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2026 IEHC 357

THE HIGH COURT Record No. 2026 42 IA [2026] IEHC 357 BETWEEN ELIZABETH SHANNON APPLICANT AND JOHN SHANNON, IRELAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE STATE [THE SHERIFF/COUNTY REGISTRAR, LAND REGISTRY, MINISTER FOR HOUSING, MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE] INTENDED RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 9 June 2026 Introduction 1. This is an application for leave to issue proceedings against the above named intended respondents. 2. The first named intended respondent is a brother of the applicant. 3. This application arises in circumstances where the applicant was made the subject of an ‘Isaac Wunder’ order by the Supreme Court on the 9th of December 2004. An order of this type is now more properly described as a Litigation Restriction Order (“LRO”). 1 4. The Supreme Court order is in the following terms: “that she will take no proceedings of whatever nature or kind, (including leave to seek Judicial Review), arising out of or connected with the property, death, will, estate, or administration of the estate of Hilda A. Shannon, deceased, against John Shannon and Malcolm Shannon and Gwendoline Shannon, Notice Parties in these proceedings, or the said estate of the said Hilda A. Shannon deceased, without first obtaining the prior leave of a Judge of the High Court such leave to be obtained by way of application in writing to be made to the Chief Registrar of the High Court.” 5. Pursuant to directions of the President of the High Court dated the 25th of November 2025, this application has been made on notice to the intended respondents and grounded on the affidavit of the applicant. Pursuant to these directions, the applicant has also exhibited a draft plenary summons which it is proposed will issue if leave is granted. 6. I was nominated by the President of the High Court as the judge to determine this application. Consistent with the terms of Practice Direction HC135, I listed the matter for the 13th of April 2026 to hear any submissions that the parties wished to make. 7. There was no appearance by the applicant on that day and the matter was adjourned to the 20th of April 2026, on which occasion I was addressed by the applicant as a litigant in person and counsel for the first named intended respondent. 2 Procedural History 8. As can be seen, the LRO in this case is of some antiquity. 9. There is nothing in the filed affidavit to give any understanding of the procedural history of this matter or the background to the making of the LRO. I am of the view that it is necessary to set out some of that background to allow for a full understanding of the nature of this application and the Court’s decision. 10. In a short judgment, Elizabeth Shannon v. His Honour Judge Moran and John Shannon, Malcolm Shannon, Gwendoline Shannon (Unreported, Supreme Court, 9th of December 2004), the Supreme Court, in reaching its determination, found as follows: “As to the application that this court should impose a Wunder Order on the Appellant the court has regard to the fact that this is not a large estate. Probate of the will of the late Hilda A. Shannon dated 15th January, 1988 issued on 9th January, 1995. The court is satisfied that the history of the litigation demonstrates that it is oppressive and vexatious to the Notice Parties John Shannon and Malcolm Shannon. The court does not consider that the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious because of the action claiming Undue Influence, the proceedings taken pursuant to the provisions of Section 117 of the Succession Act, 1965 or the proceedings claiming promissory estopple and adverse possession. The abuse consists in the multiplicity of applications for leave to seek Judicial Review which constitute an indirect attack on the decisions in these other proceedings. This multiplicity of proceedings is vexatious having regard to the modest value of the Estate, the costs incurred by the Notice Parties John Shannon and Malcolm Shannon and what must be the 3 weariness of these Notice Parties in the face of the seeming inexhaustible appetite for litigation on the part of this Appellant. It appears to this court that the Appellant has permitted herself to become convinced of rights to which she is not entitled and of wrongs which are altogether illusionary.” (Emphasis added.) 11. The Supreme Court described the circumstances of the case and the history of the litigation as “unique” before making the order in the terms set out above. 12. A true appreciation of the history of the litigation relating to the property in question can be arrived at by a consideration of the judgment of Twomey J. in Shannon v. Shannon [2024] IEHC 291, in which he described the overall picture as “30 years of the worst example of the weaponization of the courts this Court has ever seen.” That case concerned proceedings wherein John Shannon was forced to seek an order for possession so that he could ensure the preservation of his title to the property. 13. Twomey J. set out the history of the litigation by reference to the decision of Birmingham J. (as he then was) in 2012 in the High Court case of Elizabeth Shannon v. John Shannon (1996 No. 1258P), which it is necessary to quote in full: “(

  1. a)Judicial review proceedings were brought by the plaintiff [Ms. Elizabeth Shannon] and her sister [Gwendoline Shannon] against the Director of Public Prosecutions arising from decisions taken by him in relation to a criminal prosecution which had its origins in the incident, the subject matter of these current civil proceedings. These judicial review proceedings, in which the defendant in these proceedings, Mr. Shannon, was a notice party came 4 before Kelly J. who refused relief. An order for costs was made in favour of the notice party, Mr. John Shannon. (
  2. b)The plaintiff and her sister commenced proceedings under s. 117 of the Succession Act. These proceedings came on in the Circuit Court before Judge Patrick McCartan who dismissed the plaintiff's [Ms. Elizabeth Shannon's] claim although he found in favour of her sister. (
  3. c)An appeal from Judge McCartan was brought and was listed in Sligo on the 26thJune, 1997, before Flood J. There was no appearance and the appeal was struck out, though with liberty to apply to reinstate. Subsequently there was an application to reinstate, but the application was refused. There was an order for costs made in favour of the defendant [Mr. John Shannon]. (
  4. d)On the 25th February, 1998, the plaintiff issued a plenary summons seeking to revoke the Grant of Probate. It has been said, without contradiction, that the issues raised closely mirrored the issues in the s. 117 proceedings. In these circumstances the defendant, Mr. Shannon, brought a motion to have the proceedings dismissed as vexatious. That application came on before Johnson J. who acceded to the application. Costs were awarded to the defendant/moving party. [Mr. John Shannon] (
  5. e)There was no appeal brought initially from the order of Johnson J. but at a later stage the plaintiff, Elizabeth Shannon, sought to extend the time within which to appeal. The application to extend time was refused by the Supreme Court on the 19th July, 2002. (
  6. f)The defendant commenced ejectment proceedings seeking to obtain possession of lands that had been left to him by his late mother. The ejectment proceedings were heard by Judge Carrol Moran, who made an order for 5 possession. The plaintiff's, Ms. Elizabeth Shannon's, response was to seek to bring judicial review proceedings. That matter came on before Finnegan J. who on the 17th April, 2001, refused the application for leave. He did however give liberty to serve a notice of motion seeking a stay on the order of Judge Moran and made an order providing for short service in that regard. However, despite the provision for short service, at that stage there was no such application. (
  7. g)However, on the 27th July, 2001, an application, dated the 22nd December, 2000 to extend the time for appealing the order of Judge Moran came on before Murphy J. He refused the application, confirming this on the 5th November, 2001. Murphy J. awarded costs against the plaintiff. [Ms. Elizabeth Shannon] (
  8. h)The plaintiff purported to appeal the order of Murphy J. to the Supreme Court, but this exercise was unsuccessful and the purported appeal was stuck out on the 5th December, 2001. (
  9. i)The plaintiff sought to judicially review the decision of Judge McCartan made in the s. 117 proceedings. The application first came on before Finnegan J. who required the application to be brought on notice. The application on notice came before Kearns J. who on the 12th November, 2001, refused leave. There was an order for costs against the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon. An appeal was brought from the decision of Kearns J. Judgment was delivered on the 19th June, 2002, the appeal was dismissed and in the course of his judgment, which is now reported at Shannon v. McCartan [2002] 2 I.R. 377, Keane C.J commented that the [sic] had not the slightest doubt that the High Court was seriously misled by the plaintiff when the application was made ex parte for leave to apply for judicial review. There followed a further application to the Supreme Court to vary its order, which was refused on the 6 19th July, 2002. It appears that during the course of this application, Murphy J. expressed concern at the plethora of litigation. (
  10. j)There followed an application to the Supreme Court brought by Gwendolyn Shannon, sister of the plaintiff, on the 25th October, 2002, to set aside the order of Johnson J. dated 11th November, 1999, in which he had dismissed as vexatious the plenary proceedings which had duplicated the s. 117 proceedings. The motion was struck out by the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice described the application as an attempt to circumvent the earlier order of the court made in July 2002, refusing to extend time for appealing the order of Johnson J. The Chief Justice indicated that if there was a further attempt to litigate matters already decided that the court would look favourably on an application for the making of an Isaac Wunder order. (
  11. k)On the 3rd September, 2002, the applicant sought leave before Ó Caoimh J. to judicially review the order of Judge Moran of the 7th April, 2000, the order for possession. The application for leave was refused, but Ó Caoimh J. declined to make an Isaac Wunder order, although invited to do so. (
  12. l)The decision of Ó Caoimh J. was appealed by the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon to the Supreme Court. On this occasion, on the 9th December, 2004, an Isaac Wunder order was made. In addition there was an order for costs against the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon. (
  13. m)There was a further development in 2003, which saw the plaintiff issue Circuit Court proceedings which sought to re-litigate the ejectment proceedings which had come on before Judge Moran. This attempt came before Judge Kennedy, who dismissed the application making an order for costs against the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon. This decision of Judge Kennedy 7 was appealed and the matter came before de Valera J. on the 13th June, 2005. He dismissed the appeal and made an order for costs against the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon. (
  14. n)Notwithstanding the Isaac Wunder order imposed by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff, Ms. [Elizabeth] Shannon, on the 25th August, 2008, initiated proceedings against the defendant [Mr. John Shannon], his brother, the Sheriffs for Co. Sligo and Co. Leitrim, the Garda Commissioner and Ireland. It seems these proceedings were designed to challenge the order of Judge Moran made in the ejectment proceedings and it seems clear that the proceedings were caught by the terms of the Isaac Wunder order of the 9th December, 2004.” (Emphasis added.) 14. Peart J., in High Court proceedings brought by the applicant in 2012, Elizabeth Shannon and Gwendoline Shannon v. John Shannon and Malcolm Shannon (2012 59 IA), found that she had pursued a “vendetta” against her brother. Twomey J., in adopting that description, said that despite her claim to be the owner of the property, she had not succeeded in establishing an ownership right to the property in almost 30 years of litigation. She had also displayed an unwillingness to accept any court decision that went against her. 15. At paragraph 58 of his judgment, Twomey J. made the following comment: “More generally, it seems that the injustice which Mr. Shannon has had to endure of being sued vexatiously by his sister over a 30-year period has been exacerbated by the fact that she was able to sue him in the High Court, at a cost 8 which can be up to 10-100 times the cost of him being sued in the District Court or the Circuit Court.” 16. In my view, this cannot be ignored and is the context in which I must assess the present application. Discussion 17. The law in this area has been recently reviewed by the Supreme Court in M v. M [2026] IESC 2. At paragraph 41, Dunne J. said: “There can be little or no doubt about the importance of access to justice for all individuals. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a right of access to justice does not mean that there can be no limits placed on an individual’s right to litigate.” 18. At paragraph 174, Dunne J. quoted with approval the observations of Noonan J. in Fitzsimons v. Bank of Scotland Plc. [2019] IECA 336 at paragraph 24: “… The making of an Isaac Wunder order is not an abrogation of the constitutional right of access to the court, but rather a proportionate filtering mechanism to protect the opposing party from the injustice of having to incur what are often very significant and unrecoverable costs, in meeting oppressive and abusive claims.” 19. At paragraph 178, Dunne J. observed: “… In the case of Isaac Wunder orders, it is important to remember that the making of such an order does no more than restrict a party from access to the courts without prior leave to the President of the court, or a judge nominated 9 by the President of that court. It is not a blanket ban on somebody issuing proceedings, for example, for a period of two years. It is simply the requirement of a party to make an application for leave before embarking on fresh proceedings.” 20. The test for obtaining leave to issue proceedings where such an order is in place, as set out in Riordan v. An Taoiseach [2001] 4 I.R. 463, was restated by Dunne J. with approval. In Riordan, O’Caoimh J. said at page 465: “Where the court is satisfied that a person has habitually or persistently instituted vexatious or frivolous civil proceedings it may make an order restraining the institution of further proceedings against parties to those earlier proceedings without prior leave of the court. In assessment of the question whether the proceedings are vexatious the court is entitled to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not confined to a consideration as to whether the pleadings discloses a cause of action. The court is entitled in the assessment of whether proceedings are vexatious to consider whether they have been brought without any reasonable ground. The court has to determine whether the proceedings being brought are being brought without any reasonable ground or have been brought habitually and persistently without reasonable ground.” (Emphasis added.) 21. Dunne J. said that on such an application, the test to be applied is an objective one that must balance the right of access to the courts with the need to prevent abuse of the judicial process. 10 22. Dunne J. also referred to the judgment of Cooke J. in Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 321, where he said at paragraph 9 that a court ought not to grant leave by way of exception to an Isaac Wunder order “unless it is satisfied that the claim proposed to be served is not a vexatious repetition of the same grievance already disposed of and that it is not a claim which is manifestly unfounded or unstateable.” 23. At paragraphs 192-193, Dunne J. went on to say: “… Where arguable grounds are shown in a bona fide manner by such an applicant, then the jurisprudence outlined above requires the court to grant the requested leave. Equally, that seems to me to be uncontroversial. It is abundantly clear that, in considering any such application, a court will, of necessity, have to consider the history of the previous litigation between the applicant requesting leave and the person or persons in whose favour the Isaac Wunder order was made. If legitimate grounds for bringing proceedings are established then, provided that there is an arguable claim to be brought and the applicant for leave has a proper interest in litigating the issue, leave should be granted. For my part, I am satisfied that the test for leave as articulated in the cases referred to above does not need to be adjusted. It is important to emphasise that on any such application for leave, it will be important to have regard to the proceedings which have already taken place and the reasons why an Isaac Wunder order was granted in the first place.” Decision 24. The applicant’s draft plenary summons is in the following terms. The applicant claims: 11 “1. Declarations that certain actions, orders, or processes currently relied upon against the Plaintiff are invalid, improper, or cannot lawfully be enforced. 2. Injunctions restraining further reliance on or enforcement of such defective orders were appropriate. 3. Relief arising from ongoing harm and prejudice, including interference with property rights, constitutional rights, and fair procedures. 4. Damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, for continuing harm where applicable.” (Emphasis in the original.) 25. It seems to me that it is impossible to determine from the above what the nature of the claim sought to be brought actually is, or on what legal basis it is being advanced. 26. The affidavit filed by the applicant does not appear to shed any further light on the nature of the claim. It is completely silent on the history of the litigation between the applicant and the first named intended respondent beyond reciting the bare fact of an “Isaac Wunder-type order” having been made by the Supreme Court on the 9th of December 2004. At paragraphs 3-5 of the applicant’s affidavit, she says as follows: “3. I now seek leave to issue new proceedings due to ongoing harm, continuing prejudice, and continuing reliance by others on orders which I say are invalid, misleading, or defective, causing present and continuing adverse consequences for me and for my sister Gwen Shannon. 4. The purpose of these proposed new proceedings is not to re- litigate past matters already determined, but rather to address ongoing conduct, new harms, and continuing actions that have arisen or persisted after previous decisions, and which remain unaddressed by any court. 12 5. I say that serious confusion, contradictions, and errors have arisen in how past orders have been interpreted and applied, including but not limited to: • inconsistent findings by courts regarding whether an eviction occurred or was attempted; • failure to consider a defence and counterclaim filed in earlier proceedings; • reliance on orders which I say are defective or constitutionally unsound; • ongoing actions taken against me purportedly on the footing of those orders.” (Emphasis in the original.) 27. When the applicant appeared before me, she relied primarily on what is set out in the affidavit. She made reference to the Department of Agriculture withholding payments to her because John Shannon had been registered as the owner of the property; she referred to not being allowed to call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses or “present full evidence” in previous proceedings; and she invoked her right to “fair procedures.” She also submitted that the Supreme Court decision imposing the LRO was “not unanimous.” 28. Counsel for the first named intended respondent, in a brief submission, argued that it was plain from the terms of the affidavit that the applicant was inappropriately attempting to relitigate matters already decided and that this should not be permitted. 29. It seems to me that the unavoidable conclusion is that the applicant is seeking to repeat grievances and relitigate matters already decided in relation to her brother’s title to the property underlying the history of the dispute. 13 30. A bald assertion in the affidavit that the applicant is not seeking to relitigate past matters is not borne out by either the express terms of the rest of the affidavit nor by what was said in Court, where the gravamen of her complaint seemed to relate entirely to grievances arising from the conduct of previous proceedings. 31. I cannot ignore the very stark terms in which the applicant’s previous conduct of litigation had been described by my colleagues. I can see nothing in the application before me that demonstrates a bona fide, arguable claim which the applicant has a proper interest in conducting and it seems to me that the rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in making the order it did some 22 years ago is as applicable now as it was then. 32. For these reasons, I am refusing leave to issue the proceedings. 33. In the circumstances of the case, I propose to make no order as to costs. If either party wishes to contend for a different approach, the registrar should be contacted within seven days of the delivery of this judgment and I will arrange for the matter to be listed to hear argument solely on that issue. 14

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