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2026 IEHC 334

1 THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 334 [2026 No. 56 MCA] IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 35 OF THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION ACT 2015 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY APPLICANT AND JOSEPH SALLABI RESPONDENT DECISION of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, announced on the 21st May 2026 1. This is a note of my decision on an application by the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (the “LSRA” or “the Authority”) for various orders under s. 35 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (the “2015 Act” or the “Act”) against the Respondent, Mr Joseph Sallabi BL, an Irish qualified barrister. 2. I heard the Authority’s application on 28 and 29 April 2026 and had hoped to be in a position to deliver my full judgment on the application before today (the last day of the Easter court term). Unfortunately, due to other court and non-court commitments, that did not prove possible. I considered, however, that as I had reached a clear decision on the Authority’s application and as Mr Sallabi has given certain undertakings to the Court not to practise, it was only fair that I should communicate my decision to the parties with brief reasons as soon as 2 possible. I now do so. My full judgment will follow as soon as possible and most likely in the week of 8 June 2026. 3. In this application, the Authority seeks orders (

  1. a)prohibiting Mr Sallabi from providing legal services in the State unless and until he has an approved policy of professional indemnity insurance in compliance with the applicable regulations made under the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”) and the Professional Indemnity Insurance for Barristers Regulations 2024 (S.I. No. 490 of 2024) (the “2024 Regulations”), (
  2. b)prohibiting Mr Sallabi from holding himself out as being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide legal services in the State unless and until he has an approved policy of professional indemnity insurance in compliance with the 2024 Regulations, and (
  3. c)requiring Mr Sallabi to produce to the Authority proof that he has such an approved policy of professional indemnity insurance which complies with the 2024 Regulations before he provides any legal services in the State. 4. This is the first application by the LSRA for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. Section 35 is headed “Order to prohibit contravention of Act” and is in the following terms: “35

(1)Where, on the application of the Authority, it is shown to the satisfaction of the High Court – (
  1. a)that a legal practitioner or any other person has contravened, is contravening or is likely to contravene any provision of this Act or regulations made under it, or (
  2. b)… The Court may by order prohibit the legal practitioner or other person concerned from contravening that provision, notwithstanding that any such contravention may constitute an offence.
(2)An order under subsection
(1)may contain such provisions of a consequential nature as the court considers appropriate.” 3
  1. Section 35 of the 2015 Act, therefore, provides for a statutory form of injunction. It is a civil remedy and is distinct from the prosecution of criminal offences created by the 2015 Act which may be prosecuted summarily by the LSRA (under s. 36 of the 2015 Act) and from the complaints and disciplinary regime in respect of legal practitioners. Complaints alleging misconduct (as that term is defined in s. 50 of the Act) are dealt with in accordance with the statutory regime set out in Part 6 of the Act.
  2. Under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, the High Court may make an order prohibiting a “legal practitioner” from contravening any provision of the 2015 Act or regulations made under it, where it is satisfied that the legal practitioner “has contravened, is contravening or is likely to contravene” any provision of the 2015 Act or regulations made under it. The LSRA maintains that Mr Sallabi (who is a “legal practitioner”, a “qualifying barrister” and a “practising barrister” as those terms are defined in s. 2
(1)of the 2015 Act) has contravened, is contravening and is likely to contravene the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations which oblige him to have in place a professional indemnity insurance policy which complies with the provisions of s. 46
(1)of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations.
  1. The LSRA’s application for these orders was first returnable before the Court on 16 February
  2. On that date, Mr Sallabi (who is representing himself in the application) sought a lengthy adjournment to file a replying affidavit, relying on (amongst other things) the imminent commencement of a significant religious period as well as his desire to spend time with his family (having just dealt with other litigation in the High Court). The LSRA made clear that if the application was to be adjourned for a lengthy period, it would be seeking interim/interlocutory orders to last for the period of the adjournment. Having heard from counsel for the Authority and from Mr Sallabi, I granted Mr Sallabi’s application for a lengthy adjournment, made directions for the delivery of a replying affidavit by Mr Sallabi and granted 4 the orders sought by the Authority on an interlocutory basis to last until the adjourned date, 15 April
  4. On the adjourned date, having delivered replying affidavits and written submissions, Mr Sallabi provided undertakings in lieu of the orders sought by the Authority to the effect that he would not provide legal services in the State and that he would not hold himself out as being a practising barrister currently entitled to provide such legal services until after the hearing of the Authority’s application, which I listed for hearing on 28 and 29 April 2026, having made certain further directions.
  5. As I will explain in greater detail in my judgment to be delivered, Mr Sallabi is an Irish barrister, who obtained his professional qualification as a Barrister-at-Law or BL from the Honorable Society of King’s Inns on 10 October 2023 and was called to the Irish Bar by the Chief Justice the following day. On his application (made that same day), the LSRA entered Mr Sallabi’s name on the roll of practising barristers by virtue of his professional qualification and call to the Irish Bar. He remains on the roll of practising barristers.
  6. From the time of his call to the Irish Bar in October 2023 and his commencement in practice until the end of April 2025, Mr Sallabi had a professional indemnity insurance policy which was arranged by AON Ireland (“AON”) and issued by Zurich Insurance plc. That Zurich company was an Irish insurance company. However, it ceased operations in January
  7. Thereafter the relevant policy of insurance for Irish barristers was issued by a branch of Zurich Insurance Europe AG, a German company, operating in Ireland. I will refer to that policy as the “Zurich policy”.
  8. In May 2025, Mr Sallabi informed the LSRA that he had not renewed the Zurich policy on 1 May 2025 as he had “registered with the Brussels Bar Association” in early 2025 and had subscribed to the “Brussels Bar’s insurance policy” which he claimed provided coverage for his professional activities across all EU Member States (including Ireland). Mr Sallabi claims 5 to have moved to Belgium in January 2025 to establish himself there using and relying on his Irish professional legal qualifications, namely, his degree of Barrister-at-Law and his call to the Irish Bar. He provided to the LSRA a Dutch language version of the policy which was issued to the Orde van Vlaamse Balies (the Order of Flemish Bars). He subsequently provided an English translation of that policy in June 2025 and another in April 2026 in the course of the Authority’s application. I will refer to this policy for convenience as the “Brussels Bar policy” (as that was how it was described by Mr Sallabi in his correspondence with the Authority). That policy was issued by two co-insurers, MS Amlin Insurance SE (now MSIG Europe SE) (“MSIG”) and KBC Verzekeringen NV (“KBC”), both Belgian companies.
  9. The LSRA was of the view that the Brussels Bar policy (which will be described in greater detail in my written judgment) on its proper interpretation did not cover legal services provided by Mr Sallabi, as an Irish barrister, in Ireland and also that it did not comply with certain statutory requirements for a policy of professional indemnity insurance under the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. The Authority required Mr Sallabi to cease practice unless and until he had a professional indemnity insurance policy which complied with those provisions.
  10. Mr Sallabi declined to put in place another policy and maintained that the Brussels Bar policy complied with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and that, if it did not, the Authority’s insistence that he take out another policy was in breach of EU law by imposing impermissible restrictions on his entitlement to move freely between Member States of the EU to provide legal services.
  11. In the course of responding to the Authority’s application for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act, Mr Sallabi obtained a quotation from AON for renewed cover under the Zurich policy. The annual premium quoted to him by AON was €235.
  12. However, Mr Sallabi chose not to proceed with the Zurich policy and instead maintained his entitlement to rely on the Brussels Bar policy. He maintains that the Brussels Bar policy provides a sufficient indemnity 6 in respect of legal services which he provides as an Irish barrister in Ireland and that the LSRA’s insistence that it does not and that he take out a compliant policy breaches his right of establishment and his right to provide professional legal services in the State (under Chapters 2 and 3 of Title IV (Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) (the “Treaty”). Mr Sallabi maintains that he should not be required to take out another policy in respect of the legal services which he has provided and which he wishes to provide in Ireland following, what he says was, his establishment in Belgium in early
  13. Mr Sallabi did fairly acknowledge at the hearing of the LSRA’s application that it would be open to the Authority to require him to take out a compliant policy to cover his legal work as a barrister in Ireland if he did not have a Belgian policy or if that policy was ineffective to cover such legal services provided by him as a barrister in Ireland.
  14. Mr Sallabi gave as his reason for not taking out the Zurich policy (on foot of the quotation he sought) that it would facilitate claims against him by certain persons and their legal advisors (with whom he is in dispute in other proceedings in which the LSRA is not a party) and that he was concerned that future insurance premiums might become unaffordable and lead to his exclusion from the legal profession.
  15. While Mr Sallabi maintains that the Brussels Bar policy covers the legal services he provides as a barrister in Ireland and is compliant with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations, he contends that if it is not compliant with those provisions, the Court is required to disapply the 2024 Regulations and various other regulations, including the regulations which implement the EU Directives on the freedom to provide services and the right of establishment (which I refer to below).
  16. Mr Sallabi has also advanced a number of rather bizarre and, in my judgement, wholly inappropriate allegations in the course of his affidavits and submissions in response to the LSRA’s application, which include completely wild and unsubstantiated allegations against a 7 host of entities, firms and people including the LSRA itself, solicitors and counsel and even a High Court judge. Fortunately, at the hearing, Mr Sallabi chose not to advance any oral submissions in support of these bizarre and completely inappropriate allegations but did not in any way resile from or withdraw them.
  17. It is clear from the evidence and from Mr Sallabi’s affidavits and his submissions that Mr Sallabi has provided legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister (using his Barrister-atLaw professional legal qualification which he obtained from the King’s Inns and in reliance on his call to the Irish Bar and not as a Belgian qualified advocaat, avocat or rechtsanwalt, since he had not attained that professional title in Belgium) and that he intends to continue doing so.
  18. For reasons which will be set out in much greater detail in my judgment, I have concluded that the LSRA is entitled to the orders which it seeks against Mr Sallabi under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi is a “practising barrister” and a “qualifying barrister” for the purposes of the 2015 Act and that in holding himself out as being entitled to and in intending to provide legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister without a policy of professional indemnity insurance which complies with Part IV of the 2024 Regulations, Mr Sallabi is a person who is likely to contravene the provisions of s. 46
(1)of the 2015 Act and Part IV of the 2024 Regulations.
  1. I have concluded that, on its proper interpretation, the Brussels Bar policy is not intended to cover, and does not cover or provide an indemnity, in respect of legal services provided by Mr Sallabi as an Irish barrister providing legal services in Ireland and that it does not comply with certain provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations in several respects and for several reasons, some of which are referred to below, which will be elaborated upon in greater detail in my judgment.
  2. I am also satisfied that Mr Sallabi has fundamentally misunderstood the provisions in the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the right of 8 establishment of lawyers and on the freedom of lawyers to provide services in seeking to rely on those provisions and on the principles contained in that case law in support of his contention that he has sought to exercise and will be exercising those freedoms and rights when providing legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister.
  3. While Mr Sallabi has contended that he established himself as a lawyer in Belgium in January 2025, relying on his Irish professional legal qualification, and has provided some evidence to support this (such as his “lawyer’s card” and the certificate of admission from the Dean of the Brussels Bar (Dutch language section), confirming his registration on the EU-list of the Brussels Bar since 20 January 2025), other evidence is not completely consistent with that contention. He has not, for example, updated his registration details with the LSRA and his home and correspondence addresses remain as Irish addresses and he remains registered on the roll as an Irish practising barrister and not an EU “registered lawyer”. Nor did he make any mention of a move to establish himself in Belgium when asked about his business during various appearances in certain High Court proceedings before Nolan J in July 2025, where the clear impression was given by him that his practice was based in an office building in Dublin
  4. His letterhead, while making reference to a “head office” in Brussels, refers to the Dublin 4 premises and only contains Dublin telephone and fax numbers. Nor does (or did) his website or Linkedin entry make any reference to Brussels.
  5. However, notwithstanding these inconsistencies, and without deciding the point, I am prepared to assume for the purpose of this application that Mr Sallabi has at least taken steps to establish himself in Belgium. Ultimately, however, that makes no difference to my decision on the Authority’s application.
  6. I have concluded that notwithstanding Mr Sallabi’s contention that he moved to establish himself in Belgium under his professional title as an Irish barrister, he is not exercising any EU right of establishment or freedom to provide services when providing legal services in Ireland 9 as an Irish barrister. He may well be doing so when seeking to establish himself as a lawyer in Belgium in reliance on his Irish professional legal qualifications or in providing legal services there (or elsewhere in the EU) in reliance on those qualifications but he is not doing so when providing legal services in Ireland, the state in which he was awarded the qualification.
  7. I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi’s “Home Member State” for the purposes of Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (the “Lawyers’ Establishment Directive”) and the Irish implementing regulations, the European Community’s (Lawyers’ Establishment) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 732 of 2003) (the “Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations”), is Ireland. The “Host Member State” for the purposes of that Directive and those regulations is Belgium. Similarly, the “Member State from which [Mr Sallabi] comes” for the purposes of Council Directive 77/249/EEC (the “Lawyers’ Services Directive”) is Ireland and the relevant “Host Member State” is Belgium. Nor is Mr Sallabi a “visiting lawyer” within the meaning of that term in the Irish regulations which implement the Lawyers’ Services Directive, namely, the European Communities (Freedom to Provide Services) (Lawyers) Regulations 1979 (S.I. No. 58 of 1979) (the “Lawyers’ Services Regulations”)).
  8. While it is clear from Article 1
(4)of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive that it is not open to a lawyer to rely on both that Directive and the Lawyers’ Services Directive, I have no doubt that in providing legal services in Ireland as an Irish barrister, Mr Sallabi is not doing so pursuant to any right or freedom of establishment or right to provide services under the Treaty. When doing so, he is not a “visiting lawyer” within the meaning of that term in the Lawyers’ Services Regulations nor a “registered lawyer” within the meaning of that term in the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations. He is an Irish barrister, albeit one who may be seeking to establish, or who may already have established, himself in Belgium in exercise of his EU free movement rights. However, he has not become entitled (and does not claim to have become entitled) to acquire the Belgian legal professional qualification of avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt 10 by either of the two ways that can be done under the Lawyers Establishment Directive (Articles 10, 13 and 14). He is and remains, therefore, an Irish barrister.
  1. As an Irish barrister seeking to provide legal services in Ireland, Mr Sallabi is required to comply with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations, including the provisions concerning professional indemnity insurance. When providing those legal services, in Ireland, he is doing so as an Irish barrister and not as a Belgian avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt. When exercising his right of establishment or his freedom to provide services in Belgium, Mr Sallabi is doing so by virtue of his professional qualification as an Irish barrister and similarly not as a Belgian avocat/advocaat/rechtsanwalt.
  2. I have concluded, therefore, that Mr Sallabi’s reliance on the Treaty, the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive and the Lawyers’ Services Directive is fundamentally misplaced. I have also concluded that there is no basis whatsoever for Mr Sallabi’s contention that the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations, the Lawyers’ Services Regulations and the 2024 Regulations should be disapplied by the Court on any of the grounds maintained by him. There is simply no basis whatsoever for that contention, which is based on a complete misunderstanding of the correct position under EU law.
  3. Even if I were wrong about that, and if it could be said that Mr Sallabi was exercising either a freedom to provide services or any aspect of a right of establishment under the Treaty (or under either of the relevant Directives) by providing legal services as an Irish barrister in Ireland, having moved, as he contends, to establish himself in Belgium in early 2025, the LSRA would nonetheless be clearly entitled to require that he complies with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations concerning professional indemnity insurance cover in respect of those services, the provisions of Article 6 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive (and Regulation 6 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Regulations) and Article 4 of the Lawyers’ Services Directive (and Regulation 5 of the Lawyers’ Services Regulations). Mr Sallabi is 11 being treated by the LSRA in precisely the same way as any other Irish barrister who provides legal services in Ireland. There is nothing whatsoever discriminatory about that, contrary to Mr Sallabi’s submissions. He is simply wrong about that. The many cases on which he relied in his written and oral submissions, including several judgments of the CJEU simply have no bearing on or relevance to his particular circumstances. Mr Sallabi chose selected passages from those judgments without in any way demonstrating how they applied to the facts of his case.
  4. I am also satisfied that the LSRA has established that, on its proper interpretation, the Brussels Bar policy upon which Mr Sallabi relies does not provide an indemnity to him in respect of legal services which he provides and intends to provide in Ireland as an Irish barrister (Article 9 and other provisions of the policy make that clear). I reject Mr Sallabi’s contention that it does. It is striking that despite numerous attempts by Mr Sallabi to obtain express confirmation from the Brussels Bar, from the brokers who arranged the Brussels Bar policy and from the insurers, none of them provided such confirmation. If the policy did provide such cover, one might reasonably have expected that such confirmation would have been provided. I found the failure to provide that confirmation very telling.
  5. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the Authority and by Mr Sallabi on the territorial or geographical scope of the policy and, in particular, on the interpretation of Article 9, I prefer the interpretation advanced on behalf of the Authority and I found its position much more compelling. I would have been surprised if a policy of insurance provided by the Brussels Bar for its members would provide an indemnity for members on its EU-list (such as Mr Sallabi) who provide legal services in their Home Member State and under their home professional qualifications (as Mr Sallabi has done and intends to do). I am not surprised, therefore, that neither the Brussels Bar nor the brokers were prepared to confirm that cover applied in such circumstances. 12
  6. I am also satisfied that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with certain other provisions of the 2024 Regulations, including Regulation 12
(1)and certain of the paragraphs in Regulation 14. With respect to Regulation 12
(1), the evidence establishes that MSIG, one of the two co-insurers under the Brussels Bar policy, clearly meets the minimum financial requirements in that provision and is licensed and authorised to transact business in the State pursuant to Directive 2009/138/EC of the Parliament and the Council (the “Solvency II Directive”) and the Irish implementing regulations, the European Union (Insurance and Reinsurance) Regulations 2015 (S.I. No. 485 of 2015) (the “Solvency II Regulations”) and has sought to exercise its right to do so and is registered on the relevant registers maintained for that purpose by the Central Bank of Ireland (the “CBI”). However, there is no evidence that KBC has sought to exercise its right to do so and does not appear on the relevant registers maintained by the CBI. It is not open to Mr Sallabi to seek to enforce a right that KBC may have to transact business in Ireland where there is no evidence that KBC wishes to do so. It is KBC’s right, not Mr Sallabi’s. Consequently, I reject Mr Sallabi’s contention that the Brussels Bar policy complies with the requirements of Regulation 12
(1). 33. I have also considered the Authority’s contention that the Brussels Bar policy does not comply with the requirements contained in Regulation 14 and Mr Sallabi’s arguments in response. I have concluded, for reasons which will be set out in my judgment that the policy may not comply with the requirement in Regulation 14(
  1. a)and does not comply with the requirements contained in Regulation 14 (
  2. b)to (d). 34. In those circumstances, the Authority was entitled to take the view that the Brussels Bar policy did not comply with the provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations, that it was not a “qualifying insurance policy” which covers legal services provided by Mr Sallabi as an Irish barrister in Ireland and that it is not open to him to provide such services here unless he puts in place a compliant professional indemnity insurance policy. In holding himself out as 13 being entitled to provide such legal services and intending to do so, I am satisfied that Mr Sallabi is likely to contravene the relevant provisions of the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and that the Authority is entitled to an order under s. 35
(1)(a) of the 2015 Act prohibiting him from contravening those provisions.
  1. While not directly relevant to the Authority’s application, I have considered the submissions advanced by Mr Sallabi in relation to the Zurich policy. He maintains that the Zurich policy does not comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. This is a very surprising position for Mr Sallabi to adopt as he was insured under that policy between October 2023 and the end of April 2025 and even sought a quote from AON for cover under the Zurich policy in March 2026 (and obtained a quote for an annual premium of €235.00). Mr Sallabi relied on the Zurich policy for that period to comply with his obligations under the 2015 Act and under the predecessor regulations to the 2024 Regulations. The Authority is satisfied that the Zurich policy does comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations. I have considered the submissions advanced by Mr Sallabi to the contrary and I reject them. Having reviewed the terms of the Zurich policy and the cover provided under that policy (including the run-off cover which is provided, as is apparent from the material exhibited by Mr Sallabi), I am satisfied that the Zurich policy does comply with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations and there is no basis for Mr Sallabi’s surprising contention to the contrary.
  2. I have also considered the other arguments advanced by Mr Sallabi in response to the LSRA’s application. I reject his submission that the Court does not have jurisdiction and ought not to entertain the Authority’s application on the grounds advanced by him.
  3. First, I reject his contention that it is not possible for the Court to determine the issues raised in these proceedings in an application by the LSRA under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. I am satisfied that the proceedings have been properly brought by the Authority by an originating notice of motion in accordance with Order 53D and Order 84B of the Rules of the Superior 14 Courts (“RSC”), and that the evidence in the proceedings was properly provided on affidavit in accordance with Order 84B, Rule
  4. There were no relevant facts in dispute which may have required cross-examination or plenary proceedings. Nor were the legal issues raised of such complexity as to preclude their resolution in the proceedings as brought by the Authority.
  5. Second, I reject the contention that the Court ought not to have heard the application on the grounds that there is also a complaint of misconduct against Mr Sallabi pending before the LSRA. The existence of the complaint (which includes an allegation that Mr Sallabi did not have, at the time of the complaint, a valid and effective professional indemnity insurance policy as well as many other issues) does not preclude the Court from dealing with the Authority’s application for orders under s. 35 of the 2015 Act. A different test and different principles apply to the Authority’s consideration of the complaint alleging “misconduct” (as defined in s. 50 of the 2015 Act) on the part of Mr Sallabi under Part 6 of the Act. It is a matter for the Authority to determine how it deals with the complaint (and I understand from what Mr Sallabi told me in his submissions that he has been in correspondence with the Authority about the complaint but has not sought to prevent it from dealing with the complaint). The existence of the complaint does not, however, preclude the Court from exercising its jurisdiction under s. 35 of the 2015 Act and from making orders under that section. The making of such orders does not amount to a finding of “misconduct” on the part of Mr Sallabi. Any alleged “misconduct” on the part of Mr Sallabi must be determined in accordance with the procedures under Part 6 of the 2015 Act.
  6. I am satisfied that there is no other reason why I should not grant the orders sought by the LSRA. Everything points in favour of granting the orders. It is essential for the protection of the public and for clients of Mr Sallabi to whom he provides legal services as an Irish barrister in Ireland that he has a compliant professional indemnity insurance policy in place. As things stand, he does not. However, on the evidence, it appears that that deficiency can 15 easily be remedied. While not directly relevant to the making of the orders sought by the Authority, I find it astonishing that Mr Sallabi decided not to proceed with the quotation which he obtained from AON in March 2026 and to subscribe to the Zurich policy which would have provided him with a compliant policy for an annual premium cost of €235.
  7. His explanation for not taking out that policy is baffling, contradictory and makes absolutely no sense. He has spent many multiples of that amount responding to the Authority’s application and has caused the Authority to incur what are no doubt very substantial costs in engaging external solicitors and counsel to act for it in this application. This whole exercise is a scandalous waste of time and money by Mr Sallabi.
  8. The allegations which Mr Sallabi has chosen to make against the Authority and its lawyers, lawyers acting for his opponents in the litigation in the High Court in which he sought to represent one of the parties, and against a High Court judge are quite extraordinary. As if that was not bad enough, Mr Sallabi’s utterly irresponsible and baseless allegations against a solicitor in the firm representing the Authority in this application who ceased her employment with the firm during the currency of the application reached the nadir, as far as I am concerned. All of those allegations were made without any proper basis and, seemingly, without any proper appreciation of how litigation should be conducted before the Irish courts, particularly by someone who is qualified as an Irish barrister and called to the Irish Bar. It was entirely improper, inappropriate and irresponsible for Mr Sallabi to make those allegations. They ought not to have been made on affidavit or in Mr Sallabi’s written submissions and ought to have been immediately withdrawn. They were not.
  9. For these reasons, which will be further elaborated on in my judgment, I have decided to grant the orders sought by the LSRA. I will make the orders sought at paras. 1, 2 and 3 of the Originating Notice of Motion to last until 5pm on 11 June
  10. Once my judgment is delivered, I intend to make those orders on a permanent basis unless and until Mr Sallabi puts 16 in place a professional indemnity insurance policy which complies with the 2015 Act and the 2024 Regulations.
  11. It is my provisional view that as the Authority has been entirely successful in its application, for the purposes of s. 169
(1)of the 2015 Act, it should be entitled to an order for the costs of the application against Mr Sallabi. If Mr Sallabi wishes to contend otherwise, I will hear submissions on the issue following the delivery of my judgment.

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