2026 IEHC 288

(1)An order, by way of interlocutory injunction, pending the hearing and determination of these proceedings.

(2)Damages for breach of contract, including breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and breach of the defendant's contractual duty to provide a safe place of work.

(3)Damages for wrongful dismissal, arising from the defendant’s repudiatory breach of the plaintiff's contract of employment which entitled the plaintiff to treat herself as constructively dismissed.

(4)Damages for the defendant's failure and refusal to pay contractual salary and benefits due and owing to the plaintiff.

(5)A declaration that the plaintiff was constructively dismissed from her employment with the defendant.

(6)Damages for loss of earnings, loss of benefits and loss of career prospects arising from the defendant's conduct

(7)Damages for harm caused to the professional standing, reputation, and health of the plaintiff.

(8)Interest pursuant to statute.

(9)Costs.

(10)Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems just and equitable. 3. The plaintiff's notice of motion which was filed on 9 March 2026 claims the following relief: –

(1)An order, by way of interlocutory injunction, pending the hearing and determination of these proceedings, restraining the defendant from treating the plaintiff's contract of employment as terminated. 2

(2)An order, by way of interlocutory injunction, pending the hearing and determination of these proceedings, directing the defendant to immediately reinstate the plaintiff's monthly salary and contractual entitlements, withheld since 25 February 2026.

(3)An order extending time, if necessary, for the bringing and prosecution of these proceedings and for the making of the present application, having regard to the interests of justice and the circumstances set out in the grounding affidavit.

(4)An order granting the plaintiff liberty to serve this notice of motion and the grounding affidavit on the defendant, Ion Trading Ireland Ltd, on short notice, having regard to the urgency of this application and serious risk of irreparable harm arising from the defendant's conduct and breach.

(5)The plaintiff will undertake to this honourable Court to abide by any order for damages which this honourable Court may make should it subsequently transpire that the defendant has suffered loss by reason of the granting of the interlocutory relief sought herein.

(6)Such further or other order as to this honourable Court deems just and equitable, including any ancillary orders necessary to facilitate the urgent hearing of the plaintiff's interlocutory application for interim relief. 4.

(7)The costs of these proceedings.

(8)Interest pursuant to statute and contract. The plaintiff's application for interlocutory relief is grounded on an affidavit which was sworn by her on 9 March 2026. 5. It will be noted from the general endorsement of claim that the plaintiff asserts that the defendant was guilty of a repudiatory breach of the plaintiff's contract of employment which entitled her to treat herself as constructively dismissed. Indeed, at para. 5 of the general endorsement of claim 3 the plaintiff seeks a declaration that she was constructively dismissed from her employment with the defendant. 6. At para. 4 of the plaintiff's grounding affidavit she avers that the conduct of the defendant “deprived the contract of its substance and amounted, in practical and legal effect, to constructive dismissal”. In her affidavit the plaintiff refers to the fact that she resigned her employment with the defendant. An issue arises as to the date of her resignation but she is clear in her affidavit as to the fact of her resignation. At para. 98 she avers that; – “In circumstances where it had become clear to me that there was no realistic prospect of restoring my health within the defendant’s toxic organisation, I accepted that repudiation and resigned on 23 January 2026.” At para. 100 the plaintiff avers; – “I now seek redress on the basis of constructive dismissal as set out in this affidavit” 7. The plaintiff's evidence on affidavit concerning her resignation from her employment with the defendant - coupled with her allegation of constructive dismissal - is repeated and unambiguous. 8. Notwithstanding the evidence which she has presented to the court the plaintiff puts forward a different case in her written submissions to the court and asserts (at para. 3) that she did not resign, whether expressly or by implication, nor did she accept any alleged repudiation. In this regard she says that clause 12.3 of the contract expressly requires two months written notice of termination and that no such notice was given – and that accordingly, the contract of employment remains subsisting and capable of enforcement. 9. In this regard, it is an obvious point to make that the plaintiff is bound by her sworn evidence in the case and that her assertion in her written submissions to the effect that she did not resign her employment is completely at odds with the evidence she has presented to the court. 4 10. Mr Colm Casey swore a replying affidavit on behalf of the defendant on 18 March 2026. He is employed as General Legal Counsel with the defendant and is also a qualified barrister having been called to the Bar in 2005 and having practised for the years 2005 to 2011. 11. The plaintiff swore a supplemental affidavit on 23 March 2026. This supplementary affidavit again repeats the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant repudiated the contract and hollowed it out in substance and in law – such that there was nothing of the contract left. 12. In the supplemental affidavit the plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s replying affidavit seeks to introduce a range of collateral matters relating to alleged performance issues, conduct and parallel statutory processes which are not relevant to the issues before this Court. In fact, the affidavit of Mr Casey – and supporting exhibits – sets out a comprehensive history of the issues arising in the course of the plaintiff's employment with the defendant. This detail is referenced below. 13. A feature of the plaintiff's evidence on affidavit is the making and repeating of charges of wrongdoing against the defendant without providing any persuasive detail or evidence to support those charges. 14. It is apparent from the plaintiff's evidence on affidavit that the partner of the plaintiff has suffered from significant illness in recent years which illness has required complex medical treatment. This has required the plaintiff to devote time and effort to his care because of his illness and the medical treatment. It also appears from the evidence that the plaintiff has had personal challenges and difficulties in life which she has had to cope with – and which undoubtedly would have been exacerbated by reason of her partner’s ill health. In addition, the plaintiff avers that these personal challenges were aggravated by the conduct of the defendant as her employer. 15. While one cannot but have empathy for the plaintiff and her predicament in life over the past few years it must also be observed that the evidence does not support a charge that the defendant was lacking in empathy towards her. Whilst the plaintiff levels charges of bullying, harassment and 5 penalisation against the defendant she has not presented persuasive evidence to the court to support these allegations. Ultimately, this Court must determine the application before it on the evidence presented to it - and having regard to the legal authorities concerning an interlocutory application such as this. As will be apparent from the detail below the plaintiff is also seeking relief in relation to her substantive allegations against the defendant in other forums. 16. A striking feature of the plaintiff's case is that her evidence presented to the court is clearly that the employment contract ended as a result of resignation (in circumstances she says of constructive dismissal) and yet she is asking the court to grant an interlocutory injunction to immediately reinstate her monthly salary and contractual entitlements. The plaintiff has failed to explain to the court how it can be that she is legally entitled to a salary or other contractual entitlements although no longer employed by the defendant. 17. The above is a short overview of the plaintiff's application. It is necessary to delve further into the detail – which detail is comprehensively and credibly set out in the Casey affidavit. BACKGROUND FACTS 18. The Defendant is a private limited company engaged in the provision of software and consultancy services for the financial sector. 19. The Plaintiff is a qualified barrister. She also describes herself as an Employment Legal Counsel. She was engaged as a contractor by the Defendant from 6 August - 10 October 2021. The Plaintiff commenced employment with the Defendant on 11 October 2021 in its Legal Department. 20. The Plaintiff's initial engagement (August - October 2021) with the Defendant appears to have been uneventful. However, it is not correct for the Plaintiff to suggest that she worked without incident (paragraph 11 of her grounding Affidavit) for approximately 22 months under the management of 6 Patrick Walsh, General Counsel. On the contrary, email records show that while under the supervision of Mr. Walsh there were ongoing issues in respect of the Plaintiff's performance including; - The Plaintiff engaging outside counsel without her manager's approval; - The manner in which the Plaintiff was communicating with the Defendant's IT staff; - The Plaintiff's failure to respond to directions in a timely fashion; - The Plaintiff's failure to follow directions; - The Plaintiff's failure to comply with instructions. These issues are apparent if one looks at emails and communications exchanged between the Plaintiff and Mr. Walsh - which Mr. Casey exhibits. 21. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's attempt, in her grounding Affidavit, to attribute a change in her relationship with the Defendant to an exchange that took place on 20 June 2023 with her then Manager, Ms Craze, is not supported by the evidence. 22. The Plaintiff's communications with her previous manager had been difficult and the Plaintiff expressed frustration about his availability to her as a manager. Ms. Craze was appointed to manage the Plaintiff on 6 June 2023. Ms. Craze and the Plaintiff had an exchange on a teams call on the 20 June 2023 - but Mr. Casey says it is not the case that Ms. Craze losing her temper was a ‘common occurrence'. The Plaintiff's reliance, at paragraph 12 of her grounding Affidavit, on a single Microsoft Teams message from Ms. Craze in which she provides an unprompted apology for an earlier exchange is, as Mr. Casey correctly points out, a very far remove from establishing evidence of the nature of the workplace contended for by the Plaintiff. He says that it is telling that the Plaintiff did not exhibit the message sent by Ms Craze immediately after the message referred to by the Plaintiff – and which message Mr. Casey exhibits. As appears from this message, Ms Craze indicated that she had done much to support the Plaintiff and continued to do so. Ms Craze indicated that as the Plaintiff's manager she had to be in a position where she could raise queries in respect of the position taken by her team. 7 Further, Ms. Craze indicated that the reason it had been suggested that the Plaintiff report to Ms Craze was owing to the fact that the Plaintiff had expressed frustrations with Mr Walsh's availability to her. 23. What actually happened in terms of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is set out by Mr Casey in his affidavit. The court accepts as accurate his narrative as it is cogent and supported by documents exhibited by him. 24. On 19 July 2023 the Plaintiff applied for carer's leave to cover the period from 24 July 2023 to 24 January 2024. The Plaintiff was granted this leave. However, the Plaintiff requested that she be permitted to work for 16 hours per week while on a period of carer's leave. This was not a usual request when an employee sought to avail of carer's leave. However, it was considered by Mr Casey at the time and in considering the Plaintiff's request he engaged with her in terms of how she saw this working and what her needs were. He also explained to her that the needs of the team and the business would also have to be factored into the equation. Having considered the request from all perspectives, including the provisions of the applicable legislation, he determined that having the Plaintiff work for 16 hours a week while on carer's leave was not workable from a business perspective. This was communicated to the Plaintiff. She was provided with the option of either continuing to work in accordance with the terms of her contract or receiving unpaid carer's leave. 25. Thereafter there were further exchanges between the Plaintiff and Mr Casey in which the Plaintiff continued to seek to work 16 hours a week while on carer's leave. He met with the Plaintiff on 26 July 2023 via teams to discuss the matter further. Unbeknownst to him at the time, the Plaintiff covertly recorded their conversation. The conversation lasted for almost one hour. He only became aware of the recording when the Plaintiff sent it to the WRC on 22 January 2026, one day in advance of when a number of the statutory claims made by the Plaintiff were due to be heard. 26. It is of note that the Plaintiff made the recording covertly and then retained it for two and a half years before seeking to make use of it. 8 27. The teams meeting was followed by additional exchanges during which the Plaintiff continued to seek to work for 16 hours a week. However, ultimately the Plaintiff commenced carer's leave on a full-time basis on 8 August 2023. 28. The Plaintiff has stated repeatedly in her grounding Affidavit (e.g. paragraphs 28, 43 and 48) that she made complaints in July 2023 of alleged bullying by Mr Casey and by Ms Craze. Mr Casey says that this is not true. He again correctly points out that there are no documents exhibited to support these alleged bullying complaints and no detail in respect of them is presented. The documents the Plaintiff seeks to rely on to support these allegations concern the Plaintiff's communications with Mr Casey following his decision on her carer's leave application - which was granted in accordance with the legislation. In these communications (dated 28 July 2023 and 8 August 2023) the Plaintiff continued to seek to work a number of hours a week while on carer's leave. In her emails the Plaintiff communicated that she felt the Defendant was "penalizing” her for requesting carer's leave even though she had been granted carer's leave. Mr Casey says that she did not make a complaint (and expressly stated that she did not wish to do so – see email dated 8 August 2023 contained at exhibit 25 of the Plaintiffs grounding Affidavit). Mr Casey responded to the Plaintiff by email dated 28 July 2023 informing her that he viewed her penalisation allegation as 'fantasy’ and he says that he stands over this view. The court must observe that it is understandable why he held this view. 29. The Plaintiff went on carer's leave. She continued to complain about bullying during this period. Mr Casey points to one example - namely an email dated 9 September 2023 (contained also at exhibit 9 of the Plaintiffs grounding Affidavit) in which she accuses the Defendant of, inter alia, "bullying and penalisation" for lawfully deducting an overpayment - to illustrate the nature of the Plaintiff's complaints. 30. The Plaintiff did make a complaint on 28 July 2023 (exhibit 28 of her grounding Affidavit) The complaint was not a bullying complaint or a harassment complaint concerning the Plaintiff. The 9 complaint concerned alleged dissemination of private and confidential information - and an alleged conversation which was alleged to have taken place between staff members in the office kitchen in London. Of note in this regard is that the Plaintiff did not actually work there. 31. Ms Mercy Adesunloro, a member of the Defendant's HR team responsible for Ireland, arranged a call with the Plaintiff on 9 August 2023 to obtain further information in respect of this complaint. The Plaintiff on this call asked for more time to provide information relating to her grievance. Ms Adesunloro eventually closed the grievance process on 18 September 2023 due to lack of information - having followed up with the Plaintiff for detail in relation to the grievance on multiple occasions. 32. The Plaintiff references Mr Caseys handling of a significant concern he had with her relating to her 28 July 2023 complaint (the alleged confidentiality breach) and her use of her own Hotmail account, as 'castigating' her (paragraph 54 of the Plaintiff's grounding Affidavit). Mr Casey points out that the Plaintiff places no emphasis in her Affidavit on her own apology in respect of that which is contained in the same email thread. Mr Casey says he was not castigating the Plaintiff but was informing her of the importance of not breaching the Defendant's security procedures in terms of sending work emails to her personal email account which is serviced by external email providers. THE EMAIL OF 8 AUGUST 2023 AND THE PERFOMANCE AND CONDUCT ISSUES 33. On 8 August 2023, prior to the Plaintiff commencing carer's leave, Ms Craze emailed the Plaintiff in relation to a number of issues concerning her performance and conduct. These issues included: - Ignoring directions; - Focusing on non-urgent matters and delaying/failing to address matters; 10 - Lack of transparency arising from a failure to record work hours, record absences, provide certified sick notes, copy the ELT mailbox and provide prior approvals with respect to expenditure on legal resources; 34. - Breach of information security policies; - Escalation of matters without prior discussion with Ms Craze. Ms Craze indicated that she would discuss her concerns with Mr Casey with a view to potential disciplinary action in due course. 35. On the 1 November 2023, the Plaintiff sent Mr Casey an email confirming that she intended to return to work on 1 December 2023 from carer's leave. 36. A return to work meeting was held on 1 December 2023 during which the Plaintiff was informed that a decision had been made to invoke a disciplinary procedure in respect of the matters that had been raised in Ms Craze's email of 8 August 2023. 37. Mr Casey sent a follow up email on 1 December 2023 to the Plaintiff confirming the action items from the return to work meeting. He reiterated the Defendant's intention to initiate a disciplinary procedure which would commence with an investigation into allegations relating to standards of performance and acceptable conduct. In an email dated 5 December 2023 the Plaintiff referred to Ms Craze's email as being vague and lacking detail and referred to it as a 'rant' rather than notice of disciplinary action. Mr Casey responded to this email on the same day and the Plaintiff stated:"Prior to participating in a disciplinary procedure, I require ION to comply with fair procedures and detail the issues being taken against me. Once I know exactly what I am being accused of I will participate fully in the disciplinary procedure." 38. The Defendant sought the Plaintiff's input over the course of the following weeks in relation to the matter. The Plaintiff resisted engagement stating she did not know what she was accused of. This was not so. The Defendant decided that given the matter was a disciplinary issue that an 11 independent investigator would be appointed. The Plaintiff did not engage with the Defendant in this respect. Once a reasonable timeframe had elapsed, the Defendant made the decision, absent the Plaintiff's input to engage Ms Julie Galbraith, Solicitor of Eversheds Sutherland. 39. The reason why the Defendant determined to appoint an external investigator was due to the fact the matter was a disciplinary issue. In subsequent proceedings in the Circuit Court the Plaintiff repeatedly informed the Circuit Court Judge that the Defendant's decision to appoint an external investigator to address its disciplinary concerns was, in some way, a commitment on its part to do so in respect of the Plaintiff's grievance (which came later). Mr Casey rejects that any commitment was given to the Plaintiff to appoint an external investigator for any process other than the disciplinary investigation process. 40. From 20 December 2023, the external Investigator attempted to contact the Plaintiff on a number of occasions and did not receive a response. The Plaintiff was on sick leave for much of this time period. The Plaintiff eventually provided an email address for the Investigator to contact her at and duly met with the Investigator on 20 February 2024 and 29 April 2024. 41. The Investigator's report issued on 29 November 2024. The Investigator found that the following four issues were appropriate for review under the Defendant's disciplinary policy ; (

1. i)Work avoidance - 163 days had been identified in which there was minimal or no evidence of working including dates where very few emails or no emails were sent. (
2. ii)Annual leave discrepancies, failure to use system or alert that access was not set up despite being expressly told to use the Defendant's Connection system to seek approval for annual leave and time off in lieu the Plaintiff failed to use this system. (iii) Request to have Bar Council fees paid - the Plaintiff commenced work as a contractor with the Defendant and is recorded in the Report as having confirmed same to the external Investigator. As part of this arrangement the Defendant continued to pay her Bar Council 12 fees. When the Plaintiff became an employee in October 2021, the Defendant paid another year of her Bar Council fees notwithstanding the fact that she should not have been in full time employment and a member of the bar. (
3. iv)Refusal to complete tasks - the Plaintiff mistakenly set up a rule which put all her emails into a folder in December 2021. Therefore she did not receive any emails for a three week period but did not flag this with IT. 42. The Investigator recommended a mediation process which was conducted between November 2024 and January 2025. The disciplinary process did not advance further due to a variety of factors and an extensive period of time when the Plaintiff was absent on sick leave. THE PLAINTIFF'S GRIEVANCE AND COMPLAINT 43. On 15 June 2024, the Plaintiff sought to initiate a further grievance concerning allegations of bullying and harassment orchestrated by colleagues and she sought to re-open the grievance she had initially raised in July 2023. She was informed by email from Ms Adesunloro on 18 June 2024 that the 2023 grievance had been closed due to lack of information. She was provided with the grievance policy so that she could proceed with the bullying and harassment complaint. By replying email of the same date the Plaintiff indicated that she was not making fresh complaints but was in fact referring to the independent investigation process. PERIODS OF SICK LEAVE 44. Following return from carer's leave on 1 December 2023 the Plaintiff was on certified sick leave for large periods of 2024 and 2025. The Defendant's sick leave policy provides that it pays employees up to 10 days in any rolling 12-month period at its discretion. The Plaintiff was paid in 13 accordance with this policy while she was on sick leave. The Plaintiff furnished medical certificates, indicating that she was unfit for work on the following dates: 45. - 15 December 2023 for the period 15 December 2023 - 9 January 2024, - 8 January 2024 for the period 11 January 2024 - 8 February 2024, - 7 February 2024 for the period 9 February 2024 - 4 March 2024, - 5 March 2024 for the period 5 March 2024 - 1 April 2024, - 2 April 2024 for the period 2 April 2024 - 29 April 2024, - 26 April 2024 for the period 30 April 2024 - 27 May 2024, - 27 May 20224 for the period 28 May 2024 - 24 June 2024, - 18 December 2024 for the period 30 December 2024 - 26 January 2025, - 24 January 2025 for the period 27 January 2025 - 23 February 2025, - 25 February 2025 for the period 24 February 2025 - 23 March 2025, - 31 March 2025 for the period 24 March 2025 - 20 April 2025, - 17 April 2025 for the period 21 April 2025- 18 May 2025. The Defendant arranged for the Plaintiff to attend for occupational health assessments with Medwise. In July 2024 Medwise confirmed that the Plaintiff could return to work remotely and that this arrangement would be required for a three-month period. 46. Thereafter the Defendant engaged with Medwise to confirm the specific measures required to provide the Plaintiff with a safe return to work. The Plaintiff was paid during this time period despite not providing any services to the Defendant. The Defendant subsequently arranged for the Plaintiff to return to work from 14 October 2024. 47. The Defendant's current policy is that employees are required to work from the relevant company office. The Plaintiff advised the Defendant on 6 January 2025 that she had “been residing 14 and working from the Netherlands for over a year, without returning to Ireland on a weekly basis” and requested that the Defendant transfer her insurance coverage to the Netherlands. 48. The Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff on or around 16 January 2025, stating that she must either return to Ireland to work from the company's offices or provide a sick certificate confirming that she was unable to work. As appears from the above, between January and May 2025, the Plaintiff provided certified sick certificates from her doctor confirming that she was unfit for work. 2025 - THE RETURN TO WORK 49. On 19 May 2025 the Plaintiff notified the Defendant that she was fit to return to work and provided a certificate from her doctor certifying her as fit to return to work. The Defendant sought an occupational health assessment and confirmed its intention to pay the Plaintiff her salary and benefits while she awaited an appointment with Medwise for further assessment. 50. The Defendant arranged an appointment for the Plaintiff on 27 June 2025 with Medwise. Medwise confirmed that the Plaintiff was fit to return to work on a phased basis from 19 July 2025. The Defendant arranged a return to work meeting with the Plaintiff on 30 July 2025. The Plaintiff refused to carry out any tasks or duties assigned to her on her return to work - citing an unsafe working environment. 51. At paragraph 63 of her grounding Affidavit the Plaintiff complains that she was not provided with meaningful work to do as communicated to her at a further return to work meeting on 5 August 2025. Mr Casey does not accept this - he had followed up with an email to the Plaintiff on the same day. He points out that the Plaintiff had standard access to the Defendant's systems including email, Microsoft 365, Teams and Sharepoint. The Defendant limits access to mailing lists and Sharepoint folders to those who require access for the performance of their particular contractual functions. The Plaintiff's email access was limited for a time to a defined group following her escalation of matters 15 internal to the legal department to the CFO and CTO without prior discussion with her management. This limitation was lifted prior to the Plaintiff's return to work on 30 July 2025. Mr Casey points out that the Plaintiff refused to engage in any work for the Defendant following the return to work meeting. 52. On 11 August 2025, the Plaintiff emailed the Defendant's Strategic People Leader, Ms Natalia Fomicheva, noting her intention to lodge a grievance concerning what she alleged was a change in her role, her work environment and what she contended were her outstanding bullying and harassment complaints. The Plaintiff sought to have an external investigator appointed. The Plaintiff was advised that a HR manager would conduct the investigation. 53. E-mails were exchanged and Ms Fomicheva provided the Plaintiff with a copy of the Defendant's dignity at work policy and indicated that the next step was to arrange a meeting to discuss the matter further. The Plaintiff was informed that Mr Naczinsky, HR manager, would act as the grievance manager for the Plaintiff's case and would be in contact to propose a suitable time for a meeting. 54. By email of 2 September 2025 the Plaintiff incorrectly asserted that it had already been confirmed that her complaint would be investigated by an external investigator. The Plaintiff concluded her email by stating that she required the appointment of an external investigator. While an external investigator had been appointed in 2023 to conduct an investigation in the context of the disciplinary process, the Plaintiff was not entitled to the appointment of an external investigator to consider her complaint, nor had this been agreed to by the Defendant. 55. On 3 September 2025, Ms Fomicheva replied to the Plaintiff's email and stated that it had been previously indicated that if the Defendant considered it appropriate an independent investigator would be appointed. The Defendant, having considered the matter, determined that Mr Naczinsky could appropriately oversee the dignity at work process. The Plaintiff was advised that Mr Naczinsky 16 was a senior member of the HR team with significant experience in handling complaints of the type that the Plaintiff had raised and he had no prior involvement in the Plaintiff's case. The Plaintiff was informed that Mr Naczinsky would be in contact to arrange a meeting with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff acknowledged Ms Fomicheva's email on 4 September 2025 and repeated her insistence that an external investigator be appointed. The Plaintiff stated that she would not "participate in any internal investigation under these circumstances”. The Plaintiff further stated that she would not use her company issued laptop owing to what she described as "monitoring of her workplace communications" without "proper assurances and safeguards”. 56. By email of 16 September 2025, Ms Fomicheva responded to the Plaintiff and reiterated the Defendant's position in respect of the dignity at work process and the suitability of Mr Naczinsky as the manager of that process. Ms Fomicheva indicated that the Defendant did not understand the Plaintiff's suggestion that the dignity at work process was being conducted by "members of management who are themselves the subject of the complaints” given that the complaint made by her in August 2025 pertained to Mr Casey and he was not involved in this dignity at work process. Ms Fomicheva indicated the Defendant's commitment to investigating the Plaintiff's complaint and noted that in line with its policy, Mr Naczinsky would be in contact to arrange a meeting. 57. The Plaintiff had a further occupational health assessment on 25 September 2025. The assessment indicated that the Plaintiff informed the doctor that she was on sick leave and intended to remain on sick leave until "her employee relations issues conclude”. 58. By email of 9 October 2025 the Plaintiff replied to Ms Adesunloro and disputed that she had informed the doctor that she was on sick leave. The Plaintiff stated that she had returned to work but that her role had been altered, she had been isolated from colleagues and placed under Mr Caseys’ management. She asserted that it was her understanding that the doctor had recommended that she should not attend the workplace until the ongoing disciplinary and grievance procedures were 17 completed and the Defendant provided her with a safe workplace. The Plaintiff stated that she was fit to work but that she was unable to work owing to the absence of a safe and healthy work environment. 59. On 17 October 2025, Mr Naczinsky emailed the Plaintiff informing her that he had been assigned as the case manager for the grievance. He stated that he wished to schedule a formal grievance hearing on 21 October 2025. 60. By reply also on 17 October 2025, the Plaintiff stated that she was unwilling to participate unless an independent external reviewer was appointed. By two emails of 24 October 2025 Mr Naczinsky sought to schedule a formal grievance hearing. The Plaintiff indicated that she would not attend by response of the same date. 61. By email of 28 October 2025, Ms Fomicheva again addressed the issue of an external investigator with the Plaintiff and confirmed again the Defendant's position that Mr Naczinsky was an appropriate person to conduct the investigation. Ms Fomicheva reiterated the Defendant's commitment to investigating the matters raised by the Plaintiff and requested her engagement with Mr Naczinsky. 62. By letter dated 3 November 2025, the Plaintiff was notified in clear terms by the Defendant that it was no longer going to pay her given she was fit for work but refusing to undertake any of the duties of her role. The Plaintiff was informed that the position was untenable where she continued to refuse to engage with the Defendant in relation to its attempts to progress the various issues raised by her. Consequently, the Plaintiff was informed that the Defendant had determined that the Plaintiff's status was that of unpaid leave, which period would remain in place until the Plaintiff commenced carrying out the duties assigned to her and engaged with the Defendant in respect of its efforts to address the Plaintiff's complaint. 63. The Plaintiff still refused to engage. 18 APPLICATION FOR INTERIM RELIEF BEFORE THE DUBLIN CIRCUIT COURT 64. On 10 December 2025, the Plaintiff appeared before Dublin Circuit Court and made an application for short service of an application seeking relief pursuant to section 12 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (the 2014 Act"). The Defendant was served with the papers which were returnable before the Circuit Court on 15 December 2025. 65. On 15 December 2025, notwithstanding the Plaintiff's objection, the Defendant was granted an adjournment to 18 December 2025 in order to take instructions given the scope of the allegations made by the Plaintiff in her grounding Affidavit. 66. On 18 December 2025 the Defendant confirmed it would pay the Plaintiff in the next payment run in December 2025 on the basis that the application would adjourn to January 2026 so that the Defendant could file its replying Affidavit. This payment included salary for both November and December 2025. The Defendant made a further payment to the Plaintiff at the end of January 2026 given that the case was assigned a hearing date of 27 February 2026. These payments were made strictly without prejudice to the Defendant's position that the Plaintiff's application was bound to fail. This was communicated in clear terms to the Circuit Court. 67. When the matter was listed again before the Circuit Court on 12 January 2026, it was assigned a hearing date of 27 February 2026 and a further mention date of 20 February 2026 so that the Court would be provided with a copy of the papers for the hearing. On 12 January 2026, the Circuit Court directed that if the Plaintiff wished to file a replying Affidavit she should do so on or before 26 January 2026 and that the Defendant would have one week to reply. WRC COMPLAINTS. 68. The Plaintiff has also brought 17 claims against the Defendant in three complaint forms submitted to the WRC on 16 April 2025, 23 April 2025 and 23 January 2026. The Defendant is fully 19 defending these claims. The Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the complaint submitted on 23 January 2026 (detailed below). 69. When the complaints which were the subject matter of the April 2025 complaint forms were listed on 17 October 2025 the hearing was adjourned and certain directions were made by the Adjudication Officer. The Defendant was directed to provide additional documentation to the Plaintiff within a period of two weeks. This direction was complied with on 31 October 2025. 70. The Plaintiff was directed to file submissions within a further period of four weeks. The Plaintiff failed to deliver these submissions in advance of the next WRC hearing date which was the 23 January 2026. 71. Notwithstanding the fact that the Defendant had complied with the Adjudication Officer's direction in relation to documentation on 31 October 2025, at the case management hearing on 23 January 2026, the Plaintiff maintained that she had not received material that she required in order to complete her written submissions, which still remained outstanding. Having heard from the parties, the Adjudication Officer indicated that he would issue directions - including directions in relation to Plaintiff's written submissions - and would assign a three-day hearing to the case. The parties were asked to confirm available dates by email. 72. During the course of the WRC case management hearing on 23 January 2026, and for the first time, the Plaintiff indicated that she had brought a new unfair dismissal claim against the Defendant on the basis of constructive dismissal. The Plaintiff indicated that she had lodged her complaint form in this respect the day before the hearing. The Defendant had not received this claim, nor was it aware of the fact that the Plaintiff regarded herself as no longer in the Defendant's employment. 73. The Defendant received a copy of the Plaintiff's complaint form from the WRC by email on 26 January 2026 following its request for same. As appears from this complaint form, on the day of the WRC hearing on 23 January 2026 the Plaintiff submitted two further complaints in which she 20 alleged that (
4. i)she was unfairly dismissed on 25 November 2025 by way of constructive dismissal and (
5. ii)she was dismissed from her employment for having made a protected disclosure (together, "the Unfair Dismissal claim"). 74. On the morning of this application being returnable before the High Court, the 12 March 2026, the Plaintiff handed the Defendant's solicitor correspondence from her to the WRC dated 11 March 2026 indicting she was withdrawing the Unfair Dismissal claim. The Defendant points out that it had accepted the resignation by the Plaintiff of her employment by letter dated 10 February 2026. THE PLAINTIFF'S RESIGNATION 75. As mentioned, during the course of the WRC case management hearing on 23 January 2026, the Plaintiff indicated that she had brought a new unfair dismissal claim against the Defendant on the basis of constructive dismissal. The Plaintiff indicated that she had lodged her complaint form in this respect the day before the hearing. As mentioned above, the Defendant had not received this claim nor was it aware of the fact that the Plaintiff regarded herself as no longer in the Defendant's employment. 76. The Plaintiff did not inform the Circuit Court in her grounding Affidavit, nor at any of her appearances before the Circuit Court after 10 December 2025, that she had resigned from the Defendant's employment. Notwithstanding the Plaintiff's resignation prior to her application for interim relief, the Plaintiff continued to seek interim relief pursuant to section 12 of the 2014 Act. 77. In light of the content of the Plaintiff's complaint form dated 23 January 2026 the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff on 10 February 2026 referring to her constructive dismissal claim and her apparent resignation on 25 November 2025. As mentioned above, by this correspondence, the Defendant accepted the Plaintiff's resignation. 21 78. When the Plaintiff's application was listed before the Circuit Court for mention on 20 February 2026 in order for the Court to receive the papers in advance of the hearing on 27 February 2026, the Court was informed of the complaint made by the Plaintiff to the WRC on 23 January 2026 in which she alleged unfair dismissal by way of constructive dismissal on 25 November 2025, a date prior to the commencement of the Circuit Court application on 10 December 2025. 79. By email of 22 February 2026, the Plaintiff emailed the WRC copying the Defendant's solicitor indicating an intention to amend her complaint form so as to change the date of the alleged constructive dismissal to 12 January 2026, being a date after the commencement of the application on 10 December 2025. By way of replying email dated 24 February 2026, the Defendant's solicitor indicated the Defendant's opposition to this application to amend. 80. The defendant says that the timing of the Plaintiff's email to the WRC indicating a wish to amend the date she was alleging she was constructively dismissed on her complaint form is particularly telling given that it was indicated before the Circuit Court on 20 February 2026 that submissions would be made by the Defendant at the hearing in respect of a lack of candour on the Plaintiff's behalf given her failure to disclose the allegation of constructive dismissal at any point in the Circuit Court. THE HEARING BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT 81. The Plaintiff's application pursuant to section 12 of the 2014 Act opened before the Circuit Court on 27 February 2026. However, given the fact that the Plaintiff filed a lengthy Affidavit on 24 February 2026 and a further Affidavit on the morning of 27 February 2026, the hearing adjourned so that the Defendant could file a replying Affidavit. The hearing was to resume on 17 April 2026. 82. At the close of the hearing before the Circuit Court on 27 February 2026 the Plaintiff sought to ventilate the issue of the resumption of her pay pending the determination of the application. The 22 Court did not entertain this application. The Plaintiff also disputed that 25 November 2025 was the date on which she regarded her employment as terminated notwithstanding that she had referred to this date numerous times in her WRC complaint form. Before the Circuit Court the Plaintiff alternated between asserting that the date on which her employment ended was 12 January 2026 and "sometime after 12 January 2026". 83. During the course of the Circuit Court hearing, the issue of the Plaintiff's entitlement to continue to seek relief pursuant to section 12 of the 2014 Act was raised given that the Plaintiff had resigned from her employment with the Defendant. The defendant says that it is notable that this matter having been ventilated in Court, shortly after the hearing adjourned on 27 February 2026, the Plaintiff wrote to the Defendant and the Defendant's solicitor stating an intention to apply to the Circuit Court for relief pursuant to section 11 of the 2014 Act. 84. By reply of the same date, the Defendant's solicitor indicated that any further application to the Circuit Court would overlap considerably with the part heard application. It was emphasised that the Defendant required notice of any further application - including any application for short service - and to be served with the requisite pleadings in respect of same. The correspondence requested that the correspondence be brought to the attention of the Court. The Defendant had not received notice of any section 11 application to the Circuit Court at the time this hearing concluded in the High Court. REPLY TO THE PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT. 85. Mr. Casey addresses what he refers to as a number of factual inaccuracies in the Plaintiff's grounding Affidavit. Some of these have already been addressed above. He addresses these inaccuracies by referring to the paragraph numbers contained in the Plaintiff's Affidavit. Mr. Casey is forensic in detail and his replies are copied in part below because they are important for context. 23 86. The court accepts the truth and accuracy of Mr Casey’s evidence on affidavit. The court notes the plaintiffs’ failure to engage in any meaningful or credible way with his sworn evidence in her own affidavits or otherwise. The detail and chronology provided by Mr Casey paints a clear picture of a troubling and quite chaotic approach by the plaintiff to her employment, to her employer and to her work colleagues. Mr Casey says; Paragraphs 7 - 13 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 87. As appears from the background set out above, it is inaccurate to state that the Defendant failed to comply with its own internal procedures relating to workplace conflict. The Plaintiff has consistently failed to engage with the Defendant's procedure. For the avoidance of doubt, I wish to indicate that the Defendant does not accept the content of paragraph 7 of the Plaintiffs Affidavit. The Plaintiffs 28 July 2023 grievance was closed as the Plaintiff failed to provide the detail requested. The Plaintiff's 11 August 2025 complaint did not progress as the Plaintiff refused to engage with the process unless an independent investigator, for which there is no legal entitlement, was appointed. 88. I wish to clarify in respect of the Plaintiffs role that the Plaintiff was a member of a team tasked with the functions set out at paragraph 9(
6. i)- (vi). It is not the case that the Plaintiff was individually responsible for these functions. 24 89. It is not accepted that there was a unilateral alteration of the Plaintiff's role upon her return to work in December 2023 and/or 30 July 2025 as contended at paragraph 13 of the Plaintiff's grounding Affidavit. At the time the Plaintiff returned to work in December 2023 and on 30 July 2025, she was assigned to projects in order to facilitate her return to work. The Plaintiff was assigned tasks within the remit of her contractual role. I say and am advised that it is not for the Plaintiff to determine the manner in which the Defendant operates its management structures and reporting lines. I do not accept the Plaintiff's characterisation of her functions on her return to work in December 2023 or 30 July 2025. Paragraphs 14- 21 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 90. The Plaintiff at no point during or after her employment made a protected disclosure to the Defendant as alleged in paragraph 14 of her Affidavit, or at all. Insofar as the Plaintiff raised any complaints or grievances, the manner in which the Defendant appropriately responded to same is set out above. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not been subjected to penalisation of any description. In particular, the contents of paragraph 14(
7. i)- (
8. x)of the Plaintiff's Affidavit are not accepted and constitute a mischaracterisation of events by the Plaintiff. I will provide the relevant context to each of these allegations. a. The disciplinary process has been outlined above. While the Plaintiff complains that the disciplinary process has not concluded, she omits to refer to the efforts to reach a mutually agreeable conclusion via mediation on the recommendation of the external Investigator between November 2024 and January 2025. Further, as appears from the timeline set out above, the Plaintiff was then absent from work on sick leave for much of 2024 and between 30 December 2024 and 18 May 2025. Following occupational health assessment the Plaintiff returned to work on 30 July 2025. It is not accepted that the legitimate invocation of a disciplinary process constituted adverse treatment. 25 I say and am advised that the Plaintiff appears to conflate her displeasure at being subjected to a disciplinary process with bullying and harassment and that this erroneous conflation is not supported by any evidence. b. I also wish to clarify that contrary to the Plaintiff's contention that she was subject to "intermittent unlawful suspension", the Plaintiff has not been suspended at any time. c. There was no withdrawal of an annual salary uplift and bonus. I say that there is no customary annual salary uplift or bonus in the company at any level. There is however a global compensation review, and salary or bonus varies depending on an employee's performance. d. The Plaintiff's expenses have not been withheld. The Plaintiff was repeatedly informed that she was required to submit her expense claims through the Defendant's expense system, Concur, to ensure payment. The Plaintiff persistently failed to do this. The Defendant provided the Plaintiff with various options on numerous occasions to assist her in furnishing the relevant supporting vouchers to the Defendant. However, the Plaintiff continued to fail to submit her expense claims with vouching documentation as required by the Defendant's policy. e. There was no unilateral reassignment of the Plaintiff's role. When the Plaintiff returned to work on 30 July 2025 she refused to carry out any of the tasks or duties assigned to her including an employment law review of the application of artificial intelligence in the employment context in various jurisdictions, citing both an unsafe working environment and a dissatisfaction with the duties assigned to her in that, in her view, they did not fall within her role and/or were more suited to a research position. I say and believe that the duties assigned to the Plaintiff were appropriate and it was not for the Plaintiff to dictate which projects and/or tasks she was assigned. 26 91. The Plaintiff was the party who failed to engage with workplace conflict procedures. The Plaintiff's additional reference to a breach of fair procedures is also unfounded. 92. The Plaintiff resigned as of 25 November 2025 and consequentially was not due the payment of salary from 25 February 2026 onwards. Paragraphs 22 - 27 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 93. While the Plaintiff makes allegations of a unilateral alteration of her role, failure to address workplace conflict procedures, failure to afford her fair procedures, bullying and harassment and financial intimidation at paragraph 22 of her Affidavit, this is not accepted by the Defendant….. insofar as the Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to an unsafe work environment, the Plaintiff refused to engage with the Defendant under its dignity at work policy in respect of this complaint. 94. The Plaintiff refers to an email at paragraph 23 of her grounding Affidavit in which she alleged the deduction of one days overpayment in accordance with the Defendant's sick leave policy constituted bullying and harassment. I cannot accept this characterisation of the legitimate operation of the Defendant's sick leave policy. 95. Contrary to the Plaintiff's characterisation of matters at paragraph 24 of her grounding Affidavit, the Defendant arranged for the Plaintiff to attend for occupational health assessments owing to her sustained absences from work. The referral relied upon by the Plaintiff in this paragraph of her Affidavit refers to her repeated absences from work. This referral does not acknowledge that the Plaintiff has sustained a "work-related medical illness" as suggested by the Plaintiff. 96. The occupational health reports referred to by the Plaintiff at paragraph 25 of her grounding Affidavit refer to the Plaintiffs allegation of an unsafe working environment. Quite clearly these reports are not evidence of the existence of such an environment. I reiterate that insofar as the Plaintiff made this complaint to the Defendant, she refused to seek to resolve same with the Defendant by engaging in its dignity at work process. 27 Paragraphs 28 - 42 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 97. The Plaintiff returns to the disciplinary process at paragraphs 28-42 of her Affidavit. I have set out the relevant context to same above. The Plaintiff's account in respect of the disciplinary process is inaccurate and in particular I note the following: - The Plaintiff was never suspended at any time. - The Plaintiffs characterization at paragraphs 28 and 37 of her Affidavit of the email sent by her direct manager, Ms Craze on 8 August 2023, is not borne out by the evidence. I say and am advised that the Plaintiff has erroneously conflated her displeasure with being subject to a valid disciplinary process with penalisation and bullying and harassment. I also wish to clarify that while this email was sent to the Plaintiff on 8 August 2023 - owing to her absence on carer's leave this process did not commence until December 2023. - An employer is entitled to subject an employee to a disciplinary process in accordance with its procedures where same is required. In the case of the Plaintiff, the disciplinary process was warranted given the numerous performance and conduct issues that were being raised in relation to her. The Plaintiff was provided with sufficient particulars of the disciplinary matters as is apparent from the correspondence that she has exhibited. - The Defendant was entitled to review emails sent by the Plaintiff using her company email address. - The Plaintiff exhibits emails from June and July 2025 in support of her contention that she was placed on unpaid suspension. This is inaccurate. In respect of the period 17 June 2024 to 20 January 2025, as appears from the detail set out above, the Plaintiff was absent from work on sick leave for various periods of time throughout 2024 and 2025. The Plaintiff confirmed that she was fit to return to work from 17 June 2024. An occupational health assessment was deemed necessary before the Plaintiff could safely return to work. The 28 Plaintiff was paid pending the preparation of that assessment. Upon receipt of the assessment a return-to-work meeting was arranged with the Plaintiff on 14 October 2024. The Plaintiff then submitted a sick certificate on 18 December 2024 for the period 30 December 2024 to 26 January 2025. The Plaintiffs characterisation of this period of absence as suspension is wholly rejected by the Defendant. - The Plaintiff's contention that she was not in any way responsible for the delay in which she describes as the "prolonged investigation" by the external Investigator at paragraph 36 is inaccurate and fails to include reference to the Plaintiffs failure to engage with the external Investigator at the beginning of the investigation. - It is not accepted that the legitimate invocation of a disciplinary process constituted an attempt to bully the Plaintiff "out of [her] job" as contended in paragraph 36 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit. Further there is no evidential basis to support the Plaintiff's assertion that the report of the external Investigator evidences that the Defendant engaged in a "fishing expedition". An employer is entitled to subject an employee to a disciplinary process in accordance with its procedures where same is required, as it was in the Plaintiff's case. - The Plaintiff complains at paragraph 38 of her Affidavit that the disciplinary process has not concluded - she omits to refer to the efforts to reach a mutually agreeable conclusion via mediation on the recommendation of the external Investigator between November 2024 and January 2025. Further, as appears from the timeline set out above, the Plaintiff was then absent from work on sick leave between 30 December 2024 and 18 May 2025. Following the occupational health assessment the Plaintiff returned to work on 30 July 2025 and refused to discharge any of her contractual obligations. - Insofar as the Plaintiff contends at paragraph 40 of her Affidavit that the Defendant has failed to act in accordance with the advice of Dr. Gleeson in respect of the progression of the 29 disciplinary matter, I note that certain of the reports referred to by the Plaintiff refer to a wish of the Plaintiff to conclude the process. The process has however not progressed due to a myriad of factors including (
9. i)the Plaintiff's absence from work on sick leave between 30 December 2024 and 18 May 2025, (
10. ii)the need for occupational health assessment prior to the Plaintiff's return to work (iii) the making of a dignity at work complaint by the Plaintiff and her subsequent refusal to engage with the process in respect of that complaint and (
11. iv)the Plaintiff's refusal to engage with the Defendant upon her to work in July 2025 until her resignation. - The Plaintiff's characterisation of the process as being devoid of fair procedures in paragraph 41 is not borne out by the evidence. The commencement of the disciplinary process was legally sound and neither its institution nor the manner in which it has been progressed by the Defendant constituted a repudiatory breach. Paragraphs 43 - 48 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 98. It is not accepted that the Plaintiff has ever made a protected disclosure to the Defendant. Insofar as the Plaintiff refers to statutory complaints, these matters are being dealt with in the WRC and it has been the Plaintiff who has sought to delay the progress of the determination of these statutory complaints. 99. Insofar as I understand the matter the Plaintiff is referring to at paragraphs 52 and 53 of her Affidavit, the Plaintiff was unhappy that she was asked during a meeting of the legal department to explain the basis for the payment of a particular sum in relation to the termination of an employee. The Plaintiff's manager was entitled to raise such a query with the Plaintiff as her supervisor. I say and am advised that this was an appropriate matter to raise with the Plaintiff and have her report to her reporting line. 30 100. ………… I say and am advised that the Defendant was entitled to review emails sent by the Plaintiff using her company email address. I say that the Plaintiff's suggestion in paragraph 55 of her Affidavit that this constituted being unlawful surveillance is baseless. The Plaintiff acted contrary to the Defendant's acceptable use policy by furnishing this material to a personal email account and I legitimately brought this to her attention. Paragraphs 56 - 59 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 101. …………… I cannot accept the suggestion by the Plaintiff in her email of 26 July 2023 that '. she was "vilified or penalised" for "following management directions”. There is no basis in evidence for this suggestion. Further, insofar as the Plaintiff complains at paragraph 59 of her Affidavit that this "adverse treatment" was not investigated or addressed, I say that the Plaintiff did not raise a grievance in relation to same. Paragraphs 60 - 64 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 102. At paragraphs 60 - 64 of her Affidavit the Plaintiff refers to her various returns to work following carer's leave and period of sick leave. l refute the suggestion that the Plaintiff returned to a "hostile and toxic working environment" on each return to work. The Plaintiffs complaint at paragraph 61 of her Affidavit that there was no investigation in respect of the "underlying workplace conflict" following her return from carer's leave is misleading. As set out above the Plaintiff raised a grievance in July 2023 which was closed when she did not provide the information requested. It is not the case that there was an outstanding and unaddressed grievance on her return. I have repeatedly refuted the suggestion that the Plaintiffs role was unilaterally altered on her return. These allegations are not borne out by the evidence. 103. Insofar as the Plaintiff complains about her return to work in August 2025, the position again has been clearly set out by the Defendant. The Plaintiff declined to carry out any contractual duties and further declined to engage in the process to seek to resolve her dignity at work complaint. It 31 remained unviable for the Defendant to pay the salary of an employee who was refusing to work or engage with its dignity at work process and it was for this reason the Plaintiff was regarded as being on unpaid leave from 3 November 2025. 104. Upon her return to work on 30 July 2025, the Plaintiff was assigned an employment law project to review the application of artificial intelligence in the employment context in various jurisdictions. This falls within her role and it was not for the Plaintiff to dictate the parameters of the work she would and would not carry out. 105. I have addressed the issue of the Plaintiffs access to systems above. I do not accept the Plaintiff's characterisation of matters on her return to work in paragraph 64 of her Affidavit. The Plaintiff had been requested to refrain from corresponding or directing any member of her team to correspond with the executive team without input from myself and Ms Craze in August 2023. This is consistent with clear management lines and at no point prevented the Plaintiff from raising a grievance with HR, which she did on her return to work in August 2025. 106. It is inaccurate to state as the Plaintiff does in paragraph 64 of her Affidavit that upon her return to work the Defendant had neither remedied the matters about which she had complained nor taken any meaningful steps to provide a safe and "professionally viable" working environment. By this averment the Plaintiff appears to suggest that there were outstanding grievances upon her various returns to work. This is incorrect. The Plaintiff raised two grievances which I have addressed above. Paragraphs 65 - 74 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 107. The Plaintiff complains of a lack of independence concerning the investigation of her complaint of 11 August 2025 in paragraphs 65 - 70 of her Affidavit. The Plaintiff has sought to 32 incorrectly contend that she is entitled to the appointment of an external independent investigator to investigate this complaint. I say and am advised that while more properly a matter for legal submissions there is no basis in law to support this contention. As set out above, the member of the HR team appointed to investigate the complaint is a senior experienced member of the HR team with no prior involvement in the matter which is the subject of the complaint. 108. The Plaintiff appears to suggest at paragraph 68 of her Affidavit that owing to the fact that an independent investigator was appointed in the context of the disciplinary investigation in 2023 this entitles her to have an external person appointed to consider the August 2025 complaint. I say and am advised that there is no correlation between these processes and the Plaintiff is incorrect in her assumption. 109. I cannot accept that there is any validity to the Plaintiff's complaint at paragraph 72 in respect of the timing and the manner in which her grievance was progressed. The Plaintiff complains of "two years of inaction." This is incorrect. As set out above, the first grievance was made on 28 July 2023. A call was arranged with the Plaintiff on 9 August 2023. Thereafter following the failure of the Plaintiff to provide information about her grievance notwithstanding the request from HR, the grievance process was closed on 18 September 2023 due to lack of information. The Plaintiff submitted a further complaint on 11 August 2025. The Plaintiff refused to engage with the process. The Defendant has not delayed in respect of the processing of these grievances. Paragraphs 75 - 77 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 110. Insofar as the Plaintiff suggests that medical professionals indicated that she should remain absent until a safe working environment was provided to her, this is a misstatement of the medical reports that the Plaintiff exhibits. The reports, spanning various dates, refer to the Plaintiff's ongoing 33 absences and her perception of stress in the workplace. The occupational health reports were commissioned by the Defendant in order to assess the Plaintiff's fitness to return to work on various occasions. Paragraphs 78 - 83 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 111. At paragraphs 78 - 83 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit she makes various allegations in relation to the performance of my professional role in so far as it pertains to the matters she complains of. The Plaintiff suggests that I have a conflict of interest given that she has complained about me in her August 2025 complaint. In particular, as appears from the email the Plaintiff exhibits at tab 37 of her Affidavit, she sought to direct the Defendant's solicitor as to who it could take instructions from. This quite clearly is not a matter for the Plaintiff as is reflected in the response from the Defendant's solicitor. 112. Further, I say that the Plaintiff has no entitlement to be informed that the proceedings she has instituted have been brought to the attention of the CEO as appears to be contended by the Plaintiff at paragraphs 81 and 83 of her Affidavit. It is not clear to me why the Plaintiff seeks this confirmation or how it could be in anyway relevant to the claims she seeks to make. 113. The Plaintiff's allegation at paragraph 82 of her Affidavit to the effect that I have directed that communications from her work and personal email address be intercepted by the server is wholly inaccurate. As previously indicated the Defendant is entitled to review emails sent on an 34 employee's company email address and this entitlement was exercised in respect of the Plaintiff. Paragraphs 84 - 94 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 114. The Plaintiff returns to the correspondence that she received on 3 November 2025 in paragraphs 84 - 87 concerning the inability of the Defendant to continue to discharge her salary when she refused to carry out any task assigned to her. I say that the Plaintiff was informed that she would be regarded as being on a period of unpaid leave until she recommenced her duties and engaged with the dignity at work process. 115. At paragraphs 88 - 89 the Plaintiff refers to her interim application before the Circuit Court. Insofar as the Plaintiff states that an undertaking was given to discharge the Plaintiff's salary pending the hearing of her application on 18 December 2025, I say that this is a mischaracterisation of the position. On 18 December 2025 the Defendant gave a commitment to pay the Plaintiff in the next payment run in December 2025 on the basis that the application would adjourn to January 2026 so that the Defendant could file its replying Affidavit. This payment included salary for both November and December 2025. The Defendant made a further payment to the Plaintiff at the end of January 2026 given that the case was assigned a hearing date of 27 February 2026. I say that these payments were made strictly without prejudice to the Defendant's position that the Plaintiff's application was bound to fail. I further state that where the Plaintiff alleges that she has been wrongfully dismissed, which is denied by the Defendant, by virtue of these payments she has received her entitlement to eight weeks' notice. 116. The Plaintiff's suggestion at paragraph 94 of her Affidavit, that the Defendant has reneged on an undertaking given to Court in respect of the payment of the Plaintiff's salary is entirely inaccurate. No such undertaking was ever provided. The Defendant was clear to indicate what pay periods it would cover and did so expressly in Court. It is remarkable that 35 having indicated in her WRC complaint form that her employment came to an end on 25 November 2025 and in paragraph 95 her Affidavit that her employment ceased "sometime after 12 January 2026" that the Plaintiff asserts a continuing entitlement to be paid a salary. The Plaintiff has resigned and this resignation was accepted by the Defendant. Any entitlement to a salary has now ceased. Paragraph 95 - 101 of the Plaintiff's Affidavit: 117. As outlined above, the Plaintiff's contention that she erred in nominating 25 November 2025 as the date she contended she was constructively dismissed in her WRC complaint form, is untenable given the repeated reference to the date in the form. As noted above, it was not until the reference to a lack of candour on behalf of the Plaintiff was made on 20 February 2025 in the Circuit Court that the Plaintiff sought to amend the date in her third WRC complaint form to suggest that her resignation date post-dated her last appearance before the Circuit Court. 118. At paragraph 98 of her Affidavit, the Plaintiff introduces a third date on which she states her employment ended, being 23 January 2026. I say I do not understand the basis of this selection of a third date. I say that regardless of when the Plaintiff contends she resigned, the fact of the matter is she is no longer in the Defendant's employment and is not entitled to be paid a salary by the Defendant. 119. The above concludes the background narrative and the quoting of parts of the Casey affidavit. The court accepts as correct the defendant’s evidence. The plaintiff has not provided the court with any persuasive evidence to the contrary. The court has considered the plaintiffs affidavits and exhibits – and her oral and written submissions. Not alone does the plaintiff’s evidence not refute the defendants evidence in any credible or persuasive way but the plaintiff’s evidence confirms aspects of the defendant’s evidence and case – most notably in relation to the resignation. 36 120. It should be apparent on any objective view of the facts that this application by the plaintiff is devoid of any merit. The Law. 121. The principles concerning the grant of an interlocutory injunction are well settled and were restated by the Supreme Court in Merck, Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2020] 2 I.R. 1 where O'Donnell J. outlined the steps that a court should follow in an appropriate case. 122. In the context of an application for a mandatory injunction, it is necessary that the applicant establish not just a fair question to be tried but a strong case likely to succeed at hearing. In this connection in Maha Lingam v. HSE [2005] IESC 89 Fennelly J. commented: "The second is that the implication of an application of the present sort is that in substance what the plaintiff/appellant is seeking is a mandatory interlocutory injunction and it is well established that the ordinary test of a fair case to be tried is not sufficient to meet the first leg of the test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction where the injunction sought is in effect mandatory. In such a case it is necessary for the applicant to show at least that he has a strong case that he is likely to succeed at the hearing of the action. So it is not sufficient for him simply to show a prima facie case, and in particular the courts have been slow to grant interlocutory injunctions to enforce contracts of employment." 123. In Earley v. HSE [2015] IEHC 520 Kennedy J. in the High Court commented that a plaintiff was required to show that it was "probably going to be successful at trial." 37 124. Outside the context of employment injunctions, the Superior Courts have commented on a number of occasions on the threshold that must be met when seeking a mandatory interlocutory injunction. In Clare County Council v. McDonagh [2022] 2 I.R. 122, Hogan J., delivering a judgment with which the other members of the Court agreed, commented in the context of an application for a mandatory interlocutory injunction at page 161: "...the present case involves an application for a mandatory interlocutory injunction. Not only are the principles governing the grant of such interlocutory relief well set out in the decision of this Court in Merck, Sharpe and Dohme Limited v. Clonmel Chemicals Limited [2019] IESC 65, [2020] 2 JR 1 ( i.e., fair case, adequacy of damages and balance of convenience), but it is also accepted that an applicant for such mandatory interlocutory relief must generally show that the case is particularly strong and powerful: see, e.g. Attorney General v. Lee [2000] IESC 80, [2000] 4 JR 68, Shelbourne Holdings Ltd v. Torriam Hotel Operating Company Limited [2008] IEHC 376; Herrera v. Garda Commissioner [2013] IEHC 311 and, most recently, the judgments of this Court delivered respectively by Clarke C.J. in Charleton v Scriven [2019] IESC 28 and Irvine J. in Taite v Beades [2019] IESC 92. A further consideration is that, as Irvine J. put it in Taite (echoing a point previously made by Charleton CJ. in Charleton), an interlocutory injunction should be 'merely a stepping stone' towards a trial and the courts 'must ensure that such relief is not, in practice, treated as a means of obtaining summary judgment against the defendant." 125. Having cited the above authorities, Noonan J. commented at paragraph 14 of his decision in the Court of Appeal in Tenant v. Reidy [2022] IECA 137, which concerned an application for mandatory interlocutory injunctive relief in the context of a possession case: "Clearly therefore, the Court should be slow to grant such an order in the presence of a colourable defence." 38 126. The Plaintiff submits that ; “As to what is meant by a strong case, although there has been some uncertainty about what exactly this meant, in Mason v. ILTB Ltd. t/a Gillen Markets [2021] IEHC 477. Butler J. commented that a “strong case” meant a case “which would probably succeed at trial.” However, and as she explained, “...the finding that a case is strong in the sense of being one which will probably succeed at trial does not carry with it an indication that the case actually will succeed at trial. Rather, on the basis of the evidence before the court at the interlocutory stage and allowing for the fact the disputed factual elements of the plaintiff’s case may have to be taken at their height, it means that the plaintiff has exceeded by some margin the fair question to be tried threshold and has raised a case which is not only stateable but which has a real prospect of success.” A key point is that the case will “probably” succeed at trial; previously, in Earley v. HSE [2015] IEHC 520, Kennedy J. had rejected the proposition that in relation to a strong case, a plaintiff must satisfy the court that they will ultimately succeed in securing a permanent injunction: to apply a test of “ultimate success” would make it “difficult to see how any application for an injunction could be successful at the interlocutory stage.” The Court will therefore consider whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated a strong and substantive claim grounded in law, and whether the evidence establishes that she is likely to succeed at trial.” 127. As observed elsewhere in this judgment, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she has a strong case - and the evidence does not establish that she is likely to succeed at trial. Alternative Remedy. 128. As the defendant points out the Plaintiff had an alternative remedy available to her if she considered herself dismissed by virtue of her having made a protected disclosure - in the form of an application to the Circuit Court pursuant to section 11 of the 2014 Act. The Plaintiff is aware of this having suggested before the Circuit Court that the Circuit Court Judge treat her section 12 application pursuant to the 2014 Act as a section 11 application. The Plaintiff also wrote to the 39 Defendant's solicitor on 27 February 2026 indicating her intention to make an application for relief pursuant to section 11 of the 2014 Act. 129. In respect of the Plaintiff's substantive action, it is for unfair dismissal. An unfair dismissal claim ought to be maintained before the WRC. 130. It is the position that the High Court should only exercise its inherent jurisdiction where there is a lacuna in the law - KW v. PW [2016] IEHC 513 and In the Matter of Amantis Enterprises Ltd. & Anor and in the Matter of Companies Act 1963- 2012 [2013] IEHC 21. 131. In Orr v. Zoomax ltd. [2004] 1 IR 486 Carroll J. held that where there existed a statutory basis for a claim, in that case under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 ("the 1977 Act"), it was “…not open to the plaintiff to argue that the principles applicable under the statutory scheme should be imported into the common law." Where there exists a statutory remedy it is not open to a plaintiff to seek that remedy through the guise of the common law. 132. In Nolan v. Emo Oil Services Ltd. [2010] 1 I.L.R.M. 228, the plaintiff sought to restrain his dismissal on the grounds of redundancy, on the basis that he had been unfairly selected for redundancy. This, it was argued, entitled the plaintiff to litigate the fairness of his dismissal in proceedings before the High Court. Laffoy J. refused the application. 133. Relying on Maha Lingam, and the decisions of the House of Lords in Johnson v. Unisys Limited [2003] 1 A.C. 58 and Eastwood v. Magnox Electric pie [2004] 3 All E.R. 991, Laffoy J. held that the 1977 Act had introduced a new concept of unfair dismissal, with specific procedures for obtaining remedies in alternative forums, and that for the courts to expand their common law jurisdiction in parallel to the statutory code would be to supplant the statutory code. 134. In O'Domhnaill v. HSE [2011] IEHC 421, the plaintiff sought to enforce against the HSE a claimed entitlement to be appointed as a Consultant Psychiatrist on a number of grounds, including the provisions of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003 ("the 40 2003 Act"). Laffoy J., having reviewed the rights created by section 9 of the 2003 Act and the enforcement provisions in section 14 of that Act, stated: “11. [T]he conferral of specific statutory rights on an employee, such as the right to a contract of indefinite duration under s. 9

(3)of the Act of 2003, does not give rise to a parallel right which may be enforced at common law. That was the basis of two decisions of the High Court on applications for interlocutory injunctions: the decision of Carroll J. in Orr v. Zomax Ltd. [2004] 1 I.R. 486; and the decision of Laffoy J. in Nolan v. Emo Oil Services Ltd. [2009] 20 ELR 122. ” 135. In Kearney v. Byrne Wallace [2017] IEHC 713, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction restraining his dismissal by reason of what he argued was a contrived redundancy, which he contended was a breach of an implied term of his contract of employment. While the relief sought was framed in terms of a declaration and an injunction, Baker J. concluded that the claim was in substance a claim for unfair dismissal by reason of unfair selection for redundancy. At paragraphs 37 and 38 of her judgment she stated : "37. While some pleas are made relating to the fairness of the process engaged by the firm, the substance of the claim has a statutory source. The common law has no separate jurisdiction to grant an injunction in aid of such a claim, in regard to which the Oireachtas has provided a different means of redress. 38. For these reasons I consider that the claim as pleaded is in substance a claim properly characterised as one within the statutory scheme, and essentially statutory in origin. The declaratory relief sought and the claims regarding alleged breach of fairness are ancillary to that primary relief. The requirement to establish a strong case cannot be satisfied by the ancillary reliefs and must bear on the substance of the claim." This decision was confirmed in the Court of Appeal - [2019] IECA 206. 41 136. In G.McG. v. D.W. (No. 2) [2000] 4 I.R. 1 the Supreme Court cautioned against the creation of a parallel jurisdiction to a jurisdiction defined by the Oireachtas. Murray J. stated at page 27: - "Where the jurisdiction of the courts is expressly and completely delineated by statute law it must, at least as a general rule, exclude the exercise by the courts of some other or more extensive jurisdiction of an implied or inherent nature. To hold otherwise would undermine the normative value of the law and create uncertainty concerning the scope of judicial function and the finality of court orders. It may indeed be otherwise where a fundamental principle of constitutional stature is invoked against a statutory or regulatory measure determining jurisdiction, but that is not the case here." 137. These authorities were considered by Allen J. in Power v. HSE [2019] IEHC 462 where the plaintiff sought an injunction from the High Court to prevent the termination of his role as CEO pending a determination from the WRC. The plaintiff had been asked to fill the role in 2014 on a fixed-term assignment. The fixed-term assignment was then renewed on a number of occasions and in December 2018 it was renewed to specifically allow for the selection process and appointment of a permanent CEO. The plaintiff applied for the role of CEO but was unsuccessful. The plaintiff subsequently made a claim to the WRC under section 9 of the 2003 Act claiming that his position as CEO had been turned into a contract of indefinite duration after four years performing the role. A claim arising from a breach of the 2003 Act has to be made to the WRC under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Allen J. refused to grant the injunctive relief sought holding that the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction in cases in which it has no jurisdiction to decide the substance of the dispute. The Judge commented at paragraph 80: 42 "The plaintiff has the right to pursue his statutory claim. The body charged with adjudicating that claim is the body charged with deciding, if appropriate, which of the statutory remedies is appropriate. The plaintiff’s right to pursue his claim is not in any way ineffective or less meaningful because the available remedy may not be all that he might wish, or might be different to the remedy available to the courts in dealing with common law claims, or other administrative agencies in dealing with other statutory claims." 138. In summary, where there exists a statutory remedy, it is not open to a plaintiff to seek that remedy through the guise of the common law. No Substantive Action. 139. The evidence is that the Plaintiff resigned. The Plaintiff maintains that she was entitled to regard the employment relationship as at an end owing to what she describes as an unsafe working environment. Yet she asserts an entitlement to have a salary paid to her along with an order requiring the Defendant to refrain from treating her employment as terminated. The defendant correctly submits that this is an unsustainable proposition. 140. The Plaintiff has so far instituted the following: - - These proceedings; - 2025 Circuit Court injunction proceedings, record number 2025/006763; - 17 claims before the WRC : Three complaints pursuant to the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (CA00070896-001-003); - A complaint pursuant to the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 (CA00070896-0004);Four claims pursuant to the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 (CA00070896-005-007, CA00070896-009); - One complaint of discrimination and/or unequal treatment on the basis of disability (CA00070896-011); 43 - Two complaints of penalisation for having made a protected disclosure (CA00070896012, CA00070896-014); - Two complaints of penalisation for (

1. i)complying with or making a complaint under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and (
2. ii)having exercised or proposed to exercise her entitlement to carer's leave (CA00071031-001, CA00070896-013); - Two complaints pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1969 (CA00070896-001-15, CA00070896-001-16); - Two complaints of unfair dismissal pursuant to the 1977 Act (CA00079912-01-02). The Plaintiff has now withdrawn these two complaints; - A Personal Injuries Resolution Board application; - A complaint to the Data Protection Commission; - A complaint to the Department of Social Protection; - A complaint to the Health and Safety Authority. 141. The matters which the Plaintiff puts before the Court in these proceedings are a duplication of matters which are for other forums – as is apparent from the above list. There is no entitlement to seek such reliefs from the High Court. The defendant submits that the manner in which the Plaintiff is seeking to litigate these issues amounts to an abuse of process and that appears to be so. 142. In Nowak v. Moorehall Disability Services [2025] IEHC 758, O’Higgins J. stated at paragraph 36 of his judgment:"There cannot be one set of rules for represented parties and a wholly different set of rules for those who represent themselves." 143. Returning to the actual claim, and leaving aside the interlocutory relief sought, in her plenary summons the Plaintiff seeks: - 44 (
3. a)Damages for breach of contract, including breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and breach of the Defendant's contractual duty to provide a safe place of work. (
4. b)Damages for wrongful dismissal, arising from the Defendant's repudiatory breach of the Plaintiff's contract of employment which entitled the Plaintiff to treat herself as constructively dismissed. (
5. c)Damages for the Defendant's failure and refusal to pay contractual salary and benefits due and owing to the Plaintiff. (
6. d)A Declaration that the Plaintiff was constructively dismissed from her employment with the Defendant. (
7. e)Damages for loss of earnings, loss of benefits and loss of career prospects arising from the Defendant's conduct. (
8. f)Damages for harm caused to the professional standing, reputation and health of the Plaintiff. 144. As the defendant says the relief sought by the Plaintiff is devisable into four categories, relief pertaining to constructive dismissal, wrongful dismissal, penalisation and personal injury. 145. Taking the constructive dismissal and penalisation first - the appropriate forum in which to seek any relief in that regard is the WRC. The WRC is seised of the Plaintiff's penalisation claims and there have already been two dates on which the parties addressed the WRC in respect of these claims. The details of a third date are awaited. The defendants correctly point out that the relief sought at (a), (
9. c)and (e), while worded slightly differently in the context of these proceedings, are as a matter of fact all issues which are the subject matter of the Plaintiff's penalisation claims that are being heard before the WRC. 146. The matters the subject of (
10. f)are a combination of the reliefs sought under the WRC complaints and the intended personal injury proceedings. 45 147. Although the Plaintiff has now withdrawn her Unfair Dismissal complaint from the WRC the relief sought at (
11. b)and (
12. d)are matters that are required to be dealt with by the WRC. The remedy available to the Plaintiff in respect of an unfair dismissal claim is a claim pursuant to the 1977 Act before the WRC. 148. Insofar as the Plaintiff alleges wrongful dismissal the defendants reply is that the Plaintiff's resignation was accepted by the Defendant. The defendant also points out that by reason of her failure to disclose the fact of her resignation from 25 November 2025 until January 2026 the Plaintiff actually received payment for November 2025 to January 2026. Thus, the factual situation is that as a result of the payments made she has received her entitlement to eight weeks notice which the defendant says is a complete answer to the claim for wrongful dismissal (which it denies). 149. In McGrath v. Athlone Institute of Technology [2011] IEHC 254 Hogan J. commented at paragraph 13 of his judgment in the context of the 2003 Act: "The structure of the 2003 Act necessarily excludes the jurisdiction of this Court at first instance. It is quite clear that if a statutory jurisdiction of this kind is committed in the first instance to an administrative agency such as the Labour Court, then this Court does not enjoy some parallel jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in respect of the construction of the statute in question: see generally the judgment of Charleton J. in Doherty v. South Dublin County Council (No.2) [2007] IEHC 4, [2007] 2 I.R. 696 at 707." 150. The defendants submit that as the plaintiff has no underlying substantive claim that may be properly pursued before the High Court her application for an interlocutory mandatory injunction cannot succeed. In these circumstances the defendants submit that the Plaintiff cannot establish a stateable case, let alone a strong case to be tried. 46 151. The court is satisfied, having regard to the evidence and the law, that it is patently obvious that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a strong case to be tried. BALANCE OF JUSTICE/BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE. 152. For completeness the court will deal also with the balance of justice/balance of convenience - and the adequacy of damages. 153. In Moylist Construction Ltd v. Doheny & Ors [2010] 2 I.L.R.M. 470 Laffoy J. commented at paragraph 43 that it was also legitimate to ask in the context of a consideration of the balance of convenience "whether any useful purpose would be served from any perspective if an injunction in the terms sought were granted to the plaintiff." 154. The defendant submits that no useful purpose would be served by granting the mandatory injunction sought by the Plaintiff given that she chose to resign and continues to express the view that she was entitled to do so given what she describes as an unsafe work environment. The defendant fairly and correctly says that no useful purpose could be served by requiring the Defendant to both pay the salary of a person who resigned - and treat as an employee a person who had resigned - and who continually refused to carry out her contractual obligations prior to resignation. 155. In Nolan v. Science Foundation Ireland [2024] IEHC 368 Mulcahy J. stated at paragraph 85 that even if there had been a strong case likely to succeed established, the balance of convenience would lie against the Court making an order requiring it to micro-manage the plaintiff's employment : "Even had the plaintiff established a strong case likely to succeed, it would not have been appropriate to make an order requiring that the defendant facilitate the plaintiff's return to work. This would involve the court in micro-managing the plaintiff's employment and 47 would undermine the defendant's ability to ensure that its duty of care to all of its employees of SFI was adequately addressed." If one leaves aside the absence of a strong case (or lack of a substantive claim as the defendant submits) and the alternative statutory remedy available to the Plaintiff, the defendant submits that the orders sought by the plaintiff would if granted necessarily require the Court to engage in a micro-managing role. The court agrees that this would be the result of granting the relief sought - and this is a further reason why the relief sought would be refused even if the plaintiff had established a strong case likely to succeed. 156. The balance of convenience lies against the granting of the injunctive relief sought given that on the Plaintiff's own version of events the employment relationship has completely broken down. The Plaintiff cannot seek to restore that relationship solely for the purpose of pay. THE DEFENDANTS REPLY TO ASPECTS OF THE PLAINTIFF’S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS. 157. The defendant makes a number of valid points concerning the plaintiff’s written submissions and these are worth a mention ; (
13. a)Insofar as the Plaintiff asserts that she did not provide notice of intention to resign, the Plaintiff provided the Defendant with notice by way of (
14. i)the now withdrawn WRC complaint form and (
15. ii)the grounding affidavit. The defendant submits that the Plaintiff cannot credibly stand over an assertion that she did not provide the Defendant with notice and in any event the Plaintiff's repudiation of the contract was accepted by the Defendant on 10 February. The defendant submits that it is disingenuous in the extreme to now argue that she did not resign. 48 (
16. b)The Plaintiff refers to Sweeney v. Duggan [1997] 2 IR 531 at paragraph 29 of her submissions and suggests that it is authority for the proposition that termination of a contractual relationship is not to be lightly inferred. However, Sweeney concerns implied terms. The case is not about the termination of contractual relationships. In any event, the Plaintiff's averments that she resigned could be no clearer or more unequivocal. (
17. c)The Plaintiff's contention at paragraphs 32 - 35 of her submissions that the Defendant was obliged to enquire whether she intended to resign is not accepted. The Plaintiff's reliance on the UK EAT decision KWIK-Fit (GB) Ltd v. Lineham [1992] IRLR 156 is misplaced. In a passage from KWIK cited in Saint John of God Community Services CLG v. Oyegoke UDD2415, the EAT stated: "If words of resignation are unambiguous then prima facie an employer is entitled to treat them as such, but on the field of employment personalities constitute an important consideration. Words may be spoken, or actions expressed in temper of in the heat of the moment or under extreme pressure (being jostled into a decision) and indeed the intellectual make up of an employee maybe relevant. These we refer to as "special circumstances”. Where “special circumstances” arise, it may be unreasonable for an employer to assume a resignation and to accept it forthwith. A reasonable period of time should be allowed to lapse and if circumstances arise during that period which put the employer on notice that further enquiry is desirable to see whether the resignation was really intended and can properly be assumed, then such enquiry is ignored at the employer's risk." In light of the Plaintiff's affidavit, it is not clear how she could contend that her resignation occurred in the heat of the moment. Contrary to the situation that pertained in KWIK, rather than seek to retract her resignation, the Plaintiff has affirmed it on affidavit. 49 (
18. d)In Millettv. Shinkwin [2004] 15 E.L.R. 319, the Labour Court considered KWIK and noted the requirement for a retraction of the resignation within a relatively short period of time. The Plaintiff has not retracted the resignation - albeit the court will observe that the written submissions suggest otherwise but are contrary to the plaintiff’s sworn evidence. (
19. e)The Plaintiff's decision to resign, her affirmation of that resignation and her decision not to reply to the Defendant's correspondence accepting her resignation, are entirely distinguishable from these authorities. In so far as the above replies are concerned the court is satisfied that they are correct. 158. The Plaintiff's reliance on Brennan v. Irish Pride Bakeries (In Receivership) [2017] IECA 107 is misplaced. In Brennan the Court of Appeal held that the substance of the case was not one for damages for breach of contract on the facts given that if the plaintiff remained in employment at the time the business was due to be sold by receivers he might have been entitled to benefit under the TUPE Regulations. Brennan is entirely different to this case. The court agrees with the defendant that this is so. 159. The Plaintiff's reliance at paragraph 61 on An Operations Coordinator v. A Facilities Management Service Provider ADJ-00028293, which concerned a failure to adequately consider an employee's request to work from home during the Covid-19 pandemic, is also misplaced given its non-comparable facts. The court agrees with the defendant that this is so. Disciplinary process. 160. The Plaintiff contends that she was denied procedural fairness in respect of the disciplinary process. She seeks to draw an analogy with O'Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11. The 50 Plaintiff cites from the Court of Appeal decision in which Noonan J. referred to the need for expedition in the context of a disciplinary investigation concerning a doctor who had been suspended with pay pending the investigation. The Court remarked on the particular need for expedition given that the doctor was suspended and was paid from the public purse. In the present case the disciplinary matter progressed to an independent investigation resulting in a November 2024 report and thereafter the process had not advanced at the time of the Plaintiff's resignation due to the Plaintiff's absences, the need for occupational health assessment and the making of and refusal to engage with the dignity at work complaint. The court agrees with the defendant that this is so - and that the situation is different here. 161. The Plaintiff refers to Gibbons v. Commissioner of An Garda Siochana [2007] IEHC 266 as authority for the proposition that an "inordinate and inexcusable delay" can constitute a denial of procedural fairness. Gibbons concerned the extent to which there had been compliance with the obligation to conduct an investigation "as soon as practicable" as set out in the Garda Siochana (Discipline) Regulations 1989. The defendant correctly says that Gibbons is incomparable with the present case - and that in any event the context to the progression of the disciplinary process demonstrates an absence of an inordinate or inexcusable delay. 162. The defendant correctly points out that the case law referred to in paragraph 68 of the Plaintiff's submissions concerning injunctive relief in the context of disciplinary investigations is not applicable as the Plaintiff does not seek to halt an investigation. 163. Mr. Casey's affidavit addresses the decision to regard the Plaintiff as being on unpaid leave. The Plaintiff's assertion that the facts "mirror the conduct" addressed in Petkus v. Complete Highway Care Ltd [2017] IEHC 12 is incorrect. The appellants in Petkus, who experienced a 10% reduction in wages, had not ceased performing their contractual obligations. The court agrees that the case is readily distinguishable. 51 164. The Plaintiff cites Giblin v. Irish Life & Permanent Pie [2010] IEHC 36 as authority for the proposition that courts have shown a "…willingness to intervene where an employer's conduct threatens an employee's livelihood." However, Giblin concerned an application for injunctive relief in the context of a disciplinary investigation in which a decision to dismiss had been made by the same persons who conducted the initial investigation and established a case to answer. While the judgment referred to the fact that the plaintiff relied on his salary to support his family, the basis of the decision to grant the relief was the establishment of a strong case to be tried. Again the court agrees that the case is readily distinguishable from the present case. 165. The balance of convenience does not lie in favour of granting the relief sought by the Plaintiff. At paragraph 91 the Plaintiff refers to part of a dicta of Laffoy J. in Giblin. Crucially, the Plaintiff omitted the preceding words: ''it is generally considered that the prospect of an award of damages following the trial of the action is not an adequate remedy for a successful plaintiff who has been deprived of his salary pending the trial of the action." As the defendant correctly submits Giblin does not establish a rule that interlocutory relief should be granted in every application by an employee. The balance of convenience requires a factual assessment. 166. In Buttimer v. Oak Fuel Supermarket Ltd [2023] IEHC 126, Dignam J. considered Giblin and declined to restore the plaintiff's salary on an interlocutory basis stating: - If the plaintiff was successful she would be able to seek to recover the unpaid salary as back-pay or damages; - There was a serious rift in the relationship. If the salary was paid it would be without the plaintiff working or with her working notwithstanding the difficulties; - Something more than a mere assertion that the non-payment of salary would cause undue hardship was required, particularly where there was a significant rift in the relationship; 52 - If the plaintiff was unsuccessful she would have to repay any salary received on foot of an interlocutory order. The plaintiff averred that the non-payment of salary would cause undue hardship and this could only be understood as meaning that she would have to spend some or all of her salary pending trial. In the absence of any evidence as to her means and ability to satisfy her undertaking as to damages, there was a risk she would not be able to make a repayment. 167. Leaving the other arguments to one side, the defendant correctly submits that, as in Buttimer, if the Plaintiff is successful she will be entitled to damages. The effect of an order restoring her pay would require the Defendant to discharge the salary of someone who will not carry out the tasks assigned to them. As in Buttimer, the Plaintiff has made nothing more than a mere assertion of hardship and has not offered evidence of her means and ability to satisfy the undertaking as to damages. 168. As the defendant points out, this case is also distinguishable from Fennelly v. Assicurazioni Generali SpA [1985] 3 I.L.T.R. 73 which is referred to in paragraph 92, owing to the absence of "…serious difficulties…" between the parties and the willingness of the plaintiff to undertake to carry out the tasks assigned to him. 169. While the Plaintiff refers to the impact on reputation following removal from employment in paragraphs 94 - 95, the defendant submits that this line of authority is not applicable as the Plaintiff resigned. On the evidence before the court, the defendant is correct in this submission. 170. In summary, the defendant correctly distinguishes and deals with the cases cited in the plaintiff’s written submissions. The defendant also points to misquotes and significant inaccuracies in the Plaintiff’s written submissions – which it has detailed in an appendix to it’s written submissions. While the decision in Glynn v HSS trading as Citywest Hotel [2010] may be untraceable because it is unreported the other “errors” identified essentially remain unexplained. They may be due to AI use or carelessness - or both – and the court is disinclined 53 to infer any attempt to mislead the court. Whatever the explanation, such inaccuracy in written submissions is unimpressive presentation. 171. The court will not dwell on the plaintiff’s email of 14 April 2026 to the defendant’s solicitors and her reference to Rule 5.18 of the code of conduct of the Bar of Ireland. The latter appears to be an unjustified, concerning and not so subtle message to Senior Counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff’s repertoire of complaints may not yet be exhausted if she does not prevail. For a litigant to so behave when coming into court seeking an equitable remedy is lamentable. Decision. 172. The Plaintiff falls at the first hurdle as she has failed to establish a strong case to be tried. Her own evidence is that she resigned her employment. 173. There are statutory remedies provided for the plaintiff and the truth is that she has not established a substantive cause of action in these proceedings. 174. Even if she had established a strong case to be tried the court is satisfied that the balance of justice would not favour the granting of the interlocutory relief sought for the reasons identified above. 175. Indeed, the balance of justice comes down heavily in favour of the defendant having regard to the law, the employment history and the history of “litigation” instituted by the plaintiff. It would in all of the circumstances be unjust to grant the plaintiff the interlocutory relief sought by her even if she had established a strong case. 176. The torrent of litigation which the plaintiff has unleashed on her former employer and her failure to present to this court any persuasive or credible evidence to justify her actions in this regard is hugely concerning. The time, effort, stress and expense to which her former employer and work colleagues have been and are unjustifiably subjected to by the plaintiff’s actions is and has been frighteningly obvious to the court. The situation brings into focus the recent high court 54 practice direction HC 135 concerning litigation restriction orders. The court is satisfied that this application is devoid of merit and smacks of an abuse of the process of the court. 177. The court will dismiss the plaintiff’s application and this matter will be listed at 10.00 a.m. on 20 May, 2026 to deal with costs and any matters arising. 55