not able to log in. He made a rather wider application than what had been envisaged in correspondence, and sought a date for hearing of an application to effectively discharge the order of attachment. As time did not allow for the matter to be fully heard at that point, given the expanded nature of the agenda being raised, I resumed that hearing at 13:20 that day. 144. The respondents commented in the draft judgment process: “Para 124 The reasons for non-appearance are explained and justified with legal arguments to be provided in support of the 23rd March motion.” 145. Again this can be dealt with in the motion context as per the general saver above. 146. While the respondents laid stress on rule 39 of the ECtHR rules of procedure, I said that from my encounters with Strasbourg jurisprudence this was not the type of thing that that court tended to issue rule 39 indications about. Indeed that court was to say as much itself shortly thereafter as set out below. 147. The council in reply noted that the solicitor was on record at all times and was served with papers as far back as 13 February 2026, but only first appeared in court “at this late stage” on 19 March 2026. Even when served with orders, no attempt was made to correspond with the court or the applicant as to the respondents’ whereabouts or to make representations on the contempt issue (one can note that the council was informed as to the ECtHR application as noted above but that was it). Any claim that the initial stay issued by Heslin J. when the 2022 proceedings were issued had the effect of nullifying the undertaking was “confused”. There was a question as to his entitlement to make any application where there was an unpurged order of attachment: Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All E.R. 567 (Somervell , Denning and Romer LJJ.). There was no rule of law that an application to the ECtHR acted as a stay. Any affidavit could be filed before the next mention date on 23 March 2026. The demolition was underway and the council hoped it would continue unhindered. The Strasbourg point was unstateable and the application had not been furnished. As solicitor on record for the respondents, the council’s view was that the solicitor “should have been 20 in court”. The proposition being put forward that the orders should not be implemented was “extraordinary”. 148. Ultimately having heard the parties I said that I still wanted to keep the matter within the bounds of civil rather than criminal contempt. I ruled that the respondents could submit an affidavit but allowing time for that if it could not be done by Monday. I was not deciding at this stage whether they had an entitlement to apply without submitting to the order of the court or whether they should swear the affidavits personally. Insofar as there was a suggestion that the orders should not apply in the meantime, the orders stood until discharged. Accepting that rights under art. 34 of the ECHR should be respected, the enforcement of the orders did not in itself constitute an interference with the right of application to Strasbourg. In the event that a rule 39 indication was issued, that should be brought to the court’s notice and I would certainly pay attention to it immediately. I emphasised that what particularly accelerated matters from my point of view in terms of the need to implement the order as soon as possible was the evidence of serious criminality. The matter was thus left over to the return date of Monday 23 March 2026. 149. The respondents commented as follows on the foregoing in response to the draft judgment: “The following reservations and submissions arise (
- a)The Court orally made an order on the 19th March at approximately 1.50pm, that it would not pause the orders already made. It provided its reasons at that time for making that order which are, one trusts, available to be more accurately ascertained precisely on the DAR of the remote hearing on 19th March. Where that hearing that took place involving the parties and the Court. Those extempore reasons amount to the Court's judgment issued. The hearing dealt inter alia with other peripheral points made apart from the execution of the order before the Court and concerned the attendance of the respondents, their whereabouts and limitations imposed with regards to removal of contents and access to the hearings. The central issue however that arose, was the assertion by Counsel; quoted purely from the writer's recollection (and subject to it being precisely verfied [sic] by the DAR) : stating:There is nothing in law at this point to prevent the Council which is about to commence the demolition, proceeding with the demolition. To which reply by the writer was made, again purely on recollection stating :-that is correct, there is nothing in domestic law to prevent the Council proceeding to execute the orders of the Court but there is however, in European Law, under Article 34 of the European Convention of Human Rights which provides that Article 34 The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right. The contents of the Article and its significance was explained and for emphasis the last sentence (underlined) at least was read aloud to the Court and thereby placed on record to support the assertion that if the Council did proceed with the demolition, that by doing so, it was undermining the subject matter, purpose and effect of the Respondents' application lodged to ECHR. The Court was then informed of the history to the inter-actions with ECHR with the dates of the applications to Europe and the follow up in terms of the email sent on the 7th March 2026 and the reference to this by Counsel for the Applicants on the 9th March, and the inability to access remotely the transmission of the Court proceedings, on the 16th March. The submission was made that a supplemental Rule 39 application was lodged and that interim measures were sought in relation thereto, this was in addition to the original complaints made and lodged in time on 26th February. Counsel for the Applicant then replied that the demolition on her instructions was at that point already underway, that they did not intend to halt the process that the orders were there to be enforced. The Court then after giving its reasons then proceeded to make its order. There was a great deal more said which in available on the DAR. The above is only a rough summary of what traspired [sic] and it is essential in the interests of accuracy and certainty that subject to the Court, that leave to take up the DAR audio of the 19th March hearing be provided. This application will be made under the heading ‘of any other order’ as referred to in the motion, that is subject to the Court and in the absence of a separate motion to that effect being sought to be brought to the Court. That said, the respondents are therefore severely hampered in making any substantive submissions in relation to the record of the hearing which took place on the 19th March, and what was stated. This is of crucial importance as it was a matter entirely for the Applicants 21 to decide whether or not they chose to consult with the Attorney General thereafter as to whether or not they could or should, proceed with the demolition, and/or ignore what was stated and argued in court. That they believed that by doing so, they would not be in violation of what was robustly counter-argued and submitted to the Court, that they would be deliberately violating Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights as an organ of the State bound by its undertaking not to hinder a live application before that Court. It is therefore the respondent's preliminary position with the utmost respect, in response to the proposed Draft Judgment that (without prejudice to outlining whatever happened after the 19th March 2026) it is an error to now conclude that ‘the position as it appeared to the Court based on the material submitted up to consclusion [sic] of the hearing on the 23th [sic] March, 2026 could be dealt with in the proposed Judgment’. The purpose of the respondent's request is to allow the integrity of the record of what transpired on the 19th March and all that was stated in that hearing and the ex tempore determination and order ‘not to pause the execution’ be allowed to speak for itself and stand on its own, without any retrospective analysis, by the Court at this stage, some nine weeks after the decision was made. It is of concern that this is not reinterpreted in a written judgment supplemental to an otherwise final and conclusive ex tempore judgment process issued at that time. It is submitted that the DAR record of the hearing should be allowed to stand as the record of what occurred.. To issue now a retrospective review by way of analysis of what was understood by the Court at the time without the parties who were involved having available to them the benefit of the record of the DAR and to the extempore Judgment of the 19th March 2026 would be prone to inaccuracy and would undermine the intergrity [sic] of preservation of the contemporaneous record. None of this in any way affects the Court in otherwise issuing its judgment from, after the 19th March up to conclusion of the order made on 23rd March 2026. At that point the demolition was already done and beyond being any way reversed. It was a matter entirely for the Applicant to as it were, push the button to activate the demolition process once the order was made on the 19th March at 1.50pm where not, from the Court's point of view to pause the order. It was up to the Applicants for their own reasons to act or not, with or without taking cognisance of the inevitable potential breach of Article 34 of the convention having been fore-warned that demolition would transgress Art 34 and be a violation thereof. (
- b)In support of the above submission, there was no mention or suggestion, that the Court on the 19th March, would make its order, and then give its reasons later for doing so. There was no mention that the Court would at that time or subsequently opt to reserve its judgment to review its reasons for making an order or not, to pause the orders of execution. Unless the writer is wrong about this, the DAR will confirm the position for definite one way or another. This submission is entirely without prejudice to the Court's inherent jurisdiction to issue any judgment in relation to what occurred on the 23rd March 2026 and is without prejudice to the Court issuing an overarching judgment taking everything into account, having dealt with the motions which are before the Court on the 18th March and thereafter. Again this with a view in the light of concerns, first to preserve and protect the integrity of the original record of what occurred in the hearings on the 19th March 2026.” 150. First of all I appreciate the measured way the respondents make this point even if I see things slightly differently. 151. Secondly, whether the respondents are entitled to the DAR of 19 March 2026 is a matter that can be decided in due course and I express no view of that. 152. Thirdly I agree that the DAR will indeed stand as the definitive record of the proceedings on 19 March 2026 if the court decides it needs a definitive record. 153. That said, I am not sure there is much dispute about what actually happened. It is absolutely correct to say that the respondents made the submission that demolition while an ECtHR application was pending would be a severe violation of art. 34 of the ECHR. 154. It is also correct that the council dismissed that out of hand, among other things because of the fact that no copy of the application had been produced to the court (it still hasn’t been produced). The council certainly did not consult the Attorney General before continuing with demolition, or do anything of that kind. 155. I said that I agreed with the respondents that their right of access to the ECtHR should not be interfered with. However the mere execution of an order (i.e., that was enforceable in domestic law) the subject matter of an application to Strasbourg was not to be regarded as being in itself such an interference (i.e., in circumstances such as we have here – we don’t need to be unduly concerned about extreme hypotheticals like refusing to stay a death sentence, were such a procedure to be permissible). 22 156. Thus the orders stood until discharged (an additional piece of context being that there was no formal motion in that regard at that stage anyway). 157. It was made clear that the permissibility of execution of the order was very much subject to rule 39. I indicated that in the event that a rule 39 indication was issued, that should be brought to the court’s notice and I would certainly pay attention to it immediately. I appreciate the counterargument that rule 39 is not part of domestic law, but avoiding a breach of international law, even though not incorporated, has to be of compelling weight in a discretionary decision (and it should hardly be necessary to rely on Article 29.3 of the Constitution to come to such a conclusion). 158. So doing my best to see this from the respondents’ point of view, and maybe this is my shortcoming, but I am still failing to see how there is any “retrospective analysis” or that the proceedings of that date are being “reinterpreted”. 159. Incidentally there is a bit of a difference between retrospective analysis and reinterpretation. If by retrospective analysis one means elaboration after the fact of a more summary oral pronouncement, there isn’t anything wrong with that – see Walsh v. Walsh (No. 1) [2017] IEHC 181 (Unreported, High Court, 2 February 2017) and authorities cited. Jurisdiction to do so isn’t dependent on the court reserving its rights expressly at the time like some sort of party to a contract. Indeed calling this “retrospective” is a bit pejorative, as if any attempt to dispel misunderstanding is branded as suspect from the off. Reinterpretation suggests that some rationale would be given that is inconsistent with what was originally intended, but that isn’t how I see it I’m afraid. 160. If I were to engage in retrospective analysis I would say that the submission, in my view at the time, misunderstood the architecture of the ECHR. There would be no need for rule 39 if implementation of an order the subject-matter of an application under art. 34 was inherently violative of the convention. In the absence of a rule 39 indication, implementation is generally lawful both from a domestic and international law perspective. Maybe there are refinements that need to be considered and that I wasn’t conscious of then or indeed now, but that was the general position as I understood it at the time, even if I didn’t spell all that out. But that just repeats the point I made at the time at slightly greater length. 161. What I am saying now and what happened then are totally consistent in all material respects. I am sure, like any story that is repeated, one could find minor differences of wording. But there is no difference of substance. If there is a difference of substance, what is it? That isn’t at all clear from the respondents’ letter – rather it is a generalised objection to providing an account of proceedings as opposed to saying that what happened can be determined from the DAR. I very much fear that any further comment will just create additional minor variations that don’t make any difference to anything but the essentials were: (
- i)The respondents said that their right of access to the ECtHR under art. 34 should not be interfered with – I agreed with that. (
- ii)The council said in effect that the order was enforceable notwithstanding an application under art. 34 – I agreed with that. (iii) The council also objected that the application to the ECtHR had not been produced – I did not rest the decision on that point. (
- iv)The respondents said that demolition would in itself constitute an interference with the right of access to the ECtHR – I rejected that. (
- v)The respondents effectively said that demolition would interfere with their rule 39 application – I rejected that but said that if a rule 39 indication was issued I would give it attention immediately. (
- vi)At the highest level of generality, the respondents’ position was that demolition at that point would breach Ireland’s international obligations under the ECHR. The council said that demolition should go ahead – I went with the council’s submission on that. Presumably if the ECtHR have a view on this in due course they will make that known and if it is contrary to mine then I will stand to be corrected. 162. I am not sure what more the respondents expect from the DAR but if they disagree with the above in some specific respect and on some specific and plausible basis and if the court thinks it is necessary to make an order for the DAR then of course I agree with the respondents that the DAR will speak for itself as to what happened on the day. 163. Returning to proceedings on 19 March 2026, I emphasised that what particularly accelerated matters from my point of view in terms of the need to implement the order as soon as possible was the evidence of serious criminality. The matter was thus left over to the return date of Monday 23 March 2026. 164. Later that afternoon, it was indicated that the respondents were now minded to present themselves to court on the return date. 165. On Friday 20 March 2026, the council issued further correspondence indicating claims of further criminal intimidation. Step 6 – execution of the order of attachment 23 166. On Monday 23 March 2026, the matter came back on foot of the attachment order which had been executed by the Gardaí. Step 7 – the court satisfying itself as to whether contempt had been committed 167. On the same morning, the respondents issued (without leave of the court or even advance warning) a motion seeking extensive reliefs as follows: “TAKE NOTICE THAT on the 20th day of April 2026 at 10.30am in the forenoon or on the first available opportunity thereafter on a date to be provided by the High Court, sitting at the Four Courts Inns Quay, Dublin 7 an application will be made by Solicitor on behalf of the Respondents to this Honourable Court for such orders as are set out hereunder as follows:1. An order to adjourn, the present proceedings to a date to be fixed for the attendance by the respondents at liberty of their own volition. 2. An order that, the warrants for attachment of the respondents be deemed executed with no further order. 3. That the Appearance by the respondents following their attachment, and by their Solicitor remotely, on their behalf on the 19th March 2026, in these proceedings, is not deemed to be an admission or acknowledgment by them or by their Solicitor, as to the legitimacy or acceptance by the respondents, that the orders procured, by the Applicants deeming; service to be good and sufficient were lawfully sought and obtained. Where it is noted by the Court that the appearance in response thereto is without prejudice to such order where substituted service is in dispute. 4. That the appearance by solicitor on record in these proceedings for the respondents herein, entitles a right of audience, notwithstanding any challenge to the legitimacy of the order for substituted service in the context to the applicants current motion previously returnable to the 9th March 2026. 5. That the Court permit that, without prejudice to paragraph 3 that respondents may apply under the rules of court and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the order made by the Court deeming service to be effected. 6. That without prejudice to paragraphs 3 & 4 that pending investigation and enquiries by voluntary discovery, the respondents be permitted time to ascertain from An Garda Siochana, the Applicants the facts and details concerning and surrounding the execution, perfection and service of the Court Order made on the 16th March, 2026. 7. That the respondents be granted an Order to take up the audio of the DAR in respect of the two hearings on the 16 March 2026 owing to the absence of remote access to live transmissions of said hearings. 8. That the respondents be granted an Order to take up the audio of the DAR in respect of the ex parte applications made without notification to the respondents, on the 18th March 2026. 9. The pursuant to Section 5
(1)
(2)of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 as amended, that the Court make a declaration that the actions of the applicant, an organ of the state, with due regards to the applicants being put on notice of inevitable violation of fundamental rights by the respondents under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That the Court make a declaration that the actions of the applicants in the circumstances and in the absence of any other remedy are incompatible with Section 3
(1)of the European Convention on Human Rights Act,
- The pursuant to Section 5
(1)
(2)of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 as amended. That the Court make a declaration that the actions of the applicant, an organ of the state, with due regards to the applicant being put on notice of the certainty of a violation of the respondents fundamental rights being caused and effected by the applicants; deliberately proceeding with demolition of the respondents dwelling. This notwithstanding, the applicants being on notice of complaints pending before the ECHR body. Where demolition of the dwelling would effectively frustrate and vitiate the substance of the respondents' complaints, in contravention of Articles 8, 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More particularly where the applicants were previously put on notice of pending Rule 39 of ECHR emergency applications pending for determination. That the Court make a declaration that the actions of the applicants in the circumstances and in the absence of any other remedy are incompatible with Section 3
(1)of the European Convention on Human Rights Act,
- That prior to the making of any declaration referred to under paragraph 9 and or 10 hereof that the Court direct the applicants as the party having carriage of these proceedings, pursuant to the rules of Court to serve notice pursuant to Section 6
(1)of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 that the Office of the Attorney General to given notice of the proceedings in accordance with the rules of Court. 24
- That the applicants be directed to confirm on Affidavit if any contact was made subsequent to the hearing on the 19th March 2026, with the Attorney General's office or its staff, regarding the Council having being put on notice of its impending breach and violation of Article 34 ECHR in respect of the respondents fundamental rights. Where such notice informed the applicants that there continuance of demolition and execution of a Court order to that effect in the circumstances, of the respondents dwelling, were claimed to be protected against such action by the convention and thereby the execution of the demolition would be a hindrance to be in breach of Article 34 of the convention.
- That the respondents be given liberty to provide supplemental Affidavit arising from the above pending developments and enquiries.
- That the Court in the circumstances abridge the time for service of this motion to the date hereof in accordance with its own inherent jurisdiction and due to the urgency of these proceedings.
- That in view of all of the above and of the substance and merits of the matters to which the Court and the applicants have been put on notice that any further acts of demolition and removal of materials be ceased forthwith, that this be communicated directly by phone to the servants, agents, contractors and sub-contractors on site and to all persons who may be acting in relation thereto and that any property on site or removed be protected, retrieved and preserved pending further order of the Court.
- That the Court accept the respondents' solicitor's undertaking by himself or his Town Agent to stamp file this Motion and the Grounding Affidavit in the Central office of the Four Courts at the earliest opportunity.
- Such other order as to this court may been deemed appropriate.
- Costs.”
- This was a further unstructured escalation of the legal response. It may be recalled that initially they corresponded stating that nothing further could be done in domestic legal terms. Then they wrote with concerns about the contents of the unauthorised structure. At the next mention date they escalated this without prior notice into wanting to put in an affidavit and wanting the council to hold off on demolition. This mutated into a lengthy notice of motion by the following mention date. It is not immediately obvious that the respondents can properly seek to set aside or even interrogate orders of which they were on notice but at the hearing of which they did not attend either personally or by their legal representative (listening online without making one’s presence known does not constitute attendance for this purpose). But that can all be debated in due course. The respondents claimed that the council were jumping the gun in seeking contempt remedies in a way that would pre-empt the motion issued on 23 March 2026 – but a somewhat more obvious interpretation, to be debated in due course, is that it is that belated motion that seeks, without leave, to cut across a process already in train. Whether for example the council’s application should proceed to finality by way of determination of costs before turning to the respondents’ motion is something that can be discussed in due course.
- The council submitted that on the issue of whether there was contempt, that had already been decided on 9 March 2026, which was an order made on notice. That was made following evidence of requests made which were not complied with, despite the giving of voluntary undertakings which are more readily enforceable than orders: see Hussain v. Hussain [1986] 1 All E.R. 961 (Sir John Donaldson M.R., Neill and Ralph Gibson LJJ.).
- After some discussion with the legal representatives, the respondents adopted the approach of reserving their rights to a proposed motion rather than of making an issue of whether contempt had been committed for present purposes. Thus pursuant to O. 44 r. 4 RSC, I was satisfied (in fact beyond reasonable doubt, but as it was civil contempt, the balance of probabilities would have sufficed) that the respondents were in contempt of court as per the previous declaration of the court and noting that the respondents were not making an issue of contempt for present purposes but reserving their right to revisit that at a later stage in the context.
- That said, no stateable ground as to why they were not in contempt was made apparent to me as of the date of the order, but one can anticipate that there will be legal argument on the respondents’ motion in due course. Notwithstanding that hypothetical, I was satisfied that the respondents and each of them had committed contempt of court.
- So that the respondents are not in any doubt, the fact that they want to revisit the issue of contempt does not have the effect of making the u