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2026 IEHC 279

THE HIGH COURT WARDS OF COURT [2026] IEHC 279 [WOC 5688] IN THE MATTER OF T, A WARD OF COURT, AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 55 OF THE ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING (CAPACITY) ACT RESPONDENT Ex Tempore Ruling of Mr. Justice Mark Heslin delivered on the 23rd day of March 2026 Introduction

  1. This is a ruling in relation to the discharge from Wardship of Mr. [T] and the legislation we are concerned with today is the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act of 2015 (which I will call the “2015 Act”). Participation
  2. Under s.139 of the 2015 Act, the ‘default’ position is for participation by the “relevant person”, that being Mr. [T] (whom I will call the “respondent”). I am satisfied, however, that no injustice arises by proceeding in the respondent’s absence and that is for three reasons: first, the efforts made to ascertain the respondent’s view; second, the facilities made available for the respondent to participate, should he wish; and, third, the evidence in relation to the limited scope for participation by the respondent, given his challenges. Certain facts
  3. As to certain basic facts, the respondent is a gentleman born in [the 1980s]. He has complex care needs arising from severe intellectual disabilities and a rare genetic disorder. He was admitted to Wardship in 2009, and the General Solicitor is his committee in Wardship. He lives between his family home and [named care facility]. 2 Grounding affidavit
  4. I have had regard to the averments (i.e. statements sworn to be correct) by Ms. Sharon Smyth, solicitor, in her affidavit of 03 March of this year. Of particular relevance is the medical evidence to which she refers, in the form of a report of 23 September last by Dr. [U], a registered medical practitioner. Sections 2 and 3
  5. Consistent with the provisions of s.3 of the 2015 Act, Dr. [U] carried out a functional assessment of the respondent's capacity to make decisions in relation to his “personal welfare” and his “property and affairs”, both of which terms are defined in s.2 of the 2015 Act. Medical evidence
  6. Dr. [U] formed the view that the respondent lacks capacity to make decisions in relation to both his personal welfare and his property and affairs, even if the assistance of a suitable person to act as co-decision-maker is made available to him. No issue has been taken with this medical evidence either by or on behalf of the respondent. Necessity and proportionality
  7. It should also be noted that Dr. [U]’s opinion regarding the respondent’s lack of capacity does not exclude any decision which might come under the headings of either personal welfare or property and affairs, nor is it said that any particular decision will be unnecessary to be made in the future. Service
  8. In addition to Ms. Smyth's grounding affidavit, I also have the benefit of an affidavit of service which she swore on 05 March and, given the facts sworn by her to be correct, I am satisfied that service was properly effected and that appropriate efforts were made to try and explain the nature of this application to the respondent and to try and ascertain his views. However, in the manner Ms. Smyth avers, this was not possible as the respondent made no verbal reply, did not engage with Ms. Smyth, and did not appear to understand what had been explained to him. DMR
  9. However, the respondent’s father, Mr. [V], is aware of the role and obligations of a decision- making representative (or “DMR”) and has provided a declaration of suitability in the context of s.38 of the 2015 Act. Assets
  10. I note the position in relation to the respondent’s assets, a schedule of which is exhibited in the application and, in objective terms, these are relatively straightforward. 3 EPA and AHD
  11. At para. 23 of the grounding affidavit, Ms. Smyth avers that there is no Enduring Power of Attorney or Advance Healthcare Directive known to exist.
  12. Having regard to the evidence, in particular the uncontroverted medical evidence, I am going to make the following declaration. Declaration
  13. I am declaring, pursuant to s.55

(1)(b)(ii) of the 2015 Act, that the respondent, Mr. [T], lacks capacity to make decisions regarding both his personal welfare and his property and affairs, even if the assistance of a suitable person as co-decision-maker is made available to him. Orders
  1. Given the evidence which I took the time to consider very carefully in advance of sitting today, I am satisfied that it is appropriate, necessary and proportionate to make orders reflecting the draft which Ms. Smyth has very helpfully provided and I now propose to summarise those orders.
  2. First, I am making an order under s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 2008 which prohibits the publication or broadcast of any matter relating to these proceedings which would, or would be likely to, identify Mr. [T] as someone suffering from a medical condition.
  3. Next, I am formally ordering that Mr. [T] be discharged from Wardship and remitted to the management of his affairs with the appointment of a suitable person as his decision-making representative, or DMR.
  4. On the evidence, his loving father, Mr. [V], is entirely suitable and I am appointing him as DMR for Mr. [T] in the areas of both personal welfare and property and affairs decision-making, subject, of course, to the obligations found in s.8 ss.
(7)and
(8)of the 2015 Act.
  1. Mr. [T] is entitled to receive the assets held on his behalf by the Accountant of the Courts of Justice.
  2. The DMR, Mr. [V], on production of details of a suitable account with a financial institution in his name and in Mr. [T]'s name, but with that account being under the custody, control and management of Mr. [V] as DMR, is authorised to receive the assets held on behalf of Mr. [T] by the Accountant of the Courts of Justice.
  3. I will order that Mr. [T] continue to receive, directly, his Department of Social Protection entitlements, with this arrangement to be reviewed by his DMR, his father, within 12 months.
  4. The Accountant of the Courts of Justice is to carry out the directions contained in the payment schedule. 4
  5. I will make an order, reflecting the draft, pursuant to s.42
(1)of the 2015 Act, that the DMR is not entitled to be reimbursed from Mr. [T]’s assets in relation to expenses incurred in the performance by him of the functions of DMR.
  1. I will order that the inhibition registered under the folio referred to in the draft restricting dealings be discharged.
  2. As with any dealing with the property and affairs of Mr. [T], the DMR is to account to the Director of the Decision Support Service, and that reflects the provisions of s.46
(6)of the 2015 Act.
  1. The applicant is authorised to provide a copy of the court booklet to the DMR, Mr. [V].
  2. Given the permanent nature of Mr. [T]’s challenges, I will order that his capacity be reviewed by the Circuit Court no later than three years from the making of these orders and will I direct that the functional capacity assessment carried out by Dr. [U] be released to the Circuit Court in that regard.
  3. In the particular circumstances of this case, where I understand there is a legal aid certificate in place, I will make no order as to costs. In conclusion
  4. By way of a final word, this may seem like a very impersonal application and ruling, but I have not lost sight of the fact that Mr. [T] is, as the evidence makes clear, a highly valued member of a loving family. It is also clear that he is receiving great care, so that he can live as comfortable and happy a life as possible in an environment meeting his needs. I want to thank his loving parents and wish his father, in particular, the very best in circumstances where he is now taking on this new role of DMR for his son.

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.