ACT 2000 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BETWEEN FERGUS HESSION APPLICANT AND AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA RESPONDENT AND GALWAY COUNTY COUNCIL AND JOHN REDDINGTON NOTICE PARTIES Date of impugned decisio

para. 56; Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42, [2021] 7 JIC 1606 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Baker J., 16 July 2021) (Clarke C.J., O'Donnell, MacMenamin and Dunne JJ. concurring)

§§29and 31; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v.

An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024) per Murray J.

paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that applicants are confined to their pleadings. (ii) In Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IESC 25, [2008] 3 I.R. 795, per Denham J. (Murray C.J., Fennelly, Kearns and Finnegan JJ. concurring); per Clarke J. (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring) in Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 May 2012)

para. 6.9, the Supreme Court approached the question of reasons on the basis that there is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration of submissions or to “engage with” submissions in such a sense, or to provide an issueby-issue or submission-by-submission response. (iii) In Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Murray J., 4 July 2024) (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that 2 (

1. iv)(
2. v)(
3. vi)(vii) (viii) (
4. ix)(
5. x)(
6. xi)(xii) Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (the EIA directive) does not apply to projects that are not listed. In the judgment of 17 March 2011, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest and Others v Vlaamse Gewest, C-275/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:154, para. 24; judgment of 19 April 2012, Pro-Braine ASBL and Others v Commune de Braine-le-Château, intervener: Veolia es treatment SA, C-121/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:225, para. 31, the CJEU decided that environmental impact assessment (EIA) only applies to physical interventions not changes of use. In European law on environmental assessments, inter alia Directive 2003/35/EC arts. 2

para. 1 per Donnelly J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642

p. 654 (Hamilton P. concurring); per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 2014) per Clarke J. (Dunne J. concurring)

paras. 3.8-3.15), the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the merits of the decision. In Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 45 (Clarke C.J.) (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); per Finlay C.J. (Griffin, Hederman and Lynch JJ. concurring) in O’Keefe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39, [1992] I.L.R.M. 237

p. 76; Faulkner v. Minister for Industry and Commerce 1997 WJSC-SC 962, [1996] 12 JIC 1007 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 December 1996) per O’Flaherty J. (Hamilton C.J. and Barrington J. concurring), the Supreme Court approached the standard as to reasons in a way that can be reasonably summarised as an obligation to provide the main reasons on the main issues. In G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418, [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401 per Hardiman J. (Geoghan and Denham JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court decided that there is a presumption (the onus to rebut which falls on a judicial review applicant) that material has been considered if the decision-taker says so (see also Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), para. 91 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring); An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para. 137). In Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026)

para. 96 per Donnelly J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Denham J. (Murray C.J. and Fennelly J. concurring) in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 116), the Supreme Court emphasised that an applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief. In An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J.

para. 124 (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court took the approach that in the context of a 3 challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show a defect generally lies on the applicant. (xiii) In G. v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374 per Finlay C.J. (Blayney and Denham JJ. concurring)

p. 378 and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court decided that judicial review is a discretionary remedy within established doctrinal boundaries (see also De Róiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4, [2001] 1 I.R. 190, [2001] 2 I.L.R.M. 241

204 per Denham J.; Kenny v. Dublin City Council [2009] IESC 19 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 5 March 2005)

79 per Fennelly J. (Macken and Peart JJ. concurring); Kelly v. Minister for Agriculture [2021] IESC 62, [2023] 1 I.R. 38 per O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J. and Dunne J. concurring); Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205

60 per Woulfe J. (Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring); Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 4 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 22 February 2024) (O’Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Hogan and Collins JJ. concurring); S. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IESC 48 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 November 2025) per Dunne J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring)

98; Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring).

1. It is the function of a trial court to apply such principles here. While I appreciate the sincerity of the applicant as a local resident, and the very considerable expenditure of imagination and effort made to present the case on his behalf, the legal question here is whether any sufficiently convincing legal reason has been demonstrated to displace the foregoing. Geographical context
2. The project (https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/319221) is to use part of an existing agricultural field as an airstrip for private use (previous PA reg. ref. nos. 17/1784, 10/1003 An Bord Pleanála appeal ref. no. 07.238257)

Carrowntryla, Dunmore, Co. Galway. It is located

or near the following: https://maps.app.goo.gl/dNidhDXHNtQDevEZ8 (Google Street View from July 2009), https://www.google.com/maps/@53.5967322,-8.7293877,583 (aerial view from Google Maps from 2026). Parties

1. The applicant resides in Dunmore, Co. Galway and he made a submission to the planning authority (Galway County Council) in respect of the second named notice party’s application for permission (reg. ref. 2360592) for the proposed development. The applicant appealed the planning authority’s decision to grant permission for the proposed development to An Coimisiún Pleanála on 7 March
3. The respondent is An Coimisiún Pleanála.
4. The first named notice party is the planning authority (Galway County Council). The first named notice party did not

tend the hearing. 8. The second named notice party is the developer of the proposed development. The second named notice party did not

tend the hearing. Facts

1. The site of the proposed development was the subject of a first permission by the commission following refusal by the council (10/1003 on 13 December 2010). The decision of the commission is dated 18 May 2011 (ABP ref. PL 07.238257) for five years which expired on 18 May
3. There was no permission from 18 May 2016 to 13 February
5. Apparently some time before the second permission was granted, the airstrip was extended which the applicant calls an unauthorised use of land not covered by the first or any subsequent permission. The seven-year rule would apparently apply.
6. There was a second permission from the planning authority dated 13 February 2018 (reg. ref. 17/1784) for the use of part of an existing field as an airstrip for private use by the notice party, which was also for five years, expiring on 13 February
8. There was then no permission from February 2023 – February
10. The notice party made an application for planning permission (reg. ref. 2360592) in respect of the proposed development to the planning authority on 1 June
12. The nature of the application was: “Sought to use part of the existing agriculture field as an airstrip for the applicant’s private use (previous planning reference numbers 17/1784, 10/1003 and An Bord Pleanala reference number 07.238257)”
13. Importantly, the application was not for a time-limited permission.
14. On 23 June 2023, an initial submission was made by the applicant to the planning authority in respect of the application for permission for the proposed development. 4
15. On 28 June 2023, a further submission was made by the applicant to the planning authority in respect of the application for permission for the proposed development.
16. On 29 June 2023, An Taisce made a submission to the planning authority in respect of the application for permission.
17. On 4 July 2023, the Development Applications Unit of the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage made a submission to the planning authority in respect of the application for permission.
18. The planning authority’s assistant planner and senior executive planner completed an initial report dated 26 July 2023 in respect of the proposed development, which recommended that further information be sought from the notice party in respect of the said application.
19. On 26 July 2023, the planning authority sought specified further information from the notice party in respect of the application for permission.
20. The notice party responded to the planning authority’s request for further information on 23 January
22. On 16 February 2024, the planning authority’s assistant planner and executive planner completed a report in respect of the application for permission which recommended that permission be granted for the proposed development.
23. On 16 February 2024, the planning authority granted the third permission for the proposed development by way of chief executive’s order (CE order no. P11912).
24. On 7 March 2024, the applicant appealed the planning authority’s decision to the commission.
25. On 5 April 2024, the notice party responded to the applicant’s appeal.
26. The applicant’s appeal was referred to an inspector who completed a site visit on 7 August
28. On 22 September 2024, the inspector completed his report in respect of the applicant’s appeal which recommended that permission for the proposed development be granted.
29. On 14 November 2024, the applicant’s appeal was considered

a commission meeting,

which, the commission decided to grant permission for the proposed development generally in accordance with the inspector's recommendation. That decision is recorded in the commission direction (BD-018223-24) (ABP-319221-24) dated 18 November

2. On 18 November 2024, and by way of commission order (ABP-319221-24), the commission granted permission for the proposed development without limit of duration. Procedural history
3. The applicant issued the within judicial review proceedings on 17 January
5. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on 17 February
7. On 10 March 2025, directions were agreed as between the parties and the matter was adjourned to the list to fix dates on 14 July
9. On 20 June 2025, the matter was administratively adjourned into the virtual list to fix dates.
10. The respondent filed its statement of opposition on 24 July 2025 which was accompanied with a verifying affidavit of Mr Kevin Baneham sworn on 23 July
12. On 3 November 2025, the notice party applied to the court for a hearing date.
13. On the 23 March 2026, solicitors for the second named notice party indicated that the second named notice party did not wish to participate any further in the proceedings.
14. On 23 March 2026, the matter was listed

the request of the commission in order to obtain a direction from the court regarding the delivery of the applicant’s legal submissions. 40. On 20 April 2026, the matter was again listed

the request of the commission in order to obtain a direction from the court regarding the delivery of the applicant’s legal submissions.

1. On 23 April 2026, the applicant delivered his legal submissions.
2. On 11 May 2026, the matter was called on for hearing scheduled for the 19 May
4. On 14 May 2026, the commission delivered its legal submissions.
5. The matter was listed for hearing on 19 May
6. Judgment was reserved

the end of that hearing. I would like to record my thanks to all of the lawyers involved for their unfailingly courteous, professional and helpful assistance. As I have previously sought to make clear, insofar as any points advanced are not being accepted in this or any other given judgment, that is solely to do with the inherent merits of such points and is no reflection on those instructed to convey such points, a distinction that most certainly should be, and I believe generally is in fact, self-evident to all concerned. 45. On 2 June 2026, a draft of the present judgment was sent to the parties, pursuant to paras. 15, 195 to 198 and 204 of Practice Direction HC 137, to give an opportunity to address matters such as errors/ ambiguities on the basis set out below. 46. Parties are required to: (

1. i)Read the draft or have their legal representatives if applicable do so on their behalf. (
2. ii)Identify any matters falling within the below. 5 (iii) Positively communicate with the court in writing in response to the draft by the deadline specified, such responses to be emailed to the court and uploaded to ShareFile, either stating that they have no comments or setting out the comments. (
3. iv)Carry out the foregoing without delay – the draft judgment procedure is a concession which parties can engage with but must do so with immediate dispatch, discipline and focus – it is not the opening of a new phase of the litigation that gives rise to “an entitlement to elaborate procedures

every point” (to use a phrase of O’Donnell C.J. (Dunne, Charleton and Baker JJ. concurring) in O’Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 May 2023)

para. 39); and still less should the procedure invite the perhaps “serious error, to which lawyers are prone, to approach any such case on the tacit assumption that only procedures which approximate to a criminal trial are fair, and anything which departs from that is somehow dubious” (O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J., McKechnie, MacMenamin, Dunne JJ. concurring) in O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75, [2017] 3 I.R. 751, [2018] 1 I.L.R.M. 245, 780). (v) Keep the draft confidential. Draft judgments are not public domain materials and, while they can be shared between the lawyers concerned and their clients, subject to the following, it is inappropriate for any person to refer to them for any purpose other than to assist the court in relation to the finalisation of the formal judgment. Therefore anyone with information as to the text, content or proposed outcome of any draft is required not to publish or transmit such information to others save solely by way of private transmission for the legitimate purposes of assisting in the finalisation of the judgment and subject to a similar restriction on any recipient. Trial participants should take reasonable steps to keep drafts confidential. On this topic, see

torney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58, [2022] 1 W.L.R. 367, [24/01/2022] T.L.R. 1 (Briggs, Kitchin, Burrows, Rose, Arden SCJJ.) which discusses why restriction on publication of draft judgments is in the interests of the administration of justice; see also Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch), [2006] 5 WLUK 45,

the hearing, any submission as to why such reference is not relevant or otherwise should not be included or as to why such matter if included should not lead to the proposed conclusion; (

1. e)any other matter in the draft judgment that the party considers should be omitted; (
2. f)any matter not included in the draft judgment that the party considers should be added to it (including where the party considers that procedural, factual or legal points not set out in the judgment should be addressed or where the party considers that reasons for any aspect of the decision are not set out or where an overall ground is disposed of but detail of the ground or sub-ground is not expressly addressed, or where an issue arose the disposition of which would be 6 obiter but on which the party concerned considers that there would be a benefit in the court expressing a view); and (
3. g)any other proposals as to the wording (as opposed to substance) of the decision if the proposed wording causes any issue for a party for any identified reason; and (iii) assisting the court by providing views on such matters if any on which views are specifically invited in the draft judgment. 49. In particular, parties should draw the court’s

tention to any apparent error or ambiguity whether they have been successful on the point or not. 50. The rules of engagement in such a situation are that the draft is without prejudice to the right of the court ultimately to issue a judgment in whatever form or with whatever content it considers appropriate. It is then entirely a matter for the court as to whether to give judgment with or without amendment including any amendment that appears appropriate to the court whether arising from submissions or not. Any judgment may be given without further notice following the expiry of the specified period, whether comments are made or not. That period will not be extended save in exceptional circumstances. 51. The deadline for such comments from the parties was to be 15:00 on Thursday 4 June 2026. Responses were as follows: (

1. i)applicant – no response; (
2. ii)commission – helpfully pointed out some typos (4 June 2026 15:03); (iii) council – no input, did not participate in hearing; and (
3. iv)developer – no observations (3 June 2026 17:08). Relief sought 52. The reliefs sought are as follows: “1. An Order of Certiorari quashing the decision of the Respondent to grant planning permission for a development consisting of the use of part of an existing agricultural field as an airstrip which decision, An Bord Pleanála reference no. ABP-319221-24 and planning register reference no. 23/60592, was made on the 18th day of November 2024; 2. A stay on the implementation of the planning permission reference no. ABP-31922124 pending the final determination of the above entitled proceedings; 3. Such Declarations of the legal rights and/or legal position of the Applicants and (if and insofar as legally permissible and appropriate) persons similarly situate and/or of the legal duties and/or legal position of the Respondent as this Court considers appropriate. 4. An Order that Section 50B of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (as amended) and/or Section 3 and 4 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2011 and/or Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention apply to the above-entitled proceedings. 5. Further and/or other relief; 6. Interim and/or interlocutory relief; 7. An Order providing for the costs of and ancillary to these proceedings; 8. A Declaration that the Applicant is entitled to cost protection.” Grounds of challenge 53. The core grounds of challenge are as follows: “Domestic Law Grounds 1. The Respondent planning appeals board erred in law in deciding to grant planning permission in respect of an airstrip in circumstances where the proposed development represented and sought a continuation of the development permitted under register reference no. 17/1784 which permission was granted in respect of the airstrip/airport for a temporary period of five years, and the application was lodged and proceeded with on that basis. 2. The Board of the Respondent in deciding to grant planning permission for the airstrip contrary to the recommendation of its own Inspector, who acknowledged the application was made on that basis and accordingly limited its use, acted in excess of its jurisdiction, granted a permission for a development which had not been sought in the first instance, and granted planning permission in excess of their powers and jurisdiction, and accordingly the determination of the Respondent is ultra vires, invalid and void. 3. The Respondent erred in law in failing to apply Section 34

a significantly further remove in planning terms. This misrepresentation, whether deliberate or negligent, is significant. Accordingly, the plans and particulars which formed the basis of assessment does not comply with mandatory obligations under the Planning and Development Regulations 2001, materially misdescribes the context of the development both in respect of noise, impacts, visual impacts and the effect on residential amenity and as such is to render the application invalid and the decision ultra vires the Respondent being contrary to the requirements of the regulations, invalid and void. European Law Grounds

1. The Respondent erred in law in determining a preliminary examination under Council Directive 2011/92EU without the requisite information required in Schedule 7A of Planning and Development Regulations 2001, and failing to consider the required information in accordance with their obligations as competent authority under Schedule 7 of the Planning and Development Regulations
2. Accordingly, the said application reference ABP319221-24 was not carried out in accordance with the Respondent’s obligations under the requirements of European Community law.
3. The Respondent erred in law in the determination that for the purposes of Council Directive 2011/92EU that there was no real likelihood of significant effects on the environment arising from the proposed development. As set out in Section 7.3.11 of the Inspector’s Report, in circumstances where the considerations applied namely that there was no runway on site and that there was no construction or excavation associated with the development is wrong as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, and where no consideration whatsoever was given to the second limb of the definition of development, namely use and where significant effects by virtue of the said use would arise both in relation to noise, impact on wildlife, impact on residential amenity, pollution and in particular emissions to air. The Respondent thus erred in this determination. The range of factors required to be identified in any consideration of likely effects on the environment was not addressed anywhere by the Respondent required by the requirements of Council Directive 2011/92 EU and are the obligations contained in the Planning and Development Regulations
5. The Respondent erred in law in the manner in which it carried out the Stage 1 screening for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC which screening is set out

paragraph 7.4 of the Inspectors Report and where, notwithstanding that the site is located 8 approximately 1400m south of Lough Corrib SAC, no consideration is included of the said conservation objectives of the said European Site, no consideration is identified in respect of the use of the airstrip/airport by virtue of noise, disturbance or general impact, and accordingly the said assessment for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC failed to comply with the obligations in respect of a Stage 1 assessment and where the Board of the Respondent failed to address the limitation period of the Inspector and who determined the application without any reference to its obligations under the Habitats Directive/ Council Directive 92/43EEC.

1. The Decision of the Respondent the impose condition 3 is void for uncertainty in circumstances where the condition limits the use of the airport to a single aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the planning authority, but in no way limits the matters that may be agreed with the planning authority relative to the numbers, type, frequency of planes. As a consequence it could not have assessed the impact of condition 3 for the purposes of Council Directive 92/43EEC, 2011/92EU and/or the requirements of the Planning and Development Act 2000, and accordingly the condition is ultra vires the powers of the Respondent, contrary to the requirements of the said Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Habitats Directive, is invalid and is void.
2. Condition 3 which permits the airport to be used not only permanently, but for whatever use is agreed between the planning authority and the Board, and without any facility to refer the matter to the planning appeals board or for the Applicant to be aware of the nature of any submission made or agreement entered into and for no such agreement to be published is contrary to fair procedures, contrary to the scheme of the Planning and Development Act, the scheme of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and/or the Habitats Directive which does not permit any public participation in the said process, any procedure that would subject the said agreement to the mandatory obligations under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive given the nature and class of the proposed development which is subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment, and assessment for the purposes of the Habitats Directive, and accordingly the said decision is ultra vires the Respondent, invalid and void.” The impugned decision
3. The impugned decision provides as follows: “GRANT permission for the above proposed development in accordance with the said plans and particulars based on the reasons and considerations under and subject to the conditions set out below. Reasons and Considerations It is considered that, subject to compliance with the conditions set out below, the proposed development would be in accordance with the provisions of the Galway County Development Plan 2022 to 2028 namely Policy Objective ARC 4 and ARC 5 with respect to Archaeological Heritage and Section 7.9.2 with respect to control of noise pollution. The proposal would not be detrimental to amenities of neighbouring residential development in terms of noise or visual impact owing to the low intensity use proposed. The proposed development would therefore be in accordance with the planning and sustainable development of the area. Conditions
4. The development shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the plans and particulars lodged with the application, as amended by the further plans and particulars received by the planning authority on the 23rd day of January 2024, except as may otherwise be required in order to comply with the following conditions. Where such conditions require details to be agreed with the planning authority, the developer shall agree such details in writing with the planning authority prior to commencement of development and the development shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the agreed particulars. Reason: In the interest of clarity.
5. The airstrip hereby permitted shall not be used for commercial purposes or any other purpose other than private and incidental to the enjoyment of the dwelling house. Reason: In the interest of orderly development.
6. The airstrip shall only be utilised by the Applicant's aircraft (serial number 2843673), unless otherwise agreed, in writing, with the planning authority. Reason: In the interest of controlling the extent and intensity of use of the proposed air strip and limiting the impacts on residential amenities and agricultural activities in the vicinity of the development site.
7. There shall be no depositing of grass clippings or other vegetation within and around a 25-metre radius of the nearby ringfort (Sites and Monuments Record (SMR) code GA017048). Reason: To ensure the continued preservation of features of archaeological interest.” 9 Some general considerations
8. It may be of assistance to set out some general considerations arising from previous caselaw, under a number of headings as follows. Overall requirements for relief by way of judicial review
9. As discussed in Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 (Unreported, High Court, 28 November 2025) and other cases (see also Foran v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Glenveagh [2026] IEHC 23 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 23 January 2026)), there is an eight-fold path to obtaining relief by way of judicial review. These tests are cumulative, and relief should only be granted if the proceedings meet all of the following: (i) the applicant complies with jurisdictional requirements (e.g. time or standing to bring the proceedings

all (as opposed to standing for particular issues within a case that the applicant can bring

a general level)); (

1. ii)the applicant’s point is legally correct and workable; (iii) the applicant’s point is properly pleaded with the requisite specificity; (
2. iv)the specific point is one that the applicant has standing to make (bearing in mind that while standing can relate to issues such as ius tertii it does not generally require prior participation in the process insofar as there is an EU/Aarhus Convention dimension); (
3. v)material capable of sustaining the point was properly before the decision-taker

the relevant time such as to give rise to a duty to consider it (subject to exceptions primarily related to failure by the decision-taker to fulfil her autonomous obligations); (vi) the applicant has discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief; (vii) any error must transcend the harmless, the non-material and the purely technical lacking real-world consequences, bearing in mind that if error is demonstrated, then the onus shifts to the opposing parties to show harmlessness; and (viii) the exercise of discretion within established parameters does not militate against the making of the order (such as considering the proportionality of the order sought), bearing in mind that discretion is potentially more limited in an EU law context. 57. Before dealing with specific elements in detail, some general comments are worth noting

this juncture: (i) Judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the correctness of the decision: Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22

para. 1 per Donnelly J., per Clarke J. (Dunne J. concurring) in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 2014)

paras. 3.8-3.15. It is not an appeal on the merits and it is not for the court to substitute its view for that of the decision-taker: per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642

p. 654 (Hamilton P. concurring); per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; per Lady Hale in R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2012] 1 AC 663

para. 47: “it is not difficult to dress up an argument as a point of law when in truth it is no more than an

tack upon ... factual conclusions”. See also Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2025] IEHC 178 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 1 April 2025); Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

11. (ii) As Singh L.J. and Carr J. put it in R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 (Admin), [2019] 1 W.L.R. 4105

[326] (emphasis added): “Judicial review is not, and should not be regarded as, politics by another means”. The court must keep the separation of powers firmly in mind: Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63, [2001] 2 I.R. 545 (Keane C.J., Denham, Murphy, Murray, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ.); T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 101, [2001] 4 I.R. 259 (Keane C.J., Denham, Murphy, Murray and Hardiman JJ.); B. v. Child & Family Agency & Ors. [2025] IESC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 27 January 2025) (O’Donnell C.J., Murray, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), para. 62; consequently the courts must respect the principle that policy choices are for other branches of government. To stray into policy fundamentally distorts the process because “[t]he administrator is often concerned with broad considerations of the public interest whereas the judge tends to focus on the claims of the parties to the case before him” De Blacam, Judicial Review, 2nd ed, p. 97. What O’Donnell C.J. (Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring) has recently said of Article 42A is true of the Constitution and law generally – it is not “an open-ended provision that requires 10 (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) courts to substitute their judgment on social issues ... for that of the Oireachtas” (G. v. Ireland [2025] IESC 49 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 26 November 2025)

68). Nor is the equality guarantee to “become instead a more general power to second guess legislative choices in difficult areas where the courts have very limited insight. ” (

para. 86). He noted: “In Re SC [2021] UKSC 26, [2022] AC 223, Lord Reed cautioned against an expansive application of the equality guarantee contained in Article 14 ECHR observing that, in effect, since legislation was the art of differentiation, any legislation could be contested from the point of view of equality, and that a broad and expansive application of the guarantee risked undue interference with the sphere of political choice. I agree. Once it is established that a classification is not arbitrary or capricious or based on prejudice or stereotype, then this is an area where there is particular merit in the observations of Chief Justice Stone that ‘[c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern’ (United States v Butler

para. 27; Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

121; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

12. Generally speaking evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement and not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors are reviewable on an irrationality standard: Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Woulfe J., 11 April 2024) (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring); Barr J. in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2024), leave to appeal refused in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 22 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025). A decision must be read in a way that makes sense rather than nonsense if such a reading is available. It is not the case that decisions must be read in the most erroneous way possible so that applicants can get their order of certiorari (M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020); Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 (Unreported, High Court, 9 February 2021)

§50; St.

Margaret’s Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 20 February 2024)

§57); Duffy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 30 December 2025)

32. Thus a decision should not be read as invalid if a valid reading is reasonably available: see M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020)

§7; Mulloy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 86 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 12 March 2024)

§178(citing O’Donnell v.

An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023)); Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 6) [2024] IEHC 335 (Unreported, High Court, 7 June 2024)

§64

); thus for example “unhelpful” statements should not be read as inconsistent with statutory factors if the decision can be read as valid – E.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IESC 3 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 21 February 2024) per Dunne J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Murray and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025); Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13, and this applies even if the wording is sub-optimal: Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 30 December 2025)

32. It is not appropriate to engage in legalistic over-parsing or micro-analysis of decisions, or of legal instruments generally, frequently based on semantic querulousness: per Sullivan J. in R (Blewett) v. Derbyshire County Council [2003] EWHC 2775 (Admin), [2004] Env. L.R. 29

para. 41; R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd 11 (vii) (viii) and others) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212, Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.; per O’Donnell C.J. (Dunne, Charleton and Baker JJ. concurring) in O’Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 May 2023)

para. 37. As stated by Peart J. in G.T. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] IEHC 287, [2007] 7 JIC 2708 (Unreported, High Court, 27 July 2007), para. 3: “It is not desirable that a decision be parsed and analysed word for word in order to discern some possible infelicity in the choice of words or phrases used and to hold that a finding of credibility adverse to the applicant is invalid, unless the matters relied upon have been clearly misunderstood or mis-stated by the decision maker. The whole of the decision must be read and considered in order to reach a view as to whether, when the decision is read in its entirety and considered as a whole, there was no reasonable basis for the decision maker reaching that conclusion”. See also A.I.M.Z. v. Refugee Applications Commission & Ors. [2008] IEHC 420, [2008] 11 JIC 0705 (Unreported, High Court, 7 November 2008)

para. 24 per Clarke J.; per McCarthy J. in S.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Anor. [2009] IEHC 383, [2010] 7 JIC 2803 (Unreported, High Court, 28 July 2009), para. 13; per Clark J. in Obuseh v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2010] IEHC 93, [2010] 1 JIC 1404 (Unreported, High Court, 14 January 2010), para. 21; per MacEochaidh J. in Bondo v. Minister for Justice & Ors. [2012] IEHC 454, [2012] 11 JIC 0903 (Unreported, High Court, 9 November 2012), para. 24; per Barr J. in P.M. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 497, [2014] 10 JIC 0204 (Unreported, High Court, 2 October 2014), para. 59; per Faherty J. in O.S. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 839, 2015 WJSC-HC 25494, [2015] 12 JIC 1505 (Unreported, High Court, 15 December 2015), para. 59; X.E. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 402, [2018] 7 JIC 0405 (Unreported, High Court, Keane J., 4 July 2018); B.D.C. (Nigeria) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 460, [2018] 7 JIC 2006 (Unreported, High Court, 20 July 2018), para. 7; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13. Mere technicalities are not normally a proper basis for the grant of relief: see e.g. The State (Toft) v. Galway Corporation 1981 WJSC-SC 2110, [1981] ILRM 439 (O’Higgins C.J.; Walsh and Kenny JJ. concurring); Moore v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2016] IESC 70, [2017] 3 I.R. 42, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 21 (Clarke, Laffoy and O’Malley JJ.) para. 4.8 (distinguishing a substance point from “a technicality”); Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30, [2022] 2 I.L.R.M. 417 (Hogan J.; MacMenamin, Charleton, O’Malley and Baker JJ. concurring). In Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205

60, Woulfe J. (Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring) said (without needing to decide the point) that there was “a great deal of force” in the submission that it would be disproportionate to quash a decision on the basis of a “technical procedural error”. See also Watchhouse Cross Shopping Centre v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 520 (Unreported, High Court, 3 October 2025). Relatedly, a decision must be read in the round and in its context. One has to view an administrative decision in the round, and not place undue weight on semantic quibbles in respect of micro-sub-elements of it: O.A.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor. [2007] IEHC 169, [2007] 2 JIC 0904 (Unreported, High Court, Feeney J., 9 February 2007); J.B.R. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors. [2007] IEHC 288, [2007] 7 JIC 3110 (Unreported, High Court, Peart J., 31 July 2007); per Cooke J. in I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 510, [2015] 4 I.R. 144

p. 152; M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020), para. 6. A decision should be read not solely from an applicant’s point of view (an impossible standard), but from the starting point of it being valid rather than invalid where possible. One has to stand back and ask what the decision is fundamentally saying (O’Donnell & Ors. v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023), para. 54; St. Margaret’s Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 20 February 2024)

§57; Moran v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13. Judicial review is not an exercise in pointless formalism: see for example Okunade v. Minister for Justice [2018] IESC 56, [2018] 11 JIC 1401 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 14 November 2018) per O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J. and O’Malley J. concurring) 12 (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)

para.

1. It is not a game where the respondents can score as many goals as they like, but if the applicant scores one goal, the game is over. The court must make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the overall sustainability of a decision, even if there is an argument for saying that limited parts of it are suboptimal: M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020), para.
2. It is not for the applicant to dictate the procedures to be adopted or the form of a decision: see for example per Ryan P. (Peart and Hogan JJ. concurring) in A.B. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IECA 48, [2016] 2 JIC 2602, 2016 WJSC-CA 1525 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 February 2016)

para. 43. A final important general point is that there is a presumption that material has been considered if the decision says so, the onus being on an applicant to evidentially displace that: see per Hardiman J. (Denham and Geoghegan JJ. concurring) in G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418, [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401; Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), para. 91 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 55; this includes documents before the decision-taker such as a Natura impact statement – such matters are considered for AA purposes – An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para. 137. A court only decides points that are not academic, and that are properly pleaded and actually in dispute between the parties, and even then only when it is necessary and appropriate to do so: Friends of the Irish Environment v. Government of Ireland [2023] IEHC 562, [2023] 10 JIC 1904 (Unreported, High Court, 19 October 2023)

§117

. Relief whether by judicial review or otherwise should only be granted where the point is not academic or hypothetical, in proceedings brought by an applicant with appropriate standing who has normally been affected in some definite way by the impugned measure: Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 (O’Higgins C.J.; Henchy, Griffin, Kenny and Parke JJ. concurring); Mohan v. Ireland and the

torney General [2019] IESC 18, [2021] 1 I.R. 293, [2019] 2 I.L.R.M. 1, per O’Donnell J. (MacMenamin, Dunne, Charleton and O’Malley JJ. concurring)

pages 301-302; Odum v. Minister for Justice [2023] IESC 3, [2023] 2 I.L.R.M. 164 per O’Donnell C.J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Hogan and Murray JJ. concurring); Sweetman v. Environmental Protection Agency [2025] IEHC 539 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 October 2025). Pleadings 58. Some relevant legal principles concerning pleading requirements which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) Applicants are confined to their pleadings: A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2, [2011] 1 I.R. 729, [2011] 2 I.L.R.M. 100, [2011] 1 JIC 2501; Khashaba v. Medical Council of Ireland [2016] IESC 10, [2016] 3 JIC 0701, 2016 WJSC-SC 12280 per O’Malley J. (Denham C.J. and Clarke J. concurring)

para. 56; Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42, [2021] 7 JIC 1606 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Baker J., 16 July 2021) (Clarke C.J., O'Donnell, MacMenamin and Dunne JJ. concurring)

§§29and 31; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v.

An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024) per Murray J.

paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Eglington Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 209 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 15 April 2025)

11. The rules of pleading are well-established, clear and mandatory, and are of particular importance in a context of special complexity such as technical EU-heavy areas of planning law; while exact specification of every jot and tittle of a case is an impossible standard, an applicant can only be permitted to advance

a hearing a point that is acceptably clear from the express terms of the statement of grounds, subject to the grant of any order allowing an amendment: Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27, [2024] 1 JIC 2401 (Unreported, High Court, 24 January 2024). (

1. ii)Pleading requirements in judicial review are “stringent”, allowing “little room for manoeuvre”: People Over Wind & Anor. v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. (No. 1) [2015] IEHC 271, [2015] 5 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, Haughton J., 1 May 2015). 13 (iii) (
2. iv)(
3. v)(
4. vi)(vii) (viii) “It shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his grounds for the purposes of paragraphs (
5. ii)or (iii) of sub-rule

para. 308. Complex EU law arguments need to be articulated with particular clarity. It is particularly important, in the case of an allegation of a failure properly to transpose an obligation under EU law, that the requirements of O. 84, r. 20

para. 103 (cited with approval by Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring) in Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024); Rushe v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 122, [2020] 3 JIC 0502 (Unreported, High Court, 5 March 2020) per Barniville J.;

tempts to launch for example non-transposition claims not set out on the pleadings are impermissible: Alen-Buckley v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 311, [2017] 5 JIC 1211 (Unreported, High Court, Costello J., 12 May 2017). Recital of high-level principles does not create certiorari by osmosis – an applicant must specify a route-map connecting the particular factual problem alleged with the particular relief sought via a chain of reasoning: Ballyboden Tidy Towns v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 648 (Unreported, High Court, 7 January 2022), para. 20; Foley v. Environmental Protection Agency [2022] IEHC 470 (Unreported, High Court, Twomey J., 24 January 2023), paras. 71-72; Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2024] IEHC 3 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 13 February 2024), para. 124. Scattergun pleadings are liable to be viewed as “a witch’s brew designed to spread maximum confusion and to permit any argument to be made

the hearing that ingenuity can suggest”: Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38, [2024] 1 I.R. 386, [2022] 10 JIC 2402 per O’Donnell C.J.

para. 22 (Dunne, Woulfe, Hogan and Murray JJ. concurring). MacMenamin J. (Fennelly and Clarke JJ. concurring) in Babington v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2012] IESC 65 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 18 December 2012) referred to the pleading requirements in judicial review and said

para. 7: “Regrettably, these explicit stipulations are frequently not complied with, and the same grounds are set out in as many different, varying, (and wearying) reformulations of the same point as can be conceived. Practitioners should realise that, in this entirely counterproductive and unnecessary process, there is a real risk of not being able to see the wood for the trees. A good point does not gain force by repetition”. While the court has jurisdiction to grant unpleaded reliefs it can allow such relief only within the contours of the case as defined by the pleaded grounds: Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024), para. 42 per Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring). Therefore a court can’t grant relief if there is no supporting ground for it. It is not necessary that the specific provisions of national or EU law relied on are expressly enumerated if they are implicitly identifiable with acceptable clarity: Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 4) [2023] IEHC 713 (Unreported, High Court, 18 December 2023); Kennedy & Anor. v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570 (Unreported, High Court, 7 October 2024), para. 132; Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 599 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 12 November 2024); Mount Salus Residents' Owners Management Company Limited by Guarantee v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2025] IEHC 14 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 15 January 2025), para. 39. The standard is acceptable clarity, not express enumeration. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Carvill v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IECA 84 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Barniville P., Collins and Faherty JJ., 11 April 2025)

para. 148, where a developed pleading objection is made, the court should not accept the point made by the applicant without first addressing the objection. That said, the court can reject a point without deciding the pleading objection if it fails either way. 14 EIA generally 59. Some relevant legal principles regarding EIA include the following: (i) EIA only applies to projects specifically listed in the directive. In Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Murray J., 4 July 2024), the Supreme Court rebuffed

tempts to read into the EIA directive projects that are not listed. Important as the specific type of project in that case was (solar farms), the decision illustrates a broader principle – EIA only applies to specifically listed categories of project. This was a point also made by O’Moore J. in Kavanagh v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 259 (Unreported, High Court, 29 May 2020). The order of 10 July 2008, Salvatore Aiello and Others v Regione Lombardia and Others, C-156/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:398, which is belatedly relied on by the applicant in fact totally supports that position in that it finds that only projects specifically listed in the directive are covered (emphasis added): “Article 2

lantic Diamond v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 322 (Unreported, High Court, 14 May 2021); Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 59; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 26 November 2024), para. 149; per Barr J. in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2024), leave to appeal refused in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 22 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025); see also nonprecedentially Morris v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 25 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025); Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

49; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

33; reasons are to be understood in context of the “Broad issues” – Finlay C.J. (Griffin, Hederman and Lynch JJ. concurring) in O’Keefe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39, [1992] I.L.R.M. 237

p. 76 or “Broad gist” – Faulkner v. Minister for Industry and Commerce 1997 WJSC-SC 962, [1996] 12 JIC 1007 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 December 1996) per O’Flaherty J. (Hamilton C.J. and Barrington J. concurring). (ii) A decision-taker is not required to give “reasons for the reasons”: Munby L.J. (Tomlinson and Patten LJJ. concurring) in In re A. and L. (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ. 1611, [2011] 12 W.L.U.K. 725, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 1243, [2012] Fam. Law 285,

para. 35 (in the context of judicial reasoning – the administrative obligation can’t be greater); N.P.B.K. (D.R.C.) v. International Protections Appeals Tribunal [2020] 15 (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) IEHC 450 (Unreported, High Court, 25 September 2020)

29; Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

49. Certain issues are to be viewed objectively as main reasons given the nature of the process or decision

issue – for example if it is in dispute as to whether key statutory criteria for the decision have been satisfied. Where the commission is disagreeing with a council (Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26, [2023] 1 JIC 2701 (Unreported, High Court, 27 January 2023)) or with its own inspector on a point on which the grant or refusal of permission turns, such an issue is virtually by definition a main issue, speaking objectively, such that a decision not to give reasons on it would be held to be erroneous (Crekav Trading GP Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála and Ors. [2020] IEHC 400 (Unreported, High Court, Barniville J., 31 July 2020); Clonres CLG v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2021] IEHC 303 (Unreported, High Court, 7 May 2021); O'Donnell v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023); Killegland Estates Ltd v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 21 December 2023) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton, O'Malley, Baker, Woulfe and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Ventaway v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025); Phelan Walsh v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 533 (Unreported, High Court, Nolan J., 8 October 2025)

53 citing Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453 (Clarke C.J.)). In the case of the inspector, there is the additional factor that by contrast with a normal case where the commission adopts the inspector’s reasons, in a case where the commission disagrees it must come up with reasons of its own. Where the commission disagrees with the inspector’s conclusion but on a basis that was not dealt with

all by the inspector, then any enhanced reasons obligation does not apply: AAI Baneshane v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 641 (Unreported, High Court, 21 November 2025). As to what are the main issues arising from submissions of interested parties, the decision in Friends of the Irish Environment CLG & Anor. v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage & Ors. [2025] IECA 128 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 5 June 2024) is clear that, per Hyland J. (Costello P. and Collins J. concurring)

para. 148, it is for the decision-taker in the first instance to decide whether submissions raise relevant issues. Failure to address an issue in a submission can be challenged in the normal way. There is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration or to “engage with” submissions in such a sense, or to provide an issue-by-issue or submission-by-submission response: see Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IESC 25, [2008] 3 I.R. 795, per Denham J. (Murray C.J., Fennelly, Kearns and Finnegan JJ. concurring) referring to the lack of a need for a “micro specific format” (

p. 819); per Clarke J. (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring) in Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 May 2012)

para. 6.9, referring to the need for a “reasoned but not discursive ruling”. Confusing a lack of narrative discussion with a lack of reasons is a classic applicant’s fallacy: see e.g. Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

23. Reasons may be found anywhere, not necessarily in the decision itself, for example in an inspectors report: Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453, para. 9.2 per Clarke C.J. (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 11 April 2024) per Woulfe J. (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 129; thus no additional requirement for reasons is required when adopting a reasoned report (for example of a chief executive or indeed an inspector): Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022)

para. 65; Shadowmill v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 157 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 31 March 2023), para 84; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 26 November 2024)

para. 144. Reasons may be implicit from the context, for example it can be implicit that matters submitted were held not to be outweighing when placed against factors supporting the conclusion arrived

: Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 16 (viii) (

1. ix)(
2. x)(
3. xi)(xii) (xiii) (xiv) (
4. xv)(Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), paras. 96-99 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring). Consistently with the principle that there do not need to be reasons for the reasons, a decision-maker doesn’t need to give reasons for not changing her mind from an already-articulated position absent a significant change in circumstances or a significant new point (Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022), para. 67; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, 26 November 2024), para. 145 per Holland J.) or for not making an exception to a clear policy for which reasons have been previously articulated, unless there is a significant change in circumstances or the unusual case of a new point being made of such significance that it needs to be expressly addressed: AAI Baneshane v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 641 (Unreported, High Court, 21 November 2025). That principle in turn reflects an even broader principle that a re-iteration of a previous position or decision is not a new decision for the purposes of judicial review, and does not for example re-start the clock for challenge: Killegland v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022). That said, a new plan is indeed a new decision and can be challenged afresh even if it contains the proverbial old wine in a new bottle. But an individual decision does not become a fresh decision merely because the decision-maker is asked to change her mind and doesn’t. There is no obligation to give reasons for not changing the status quo, for example maintaining a previous plan provision, in respect of which reasons would have been given

an earlier stage: Jones v. South Dublin County Council [2024] IEHC 301 (Unreported, High Court, 11 July 2024)

§209, Voyage Property v.

Limerick City and County Council [2025] IEHC 696 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 December 2025)

1. There is no obligation to state reasons for what is obvious: Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022) (from which the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, [2023] IESC 39 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 21 December 2023) (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton, O’Malley, Baker, Woulfe and Donnelly JJ. concurring)), para. 83; Industrial Development Agency v. Information Commissioner [2024] IEHC 649 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 15 November 2024), para.
2. There is no obligation to give reasons for rejecting a legally incorrect point: see Ironborn v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2023] IEHC 477 (Unreported, High Court, Mulcahy J., 31 July 2023). Reasons are tied into the exercise of evaluation and judgement, so if the latter do not arise then neither does the former – thus there is no need for reasons if there is in fact no evaluation by the decision-taker – if the issue is correctly applying a mandatory, nondiscretionary, non-evaluative, legal rule, a valid decision does not become invalid due to failure to explain the law or indeed to give reasons for the rejection of a legally incorrect submission. A decision should not be quashed for lack of reasons if nobody could be in any real doubt as to what the reasons were: Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 21 December 2023) per Hogan J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton, O’Malley, Baker, Woulfe and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

34. If some reasons are good and others are bad, the decision may be severable if the good reasons are stand-alone (McCarthy Meats v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government [2020] IEHC 371, [2020] 7 JIC 2707 (Unreported, High Court, Heslin J., 27 July 2020); Murtagh v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 345 (Unreported, High Court, Owens J., 29 March 2023); Ironborn v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2023] IEHC 477 (Unreported, High Court, Mulcahy J., 31 July 2023); Voyage Property v. Limerick City and County Council [2025] IEHC 696 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 December 2025)). Reasons are not severable if there is a certain link between the reasons (Element Power Ireland Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 550 (Unreported, High Court, Haughton J., 28 September 2017)). Reasons should not be created ex post facto: K v. Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 582 (Unreported, High Court, Bolger J., 21 October 2022); Ballindooley Developments Limited v. Minister for Housing Local Government and Heritage & Ors. 17 [2025] IEHC 109 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 20 February 2025), although reasons that existed

the relevant time can be evidenced after the event if appropriate: RPS Consulting Engineers Ltd v. Kildare County Council [2016] IEHC 113, [2017] 3 I.R. 61

para.

1. Onus of proof
2. Some relevant legal principles concerning the onus of proof which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) With only defined and extremely limited exceptions, in judicial review the onus of proof is on the applicant

all times: per Denham J. (Murray C.J. and Fennelly J. concurring) in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; Cork County Council v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 683 (Unreported, High Court, 5 November 2021)

§57; Monkstown Road Residents Association v.

An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 318 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2022)

para. 96 per Holland J.; that remains the case even when in a constitutional challenge it is proved that constitutional rights have been interfered with: O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 116; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

14. To put the same point another way, there is a presumption of validity for administrative decisions: per Finlay P. in In re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (Unreported, High Court, 5 December 1977) and per Keane J. in Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] I.R. 88

102; Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 22; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

15. (ii) The onus shifts only in defined special circumstances. For example, where an error is demonstrated by an applicant, the onus shifts to opposing parties to show that the error is harmless: H.A. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IECA 166, [2022] 7 JIC 2201 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Donnelly J., 22 July 2022)

para. 48 (Ní Raifeartaigh and Collins JJ. concurring). An onus on a decision-taker in the administrative process (e.g. to conduct a valid AA) does not convert into an evidential or any burden in the judicial process to show that the decision is valid (for reasons explained in Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26, [2023] 1 JIC 2701 (Unreported, High Court, 27 January 2023)

para. 85). (iii) The onus of proof does not shift to a notice party merely because the decisiontaker does not defend the decision on a given point or generally. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s finding in Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 4 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 22 February 2024) (O’Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Hogan and Collins JJ. concurring) that a notice party can defend a permission even if the decision-taker does not. (iv) In the context of a challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show, by evidence (normally expert evidence), or by demonstrating a flaw on face of material, that AA/EIA was defective, or that there were factual circumstances requiring a decision-taker to consider any other autonomous obligation, lies on the applicant: R v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 (Barrow J.)

paras. 36-38, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C 5141; Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 230, [2021] 4 JIC 1204 (Unreported, High Court, 12 April 2021), para. 19; An Taisce v. an Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J.

para. 124 (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring); Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 (Unreported, High Court, 20 May 2024)

§191(v) (leave to appeal refused in Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 9 (Charleton, Collins and Donnelly JJ., 27 January 2025)); Salmon Watch Ireland, Inland Fisheries Ireland, Sweetman & Ors. v. Aquaculture Licences Appeals Board & Ors. [2024] IEHC 421 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 12 July 2024), §1097; Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2024)

para. 115; Minoa Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 704 (Unreported, High Court, Heslin J., 10 December 2024), para. 333; Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

55; Oxigen v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 632 18 (

1. v)(
2. vi)(Unreported, High Court, 19 November 2025) (for example, in relation to proving that a decision-taker lacks expertise). Thus, apart from (
3. i)failure to consider something that the decision-taker was autonomously required to consider, (
4. ii)patent flaw on the face of the materials, or (iii) other legal error, inadequate consideration or failure to dispel scientific doubt has to be established by admissible evidence (normally expert evidence) in the judicial review showing either that reasonable doubt was created by the material before the decision-taker

the time (albeit not limited to what was adduced by the applicant specifically), or that such material even if uncontradicted would on its face have created doubt in the mind of a reasonable expert: An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 422, [2021] 7 JIC 0205 (Unreported, High Court, 2 July 2021)

§7and §8; Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 (Unreported, High Court, 20 May 2024)

§191(v), leave to appeal refused: Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 9 (Charleton, Collins and Donnelly JJ., 27 January 2025); Kennedy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570 (Unreported, High Court, 7 October 2024)

§§ 73and 105; Roache v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 311 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 21 May 2024)

§117; Ryanair DAC v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 74 (Unreported, High Court, 14 February 2025)

§64et seq.; Massey v.

An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 (Unreported, High Court, 11 April 2025). As noted in Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2024), summarised in the nonprecedential determination refusing leave to appeal [2025] IESCDET 41 (O’Malley, Murray and Donnelly JJ., 10 March 2025)

para. 8, “the critical point was that scientific and factual shortcomings in EIA or indeed in an Appropriate Assessment, must be established by the applicant who bore the burden of proof”. Similarly, leave to appeal was refused in Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 74 (Dunne, Hogan and Donnelly JJ., 4 June 2025) where “The applicant’s claim failed for the reason that the High Court accepted that the respondent had come to a lawful conclusion of no doubt that an appropriate assessment was not needed and that the respondent had given reasons for that conclusion. On the judicial review the applicant had not displaced that conclusion by way of evidence” (para. 25). That is consistent with the general law: O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring). The Supreme Court determination in 100 Meter Tall Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 85 (Charleton, Hogan and Collins JJ., 1 July 2025) is to the same effect: “17. As [the trial judge] pointed out (

para. 196) the Court of Justice ruled in Case C-721/22 Eco Advocacy CLG (EU:C:2023:477) the Board simply provides ‘reasons sufficient to explain that the decision does not create reasonable scientific doubt as to impact on European sites.’ This was simply the test which [the trial judge] applied in the present case. He concluded (

para. 230) that the Board had addressed the issue of potential bird movements of water birds and hen harriers and ‘gives reasons for that conclusion which the applicants have not displaced evidentially.’ 18. The Court considers that this second issue involves the application of standard principles and does not meet the constitutional criteria”. See also Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála & Statkraft [2025] IEHC 15 (Unreported, High Court, 15 January 2025)

§95; Concerned Residents of Coolkill v.

An Bord Pleanála & Midsal Homes [2025] IEHC 265 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 19 May 2025)

309. The onus of proof as to an inadequacy in the decision cannot be discharged by mere assertion: Joyce Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 601, [2020] 11 JIC 2402 (Unreported, High Court, Allen J., 24 November 2020)

§9; Murphy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 59 (Unreported, High Court, Bolger J., 6 February 2024)

§14; nor does mere assertion create scientific doubt for AA purposes: Harrington v.

An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 232, [2014] 5 JIC 0909 (Unreported, High Court, O’Neill J., 9 May 2014); Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 59 (Unreported, High Court, Bolger J., 6 February 2024)

§14; Duffy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 27 September 2024)

§40-§41.

If demonstration of error depends on expert opinion, the onus of demonstration in that regard cannot be discharged by non-expert views articulated by or on behalf of an applicant. Such an exercise in ultracrepidarianism is generally inadmissible on standard evidential principles insofar as matters of opinion are 19 concerned: Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 (Unreported, High Court, 11 April 2025). (vii) Where there is a conflict of admissible evidence, in the absence of cross-examination such a conflict must generally be resolved against the party carrying the onus of proof: RAS Medical Ltd v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] IESC 4, [2019] 1 I.R. 63, [2019] 2 I.L.R.M. 273 (Clarke C.J.) (O’Donnell, MacMenamin, Dunne and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring). That is normally the applicant but in the case of an opposing party asserting that a demonstrated error is harmless, the conflict will be resolved against the opposing party. (viii) That said, while conflict between equally inherently credible averments, with no cross-examination, is generally resolved against the party carrying the onus of proof, a court is not always obliged to regard all averments as being equally credible, or to disregard internal or evident problems with them (see by analogy the manner in which the Supreme Court considered it was entitled to prefer an affidavit over even oral evidence in Koulibaly v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2004] IESC 50, [2004] 7 JIC 2906 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Denham J. (Geoghegan and McCracken JJ. concurring), 29 July 2004)). Among the matters to which regard might be had would be included the failure to explain patently relevant questions that are clearly within that party’s responsibility (Doorly v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 6 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 21 January 2022)

para. 137 (Ní Raifeartaigh and Pilkington JJ. concurring)). This specific and common sense power of the court to evaluate inherent defects in evidence remains notwithstanding caselaw on cross-examination such as RAS Medical or Re Bayview Hotel (Waterville) Limited [2022] IEHC 516 (Unreported, High Court, Butler J., 8 September 2022). This is consistent by analogy with the judgment of Hardiman J. (Hanna and Feeney JJ. concurring) in DPP v. Barnes [2006] IECCA 165, [2007] 3 I.R. 130, [2007] 1 I.L.R.M. 350

para. 95 – the court as finder of fact is “not ... constrained” to accept “the only account available” even if that account is provided by oral evidence. Inadequacy of assessments 62. Some relevant legal principles regarding inadequacy of assessments which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) European assessments are an iterative process not a single document, so flaws

one point can be addressed

a later point in the process: per Lord Hoffman in R (Edwards) v. Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1587, para 38; R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

66 and 143; Cogent Land LLP v. Rochford District Council [2012] EWHC 2542 (Admin), [2013] 1 P & CR 2, Singh J. (paras. 111-126); No Adastral New Town Ltd v. Suffolk Coastal District Council [2015] EWCA Civ. 88, [2015] Env. L.R. 28 per Richards LJ. (Underhill and Briggs LJJ. concurring) (paras. 48-54); hence amendments to a plan under assessment can be introduced in the process, R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd

67. (ii) “Deciding whether an effect of a project on the environment is ‘significant’ clearly requires a value judgment and carries the potential for cases to arise in which different decision-makers may legitimately reach different conclusions without it being possible to say that any of them has made an error in interpreting or applying the term”: R (on the application of Finch on behalf of the Weald Action Group) v. Surrey County Council and others [2024] UKSC 20, [2024] 4 All E.R. 717, [2024] P.T.S.R. 988, [2024] 6 W.L.U.K. 315 per Lord Leggatt SCJ. (Lord Kitchin and Lady Rose SCJJ. concurring)

58 (emphasis added). (iii) Determining whether an effect is capable of being assessed, or whether it is a likely effect, is also evaluative: Finch

77-78. (

1. iv)Standard of assessment: AA must, by reference to best scientific knowledge, dispel all reasonable scientific doubt as to adverse effects on European sites (art. 6 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the habitats directive)); EIA must be as complete as possible: judgment of 3 March 2011, Commission v Ireland, C-50/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:109. (
2. v)As with any evaluative conclusion by a decision-taker, the AA evaluation is one in the first instance for the decision-taker: Lord Carnwath in R. (on the application of Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3170

para. 41; per Sales L.J. in Smyth v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 174, [2015] P.T.S.R. 1417

20 (

1. vi)(vii) (viii) (
2. ix)para. 83; judgment of 7 November 2018, Holohan v An Bord Pleanála, C-461/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:883

para. 44; R. (on the application of Wyatt) v. Fareham Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 983, [2023] P.T.S.R. 1952, [2022], 7 W.L.U.K. 197, [2023] Env. L.R. 14 (Sir Keith Lindblom P., Singh and Males LJJ.) Ultimately it is for the national courts to carry out a thorough and in-depth examination of the scientific soundness of the AA: judgment of 7 November 2018, Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA and Vereniging Leefmilieu v College van gedeputeerde staten van Limburg and College van gedeputeerde staten van Gelderland, joined cases C-293/17 and C-294/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:882

para. 101. This may go beyond the mere review for reasonableness accepted in the UK: R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

143. While the standard for the decision-taker’s carrying out of AA is removal of reasonable scientific doubt as to effects on the integrity of European sites by reference to their conservation objectives, and by the application of best scientific knowledge, that does not require the decision-taker to disprove “any effect whatsoever”, matters having “no appreciable effect”, or “hypothetical risk”: opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 29 January 2004 in Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, paras. 102-106; judgment of 7 November 2018, Holohan v An Bord Pleanála, C461/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:883

paras. 33–37; Holland J. in Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 146, [2022] 3 JIC 1603 (Unreported, High Court, 16 March 2022), citing R Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd v. The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2016] EWHC 2581 (Admin), [2016] 10 W.L.U.K. 396, [2017] Env. L.R. 14 (

para. 259). Absence of reasonable doubt therefore does not mean “absolute certainty” (paras. 44, 58, 59, and 61 of the CJEU's judgment and paras. 102 to 108 of the Advocate General's opinion in Waddenzee, the judgment in Holohan

paras. 33-37, and Lord Carnwath in R. (on the application of Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3170

para. 41). It is settled law that the EIA directive should not be read as imposing impossibly onerous obligations: An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (Kilkenny Cheese) [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281, per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para. 105, rejecting “impossibly onerous and unworkable obligations”; Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025). Given the very wide scope of matters coming within EIA, an argument that any impact should not have been considered is presumptively implausible. In particular, potential and unmitigated impacts are required to be considered in the EIA process: Oxigen v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 632 (Unreported, High Court, 19 November 2025). Discretion 63. Some issues regarding discretion established by the caselaw are as follows: (i) Judicial review is a discretionary remedy: per Murray J. (Whelan and Pilkington JJ. concurring) in O’Connell v. Behan [2021] IECA 186 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 1 July 2021)

43 (see also per Charleton J. (diss.) in Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council v. Westwood Club Ltd [2019] IESC 43, [2020] 3 I.R. 417

10; ). This historically arose from the development of judicial review out of the power to grant equitable relief. (ii) Discretion applies both

the leave stage and

the substantive stage: per Finlay C.J. (Blayney and Denham JJ. concurring) in G. v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374

p. 378; De Róiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4, [2001] 1 I.R. 190, [2001] 2 I.L.R.M. 241

204 per Denham J.; Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring). (iii) The effect of the doctrine of discretion is that even if there was a “jurisdictional” infirmity such as in planning application documents, AA, or other such requirement the process is not automatically void ab initio and certiorari is not automatic: Byrnes v. Dublin City Council [2017] IEHC 19 (Unreported, High Court, Baker J., 18 January 2017); Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 403 (Unreported, High Court, Owens J., 16 June 2021); Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. 21 (

1. iv)(
2. v)(
3. vi)An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 722 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 21 December 2023) (§102 et seq.); and Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 (Unreported, High Court, 28 November 2025) (§81 et seq.). The court can exercise discretion of its own motion because the court itself has to be satisfied as to the correctness of granting relief: Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 4 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 22 February 2024) (O’Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Hogan and Collins JJ. concurring). That implies that the court has an entitlement to exercise such discretion itself even if a party doesn’t plead discretion as such or pleads it on limited grounds. In exercising that discretion however the court is bound by established principles as to the exercise of such discretion: Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring)

60. As Donnelly J. pointed out in that case

27, the use of the term discretion is strictly delineated. O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J. and Dunne J. concurring) said in Kelly v. Minister for Agriculture [2021] IESC 62, [2023] 1 I.R. 38 that the court is not “

large”, or is free to take into account “its views on the underlying merits” (the contrast with Christian below indicates that what is envisaged is merit in some general sense separate from the “constitutional or legal value[s]” concerned). Rather, “the circumstances which allow the court not to make an order which would otherwise be justified must be such as to derive from an important constitutional or legal value of sufficient weight to warrant not making an order otherwise justified” (Clarke J. in Christian v. Dublin City Council [2012] IEHC 163, [2012] 2 I.R. 506,

567) as cited with approval by Donnelly J. in Amariei

27. Thus the court must be conscious of the need for statutory requirements to be observed, see e.g. Protect East Meath v. Meath County Council [2026] IESC 1 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 22 January 2026). The established principles as to the exercise of discretion fall into three broad categories: conduct of the applicant, the practical value of the remedy, and disproportionality. Under these headings the following points emerge: (a) “[T]he action or inaction of the claimant (such as a failure to exhaust an alternative remedy, delay, laches, waiver, acquiescence or misconduct in connection with the proceedings)” is relevant (O’Connell v. Behan [2021] IECA 186 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Murray J. (Whelan and Pilkington JJ. concurring) 1 July 2021)

43). In particular: 1. Failure to exhaust remedies as the general rule: Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring), save where for example there is a fundamental failure of justice: A.B. v Chief International Protection Officer & Ors [2026] IESC 23 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton, Woulfe and Murray JJ. concurring). “It is a long-standing principle of the law relating to judicial review that the court asked to quash an administrative decision has a discretion to refuse to do so if there is an alternative remedy available to put right the wrong complained of in the proceedings.” per Dunne J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), S. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IESC 48 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 November 2025)

2. This can include failure by an applicant to take action to protect their position: Baile Bhruachlain Teoranta v. Galway County Council [2024] IEHC 604 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2024); Voyage Property v. Limerick City and County Council [2025] IEHC 696 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 December 2025)

2. The failure by the applicant to make the point in the process is relevant: Costello J. in Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Government of Ireland [2021] IECA 317 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 November 2021)

2. Unwarranted failure to prosecute the proceedings: Delaney v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 621 (Unreported High Court, 13 November 2025). (b) Grounds relating to “the practical value of the remedy (such as mootness or futility) (see Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd v. IA 22 [2020] IECA 19, [[2021] 1 I.R. 384]

para. 78)” are relevant: O’Connell v. Behan [2021] IECA 186 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Murray J. (Whelan and Pilkington JJ. concurring), 1 July 2021)

43. Thus for example a remedy is not required where the order sought would be futile and inappropriate: Protect East Meath v. Meath County Council [2026] IESC 12 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 19 February 2026)

8. (c) The proportionality of certiorari (as opposed for example to either no order or declaratory relief only) may also be a factor: in Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205

60, Woulfe J. (Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring) said (without needing to decide the point) that there was “a great deal of force” in the submission that it would be disproportionate to quash a decision on the basis of a “technical procedural error”. In particular: 1. The importance of the provision not complied with is a factor – the process requires “consideration of whether the matter concerned is one of importance or of triviality”: per Finlay C.J. (Blayney and Denham JJ. concurring) in G. v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374

p. 378 (emphasis added). Thus an “inconsequential” breach was not a basis for the grant of relief as a matter of discretion in Kenny v. Dublin City Council [2009] IESC 19 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 5 March 2009)

79 per Fennelly J. (Macken and Peart JJ. concurring). 2. Likewise the importance of the countervailing legal value being protected by the impugned decision is a factor in the balance, whether that be a value enshrined in law generally, the ECHR as transposed, the Constitution or EU law – as cited above, the court can consider whether there is “an important constitutional or legal value of sufficient weight to warrant not making an order otherwise justified” (Clarke J. in Christian v Dublin City Council [2012] IEHC 163, [2012] 2 I.R. 506,

567) as cited with approval by Donnelly J. in Amariei

2. Prejudice or the lack of it to the applicant or anyone else (see O’Connell v. Behan [2021] IECA 186 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 1 July 2021)

43: “grounds relating to the impact a remedy will have on others (such as where the grant of relief would represent an unwarranted interference with the settled rights or expectations of third parties)”). 4. In assessing proportionality it follows that matters regarding the seriousness of the error such as the extent of the noncompliance, whether the error was once-off, whether the issue is purely historic and cannot reoccur, the level of deliberation involved in the error and the extent to which reasonable steps were taken to prevent or identify such an error, whether the error was rectified promptly when it came to light (if capable of rectification), whether there is a pattern of non-compliance, and any other relevant circumstances may be relevant (see also Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27, [2024] 1 JIC 2401 (Unreported, High Court, 24 January 2024) para. 134). Whether the points were made

the appropriate time 64. The parties’ positions on whether the applicant’s points were made

the appropriate time as recorded in the statement of case are summarised as follows: “1. Points contended to be referenced in submissions/affidavits/statement of case/ otherwise in the proceedings (excluding pleadings) but not made in the process and not pleaded:Respondent’s Position: The Commission contends that the following assertions do not form part of the Applicant’s pleaded case as per his Statement of Grounds and it is the Commission’s position that the Applicant is precluded from now advancing same in seeking to impugn the Commission’s Decision:(a) in the context of the Applicant’s complaints under Core Ground 1, the Commission failed in their obligation to properly and/or meaningfully engage with the Inspector’s Report, the submissions made in respect of the application and the application documentation (

§18

of the Applicant’s submissions), and 23 (b) in the context of the Applicant’s complaints under Core Ground 1, the Commission failed to meaningfully engage with the application made to it and its decision to grant permission without the condition in respect of the temporary duration of the permission is fundamentally an error of law and of fact (

§18of the Applicant’s submissions).

Applicant’s Position: (a & b) The contention of the Commission in this regard is not understood, as the matter complained of is referred to as being ‘Core Ground 1’, and therefore, has been pleaded. These are matters for the hearing of the action and are not matters to be argued in a ‘Statement of Case.’ Furthermore, the point raised

1(

1. b)could not possibly have been raised in the process, i.e. the duration of the permission, as it was unforeseeable that the Commission would grant permission for an unlimited period where a period of 5 years had been consistently granted in the earlier permissions. For the record, this matter was pleaded. 2. Points contended to have been made in the process, but not pleaded:(
2. a)N/A 3. Points contended to be referred to narratively/contextually in the pleadings but without any properly formulated legal plea:(
3. a)Respondent’s Position: Core Ground 1:- The plea

E15 of the Statement of Grounds that Condition No. 3 of the Commission’s Order ‘significantly expands potentially the impact of the airport’ does not comply with Order 84 Rule 20

§23of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. a)The Respondent’s position in this regard is rejected. It is absolutely clear on its face and as pleaded in Core Ground 1 and E15 that the effect of condition no. 3 of the Commission’s Order significantly expands potentially the impact of the airport. There is absolute clarity in the stark and identifiable difference of impact and effect, and this matter is clearly particularised and beyond any ambiguity. It is difficult to understand how the direct nexus between the vast difference of effect between the permission granted and the ability to vary same by condition 3 is viewed by the Commission as not being a complaint which is linked to the relief sought. Respondent’s Position: (
2. b)Core Ground 3:- The plea

E22-E23 of the Statement of Grounds purports to impugn the Commission’s Decision to grant permission for the proposed development by reference to the EIA Directive and/or seeks to impugn the Commission’s preliminary examination in respect of the proposed development for the purposes of the EIA Directive and these pleas are unrelated and bear no nexus to Core Ground 3 of the Statement of Grounds. In turn, these pleas do not comply with Order 84 Rule 20

§36of the Statement of Opposition).

(c) Core Ground 3:- The plea

E23 of the Statement of Grounds is vague and does not comply with the requirements of Order 84 Rule 20

§44of the Statement of Opposition).

(d) Core Ground 3:- Insofar as the Applicant pleads

E23 of the Statement of Grounds that the Commission failed to conduct a preliminary examination in respect of the Habitats Directive, the said plea is both misconceived and does not comply with Order 84 Rule 20

§45of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (b, c & d) The pleas

E22/E23 are to be read in conjunction with Core Ground 3, and when read together the temporal nature of the granting of a perpetual permission, not limited to 5 years as set out in Core Ground 3 has the inevitable impact and effect that the Respondent failed to comply with its obligations under Schedule 7 of the Planning and Development Regulations, 2001. The relief sought in terms of Core Ground 3 is entirely coherent. In relation to points (c) and (d) it appears that the Respondents misunderstand the basis of the Core Ground and the reasons given, namely the failure of the Commission to give appropriate reasons for disagreeing with the Inspector for the imposition of a limit of 5 years 24 on the permission. It should be noted

paragraphs E18, E19 and E20 are also to be read with Core Ground 3 in relation to the failure to give reasons by the Respondent. Respondent’s Position: (e) Core Ground 4:- The Statement of Grounds contains no particulars relating to Core Ground 4, contrary to the requirements of Order 84, Rule 20

§49of the Statement of Opposition).

Rather, the Applicant simply restates Core Ground 4 in his particulars for Core Ground 2 and 4 as per his Statement of Grounds. (see

§49of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. e)Paragraphs E18, E19 and E20 both refer to Core Ground 2 and Core Ground 4, as both of these grounds are linked. Respondent’s Position: (
2. f)Core Ground 4:- The Statement of Grounds does not disclose how the Planning Authority allegedly has ‘been afforded unrestricted rights in respect of the airport by virtue of condition 3’ as per Core Ground 4 as pleaded. This plea does not comply with Order 84, Rule 20

§51of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. f)The Planning Authority has been afforded unrestricted rights in respect of the airport by virtue of Condition 3 in terms of granting a permission into perpetuity rather than a 5 year permission, and it is plain common sense that the terms of the permission into perpetuity is, within the envelope of the permission itself, unrestricted on account of the perpetual nature of the permission granted. Condition 3 of the permission directs that the development is to be used only for the developer’s personal aircraft unless otherwise agreed in writing with the Planning Authority. This condition affords unfettered control without any participation of the applicant in these proceedings to have any input whatsoever to potential unrestricted further development of this airfield. Respondent’s Position: (
2. g)Core Ground 5:- Insofar as the Applicant claims that the Notice Party’s application for permission failed to comply with Articles 16,18 and 20 of the 2001 Regulations, same has not been adequately pleaded or particularised under Core Ground 5 of the Statement of Grounds contrary to the requirements of Order 84 Rule 20

§58of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. g)This complaint is not understood. Please see paragraphs E25, E26 and E27 of the Statement of Grounds referring to Article 17, Article 19, Article 22 and Article 23 of the Planning and Development Regulations, 2001. Respondent’s Position: (
2. h)Core Ground 6:- Insofar as the Applicant pleads

Core Ground 6 and/or E28 of the Statement of Grounds that the plans and particulars of the proposed development which formed the basis of the Commission’s assessment materially mis-describe the context of the proposed development both in respect of noise, impacts, visual impacts and the effect on residential amenity such as to render the Notice Party’s application for permission invalid, such pleas do not comply with Order 84 Rule 20

§70of the Statement of Opposition).

(i) Core Ground 6:- The plea

E29 of the Statement of Grounds is premised on the contention that it was necessary for the Notice Party’s application for planning permission to address alleged unauthorised development and this plea does not comply with Order 84 Rule 20

§71of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (h & i) Core Ground 6 refers to the misrepresentation of the location and number of dwellinghouses adjacent to the runway. This material misdescription, together with the failure to record unauthorized development, in particular the extension of the runway as described

para E29, are both adequately pleaded grounds and particulars, sufficient to establish the fundamental misdescriptions in the application, and indeed these matters are further referred to

para. F38 of the Statement of Grounds under ‘Factual Background’, and are also treated of in detail by the Applicant in his Affidavit dated. Respondent’s Position: (j) Core Ground 7:- The plea

E31 of the Statement of Grounds that Condition 3 purportedly imposes no limitation in terms of what might be agreed in respect of the use of the proposed airstrip which the Applicant claims is contrary to the public participation requirements of the EIA Directive and/or contrary to the ‘obligation to participate in any such decision making process’ and/or contrary to the ‘requirements to be notified of the 25 decision in that regard so as to bring any proceedings in respect of any such review as is entitled to be made under the EIA Directive’ bear no nexus to Core Ground No.7 and cannot form the basis of any grant of relief thereunder (

§86of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. j)Once again, the Respondent appears to fail to appreciate the enormous significance which exists between a permission granted into perpetuity and one which is granted only for a period of 5 years, and the permanent effects that a permanent permission have as opposed to the temporary effects that a limited permission has. With respect, such a distinction ought to be patently self-evident. Respondent’s Position (
2. k)Core Ground 8:-Core Ground 8 and/or E32 of the Statement of Grounds has not been adequately pleaded or particularised contrary to the requirements of Order 84 Rule 20

§91of the Statement of Opposition).

E32 of the Statement of Grounds repeats Core Ground 8 which makes bare and/or broad assertions and no particulars are provided in respect of same. Applicant’s Position: (k) Core Ground 8 is adequately pleaded, and indeed the Core Ground internally references the particularization of same by specifically referring to the considerations applied in the Inspector’s Report

Section 7

.3.11 and by specifically referring to no consideration having been given to the second limb of the definition of development. The Ground is both adequately pleaded and particularized. Respondent’s Position: (l) Core Ground 11:- Core Ground 11 and/or E35 of the Statement of Grounds seeks to impugn Condition No. 3 to the Commission’s Order which is a limited condition on a point of detail under s.34

§114of the Statement of Opposition).

(m) Core Ground 11:- Core Ground 11 and/or E35 of the Statement of Grounds has not particularised how the lack of an expressed facility in Condition No.3 to refer the matter to the Commission in default of agreement as between the Notice Party and the Planning Authority has resulted in the Commission breaching its obligations under the 2000 Act or otherwise. In turn, the Applicant’s pleas in this regard are contrary to the requirements of Order 84 Rule 20

§115of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (l & m) Condition 3 of the Commission’s Order is not a limited condition on a point of detail under Section 34 of the 2000 Act. It provides potentially unlimited scope to vary the nature of the aircraft, the usage of same, and indeed the ancillary uses of the airfield solely on the basis of written agreement between the developer and the Planning Authority. This goes way beyond the scope of a limited condition, and the inconsistencies of such a condition under the EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive is adequately particularised

para 36 and indeed is self-evident. This matter is more appropriately to be addressed

the hearing of the case. 4. Points contended to have been pleaded but not made by the applicant in the process:Respondent’s Position: (a) Core Ground 1 (

E13 of the Statement of Grounds):- The Applicant’s appeal to the Commission did not contend that, if the Commission granted permission for the proposed development, such a grant of permission ought to be the subject of a condition that the use of the subject lands as an airstrip shall cease on or before the expiration of five years from the date of the grant of such permission on the basis that the principles of res judicata apply given the Commission’s decision dated 18th May 2011 (ABP Ref. PL 07.238257) and the Planning Authority’s decision dated 13th February 2018 (Reg. Ref 17/1784). Having not asserted that position before the Commission, the Applicant cannot purport to impugn the decision of the Commission by reference to that issue (see

§15

of the Statement of Opposition) Applicant’s Position: (a) This contention is rejected. The Commission is

tempting to extend a level of foresight on behalf of an ordinary member of the public which is both unreasonable and unjustified. The Commission and Planning Authority in 2 previous permissions of 2011 and 2018 imposed a 5 year limitation, and an ordinary member of the public cannot be expected to anticipate an unexplained inconsistency in the actions of a Public Authority. The Commission is suggesting a level of prescience on behalf of the Applicant which is simply impossible to 26 comply with as no person, let alone an ordinary member of the public with no experience of the planning process, could be expected to engage in a process of guesswork as to how the Commission would formulate its decision. The Applicant could never be expected to anticipate that the Commission would overrule the recommendation of its Inspector which recommended that the permission would have a duration of 5 years, and much less so could the Applicant be expected to anticipate that the Commission would overrule its Inspector without providing any reasoning for doing so. Respondent’s Position: (b) Core Ground 2/4 (

E17 of the Statement of Grounds):- The Applicant did not assert before the Commission that the Planning Authority had been afforded ‘unrestricted rights in respect of the use of the airport’ by virtue of Condition No. 5 of the Chief Executive’s Order dated 16th February 2024 (now Condition No. 3 of the Commission’s Order). The Applicant now purports to impugn the Commission’s Decision, the subject matter of the within proceedings, on the basis of same, by reference to Core Ground No. 4, and the Applicant is not entitled to do so (see

§51of the Statement of Opposition).

Applicant’s Position: (

1. b)The Applicant, in his comprehensive submission to the Commission following the decision of the Planning Authority, and specifically raised issues of the effects of noise of the aircraft on his household, the type of aircraft, the flight path of the aircraft and the frequency of flights, all of which are directly relevant to the potential unrestricted rights in respect of the use of the airport and indeed the intensification of the use of this development by aircraft which can arise, directly out of condition 3 solely by way of written agreement between the developer and the Planning Authority. Respondent’s Position: (
2. c)Core Ground 5 (E5 of the Statement of Grounds):- The Applicant’s appeal to the Commission did not raise the issue and/or address the Notice Party’s purported noncompliance with Article 16,17, 18 and 20 of the 2001 Regulations with respect to the Notice Party’s applica