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2026 IEHC 326

[2026] IEHC 326 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2024/1367JR] BETWEEN G.T. (GEORGIA) APPLICANT AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 22nd day of May, 2026 INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for judicial review in which the applicant is seeking an Order of mandamus compelling the respondent to consider an application for permission to reside made by the applicant. Alternatively, the applicant is seeking to quash the respondent’s refusal of the permission to reside application.
  2. As will be explained in this judgment, the applicant’s claims are predicated on a narrow point relating to how certain applications made by him in August 2024 should be characterised. There was also a broader aspect to the claims by which the applicant claimed that, despite having a permission to remain in the State for the purpose of pursuing a claim for international protection and a labour market access permission, he had also been the subject of an employment permit which had been issued on the application of his employer, and he claimed that – separate to his international protection permission – he ought to have been entitled to obtain permission to reside in the State on that basis.
  3. At the material times, the applicant in these proceedings was an applicant for international protection pursuant to the Immigration Act
  4. At the time of the hearing of this judicial review action, the applicant had been refused international protection by the IPO and an appeal against this decision to the IPAT remained extant. While the instant proceedings do not concern the applicant’s international protection status or application, the factual matrix underpinning these proceedings cannot be separated from his application for international protection. In the circumstances, the identity of the applicant has been anonymised and any potentially identifying information has been presented in such a manner as to minimise the risk of identifying the applicant in accordance with s. 26 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”). BACKGROUND
  5. The applicant is a Georgian national who arrived in this jurisdiction in December
  6. The applicant arrived in the State having travelled through Ukraine, France and Spain before arriving in Belfast. From Belfast, the applicant travelled by road to Dublin. From April 2022, the applicant was employed as a general operative with a company which provides specialised trade and labour services to the construction sector.
  7. The applicant accepts that he was employed without the appropriate permission from April 2022 until his Labour Market Access Permission (“LMAP”) was granted on the 21 July
  8. The applicant was further employed without permission upon expiry of this permission in July 2023, until the applicant was issued further permission in January
  9. The applicant’s employer applied for a general employment permit which was granted on the 26 July 2024 which remains valid until the 26 July
  11. The parties are in agreement as to the applicant’s permission to reside in the jurisdiction for the purpose of determining his international protection claim, as well as the applicant holding a valid LMAP and general employment permit which was applied for by his employer. The disagreement between the parties relates to his attempts to obtain permission to reside in the State on a basis that differed from his permission to reside as an international protection applicant.
  12. The parties agreed that the general employment permit is not a residence permission, and permission in that regard is required to be obtained from the Minister. The applicant evidently sought to attain Stamp 1 permission, and it is the steps taken to attain such permission which forms the basis of the dispute between the parties.
  13. The applicant’s claim is predicated on the fact that upon presenting at the respondent’s offices, he attempted to obtain and register residency permission in the jurisdiction. The applicant contends that he was refused from doing so on the basis that he is an international protection applicant.
  14. The position of the respondent is that the applicant did not apply for permission under s. 4 of the 2004 Act or under the Minister’s discretion and thus there is no application for which mandamus may be granted, or decision against which certiorari may provide relief. In essence, the respondent argue that the applicant has conflated the application for permission and its subsequent registration. Three immediate difficulties arise in connection with the manner in which the applicant approached the registration of his permission to remain in the State.
  15. First, a feature of the pleadings and submissions put before the Court is evidently that the applicant and the respondent operated at significant cross-purposes in relation to the processes which underpin the permission and registration regime for holders of general employment permits.
  16. Second, the applicant’s case relied on inconsistent terminology used to articulate what precisely the applicant was seeking. This was more than a semantic difference, as the terminology referred to two distinct issues. At some points, the applicant purports to seek to obtain permission and subsequently register such permission. In other instances, the applicant is seeking simply to register permission. The distinction between obtaining and registering permission is crucial to the determination of this action and this conflation will be addressed below.
  17. Third, the events underpinning the proceedings occurred at a time when the underlying law changed. The event that triggered the proceedings occurred on the 7 August 2024, and the Employment Permits Act 2024 was commenced shortly thereafter. The 2024 Act contains provisions that appear to expressly address the position of applicants for international protection in the context of the requirement for foreign nationals to have an employment permit.
  18. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the application for judicial review should be refused. That decision is grounded in findings that the narrow basis for the claim has not been made out. I have decided that it is not necessary to address the broader issue of whether a person who as of August 2024 has applied for international protection and obtained a LMAP is entitled to seek permission to reside in the State on a separate basis related to their being the subject of a general employment permit.
  19. In order to address the arguments in relation to obtaining permission and its registration, it is necessary to consider the pleadings in some detail. PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE Affidavit of the applicant
  20. The applicant swore an affidavit on the 31 October 2024 which sets out his background, the circumstances of his international protection application as well as the matters which transpired at the offices of the ISD. The affidavit was sworn in Georgian and a translated version accompanied by an affidavit of the translator was provided to the Court.
  21. After setting out his work history, the applicant stated that he obtained an LMAP in July 2022, some months after commencing employment. His first LMAP expired in July 2023, and it appears that his employer made an application for an employment permit between the expiration of his first LMAP and the issuing of the second LMAP in January
  22. The applicant exhibited the application form that was completed by his employer. The application form identified that the applicant had made an application for asylum in the State and identified the permission that he had from the Minister for Justice to access the labour market. The employment permit issued and was valid for 2 years from the 24 July
  23. In that regard, it issued after the second LMAP had been granted.
  24. The applicant exhibited an email chain that made clear that prior to attending the Minister’s office at Burgh Quay, he had sought an online appointment which confirmed that he had “booked an appointment to register your immigration permission for the first time.” The email informed the applicant of the documentation and materials that had to bring with him. The applicant stated that he attended the immigration registration office on Burgh Quay, Dublin 2, on the 7 August 2024 and requested that they “register me”. The applicant explained the purpose of this attendance in the following terms: I provided the immigration authorities with a copy of the general employment permit and my Georgian passport. I requested that they register me. I… am so advised that the appropriate residence permission which is given to general employment permit holders as a matter of course is a “stamp 1” permission. The immigration official at the public counter denied my request and informed me that because I was an applicant for international protection, I could not register with an employment permit. They did not provide me with a written decision.
  25. The applicant then set out the details of his international protection claim and related procedural matters. For the purpose of this application, the pertinent circumstances are that the applicant was refused international protection by the IPO in a decision dated the 17 January
  26. The applicant subsequently appealed this decision to the IPAT, which is yet to be determined.
  27. The email confirming the applicant’s appointment in the registration office was exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit. As noted above and as emphasised by the respondent, it states, “Thank you for booking an appointment to register your immigration permission for the first time.” The email also outlines the documents which appointment holders ought to bring to their appointment, including “printed/hard copies of the required supporting documentation relevant to your permission”
  28. The documentation relating to the applicant’s international protection claim was also exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit. The precise claim is not pertinent to the within application and it is thus not necessary to comment on the substance of that application. As provided under s. 49 of the International Protection Act, the applicant’s “permission to remain” application was considered following IPO’s refusal of asylum status and subsidiary protection. The permission to remain application was refused on the 24 January
  29. Affidavit of Hugh McCabe
  30. The applicant’s solicitor, Hugh McCabe, swore an affidavit on the 31 October
  31. The affidavit of Mr. McCabe set out that he acted for the applicant for the purpose of the applicant’s international protection claim but did not act for the applicant for the purpose of the applicant obtaining a general employment permit. Following the applicant attending at Burgh Quay on the 7 August 2024, Mr. McCabe took instructions from the applicant in relation to the matters which transpired.
  32. After setting out the circumstances in which he was instructed in the case, Mr. McCabe outlines the process for obtaining “stamp 1 permission”, according to the materials published by the Respondent, in particular through the website of the Department of Justice. Mr. McCabe quotes from the webpage titled “general employment permit”, in which it states, at the time it was accessed on the 29 October 2024: An employment permit is not a Residence Permission. In order to be lawfully resident in the State, it is a requirement that all non-EEA national in possession of an employment permit must register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau… Delay in registering with Garda National Immigration Bureau could affect applications in the granting of long-term residency and/or citizenship. In certain circumstances, an employment permit may be issued to persons already lawfully residing in the State on another immigration permission and who have been offered employment in an eligible occupation. In this instance, on receipt of the employment permit, the persons concerned must register their change of status with the Garda National Immigration Bureau.
  33. Mr. McCabe exhibits correspondence with various State organisations involved in the administration of immigration services. On the 14 August 2024, Mr. McCabe wrote to GNIB calling for an explanation as to why the applicant was refused registration of his permission on the basis of being an international protection applicant. In reply, GNIB noted that they have no role in the registration of immigration permissions in Dublin. The GNIB directed Mr. McCabe to the Immigration Service Delivery (the ISD). Mr. McCabe subsequently wrote to the ISD on the 16 August 2024 enclosing the previous correspondence with the GNIB, calling for an explanation in the same terms as requested from the GNIB.
  34. The ISD replied on the 21 August 2024 stating: Unfortunately your query is not something our Unit can help you with. If you would like to contact the International Protection Office as they may be better able to help you with this. All further queries on this matter should be addressed to the International Protection Office (ISD).
  35. Mr. McCabe replied on the same date stating that he did not believe this was a query which ought to be directed to the IPO. Mr. McCabe noted that the GNIB refused to register the stamp 1 permission of the applicant and thus this decision was made at the behest of the respondent and not the IPO. The respondent clarified that the applicant attended the offices of the ISD rather than the GNIB.
  36. By way of letter dated the 23 August 2024, Mr. McCabe wrote to the GNIB, copying the Domestic Residence and Permissions department within the ISD. Mr. McCabe set out the following in his letter: In circumstances where the Minister and the GNIB will not address and register our client’s permission on stamp 1 conditions, we call on you to confirm that you do not intend to stand over the prior refusal, which appears to us to have been a patently wrong decision, and to urgently confirm that out client may attend for the purposes of registering his Stamp 1 permission, failing which we intend to take instructions on the commencement of judicial review proceedings within 14 days and without further warning.
  37. The ISD replied on the 11 September 2024 suggesting that the applicant ought to contact the international protection office. This concluded the correspondence between the applicant’s representatives and the various state departments. THE PROCEEDINGS
  38. The statement grounding this application for judicial review was filed on the 31 October
  39. The legal grounds upon which the applicant is seeking his judicial review are as follows: (i) The Applicant holds a general employment permit issued pursuant to section 8 of the Employment Permits Act 2006, and based on this has applied to the Minister for a permission to reside in the State under section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004 and or under the Minister’s executive discretion. In refusing to determine and or accept and or consider the Applicant’s said application, the Minister has acted is acting in breach of her obligations pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004 and or is acting unreasonably and or is fettering the discretion vested in her. Section 4 of the said 2004 [sic] does not contain any ex ante condition excluding applicants who hold a temporary permission granted pursuant to section 16 of the International Protection 2015, and the Minister was in error in refusing to determine and or accept and or consider the application and, instead, erroneously directing the Applicant to the International Protection Office. The International Protection Office has no rule in determining such applications. (ii) The Minister erred in law and or acted irrationally and or unreasonably in refusing to determine and or accept and or consider the Applicant’s application for a permission to reside in the state on account of him holding a temporary permission pursuant to section 16 of the International Protection Act
  40. Section 16

(6)(b) of the said 2015 Act envisages scenarios whereby an Applicant would not be subject to certain provisions of the said 2015 Act (ss.16
(3)(a), 16
(3)(b), 16
(3)(
  1. d)and 20) by virtue of him being entitled to remain in the State under another enactment or rule of law, were he not an applicant for protection. There is no restriction in law to the Applicant holding an immigration permission pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004, and or executive discretion, and pursuing a parallel application for international protection, and the Minister has erred in law and or fettered her discretion in purporting to impose such a restriction. (iii) The Minister acted in breach of constitutional justice and procedural fairness in failing to determine and or accept and or consider the Applicant’s application for a permission to reside on the basis of him holding a general employment permit. The Applicant is entitled to a substantive consideration of the said application which the Minister has failed to undertake. (
  2. iv)If the Minister has made a substantive decision (which is denied), the Minister’s reasons remain undisclosed to the Applicant, in breach of constitutional justice and, particularly, the duty to give reasons. 29. The factual grounds upon which the judicial review is grounded are as follows: The Applicant is a national of Georgia who applied for international protection in the State in December 2021. The IPO refused to recommend a grant of international protection and his application for protection in the jurisdiction is under appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal. He currently resides in the state on the basis of the temporary permission granted to him pursuant to section 16 of the 2015 Act. The Applicant has been working for [name of employer] since April 2022 as a General Operative. He currently holds a labour market access permission granted pursuant to regulation 11 of the European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018 (S.I No. 230/2018). His employer applied for, and he was granted, a general employment permit, from the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, which is valid from 25 July 2024 to 24 July 2026. On 7 August, he attended at Immigration Service Delivery’s public offices in Burgh Quay Dublin 2, seeking to register and obtain an immigration permission, which would permit him to reside in Ireland on foot of the Employment Permit. Registration was refused. The Applicant did not receive a written decision and was directed to the International Protection Office. The Applicant’s solicitor entered correspondence with the Minister’s immigration officers thereafter. The Minister has directed that the Applicant attend at the International Protection Office rather than their offices. The International Protection Office has no role in registering immigration permissions and the Applicant cannot enter employment on foot of the general employment permit without a corresponding stamp 1 permission from the Minster. Although the Applicant can lawfully continue his employment pursuant to the labour market access permission which he holds, employment pursuant to labour market access permission is less beneficial to the Applicant and his employer than employment pursuant to the general employment permit which he holds and the stamp 1 immigration permission to which he is entitled. 30. The respondent filed its statement of opposition on the 28 March 2025. The respondent asserts that no application has been made to the respondent pursuant to the 2004 Act and as such there is no application which can be compelled to be determined by way of mandamus and no decision from which certiorari is available. The respondent asserts that the applicant is only entitled to enter employment pursuant to the LMAP which he was granted and disputes that the applicant is entitled to stamp 1 permission. 31. The respondent outlines the role of a registration officer and emphasises that such a role does not involve the exercise of any discretion or decision-making power on the part of the officer. 32. The statement of opposition was verified by an affidavit of Aoife O’Flaherty, an assistant principal officer with the registration office of the ISD. Ms. O’Flaherty outlines the process underpinning the employment permit regime. Ms. O’Flaherty sets out that a foreign national who is outside the State and who successfully obtains a general employment permit must subsequently receive the relevant landing stamp in their passport, regardless of whether the foreign national is visa or non-visa required. A foreign national who is already within the State must have a valid and registered residence permission in order to register a new permission under the employment permit. Ms. O’Flaherty notes that as an applicant for international protection, the applicant’s residence and employment entitlements are governed by the 2015 Act and the and European Community (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018. 33. In relation to the registration process, Ms. O’Flaherty explains that the process of registration is directed to ensuring the maintenance of an active register of all foreign nationals “who have permission to be in the State”, per s. 9
(1)(a) of the 2004 Act. The process of registration is concerned exclusively with the verification of documents and does not involve the exercise of discretion or decision-making powers. Instead, registration officers will work through a check-list of documents, and if satisfied the documentation is in order, will issue a registration certificate.
  1. In relation to this check-list of documentation which the registration officer will consider, the registration officer will first satisfy themselves as to the identification of the foreign national. After that, the registration officer will check as to whether the foreign national is visa required or non-visa required. If the foreign national is visa required, the registration officer will check whether the foreign national has the appropriate entry visa and landing stamp. For those who have been granted a residence permission, the registration officer will require a copy of the letter granting same.
  2. Ms. O’Flaherty notes that the applicant was refused registration on the 7 August 2024 on the basis of being an international protection applicant. Ms. O’Flaherty notes that this had the practical effect of the applicant being unable to produce the correct documentation to show that he had the necessary residence permission from the respondent.
  3. Ms. O’Flaherty concludes her affidavit noting that the applicant never applied to the respondent under s. 4 of the 2004 Act for permission to land, nor has the applicant sought to apply to change his residence permission. ARGUMENTS
  4. The applicant filed submissions in support of the application for leave to bring judicial review on the 11 November
  5. The applicant considers that the following legal questions arise: i. Whether the Minister has erred in law, fettered her discretion and or breached fair procedures in failing to accept/determine the Applicant’s application for permission to reside on the basis of having been granted general employment permit by the Minister for Enterprise because he is an international protection applicant. ii. If the Minister has made a substantive decision (which is denied), whether the Minister acted unlawfully and/or in breach of constitutional justice and, particularly, the duty to give reasons.
  6. In response to the first question, the applicant first outlines the principles underpinning immigration permissions for foreign nationals who have been granted a general employment permit. The applicant notes that a foreign national holding a general employment permit must apply to the Minister for Justice for an immigration permission to reside in Ireland. These applications are processed by the ISD as officers of the Minister. Where the Minister is satisfied to grant the immigration permission, “stamp 1” will be placed on the passport of the foreign national.
  7. The applicant notes that the Minister for Justice retains the power to grant permission to enter and reside in the State where an applicant has been granted an employment permit by the Minister for Enterprise. This principle is not disputed and has been the subject of previous consideration by this Court and the Court of Appeal.
  8. The applicant submits that he has obtained a general employment permit and that “the Minster for Justice has refused to consider registering that permission”. The applicant compares this situation with that facing the Court in Hossain v Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC
  9. In Hossain, the Minister for Enterprise refused to issue an employment permit on the basis that the applicant was excluded from the employment permit regime as he already held stamp 4 permission.
  10. The Court held in Hossain: …there is nothing in the Acts or in the regulations, which explicitly prohibit the Minister [for Enterprise] from issuing an employment permit to a foreign national, who already has a right to work by virtue of his or her immigration permission.
  11. While accepting that the instant case differs insofar as the applicant already holds a general employment permit, the applicant submits that by analogy there is similarly nothing in the 2004 or 2015 Acts which excludes the applicant, as a person residing on the basis of temporary permission pursuant to s. 16 of the 2015 Act, from being granted another form of permission. It should be noted that the legal situation altered between the date when the applicant attended at the registration office on the 7 August 2024, and the date when the proceedings commenced. On the 2 September 2024, the Employment Permits Act 2024 was commenced. I am satisfied that the case falls to be determined by reference to the applicable legal provisions as of the 7 August 2024 and not the later commenced provisions.
  12. With regard to the interaction with the 2015 Act, the applicant outlines that s. 16 of the 2015 Act provides for “permission to enter and remain in the State”. The constitutional challenge to s. 16
(3)(
  1. b)in NHV v Minister for Justice [2017] IESC 35 and the subsequent legislative changes were set out by the applicant. In particular, the applicant notes that the 2018 Regulations now provide for international protection applicants to enjoy LMAP. 44. The relevance of the applicant’s status as an international protection applicant arises in circumstances where s. 8 of the Employment Permits Act 2024 excludes applicants of international protection from the scope of s. 7 of the 2024 Act. Section 7 of that Act states that, inter alia, a foreign national shall not enter employment in the State except in accordance with an employment permit. Evidently, international protection applicants are excluded from the scope of s. 7 of the 2024 Act owing to the fact that their employment entitlements are governed by the 2015 Act and the associated 2018 Regulations. 45. The applicant submits that the provisions of the 2024 Act are inclusive in nature having regard to alternate means of access to the labour market. According to the applicant, while the 2024 Act excludes international protection applicants from the requirement to hold a general employment permit, it does not preclude an international protection applicant from holding one, and thus does not preclude an applicant from stamp 1 permission. 46. The applicant further argues that the 2015 Act envisages scenarios where an international protection applicant would be entitled to remain in the State under another enactment or rule of law. 47. The threshold question is whether the law provided for in section 8 of the 2024 Act reflected the law that applied on the 7 August 2024. I am satisfied on the facts of this case that it is not necessary to address that broader issue, and that the issue better falls to be determined in a more suitable case with a clearer factual backdrop. 48. The arguments advanced in the submissions in support of the leave application for judicial review were supplemented by submissions filed for the purpose of the substantive judicial review action. 49. The applicant took issue with several aspects of Ms. O’Flaherty’s affidavit, these points relate to the precise nature of the correspondence between the applicant and the respondent’s offices. The applicant argues that the respondent’s department failed or refused to address the points raised in correspondence by the applicant. The applicant considers it incorrect that he was referred to the IPO on the basis that the role of the IPO is limited to matters relating to the 2015 Act and that therefore the issues presenting the applicant in this instance were not ones properly for the IPO’s consideration. 50. The applicant submits that he is lawfully entitled to hold a temporary permission under s. 16 of the 2015 Act while seeking to hold another form of permission. The applicant then outlines that: “The applicant has sought to register a residency permission on foot of the employment permit he has received from the Minister for Enterprise and he is being denied the opportunity to even seek to register that permission.” 51. In relation to the respondent’s argument that the applicant has not made an application for permission to reside, the applicant submits that the respondent has failed to point to any guidance or policy with which the applicant has failed to comply with. The applicant contends that he attended the ISD office with his employment permit for the purpose of “seeking the appropriate permission and registration”. 52. The distinction between immigration officers and registration officers was addressed by the applicant by reference to the dicta of the Supreme Court in Sulaimon v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 63: “[6] It should perhaps be explained at this point that the Act of 2004 contemplates not simply a process of permission for a person to remain within the State, but also that such persons will be registered in a register of nonnationals pursuant to s.9 of that Act. That register, it should be noted, is of nonnationals “who have permission to be in the State.” Thus the sentence referring to the certificate of registration clearly contemplated a process of registration which is separate and distinct from, and subsequent to, the permission to remains required by section 5.” 53. The applicant suggested that the respondent in essence was arguing that the applicant was dealt with by a registration officer on the 7 August 2024, and, notwithstanding the fact the applicant was clearly seeking to obtain and register permission, he was at fault for not insisting that he be dealt with by an immigration officer instead. The applicant then submits that the respondent ought to have expressly pleaded that there was not an immigration officer capable of granting permission if this was the case and that an explanation for how this was the case ought to have been put on affidavit. In the absence of such pleading, the applicant invites the Court to proceed on the basis that the applicant could have been granted a permission at Burgh Quay on the 7 August 2024. 54. The respondent filed written submissions on the 5 September 2025. The respondent sets out the legislative basis for registration, quoting largely from the affidavit of Ms. O’Flaherty. The respondent addresses the case of Sulaimon and in particular references the concurring judgment of Hardiman J. at paragraph 87: “…in order to be registered, or to be obliged to register, a non-national must have permission to be in the State… What is of interest for present purposes is that the Register is not a register of non-nationals in general, but a register of non-nationals “who have permission to be in the State”, not “who have applied for permission” but “who have permission”. Since this is the defining characteristic which gives rise to the requirement to register, it appears to me logically to follow that the permission to be in the State must pre-exist the obligation to register. One must “have” permission before one registers.” 55. The respondent subsequently addresses the pleadings and the inconsistency in what precisely the applicant sought at Burgh Quay on the 7 August 2024. The following references to the pleadings point to what the respondent submits constitute the inconsistencies: • Statement of Grounds: An application for permission to reside in the State under section 4 of the Immigration Act, 2004… • Applicant’s affidavit: I attended at the Minister’s immigration office…to seek a permission to reside on foot of the permit” • Applicant’s legal submissions: The applicant has sought to register a residency permission on foot of the employment permit… 56. On the basis of this inconsistency in terminology, the respondent argues that the applicant has conflated the act of registration with an application for a residency permission. The fact that the employment permit is not a residency permission is also clear from the cover letter accompanying the employment permit in which it stated: “Please note that this permit relates to employment only and it is not a residence permit or permission to enter Ireland. Visa required and Non-Visa required persons must have at all times: (
  2. a)Current appropriate permission from the immigration authorities which allows you to enter, reside and undertake employment in the State…” 57. Similarly, the email notification received by the application after he made his registration appointment stated, “Thank you for booking an appointment to register your immigration permission for the first time”. 58. The respondent submits that the applicant’s attendance at the registration office did not and could not constitute an application for permission to remain pursuant to s. 4 of the 2004 Act. The respondent strongly disputes what it characterises as the applicant attempting to obtain a legal entitlement by the act of attending before an officer with no power to consider such an application let alone grant the entitlement sought. 59. With regard to the applicant’s position as an IPO applicant, the respondent notes that s. 17
(4)of the 2015 Act provides: A certificate shall be deemed to be a registration certificate for the purposes of section 12 of the Act of 2004 and an applicant to whom a certificate has been given shall, for so long as they certificate remains valid, be deemed to have complied with section 9 of that Act.
  1. The respondent submits that in light of the fact that the temporary residence certificate is deemed to constitute registration for the purposes of the 2004 Act, there was no extant permission which required to be registered by the applicant. The temporary permission under the 2015 Act is deemed registered by virtue of the temporary residence certificate, while no permission under 2004 Act has been granted which requires registration.
  2. The interaction between the employment permit legislation and the 2015 Act was then considered. The respondent submits that the 2018 Regulations operates in such a manner as to specifically exclude the applicant from the operation of the 2015 Act. This is on the basis that an applicant is prohibited from entering employment “except in accordance with…a labour market access permission” DISCUSSION
  3. The argument advanced by the applicant that there was or ought to have been an immigration officer present in Burgh Quay to deal with his application on the 7 August 2024 is misplaced. Regardless of whether the applicant truly intended to obtain residence permission on the 7 August 2024, it is clear from the proceedings that the applicant made an appointment to register permission.
  4. The applicant’s submission therefore that the respondent faults the applicant for not insisting he be dealt with by an immigration officer is a clear mischaracterisation of the flaw in the applicant’s case. The suggestion that an immigration officer was – or ought to be – present in Burgh Quay to deal with a purported application for residency permission is not correct. The administration of any service could not operate effectively if a person such as the applicant was entitled to insist that their application must be dealt with by another member of staff with distinct statutory duties simply on the basis that this was the application they intended to have completed that day, even when that was not the stated purpose of their attendance.
  5. The applicant further submits that the respondent has failed to “point to any guidance or policy, which the Applicant has not complied with”. Again, this is clearly incorrect. The cover letter accompanying the general employment permit explicitly states that the permit is not residency permission and that the holder must have at all times permission from the immigration authorities which allows the applicant to enter, reside and undertake employment in the State. The grant of the employment permit in accordance with s.8 of the 2006 Act as amended was notified in a letter dated the 26 July 2024, and includes the following statement: “Please note that this permit relates to employment only and it is not a residence permit or a permission to enter Ireland. Persons who are nationals of countries that are visa required for travel to Ireland must make a visa application through www.inis. gov.ie. In the visa application you will be required to submit evidence of your professional qualifications, if required, as well as evidence of previous work experience, if required.”
  6. The LMAP was issued in accordance with the European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018 to 2021, which addresses inter alia the position of applicants for international protection in the State. Section 16
(1)of the 2015 Act provides a person in the position of the applicant with “a permission that operates to allow the applicant to enter and remain or, as the case may be, to remain in the State for the sole purpose of the examination of his or her application, including any appeal to the Tribunal in relation to the application.” 66. The LMAP is governed by regulation 11 of the 2018 Regulations, S.I. 230 of 2018, which provides: “11
(1)Save as may be provided under any other enactment or rule of law, an applicant shall not seek, enter or be in employment or self-employment except in accordance with– (a) a labour market access permission granted or renewed by the Minister under this Regulation … that is valid, …” 67. Significantly, Regulation 11
(12)provides that: “The Employment Permits Acts 2006 to 2014 shall not apply to a non-national who is an applicant or a recipient.” 68. In turn, the Regulations define an “applicant” as including a person who is an applicant under the 2015 Act, which is the status of the applicant in these proceedings. 69. In those premises the correct position appears to be that at the time when the applicant was the subject of the employment permit and made his application on 7 August 2024, he already had permission to remain in the State under the provisions of the 2015 Act and already was permitted to access the labour market in accordance with the LMAP. The existence of the prior permissions to remain and to work and their potential interactions with the application to register a permission gave rise to the difficulties that arose. However, the clear situation is that while it may have been possible for the applicant to have provided a clearer articulation of precisely what was sought this was not done prior to the issue of the proceedings, and that the applicant in my view attended at the office at Burgh Quay for a specified purpose but then endeavoured to achieve a different objective from a person who did not have authority to make the decision sought. 70. On balance therefore I am not satisfied that the applicant has made out a case either for the grant of mandamus or certiorari. The temporary residence certificate and the permission it confers is for the “sole purpose of the examination of his or her application.” This provision does not apply in circumstances where the applicant has residence permission under another enactment or rule of law. The applicant is therefore suggesting that the stamp 1 permission which he sought would exclude him from the restrictive terms of the 2015 Act. Again, this question does not arise in circumstances where the applicant did not make an application under s. 4 of the 2004 Act and therefore could not register any residence permission. However, it is clear from the statutory provisions that residence permission pursuant to the 2015 Act
  1. a)does not need to be registered, and
  2. b)cannot constitute residence permission for the purpose of the general employment permit. 71. The applicant having clearly made an appointment to register permission, therefore cannot be said to have made an application to obtain residency permission pursuant to s. 4 of the 2004 Act on the 7 August 2024. 72. The question of whether an international protection applicant is entitled to obtain and register permission under the 2004 Act therefore does not properly arise in this instance. I should note that much of the confusion that seems to have underpinned this case could have been avoided if the applicant had been clearer in his use of terminology and been more open at an earlier stage about the fact that he was seeking a permission to remain or some form of visa status separate and independent from his status as an international protection applicant, and if a proper attempt had been made to engage in the process rather than by progressing immediately to issue the proceedings. 73. In all the premises, the court will refuse the application for relief by way of judicial review. As this judgment is being delivered electronically my provision view is that the respondent should be entitled to costs as against the applicant to be adjudicated in default of agreement. However, I will list the matter before me on Tuesday, the 9 June 2026 at 10.30am for final orders and I will hear any submissions on costs that the parties may wish to make on that date.

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.