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2026 IEHC 382

[2026] IEHC 382 THE HIGH COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE UNFAIR DISMISSALS ACTS 1977 TO 2007 [2025/38 CA] [2025/135 CA] Between: AGNIESZKA NOWAK Plaintiff/Appellant AND INTESA SAN PAOLO VITA S.P.A Defendant/Respondent JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 17th day of June, 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. This judgment arises from an appeal brought by the plaintiff against two decisions of His Honour Judge Geoffrey Shannon in the Circuit Court. The first decision related to a preliminary issue as to whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear or determine the plaintiff’s appeal from a determination made by the Employment Appeals Tribunal on the 10 April 2019. The second issue related to the cost order that was made on foot of the determination of the jurisdiction issue. In this judgment I will refer for convenience to the appellant Ms. Nowak, as the plaintiff, and the respondent employer as the company. At the hearing before this court, Ms. Nowak represented herself. This is a choice that she is fully entitled to take, but clearly given the technical legal issues that have arisen these are matters where professional legal assistance would have been helpful to the plaintiff. 2. This appeal was heard alongside an application for discovery in respect of a plenary action brought by the plaintiff relating to the same factual matrix. The judgment in that matter is delivered concurrent to this judgment and bears neutral citation: [2026] IEHC 383. 3. Underpinning these issues, and a number of other actions taken by the plaintiff, are disputes arising from the employment of the plaintiff with the defendant company and particularly a dispute about the termination of her employment. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the court to adjudicate on matters other than the two issues referred to above, but it is necessary to set out in broad terms the nature of the underlying dispute. The core dispute itself is relatively straightforward (or should have been relatively straightforward) but has been complicated by a lengthy series of procedural wrangles. 4. Ultimately, for the reasons set out in this judgment I have concluded that the plaintiff cannot succeed in these appeals. BACKGROUND 5. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company as a trainee management accountant within the finance department of the company. The terms of her employment were set out in a letter offering the position dated the 30 March 2006. That letter also set out the company’s dismissal procedure for the purposes of the then provisions of s. 14 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, as amended by s. 9 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993. The process set out procedures relating to gross misconduct and procedures for dismissal on grounds other than gross misconduct. 6. Difficulties arose as between the plaintiff and the company, and this culminated in the company serving a letter on the plaintiff, dated the 20 August 2015, in which the plaintiff was informed that her employment was being terminated with immediate effect. As framed in the letter, the reasons given were that (

  1. a)the plaintiff failed to attend as directed at a meeting with an identified HR manager on the 14 August 2015, (
  2. b)the plaintiff failed to attend a disciplinary hearing on the 30 July 2015, (
  3. c)the plaintiff failed and refused to engage with the company, and (
  4. d)insubordination in refusing to follow instructions in relation to attendance at the meetings. 7. On or about the 4 September 2015, the plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission. In the form completed by the plaintiff she identified the 20 August 2015 as the date when her employment ended, and she set out details of her complaints. a. The first was an equal pay complaint based on her race, and she stated that she was paid less than identified comparators. In relation to that complaint, the plaintiff indicated that she wished to make a complaint to the Director of the Equality Tribunal under s. 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. b. The second complaint was that she was unfairly dismissed. In that regard, she complained that she was dismissed while on certified sick leave, that the reasons given were insufficiently detailed, and that she was denied fair procedures and access to an arbitration service. In the form that she completed, the plaintiff identified that she was seeking re-engagement, and in terms of the redress options, she selected a complaint to the Employment Appeals Tribunal for a determination under s. 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. c. The third complaint was that the plaintiff was not notified in writing of a change to her terms of employment. This was related to what the plaintiff characterised as a change to the title of her position. The redress option chosen was investigation by an Inspector under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. 8. As explained by Simons J. in a previous judgment concerned with the within proceedings (Nowak v. Intesa San Paolo Vita S.p.A. [2024] IEHC 262), the plaintiff’s claim was made prior to the commencement of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and so the issue of unfair dismissal fell to be considered by reference to the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended). 9. The claim pursuant to the Employment Equality Act 1998 fell to be determined first and was heard by an Equality Officer on the 25 July 2016. By decision dated the 4 October 2016, the plaintiff’s 1998 Act claims were dismissed in their entirety. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Labour Court. 10. While the appeal concerning the 1998 Act remained extant, the EAT heard and determined the unfair dismissal claim. By decision dated the 2 February 2017, the EAT considered that the plaintiff was not entitled to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal, as s. 101

(2)of the 1998 Act precludes a claimant from seeking redress for unfair dismissal pursuant to the 1977 Act where the claimant has referred the same case to the Director of the Equality Tribunal. 11. This decision was successfully appealed by the plaintiff to the Circuit Court who held that on the basis that it was open to the Labour Court who has been charged with determining the claim under the 1998 Act, to issue a direction permitting the appellant to pursue a claim under the 1977 Act. The company unsuccessfully appealed the Circuit Court Order to the High Court. By Order of McDermott J. on the 28 June 2018, the case was referred back to the EAT “for further consideration”. McDermott J. also directed the company to write to the Labour Court seeking clarification as to whether it intends to a) issue a direction enabling the plaintiff to pursue an unfair dismissal claim in accordance with s. 101
(2)(
  1. b)of the 1998 Act (as amended), or
  2. b)having considered the matter, decide not to issue such a direction. 12. Notwithstanding that the company complied with the direction of McDermott J. and requested clarification from the Labour Court, in its decision of the 31 August 2018, the Labour Court made no reference to the Order of McDermott J. nor the question of whether a direction was or was not being made allowing for the plaintiff to pursue her unfair dismissal claim. 13. The unfair dismissal claim was heard by the EAT on the 23 and the 24 January 2019, and the 4 March 2019. The consequent written ruling from the EAT issued on the 10 April 2019. The ruling commenced by noting that the complaints relating to discrimination had been dismissed by an Adjudication Officer / Equality Officer in a decision dated the 4 October 2016. The EAT explained that on the first day of the hearing before that body, the company had raised a jurisdictional issue; which was that because the plaintiff had invoked a claim under the Employment Equality Act, the EAT was precluded from hearing the case by virtue of s. 101
(2)(b) of the Employment Equality Act. 14. The EAT noted the terms of s. 101
(2), and that in a decision dated the 2 February 2017 the EAT had decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to pursue a claim for redress under the Unfair Dismissals Acts as she was dismissed before she referred her case to the Director of the Equality Tribunal. That EAT decision was appealed to the Circuit Court and on the 12 July 2017 the appeal was allowed. The company appealed that decision to the High Court and this court (McDermott J.) affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court. Pursuant to a direction from the High Court the company wrote to the Labour Court (where an appeal was pending whereby the plaintiff had challenged the decision relating to the Equality Tribunal decision) stating inter alia that the High Court was of the view that the EAT had erred in making a decision on the matter while the appeal was pending before the Labour Court in respect of the Equality Tribunal decision. The letter noted the recommendation from the High Court that it might be of assistance if the Labour Court were to specify in its determination either (a) that it was issuing a direction pursuant to s. 101
(2)(
  1. b)(which would enable the plaintiff to pursue an unfair dismissal claim before the EAT), or (
  2. b)that it had considered the matter and decided not to make such a direction. 15. The Labour Court decision was dated the 31 August 2018, and as previously noted it did not refer to the correspondence, the directions of McDermott J., or section 101
(2)(
  1. b)of the 1998 Act. This led to the initial dispute before the EAT as to whether the plaintiff could pursue her claim under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The EAT decided that it would hear the entire matter and make a decision on the preliminary issue as part of its overall determination. This led to the substantive hearing. 16. Towards the end of the hearing, the plaintiff raised a further new preliminary matter which gave rise to the matters that fall to be addressed in this judgment. On the third day of the hearing, the 4 March 2019, the plaintiff asserted that there had in fact been no effective termination of her employment. This was on the basis that the letter terminating her employment was written by the Chief Financial Officer of the company; and as that officer was not a director of the company, he did not have power to terminate the employment. The plaintiff asserted that if there was no effective termination she would then pursue proceedings that she had commenced in the High Court (not these proceedings, to be clear) and if the EAT determined that it had jurisdiction, she wished to appeal that issue to the Circuit Court. 17. In the circumstances, the EAT, having adjourned to consider the position, decided that it would continue to hear the entire substantive matter and deal with the plaintiff’s jurisdiction point as part of its overall determination. The plaintiff did not agree with the course of action proposed by the EAT and refused to consent to the continuation of her cross examination. The EAT warned the plaintiff that if she refused to be cross examined the EAT would not consider her evidence in chief. The plaintiff also had been advised by the EAT that she was entitled to withdraw her unfair dismissal claim if she considered that her employment in fact had not been terminated effectively. Despite those warnings, the plaintiff withdrew from cross examination. 18. In its determination on the 10 April 2019, the EAT set out the evidence that it considered was properly before it and noted that the plaintiff, when she raised her jurisdictional point, was informed that she had the option at that juncture to withdraw her claim or proceed. The EAT decided that the company’s jurisdictional point was erroneous and that it had jurisdiction to consider the case on the basis that the earlier case before the Equality Tribunal and Labour Court did not deprive it of jurisdiction in light of the decision of the High Court. That decision has not been challenged. 19. The plaintiff’s jurisdictional challenge was dismissed on the basis that the EAT found that clearly the plaintiff’s employment had been terminated by the letter of the 20 August 2015. There were two elements to this aspect of the decision. In the terms described by the EAT, first: “There was no suggestion that the Claimant was not told clearly and unequivocally that her contract was at an end and the circumstances left no doubt that the dismissal was intended. The Claimant never presented for work, never disputed that she was dismissed, and apparently never mentioned in any case before this, in the number of years since 20 August 2015, that she was not effectively or properly terminated, or made the case that her employment might survive.” 20. The EAT went on to state, in relation to the issue of the powers of the CFO: “There was no suggestion at any stage that, in terminating the employment of the Claimant, the Chief Financial Officer, DS, was acting in excess of authority. The Tribunal notes that the final written warning issued by DS in advance of the termination was upheld by the Chief Executive Officer of the Respondent, MC, on 12 August 2015. Further the termination itself was appealed to the Chief Executive Officer, MC, who upheld the decision by DS by letter dated 1 September 2015. Therefore, even if there was not actual authority vested in DS, which there may have been, there was implied authority vested in him, and the company held him out as having the authority to terminate the employment of the Claimant and ratified through its actions that termination.” 21. The substantive decision of the EAT was that the plaintiff was not unfairly dismissed, that the company acted reasonably in its dealings with the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff repeatedly failed to engage with the company despite repeated warnings. 22. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the Circuit Court on the 25 April 2019, and sought an order setting aside the EAT determination and a declaration that she “was still effectively employed” by the company. 23. The appeal before the Circuit Court suffered from its own protracted lifespan, though this was through no fault of the plaintiff. It is not necessary to rehearse the matters which unfolded in detail. By way of brief summary, the proceedings were struck out improperly due to errors within the relevant Circuit Court office. While proceedings were reinstated, the company issued a countermotion seeking to strike out the proceedings as frivolous and vexatious. The company was successful in its countermotion in the Circuit Court; the plaintiff successfully appealed the Order and it was this appeal which was before Simons J. in the previously mentioned judgment of Nowak v. Intesa San Paolo Vita S.p.A. [2024] IEHC 262. Following the proceedings outlined above, the appeal came before the learned Circuit judge on the 16 October 2024. The plaintiff raised a preliminary issue arguing that the Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 24. In the comprehensive written note of his judgment dated the 14 February 2024, the learned judge addressed the preliminary issue as to whether the Court had jurisdiction; in effect this was framed on the basis that the letter of termination was ineffective. The learned judge concluded that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was set out in s. 11 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993; that the court had jurisdiction where the plaintiff had chosen not to withdraw her claim to the EAT; and that the substantive appeal should proceed to hearing. That is the first decision which must be considered by this court. On the 2 May 2024, and in a separate written ruling, the learned Circuit judge determined that the company was entitled to its costs on the plaintiff’s preliminary point, having regard to s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and the relevant case law. That is the second matter to be addressed in this judgment. 25. The matters for determination before this Court are therefore whether: a. the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaintiff’s appeal from the Employment Appeals Tribunal; and b. the respondent is entitled to its costs. ARGUMENTS Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court 26. The crux of the plaintiff’s argument is that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the EAT was correct in its finding that the appellant was dismissed on the 20 August 2015; and further to determine whether the EAT had jurisdiction to hear the claim under the 1977 Act. According to the plaintiff, the Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of the appeal regarding whether or not the dismissal was unfair, if the dismissal was legally ineffective. The plaintiff considers that it follows therefore, that the Circuit Court must first determine whether the dismissal was legally effective before it is entitled to “dive into the merits [of] whether or not the Appellant was unfairly dismissed”. 27. The plaintiff argued that the termination on the 20 August 2015 did not have legal effect. For this purpose, the appellant set out the background factual circumstances of her employment. The plaintiff also provided a detailed description of the events which unfolded throughout the disciplinary process leading to the dismissal letter of the 20 August 2015. The events outlined by the appellant include correspondence between the appellant and the defendant’s human resource department, as well as the defendant’s chief financial officer and chief executive officer. 28. The description of the events outlined above was followed by legal arguments concerning the ineffectiveness of her termination. These arguments can be broadly summarised as being to the effect that
  2. a)the CFO of the defendant was acting ultra vires,
  3. b)the disciplinary process lacked fair procedures,
  4. c)there was a breach of natural and constitutional justice. 29. In circumstances where the arguments advanced as to the substantive reasons for the termination of the plaintiff’s employment and the fairness of the process are not matters for determination in this appeal, it would not be of assistance to engage in any detailed consideration of the arguments raised by the plaintiff on these points. 30. It must be noted that the plaintiff has dedicated a significant portion of her submissions to the question of the efficacy of her termination. In particular, while the plaintiff has sought to rely on case law to advance the arguments regarding the efficacy of her dismissal, no legal principle beyond mere assertions put forth by the appellant was identified regarding the live issue before this Court: the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to hear the appeal from the EAT. 31. For its part, the company set out the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 which it considers pertinent to the resolution of this appeal. Section 7 of the 1977 Act identifies the redress that may be awarded to an employee who is unfairly dismissed. Section 15 of the 1977 Act requires an employee to elect between pursuing a statutory or common law claim for unfair dismissal; the employee cannot pursue both. The manner in which redress for a statutory claim can be pursued is provided in s. 8 of the same Act: 8.—
(1)A claim by an employee against an employer for redress under this Act for unfair dismissal may be brought by the employee before a rights commissioner or the Tribunal and the commissioner or Tribunal shall hear the parties and any evidence relevant to the claim tendered by them and, in the case of a rights commissioner, shall make a recommendation in relation to the claim, and, in the case of the Tribunal, shall make a determination in relation to the claim. 32. Having set out the jurisdiction of the EAT to hear the claim for unfair dismissal in the first instance, the company submits that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court follows from s. 11 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993: 11.—
(1)A party concerned may appeal to the Circuit Court from a determination of the Tribunal in relation to a claim for redress under the Principal Act within 6 weeks from the date on which the determination is communicated to the parties. 33. The company argues that the 1977 Act is a self-contained code which prescribes
  1. a)the right to a statutory claim of unfair dismissal,
  2. b)the redress which may be awarded,
  3. c)how and by whom claims for unfair dismissal are to be determined. The company emphasised that by making a claim for unfair dismissal, the plaintiff was and had to have been taken as asserting that she has been dismissed. 34. The company argued that the plaintiff necessarily had to elect between a common law claim for wrongful dismissal and a statutory claim for unfair dismissal. Having opted to submit a complaint form for unfair dismissal and seeking redress from the EAT, the plaintiff invoked the EAT’s jurisdiction. Having been dissatisfied with the EAT’s determination, the plaintiff subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court when she lodged her notice of appeal. Costs 35. In relation to costs, the plaintiff argued that costs should not be determined until the proceedings are fully concluded. As the Circuit Court decision relating to jurisdiction was subject to appeal to this court, the plaintiff suggested that it was premature for the learned Judge to award costs in favour of the company, notwithstanding that party’s success in the Circuit Court. This appeared to be advanced on the basis that an appeal forms an integral part of the determination of an issue and the plaintiff was entitled to appeal this issue. In summary, the plaintiff advances the proposition: “The costs order should be made only if the appeal is fully concluded (the jurisdiction point of law is determined as well as substantive issues if necessary) rather [than] on a piecemeal basis.” 36. The plaintiff advanced a related submission thereafter that it was contrary to common sense to award costs on a preliminary issue when the substantive issue remains to be determined. This was followed by discursive commentary as to what she considers the “unjust” nature of the company being entitled to its legal costs whilst the plaintiff as a litigant in person is only entitled to her outlays. The plaintiff considers that this amounts to marginalisation and unequal treatment of litigants in person. 37. The company was of the view that it was not necessary to make submissions as to the issue of costs pending the determination of the jurisdiction issue. It took the overarching view that costs follow the event and did not engage in detail with the ancillary arguments advanced by the appellant concerning the justness of legal cost applications. The company instead provided the Court with the arguments relied upon by that party in the Circuit Court. 38. The crux of the issue, the company argued, can be resolved by reference to ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. The respondent further sets out dicta of Murray J. in Chubb European Group SE v. Health Insurance Authority [2022] 2 I.R. 734 and Higgins v. Irish Aviation Authority [2020] IECA 277. 39. In relation to Chubb, the respondent sets out the broad general principles set out by Murray J. that apply to the awarding of legal costs in accordance with the 2015 Act:“…it seems to me that the general principles now applicable to the costs of proceedings as a whole (as opposed to the costs of interlocutory applications) can be summarised as follows: (
  4. a)The general discretion of the Court in connection with the ordering of costs is preserved (s.168
(1)(a) and 0.99, r.2
(1)). (b) In considering the awarding of costs of any action, the Court should ‘have regard to’ the provisions of s.169
(1)(0.9, r.3
(1)). (c) In a case where the party seeking costs has been ‘entirely successful in those proceedings’, the party so succeeding ‘is entitled’ to an award of costs against the unsuccessful party unless the court orders otherwise (s.169
(1)). (d) In determining whether to ‘order otherwise’ the court should have regard to the ‘nature and circumstances of the case’ and ‘the conduct of the proceedings by the parties’ (s.169
(1)). (e) Further, the matters to which the court shall have regard in deciding whether to so order otherwise include the conduct of the parties before and during the proceedings, and whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues (s. 169
(1)(
  1. a)and (b)). (
  2. f)The Court, in the exercise of its discretion may also make an order that where a party is ‘partially successful’ in the proceedings, it should recover costs relating to the successful element or elements of the proceedings (s.168
(2)(d)). (g) Even where a party has not been ‘entirely successful’ the court should still have regard to the matters referred to in s.169
(1)(a)-(g) when deciding whether to award costs (0.99, r.3
(1)). (h) In the exercise of its discretion, the Court may order the payment of a portion of a party's costs, or costs from or until a specified date (s.168
(2)(a)).”
  1. With regard to Higgins, the respondent sets out the following principles articulated by Murray J. as they relate to the application of s. 169 of the 2015 Act at para 9-10 of his judgment:Both parties referred in their submissions to ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act
  2. In this case, the application of these provisions when viewed in the light of O.99, r.3
(1)RSC involves the Court in addressing four questions: (a) Has either party to the proceedings been ‘entirely successful’ in the case as that phrase is used in s.169
(1)? (b) If so, is there any reason why, having regard to the matters specified in s.169
(1)(
  1. a)– (g), all of the costs should not be ordered in favour of that party? (
  2. c)If neither party has been ‘entirely successful’ have one or more parties been ‘partially successful’ within the meaning of s.168
(2)? (d) If one or more parties have been ‘partially successful’ and having regard to the factors outlined in s.169
(1)(a)-(g) should some of the costs be ordered in favour of the party or parties that were ‘partially successful’ and if so, what should those costs be? In answering these questions, it is particularly important to bear in mind that whether a party is ‘entirely successful’ is primarily relevant to where the burden lies within process of deciding how costs should be allocated. If a party is ‘entirely successful’ all of the costs follow unless the Court exercises its discretion to direct otherwise having regard to the factors enumerated in s.169
(1). If ‘partially successful’ the costs of that part on which the party has succeeded may be awarded in its favour, bearing in mind those same factors. Indeed, having regard to the general discretion in s.168
(1)(a) and O.99 R.2
(1)a party who is ‘partially successful’ may still succeed in obtaining all of his costs, in an appropriate case.
  1. The respondent further notes that the issue of whether a party has been “successful” has been considered by Murray J. at para 12 of Higgins, referencing Simons J. in Náisiúnta Leictreach Contraitheoir Éireann v. The Labour Court [2020] IEHC 342:“As Simons J. suggests in the course of his judgment in Naisiunta Leichtreach Contraitheoir Eireann Cuideachta Faoi Theorainn Rathaiochta v. The Labour Court and ors. [2020] IEHC 342 at paras. 42-46 the inquiry as to whether a party has been ‘successful’ in proceedings can be pointed in one of three possible directions. First, by examining the relief claimed and determining whether the party has obtained (or successfully resisted the application for) the orders sought in the action. Second, by breaking the issues in the action down and assessing which party has prevailed on which issue. Third, by interrogating the case further and examining the arguments advanced on each issue assessing which party won which argument.” DISCUSSION
  2. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to determine an appeal from the EAT is provided for within the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 –
  3. The issue here is quite net: the statutory regime which creates the cause of action upon which the plaintiff relies also provides the mechanisms for appeal. Section 11
(1)of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1993 in particular provides: A party concerned may appeal to the Circuit Court from a determination of the Tribunal in relation to a claim for redress under the Principal Act within 6 weeks from the date on which the determination is communicated to the parties.
  1. In those premises, the plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the EAT when commencing the proceedings and clearly also engaged the statutory jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as provided in s. 11 when she submitted her appeal. I am satisfied that the Circuit Court was correct in finding that it had jurisdiction to determine the appeal from the EAT.
  2. In relation to the plaintiff’s argument that the Circuit Court may only possess jurisdiction if it is satisfied that a dismissal has taken place, this is clearly an untenable argument on the facts before the court. The plaintiff has invoked and sought to rely on a selfcontained statutory code. The plaintiff expressly invoked that jurisdiction on the basis that she had been unfairly dismissed. As noted by the EAT in the extract from its decision set out above, at every stage of the process up to the March 2019 hearing, the plaintiff proceeded on the basis that her employment had been terminated. It follows that it is not open to the plaintiff to make the contrary contention that she had not been dismissed. The proceedings in the EAT and then the Circuit Court was predicated on a contention by the plaintiff that she had been dismissed but that the dismissal was unfair. The company accepted that there had been a dismissal and argued that it was not unfair. It would be entirely illogical and contrary to the statutory scheme for the plaintiff to invoke and then question that jurisdiction: the plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate the process. As noted entirely reasonably by the EAT, if the plaintiff does not consider that she had been dismissed she was entitled to withdraw her claim and pursue alternative remedies, if they remain open to her.
  3. In addition, to the extent that this needs to be addressed, I consider that the reasoning of the EAT that led to the conclusion that there had been an effective termination (as opposed to a fair dismissal, which is not a matter before this court) must be correct. That decision was based on very straightforward and well-established principles of agency law. There was no basis in law or fact put before this court to suggest that the EAT was incorrect in finding that the company CFO had the power to terminate the plaintiff’s employment, whether on the basis of his express authority or on the basis of his implied authority. Moreover, I am satisfied that the subsequent ratification of the decision by the CEO puts the matter beyond reasonable argument.
  4. As noted above, a significant portion of the plaintiff’s submissions with regard to jurisdiction were dedicated to the fairness and legal effect of the dismissal. It is for the Circuit Court, properly charged with determining the appeal from the EAT, to determine whether the appellant was dismissed in an unfair manner. I consider therefore that the plaintiff’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court (and the related challenge to the jurisdiction of the EAT) is misplaced in the circumstances. It is difficult to see what benefit could accrue to the plaintiff by challenging the jurisdiction of the bodies that she engaged to determine her cause of action, rather than simply engaging with the substantive issues before each body or withdrawing the claim. Costs
  5. The starting point in an issue as to costs is the provisions of ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act
  6. Section 168 provides:168.
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Part, a court may, on application by a party to civil proceedings, at any stage in, and from time to time during, those proceedings— (
  1. a)order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings, or (
  2. b)where proceedings before the court concern the estate of a deceased individual, or the property of a trust, order that the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more parties to the proceedings be paid out of the property of the estate or trust.
(2)Without prejudice to subsection
(1), the order may include an order that a party shall pay— (
  1. a)a portion of another party’s costs, (
  2. b)costs from or until a specified date, including a date before the proceedings were commenced, (
  3. c)costs relating to one or more particular steps in the proceedings, (
  4. d)where a party is partially successful in the proceedings, costs relating to the successful element or elements of the proceedings, and (
  5. e)interest on costs from or until a specified date, including a date before the judgment. … 48. Section 169 codifies the long-standing principle that costs should follow the event. The section provides:169.
(1)A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties, including— (
  1. a)conduct before and during the proceedings, (
  2. b)whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings, (
  3. c)the manner in which the parties conducted all or any part of their cases, (
  4. d)whether a successful party exaggerated his or her claim, (
  5. e)whether a party made a payment into court and the date of that payment, (
  6. f)whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and circumstances of that offer, and (
  7. g)where the parties were invited by the court to settle the claim (whether by mediation or otherwise) and the court considers that one or more than one of the parties was or were unreasonable in refusing to engage in the settlement discussions or in mediation.
(2)Where the court orders that a party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is not entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, it shall give reasons for that order.
(3)Where a party succeeds against one or more than one of the parties to civil proceedings but not against all of them, the court may order, to the extent that the court considers that it is proper to do so in all the circumstances, that— (
  1. a)the successful party pay any or all of the costs of the party against whom he or she has not succeeded, or (
  2. b)the party or more than one of the parties against whom the successful party has succeeded pay not only the costs of the successful party but also any or all of the costs that the successful party is liable to pay under paragraph (a).
(4)Unless the court before which civil proceedings were commenced orders otherwise, or the parties to those proceedings agree otherwise, a party who discontinues or abandons the proceedings after they are commenced (including discontinuance or abandonment of an appeal) is liable to pay the reasonable costs of every other party who has incurred costs in the defence of the civil proceedings concerned until the discontinuance or abandonment. 49. As is clear from s. 169
(1)and as emphasised by Murray J. in Chubb, a party who is entirely successful is entitled to an award of costs as against the unsuccessful party unless the Court orders otherwise.
  1. I have no doubt that the company having resisted this preliminary application as to jurisdiction must be considered the successful party. While the plaintiff suggests that the issue of costs ought to be held over until the hearing of the substantive issue, there is no force behind this argument. The preliminary application as to jurisdiction is a distinct event, which came before the court on the express application of the plaintiff. The plaintiff having brought and failed in this application, cannot therefore expect to avoid an award of costs made against her on the sole basis of it being possible to make such an order at a later date, regardless of whether the plaintiff considers in her own opinion that it may be more prudent to do so.
  2. In circumstances where the respondent has successfully resisted the appeal against the Order of costs in the Circuit Court, I am satisfied that the appeal against that Order should be dismissed. However, I consider that a fair outcome will be to place a stay on the costs orders pending the determination of the extant appeal before the Circuit Court. CONCLUSION
  3. In circumstances where I am satisfied that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the EAT, I am satisfied that the appeal against the decision dated the 14 February 2025 should be refused. Similarly, I am satisfied that the appeal against the order for costs made against the plaintiff on the 2 May 2025 should similarly be refused. However, I consider that it is appropriate that that costs order (the order made in the Circuit Court) should be stayed pending the determination of those proceedings.
  4. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, my provisional view is that the respondent company should be entitled to its costs as they were incurred in resisting the appeals in the High Court. I will list the matter before me for argument on the precise nature of the final orders at 10.30am on Tuesday, the 30 June 2026.

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