ACT 2000 BETWEEN STEPHEN KEOGH, TOM QUIRKE AND RURAL RESIDENTS WIND AWARE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP APPLICANTS AND AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA RESPONDENT AND EDF RENEWABLES IRELAND LIMITED NOTICE PARTY Date o

para. 56; Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42, [2021] 7 JIC 1606 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Baker J., 16 July 2021) (Clarke C.J., O'Donnell, MacMenamin and Dunne JJ. concurring)

§§29and 31; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v.

An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024) per Murray J.

paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that applicants are confined to their pleadings. In Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024), per Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that complex EU law arguments need to be articulated on the pleadings with particular clarity. In Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38, [2024] 1 I.R. 386, [2022] 10 JIC 2402 per O’Donnell C.J.

para. 22 (Dunne, Woulfe, Hogan and Murray JJ. concurring), and per MacMenamin J. (Fennelly and Clarke JJ. concurring) in Babington v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2012] IESC 65 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 18 December 2012)

para. 7, the Supreme Court emphasised that scattergun pleadings are inappropriate. (ii) In Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026)

para. 1 per Donnelly J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642

p. 654 (Hamilton P. concurring); per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 2014) per Clarke J. (Dunne J. concurring)

paras. 3.8-3.15), the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the merits of the decision. 2 (iii) (

1. iv)(
2. v)(
3. vi)(vii) (viii) (
4. ix)(
5. x)In Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026)

para. 96 per Donnelly J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Denham J. (Murray C.J. and Fennelly J. concurring) in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 116), the Supreme Court emphasised that an applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief. In An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J.

para. 124 (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court took the approach that in the context of a challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show a defect generally lies on the applicant. In G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418, [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401, the Supreme Court decided that there is a presumption (the onus to rebut which falls on a judicial review applicant) that material has been considered if the decision-taker says so (see also An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para. 137; Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), para. 91 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring)). In Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Woulfe J., 11 April 2024) (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Keane C.J. (Denham, Murphy and McGuinness JJ. concurring) in Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44, [2002] 2 I.R. 169, [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. 24), the Supreme Court decided that evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement and not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors are reviewable on an irrationality standard. In Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IESC 5 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Donnell C.J., 4 February 2026) para. 118(xiv), the Supreme Court emphasised the relevance of the extent to which submissions on a given point were made to the decision-taker, which decision is consistent with the general principle that, apart from autonomous-type obligations, material capable of sustaining the point must have been properly before the decision-taker

the relevant time such as to give rise to a duty to consider it. In Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IESC 25, [2008] 3 I.R. 795, per Denham J. (Murray C.J., Fennelly, Kearns and Finnegan JJ. concurring); per Clarke J. (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring) in Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 May 2012)

para. 6.9, the Supreme Court approached the question of reasons on the basis that there is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration of submissions or to “engage with” submissions in such a sense, or to provide an issueby-issue or submission-by-submission response. In Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 45 (Clarke C.J.) (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); per Finlay C.J. (Griffin, Hederman and Lynch JJ. concurring) in O’Keefe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39, [1992] I.L.R.M. 237

p. 76; Faulkner v. Minister for Industry and Commerce 1997 WJSC-SC 962, [1996] 12 JIC 1007 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 December 1996) per O’Flaherty J. (Hamilton C.J. and Barrington J. concurring), the Supreme Court approached the standard as to reasons in a way that can be reasonably summarised as an obligation to provide the main reasons on the main issues. In Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453, para. 9.2 per Clarke C.J. (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 11 April 2024) per Woulfe J. (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 129, the Supreme Court approached the question of reasons on the basis that reasons may be found anywhere, not necessarily in the decision itself, for example in an inspectors report. In Waltham Abbey/Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30, [2022] 2 I.L.R.M. 417 (§43 per Hogan J.; MacMenamin, Charleton, O’Malley and Baker JJ. concurring); Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 43, [2024] 2 I.R. 222, [2022] 2 I.L.R.M. 313 (§106 et seq. per Murray 3 J.; O'Donnell C.J., O'Malley, Woulfe and Hogan JJ. concurring); Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205 (inter alia, §47 per Woulfe J.; Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring); Ashbourne Holdings Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2003] IESC 18, [2003] 2 I.R. 114, [2003] 2 I.L.R.M. 446 per Hardiman J.

para. 30, the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that the law does not favour unworkable interpretations. (xi) In G. v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374 per Finlay C.J. (Blayney and Denham JJ. concurring)

p. 378 and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court decided that judicial review is a discretionary remedy within established doctrinal boundaries (see also De Róiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4, [2001] 1 I.R. 190, [2001] 2 I.L.R.M. 241

204 per Denham J.; Kenny v. Dublin City Council [2009] IESC 19 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 5 March 2005)

79 per Fennelly J. (Macken and Peart JJ. concurring); Kelly v. Minister for Agriculture [2021] IESC 62, [2023] 1 I.R. 38 per O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J. and Dunne J. concurring); Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205

60 per Woulfe J. (Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring); Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 4 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 22 February 2024) (O’Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Hogan and Collins JJ. concurring); S. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IESC 48 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 November 2025) per Dunne J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring)

98; Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 25 March 2026) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring).

1. It is the function of a trial court to apply such principles here. While I appreciate the sincerity of the applicants as concerned local residents, and the exceptional skill and energy deployed to present the case on their behalf, the legal question here is whether any sufficiently convincing legal reason has been demonstrated to displace the foregoing. Geographical context
2. The project (https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/320354) consists of seven wind turbines and all associated works in the townlands of Ridge, Agharue, Coolnakisha and Seskinrea, Co. Carlow, approximately

: https://maps.app.goo.gl/NNHpgn7eyNorCyfM8. Parties 5. The first named applicant is Stephen Keogh, information technology professional, the second named applicant is Tom Quirke, a farmer, the third named applicant is Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group, an unincorporated voluntary environmental non-governmental organisation, the respondent is An Coimisiún Pleanála, decision-taker, and the notice party is EDF Renewables Ireland Limited, developer. Facts 6. On 13 May 2024, the notice party submitted the planning application the subject-matter of these proceedings to Carlow County Council (reg. ref. no. 24/60122). The application documentation included an environmental impact assessment report (EIAR) and a Natura impact statement (NIS). 7. A total of 93 submissions and observations by members of the public are recorded in respect of the planning application, and in June 2024, each of the applicants made an individual submission on the planning application. 8. Thereafter, four internal reports were prepared by council officials on the planning application, namely: (

1. i)“Environmental Department – Planning Referral Report” dated 31 May 2024, which recommended planning conditions and also provided an EIAR assessment checklist report (dated 31 May 2024), which found that the content of the submitted EIAR was largely adequate and an appropriate assessment (AA) conclusion statement (also dated 31 May 2024) in which it was stated that the project, alone or in combination with other projects, will not adversely affect the integrity of European sites; (
2. ii)“Senior Engineer – Environment, Planning Report” dated 19 June 2024, which recommended a grant of permission, subject to conditions; (iii) assistant chief fire officer report dated 2 July 2024, sent under cover of email dated 17 July 2024, which had no objection to the proposed development subject to condition relating to the submission of a risk assessment of the proposed battery energy storage system (BESS) facility and suppression system; and (
3. iv)“Planning Report – Transportation” (undated but

tached to an email dated 3 July 2024) which concluded that the application documents and the EIAR failed “to satisfactorily demonstrate that the local road network is of adequate capacity and design to accommodate the volume and frequency of HGV traffic proposed along the 4 haul routes during the construction period” and, accordingly, on the basis of the information submitted to the Council, would be likely to have “a significant adverse impact on the local road network, would endanger public safety by reason of a traffic hazard and be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area”.

1. Submissions or observations were made on the planning application by a number of prescribed bodies, including Irish Aviation Authority, Health Services Executive Environmental Health Services, Development Applications Unit of the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, and Kilkenny County Council.
2. A planning report was prepared by an executive planner and senior executive planner (dated 5 July 2024), which recommended that the council should decide to refuse permission for three reasons. On 5 July 2024, the council issued a notification of a decision to refuse permission.
3. On 1 August 2024, EDF submitted a first-party appeal with the commission which addressed each of the three reasons for the planning authority’s decision to refuse permission and, in addition to the documentation submitted to the planning authority, included a stage 2 road safety audit.
4. Three observations were received within the statutory timeframe from: Rural Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group (including appended reports from Hydro G, Grosvenor Consulting and Huson & Associates), Justin and Susan Hayden, and Mary Farrell.
5. On 27 August 2024, the council submitted a response to the appeal.
6. Observations submitted to the commission by the first named applicant (on 29 August 2024) and on behalf of the second named applicant (on 1 August 2025 and 14 August 2025) were considered invalid by the commission.
7. The commission assigned a senior planning inspector to report on the appeal. The inspector prepared a report dated 22 October 2025 in respect of the appeal, which recommended that planning permission should be granted for the proposed development, subject to 22 recommended conditions.
8. The commission’s direction dated 24 November 2025 (CD-021264-25) recorded that the submissions on file and the inspector’s report were considered

a commission meeting held on 13 November 2025 (CME-005492-25), and the commission decided to grant permission generally in accordance with the inspector’s recommendation, subject to 24 conditions.

1. On 27 November 2025, by way of commission order (ABP-320354-24), the commission granted planning permission for the proposed development, subject to 24 conditions. Procedural history
2. The proceedings were issued on 20 January
4. Leave was granted by order dated 26 January 2026 (perfected on 4 February 2026).
5. The applicants filed an amended statement of grounds (dated 26 January 2026) on 8 April
7. The commission served its opposition papers on 19 March 2026 (which were filed on 20 March 2026).
8. EDF served its opposition papers on 20 March 2026 (which were filed on 23 March 2026).
9. The applicants served three replying affidavits on 10 April
11. The applicants served their submissions on 14 April
13. The matter was listed for callover on 20 April
15. EDF served its submissions on 21 April
17. The commission served its submissions on 21 April
19. The statement of case was uploaded to ShareFile on 21 April
21. The matter was listed for hearing on 28 April
23. Judgment was reserved

the end of that hearing. I would like to record my thanks to all of the lawyers involved for their unfailingly courteous, professional and helpful assistance. As I have previously sought to make clear, insofar as any points advanced are not being accepted in this or any other given judgment, that is solely to do with the inherent merits of such points and is no reflection on those instructed to convey such points, a distinction that most certainly should be, and I believe generally is in fact, self-evident to all concerned. 31. On 22 May 2026, a draft of the present judgment was sent to the parties, pursuant to paras. 15, 195 to 198 and 204 of Practice Direction HC 137, to give an opportunity to address matters such as errors/ambiguities on the basis set out below. 32. Parties are required to: (

1. i)Read the draft or have their legal representatives if applicable do so on their behalf. (
2. ii)Identify any matters falling within the below. (iii) Positively communicate with the court in writing in response to the draft by the deadline specified, such responses to be emailed to the court and uploaded to ShareFile, either stating that they have no comments or setting out the comments. (
3. iv)Carry out the foregoing without delay – the draft judgment procedure is a concession which parties can engage with but must do so with immediate dispatch, discipline 5 and focus – it is not the opening of a new phase of the litigation that gives rise to “an entitlement to elaborate procedures

every point” (to use a phrase of O’Donnell C.J. (Dunne, Charleton and Baker JJ. concurring) in O’Sullivan v. Health Service Executive [2023] IESC 11 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 May 2023)

para. 39); and still less should the procedure invite the perhaps “serious error, to which lawyers are prone, to approach any such case on the tacit assumption that only procedures which approximate to a criminal trial are fair, and anything which departs from that is somehow dubious” (O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J., McKechnie, MacMenamin, Dunne JJ. concurring) in O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75, [2017] 3 I.R. 751, [2018] 1 I.L.R.M. 245, 780). (v) Keep the draft confidential. Draft judgments are not public domain materials and, while they can be shared between the lawyers concerned and their clients, subject to the following, it is inappropriate for any person to refer to them for any purpose other than to assist the court in relation to the finalisation of the formal judgment. Therefore anyone with information as to the text, content or proposed outcome of any draft is required not to publish or transmit such information to others save solely by way of private transmission for the legitimate purposes of assisting in the finalisation of the judgment and subject to a similar restriction on any recipient. Trial participants should take reasonable steps to keep drafts confidential. On this topic, see

torney General v. Crosland (No. 2) [2021] UKSC 58, [2022] 1 W.L.R. 367, [24/01/2022] T.L.R. 1 (Briggs, Kitchin, Burrows, Rose, Arden SCJJ.) which discusses why restriction on publication of draft judgments is in the interests of the administration of justice; see also Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 1131 (Ch), [2006] 5 WLUK 45,

the hearing, any submission as to why such reference is not relevant or otherwise should not be included or as to why such matter if included should not lead to the proposed conclusion; (

1. e)any other matter in the draft judgment that the party considers should be omitted; (
2. f)any matter not included in the draft judgment that the party considers should be added to it (including where the party considers that procedural, factual or legal points not set out in the judgment should be addressed or where the party considers that reasons for any aspect of the decision are not set out or where an overall ground is disposed of but detail of the ground or sub-ground is not expressly addressed, or where an issue arose the disposition of which would be obiter but on which the party concerned considers that there would be a benefit in the court expressing a view); and (
3. g)any other proposals as to the wording (as opposed to substance) of the decision if the proposed wording causes any issue for a party for any identified reason; and 6 (iii) assisting the court by providing views on such matters if any on which views are specifically invited in the draft judgment. 35. In particular, parties should draw the court’s

tention to any apparent error or ambiguity whether they have been successful on the point or not. 36. The rules of engagement in such a situation are that the draft is without prejudice to the right of the court ultimately to issue a judgment in whatever form or with whatever content it considers appropriate. It is then entirely a matter for the court as to whether to give judgment with or without amendment including any amendment that appears appropriate to the court whether arising from submissions or not. Any judgment may be given without further notice following the expiry of the specified period, whether comments are made or not. That period will not be extended save in exceptional circumstances. 37. The deadline for such comments from the parties was to be 16:00 on Wednesday 27 May 2026. Comments were as follows: (

1. i)applicants – restated their position on wind-take on the record (see below); (
2. ii)commission – helpfully pointed out some typos; and (iii) developer – no additional comments. Relief sought 38. The reliefs sought are as follows: “1. An Order of certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing the decision of the Respondent dated the 27th November 2025, granting permission to the Notice Party (on appeal from the planning authority first instance decision (Planning Ref. No. 24/60122)) for the construction of 7 wind turbines and associated works within Killeshin Hills, in the townland of Ridge, Agharue, Coolnakisha and Seskinrea, County Carlow (ABP-320354-24). 2. Such further and / or other Orders or Declaration(
3. s)as to the legal rights and / or legal position of the Applicants and / or the legal duties and / or legal position of the Respondent as the Court considers appropriate. 3. A Declaration that special costs rules apply to the proceedings under Section 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended) and / or by way of Section 3 and 4 of the Environmental (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act, 2011; 4. An Order pursuant to Order 84 rule 20

all, the reasons and basis for the previous refusal (PL.01.243364) of permission for a 21 turbine wind farm

the subject location. The failure to do so was a failure to take relevant considerations into account rendering the Respondent’s decision invalid. i. If the Respondent did consider the planning history and previous refusal (PL.01.243364) it failed to set out any reasons or any sufficient reasons so as to understand why it was permissible to grant permission on this occasion when the Bord had previously made express finding as to the unsuitability of wind turbines

the elevated ‘ridge’ location. 3. The Respondent failed to engage with, consider or address the submissions from the Applicants and the planning authority as to the applicability of the 2006 Wind Energy Guidelines in the context of noise, shadow flicker and the sitting for the proposed wind turbines. The Respondent was directly requested to consider the 2019 draft Wind Energy Guidelines, the World Health Organisation 2018 Guidelines on Noise and the independent expert reports submitted as regards the issue of noise and human amenity from the operation of wind turbines in the rural setting including the cumulative effect on noise, shadow flicker and visual amenity arising from all wind farms in the location. The Respondent did not address these submissions adequately, or

all, and effectively treated the 2006 Wind Energy Guidelines as prescriptive, conclusive and exclusive. This amounted to a fettering of the Respondent’s discretion inter alia whether or not to ‘have regard’ to the 2006 Guidelines. 4. The impugned decision is invalid as the Respondent erred in failing to consider adequately or

all the submission from the First Applicants on the environmental consequences of microplastic emission from the operation of the subject wind turbines, being an area where the local drinking water supply emanates from. Such submissions, and the evidence upon which they were based, comprised a relevant planning consideration and a relevant EIA consideration which the Respondent ignored entirely in its Inspector’s Report and in its ultimate decision to grant permission. i. If this issue was considered, the Respondent failed to give sufficient reasons or any reasons to enable the Applicants to understand how such an environmental issue was dismissed or overcome by the Respondent. ii. Having regard to the considerations that are incumbent upon the Respondent to take into account when considering the potential effects on the environment the decision reached by the Respondent is irrational. 5. The Respondent and / or the Notice Party erroneously described the property of the Second Named Applicant as a ‘participating property’ with the result inter alia that no mitigation measures to eliminate shadow flicker to his property were proposed, assessed or mandated by the ultimate planning conditions

tached to control shadow flicker to residential properties effected. The description of the Second Named Applicant’s property as a ‘participating property’ was a material error of fact and the failure to take into account the submissions of the Applicant that his property was not a ‘participating property’ was a failure to take into account a material consideration when reaching the impugned decision. 6. The impugned decision is invalid as the Respondent erred in law in

1. a)failing to identify the material contravention of the Carlow Development Plan as it related to landscape WE.P4, 16.12.3, LA.P1, LA.P2, LA.P3 and LA.P11 and noise assessment WE.P1 and 16.12.2 and
2. b)in materially contravening the Carlow Development Plan 2022 - 2028, Policy WE.P4, LA.P1, LA.P2, LA.P3, LA.P11 and WE.P1 and 16.12.2 which seek to protect and maintain the overall integrity of Carlow County’s landscape; which area, has a landscape sensitivity rate of 5 out of scale of 1 to 5; i. The Respondent was not entitled to grant development consent in the absence of a clear and cogent assessment as to how it was justifiable to contravene the development plan that wind farms were ‘not normally permissible’ in the subject area and acted ultra vires in so granting development consent without providing a reasoned conclusion or any conclusion for departing from the protections afforded to the landscape area by the Carlow Development Plan. EU Law Ground 7. The impugned decision is invalid and the Respondent erred in law in granting planning permission for the development of the site given the selective overreliance by the Respondent on the Wind Energy Guidelines 2006, which guidelines, it was submitted where in breach of the SEA Directive 2001/42EU and S.I 2004/435 Regulations as being a plan or programme which was compiled without having first undergone an environmental assessment in accordance with the SEA Directive 2001/42EU.” The impugned decision 40. The impugned decision provides as follows: 8 “Decision GRANT permission for the above proposed development based on the reasons and considerations under and subject to the conditions set out below. Reasons and Considerations The Commission performed its functions in relation to the making of its decision in a manner consistent with Section 15

tainment of Conservation Objectives for the River Barrow and River Nore Special Area of Conservation (Site Code: 002162) or the River Nore Special Protection Area (Site Code: 004233). Environmental Impact Assessment: The Commission completed an environmental impact assessment of the proposed development taking account of: (

1. a)the nature, scale and extent of the proposed development, (
2. b)the Environmental Impact Assessment Reports (EIAR’
3. s)and associated documentation submitted in support of the application, (
4. c)the planning authority reports, and the submissions received from the observers and prescribed bodies, and (
5. d)the Inspector’s report. The Commission considered that the Environmental Impact Assessment Report, supported by the documentation submitted by the applicant, adequately considers alternatives to the proposed development and provided information which is reasonable and sufficient to allow the Commission to reach a reasoned conclusion on the significant effects of the proposed development on the environment, taking into account current knowledge and methods of assessment. The Commission i's satisfied that the information contained in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report is up to date and complies with the provisions of EU Directive 2014/52/EU amending Directive 201 1 /92/EU The Commission considered, and agreed with the Inspector’s reasoned conclusions, that the main significant direct and indirect effects, both positive and negative, of the proposed development on the environment are those arising from the impacts listed below and would be mitigated as follows: • Landscape and Visual: Negative landscape and visual impacts arise during the operational phase of the proposed development given the placement of significant structures within the local landscape thereby changing the existing visual context. This will result in significant residual indirect and cumulative visual effects on a small number of residential receptors located in elevated positions to the west and north, within circa 800 metres, and which have primary views towards the proposed wind farm. Residual landscape effects on the site will be direct and not significant, and on the wider study area indirect, cumulative and not significant. Residual visual effects on other visual receptors will be indirect, cumulative and not significant. • Land, Soil, Geology, Air and Climate: Taking account of mitigation measures to manage risk, a low risk of peat slide has been demonstrated. Positive long-term significant cumulative effects on climate as a result of the proposed development in combination with other wind farms due to reduced greenhouse gas emission from increased electricity generation from renewable sources. • Biodiversity and Birds: The removal of linear habitats on site, including treelines and hedgerows will have local effects which can be mitigated through the delivery of mitigation measures, including the Biodiversity Management and Enhancement Plan within the site. Negative local level effects on species and birds which are likely to arise in the construction or operational phases can be adequately mitigated by 10 measures and monitoring outlined in the application documentation and are not considered to be significant. • Water (including aquatic habitat and species): There will be no impacts on water connectivity or movement of fish or result in the loss of instream habitat. Negative effects on surface water and groundwater, and on aquatic species, habitat and downstream receptors which are likely to arise from potential release of sediments and other pollutants into watercourses can be adequately mitigated by measures outlined in the application documentation. The proposed development will not cause a deterioration in water quality or impede the ability of ground water and surface water bodies to achieve good or high status under the Water Framework Directive. • Noise: Negative noise impacts arising during the construction phase of the proposed development will be short-term, temporary, transient and mitigated through the implementation of measures outlined in the planning application documentation. Operational noise levels, individual and cumulatively, will not be significant and can be controlled by noise limit condition and mode management mitigation measures. • Cultural Heritage: Permanent changes to Black Bridge (a protected structure) will have a direct, moderate and not significant effect, and will be further mitigated through the implementation of measures outlined in the planning application documentation. • Material Assets: Negative traffic effects arise during the construction phase of the proposed development; the road network has the capacity to facilitate this traffic, and effects will be mitigated through the implementation of a traffic management plan. Potential negative effects on telecommunication links and aviation during operation can be adequately mitigated. • Population and Human Health: Negative impacts on human health and population arising from construction and operation, including noise, traffic and dust disturbance, can be adequately mitigated by measures outlined in the application documentation. Long-term positive moderate cumulative effects on the local area from employment and investment. The Commission completed an environmental impact assessment in relation to the proposed development and concluded that, subject to the implementation of the mitigation measures proposed, and subject to compliance with the conditions set out below, the effects of the proposed development on the environment, by -itself and in combination with other plans and projects in the vicinity would be acceptable. In doing so, the Commission adopted the report and conclusions of the Inspector. Proper Planning and Sustainable Development: It is considered that, subject to compliance with the conditions set out below, the proposed development would make a positive contribution to Ireland's renewable energy and security of energy supply requirements, would be in accordance with European, national, and regional renewable energy policies and with the provisions of the Carlow County Development Plan 2022-2028, would not have an unacceptable impact on the landscape and visual amenities of the area, the biodiversity of the area, geology and soil of the area, the water environment of the area, the residential amenities of the area would not adversely affect the archaeological and cultural heritage of the area, and would be acceptable in terms of traffic and road capacity and traffic safety. The proposed development would, therefore, be in accordance with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area. The Commission noted and agreed with the Inspector’s assessment that the proposed wind farm is acceptable in principle having regard to national, regional and local policy in support of, and requiring the delivery of increased on shore wind energy to meet climate and energy security objectives. The Commission noted that the subject site is located within the uplands landscape type and that Objective WE P4 of the Carlow County Development Plan 20222028 states that wind farm development will not normally be permissible in this landscape type. The Commission noted that this conflicts with Policy RE P1 of the development plan which aims to encourage and facilitate the production of energy from renewable sources, and Objective LA P7 which aims to facilitate developments, including windfarms, that have a functional and locational requirement to be situated on steep or elevated sites. The Commission further noted, and as set out in the Inspector’s assessment, that the Killeshin Hills landscape character area is determined as having moderate capacity to absorb wind farming. Furthermore, the development plan states that ‘in the Killeshin landscape character area, close to the border with County Kilkenny, the wind speeds are favourable and there are no environmental designations that preclude wind farm construction. However, the constraints mapping suggests that it may be difficult to meet separation distances between wind turbines and dwellings.’ The plans and particulars submitted with the planning 11 application confirm that separation distances between the proposed wind farm elements and dwellings can achieve a setback distance of four times the maximum tip height which exceeds the minimum of 500 metres and is in accordance with the draft Wind Energy Development Guidelines 2019, and this, therefore, is not a constraint. Having regard to the entirety of the objectives and provisions of the Carlow County Development Plan in support of the provision of renewable energy, including Chapter 7 (Climate Action and Energy) and Appendix VI (Carlow County Renewable Energy Strategy), the Commission is satisfied that the proposed development can be considered acceptable in the context of Objective WE P4, would be in accordance with the overall policies and objectives of the Carlow County Development Plan 2022-2028, and would be acceptable in the context of national objectives to address climate change, increase renewable energy, and achieve security of energy supply. Conditions 1. The proposed development shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the plans and particulars lodged with the application except as may otherwise be required in order to comply with the following conditions. Where such conditions require details to be agreed with the planning authority, the developer shall agree such details in writing with the planning authority prior to commencement of development and the proposed development shall be carried out and completed in accordance with the agreed particulars. Reason: In the interest of clarity. 2. The period during which the development hereby permitted may be carried -out shall be ten years from the date of this Order. Reason: Having regard to the nature and extent of the proposed development, the Commission considered it appropriate to specify a period of validity of this permission in excess of five years. 3. This permission shall not be construed as any form of consent for the associated development components where these are located within County Kilkenny, including the grid connection route (circa 18.1 kilometres) and the turbine delivery accommodation works, or agreement to a connection to the national grid. Reason: In the interest of clarity. 4. (
6. a)This permission shall be for a period of 35 years from the date of the first commissioning of the windfarm. All structures, including foundations, shall then be removed and the site reinstated unless, prior to the end of that period, planning permission shall have been granted for their retention for a further period. (
7. b)Prior to commencement of development, a detailed Site Restoration Plan providing for the removal of the turbines and all ancillary structures, and a timescale for its implementation, shall be submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the planning authority. (
8. c)On full or partial decommissioning, or if the wind farm ceases operation for a period of more than one year, the windfarm, the turbines and all ancillary structures shall be dismantled and permanently removed from the site. The site shall be restored in accordance with the agreed Site Restoration Plan, and all decommissioned structures shall be removed from the site within 12 months of decommissioning. Reason: To enable the planning authority to review the operation of the windfarm over the stated time period, having regard to the circumstances then prevailing, and in the interest of landscape restoration upon cessation of the project. 5. The mitigation, monitoring and enhancement measures contained in the submitted Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) shall be implemented in full. Reason: To protect the environment. 6. The mitigation and monitoring measures contained in the submitted Natura Impact Statement (NIS) shall be implemented in full. Reason: To protect the environment and the integrity of European Sites. 7 The developer shall retain the services of a suitably qualified and experienced Ecologist (to perform the role of Ecological Clerk of Works) to undertake pre-construction surveys

the various project elements, immediately prior to commencing work to check for the presence of protected species in the vicinity, and to oversee and ensure the implementation of all environmental mitigation and monitoring measures during construction and operation of the wind farm. Reason: To protect biodiversity.

1. Prior to commencement of development, the developer shall submit to the planning authority a complete schedule of all mitigation, monitoring and enhancement measures. This shall identify who is responsible for the implementation of these measures and timescales for implementation. Reason: To protect the environment and the integrity of European Sites. 12
2. (a) Appropriate software shall be employed on each of the turbines to ensure that there will be no shadow flicker

existing nearby habitable dwellings (excluding participating properties). Turbine shutdown shall be undertaken by the wind energy developer or operator in order to eliminate the potential for shadow flicker. (b) A report shall be prepared by a suitably qualified person in accordance with the requirements of the planning authority indicating compliance with the above shadow flicker requirements

dwellings. Within 12 months of the commissioning of the wind farm, this report shall be prepared and submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the planning authority. The developer shall outline proposed measures to address any recorded non-compliances, including controlling turbine rotation, if necessary. A similar report may be requested by the planning authority

reasonable intervals thereafter. Reason: In the interest of residential amenity. 10. (a) Noise levels generated by the windfarm following commissioning, by itself or in combination with other existing or permitted wind energy development in the vicinity, when measured externally

existing noise sensitive locations, shall not exceed: • For the daytime period, 7am to 11pm, in quiet environments, where background noise is less than 30dB(A)L90 T10, a maximum noise level of 40dB(A)L90 T10. • For the daytime period, 7am to 11pm, where the background noise level exceeds 30dB(A)L90 T10, the greater of 45dB(A)L90 T1 0, or 5dB(A) above background levels. • For the nighttime period, 11 pm to 7am, for all noise environments, 43dB(A)L90 T10. (

1. b)Prior to the commissioning of the windfarm, the developer shall submit to, and agree in writing with, the planning authority a Noise Compliance Monitoring Programme (NCMP) for the operational windfarm. The NCMP shall include a detailed methodology for all sound measurements, including frequency of monitoring and recording of results, which shall be made publicly available. The results of the initial noise compliance monitoring shall be submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the planning authority within 12 months of commissioning of the wind farm. The NCMP shall be fully implemented during the operation of the windfarm. Reason: in order to protect the amenities of existing noise sensitive properties in the vicinity of the proposed development. 11. All works to Black Bridge (a protected structure) shall be carried out under the supervision of a qualified professional with specialised conservation expertise and in accordance with best conservation practice as detailed in the ‘Architectural Heritage Protection: Guidelines for Planning Authorities’ issued by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government in 2011. A Structural Assessment of the bridge in accordance with relevant Transport Infrastructure Ireland Guidelines and an Architectural Impact Assessment shall be submitted for the written agreement of the planning authority prior to the commencement of any works on Black Bridge. Reason: To ensure that the character and integrity of the protected structure and NIAH listed structures is maintained and protected from unnecessary damage and loss of fabric. 12. The developer shall appoint a Community Liaison Officer for all stages of the proposed development who shall be the first point of contact for residents and be responsible for monitoring and reporting of complaints, maintaining complaints register, addressing complaints and for discharging information in relation to the development to residents. Contact details for the Community Liaison Officer shall be provided to the planning authority. Reason: In the interest of amenity and orderly development. 13. The construction of the proposed development shall be managed in accordance with a Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) which shall be submitted to, and agreed in writing with, the planning authority prior to commencement of development. The CEMP shall provide an implementation tool for the schedule of mitigations (as conditioned) and as applicable to the construction phase and the contractor(s). The CEMP shall provide details of intended construction practice for the proposed development, including, but not limited to, and in line with the methodology and mitigation and monitoring measures detailed in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report and the Natura Impact Statement: (
2. a)Details of the construction methodology for all the components of the proposed development. (
3. b)Details of all services and utilities along the grid connection route and methodology for crossing/diversions. (
4. c)Details of on-site car parking and access arrangements for site workers and deliveries. (
5. d)A construction traffic management plan. Details of abnormal load road routes and management of the abnormal load delivery process, construction haul routes, road closures 13 and diversion, local property access arrangements, and alternative arrangements to be put in place for pedestrians in the case of the closure of any public road or footpath during the course of site development works (
6. e)Measures to obviate the queuing of construction traffic on the adjoining road network. (
7. f)Measures to prevent the spillage or deposit of clay, rubble or other debris on the public road network. (
8. g)Details of appropriate mitigation measures for noise, dust and vibration, and monitoring of such levels. (
9. h)Containment of all construction-related fuel and oil within specially constructed bunds to ensure that fuel spillages are fully contained. Such bunds shall be roofed to exclude rainwater (
10. i)Details of marking of hydrological buffer zones and silt fencing. Means to ensure that surface water run-off is controlled such that no silt or other pollutants enter local surface water sewers or drains. (
11. j)A surface water management plan, including details of water quality monitoring. (
12. k)Works to be carried out in accordance with Inland Fisheries Ireland 'Guidelines on protection of fisheries during construction works in and adjacent to waters’. (
13. l)The location and specifications of any temporary storage requirements. (
14. m)A waste management plan for construction waste. (
15. n)The location of all archaeological constraints and cultural heritage constraints relevant to the proposed development. (
16. o)A record of daily checks that the works are being undertaken in accordance with the CEMP shall be made available for inspection by the planning authority, with monitoring on a daily basis of all watercourses in or adjacent to works areas. (
17. p)Details of a local community feedback mechanism, where feedback, including complaints, are received and acted upon by a designated Community Liaison Officer. Reason: In the interest of amenities, public health and safety and environmental protection. 14. The actual detail(
18. s)of the proposed development not confirmed

the time of the planning application, the subject of an opinion by the planning authority under section 321

ground level beside the mast. Reason: In the interest of visual amenity. 16. Prior to the commissioning of the windfarm, the developer shall submit for the written agreement of the planning authority details of actions to be taken by the developer in the event of the development causing interference with telecommunication signals. Such actions shall be completed to minimise interference with telecommunication signals and shall be carried out to the written satisfaction of the planning authority

the developer’s expense. Reason: In the interest of protecting telecommunication signals and residential amenity.

1. Prior to commencement of development, details of the external finishes to the substation buildings and structures, battery energy storage system, fencing, and for provision of CCTV to the sub-station compound, shall be submitted to the planning authority for written agreement. Reason: In the interest of clarity and visual amenity.
2. Site development and building works shall be carried out only between the hours of 0700 to 1900 Mondays to Fridays, inclusive, between 0800 to 1400 hours on Saturdays and not

all on Sundays or public holidays. Deviation from these times shall only be allowed in exceptional circumstances, including when delivering abnormal loads, where prior written agreement has been received from the planning authority and in accordance with measures outlined in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report. Reason: To safeguard the amenity of property in the vicinity. 19. (

1. a)Prior to commencement of development, the developer shall carry out a preliminary screening of enroute communications, navigation and surveillance equipment in consultation with the Irish Aviation Authority. On completion of the screening, confirmation of its 14 agreement with the Irish Aviation Authority shall be submitted by the developer to the planning authority for written agreement. (
2. b)Prior to commencement of development and following consultation with the Department of Defence and the Irish Aviation Authority, the developer shall submit for the written agreement of the planning authority details of an obstacle warning light scheme which can be visible to night vision equipment. (
3. c)The developer shall inform the Irish Aviation Authority of its intention to commence crane operations with a minimum of 30 days prior notification of their erection (
4. d)Prior to commissioning of the turbines, the developer shall inform the planning authority and the Irish Aviation Authority of the coordinates of the as-constructed positions of the turbines and the highest point of the turbines (to the top of the blade spin). Reason: In the interest of air traffic safety. 20. (
5. a)Prior to commencement of development, the developer shall submit a Fire Risk Assessment of the BESS, which shall be carried out by a suitably qualified individual, for the review of the planning authority. No works shall commence on site until the developer has received the written agreement of the planning authority with regard to this assessment (
6. b)Only first generation (new) batteries shall be used in the proposed development. Prior to commencement of development, a method statement shall be submitted for the written agreement of the planning authority detailing how end-of-life batteries shall be managed and disposed of. End-of-life battery management shall thereafter be undertaken in accordance with the details agreed. Reason: In the interest of public safety and environmental management. 21. (
7. a)The developer shall establish a Community Benefit scheme which shall be adhered to for the life of the wind farm. The scheme shall be administered in accordance with the RESS Community Benefit Fund Good Practice Principles, 2021, prepared by the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications (
8. b)In the event that the developer does not utilise the government’s Renewable Energy Support Scheme (RESS), prior to the commencement of development, a community gain proposal shall be submitted to the planning authority for written agreement. In default of agreement, the matter shall be referred to An Coimisiún Pleanála for determination. Reason: To ensure that the community living in proximity to the wind farm benefits from it. 22. Prior to commencement of development, the developer shall lodge with the planning authority a cash deposit, a bond of an insurance company, or such other security as may be acceptable to the planning authority, to secure the reinstatement of public roads which may be damaged by the transport of materials to the site, coupled with an agreement empowering the planning authority to apply such security or part thereof to the satisfactory reinstatement of the public roads. The form and amount of the security shall be as agreed between the planning authority and the developer or, in default of agreement, shall be referred to An Coimisiún Pleanála for determination. Reason: In the interest of traffic safety and the proper planning and sustainable development of the area. 23. Prior to commencement of development, the developer shall lodge with the planning authority a cash deposit, a bond of an insurance company, or such other security as may be acceptable to the planning authority, to secure the satisfactory reinstatement of the site upon cessation of the project, coupled with an agreement empowering the planning authority to apply such security or part thereof to such reinstatement. The form and amount of the security shall be as agreed between the planning authority and the developer or, in default of agreement, shall be referred to An Coimisiún Pleanála for determination. Reason: To ensure the satisfactory reinstatement of the site. 24. The developer shall pay to the planning authority a financial contribution in respect of public infrastructure and facilities benefiting development in the area of the planning authority that is provided or intended to be provided by or on behalf of the authority in accordance with the terms of the Development Contribution Scheme made under section 48 of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended. The contribution shall be paid prior to commencement of development or in such phased payments as the planning authority may facilitate and shall be subject to any applicable indexation provisions of the Scheme

the time of payment. Details of the application of the terms of the Scheme shall be agreed between the planning authority and the developer or, in default of such agreement, the matter shall be referred to An Coimisiún Pleanála to determine the proper application of the terms of the Scheme. Reason: It is a requirement of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended, that a condition requiring a contribution in accordance with the Development Contribution Scheme made under section 48 of the Act be applied to the permission.” 15 Some general considerations

1. It may be of assistance to set out some general considerations arising from previous caselaw, under a number of headings as follows. Overall requirements for relief by way of judicial review
2. As discussed in Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 (Unreported, High Court, 28 November 2025) and other cases (see also Foran v. An Coimisiún Pleanála & Glenveagh [2026] IEHC 23 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 23 January 2026)), there is an eight-fold path to obtaining relief by way of judicial review. These tests are cumulative, and relief should only be granted if the proceedings meet all of the following: (i) the applicant complies with jurisdictional requirements (e.g. time or standing to bring the proceedings

all (as opposed to standing for particular issues within a case that the applicant can bring

a general level)); (

1. ii)the applicant’s point is legally correct and workable; (iii) the applicant’s point is properly pleaded with the requisite specificity; (
2. iv)the specific point is one that the applicant has standing to make (bearing in mind that while standing can relate to issues such as ius tertii it does not generally require prior participation in the process insofar as there is an EU/Aarhus Convention dimension); (
3. v)material capable of sustaining the point was properly before the decision-taker

the relevant time such as to give rise to a duty to consider it (subject to exceptions primarily related to failure by the decision-taker to fulfil her autonomous obligations); (vi) the applicant has discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief; (vii) any error must transcend the harmless, the non-material and the purely technical lacking real-world consequences, bearing in mind that if error is demonstrated, then the onus shifts to the opposing parties to show harmlessness; and (viii) the exercise of discretion within established parameters does not militate against the making of the order (such as considering the proportionality of the order sought), bearing in mind that discretion is potentially more limited in an EU law context. 43. Before dealing with specific elements in detail, some general comments are worth noting

this juncture: (i) Judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the correctness of the decision: Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22

para. 1 per Donnelly J. (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring); per Clarke J. (Dunne J. concurring) in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 2014)

paras. 3.8-3.15. It is not an appeal on the merits and it is not for the court to substitute its view for that of the decision-taker: per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642

p. 654 (Hamilton P. concurring); per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; per Lady Hale in R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2012] 1 AC 663

para. 47: “it is not difficult to dress up an argument as a point of law when in truth it is no more than an

tack upon ... factual conclusions”. See also Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2025] IEHC 178 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 1 April 2025); Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

11. (ii) As Singh L.J. and Carr J. put it in R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 (Admin), [2019] 1 W.L.R. 4105

[326] (emphasis added): “Judicial review is not, and should not be regarded as, politics by another means”. The court must keep the separation of powers firmly in mind: Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63, [2001] 2 I.R. 545 (Keane C.J., Denham, Murphy, Murray, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ.); T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 101, [2001] 4 I.R. 259 (Keane C.J., Denham, Murphy, Murray and Hardiman JJ.); B. v. Child & Family Agency & Ors. [2025] IESC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 27 January 2025) (O’Donnell C.J., Murray, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), para. 62; consequently the courts must respect the principle that policy choices are for other branches of government. To stray into policy fundamentally distorts the process because “[t]he administrator is often concerned with broad considerations of the public interest whereas the judge tends to focus on the claims of the parties to the case before him” De Blacam, Judicial Review, 2nd ed, p. 97. What O’Donnell C.J. (Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring) has recently said of Article 42A is true of the 16 (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Constitution and law generally – it is not “an open-ended provision that requires courts to substitute their judgment on social issues ... for that of the Oireachtas” (G. v. Ireland [2025] IESC 49 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 26 November 2025)

68). Nor is the equality guarantee to “become instead a more general power to second guess legislative choices in difficult areas where the courts have very limited insight. ” (

para. 86). He noted: “In Re SC [2021] UKSC 26, [2022] AC 223, Lord Reed cautioned against an expansive application of the equality guarantee contained in Article 14 ECHR observing that, in effect, since legislation was the art of differentiation, any legislation could be contested from the point of view of equality, and that a broad and expansive application of the guarantee risked undue interference with the sphere of political choice. I agree. Once it is established that a classification is not arbitrary or capricious or based on prejudice or stereotype, then this is an area where there is particular merit in the observations of Chief Justice Stone that ‘[c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern’ (United States v Butler

para. 27; Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

121; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

12. Generally speaking evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement and not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors are reviewable on an irrationality standard: Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Woulfe J., 11 April 2024) (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring); Barr J. in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2024), leave to appeal refused in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 22 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025). A decision must be read in a way that makes sense rather than nonsense if such a reading is available. It is not the case that decisions must be read in the most erroneous way possible so that applicants can get their order of certiorari (M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020); Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 (Unreported, High Court, 9 February 2021)

§50; St.

Margaret’s Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 20 February 2024)

§57); Duffy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 30 December 2025)

32. Thus a decision should not be read as invalid if a valid reading is reasonably available: see M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020)

§7; Mulloy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 86 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 12 March 2024)

§178(citing O’Donnell v.

An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023)); Save Roscam Peninsula CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 6) [2024] IEHC 335 (Unreported, High Court, 7 June 2024)

§64

); thus for example “unhelpful” statements should not be read as inconsistent with statutory factors if the decision can be read as valid – E.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IESC 3 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 21 February 2024) per Dunne J. (Charleton, Woulfe, Murray and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025); Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13, and this applies even if the wording is sub-optimal: Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 715 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 30 December 2025)

32. It is not appropriate to engage in legalistic over-parsing or micro-analysis of decisions, or of legal instruments generally, frequently based on semantic querulousness: per Sullivan J. in R (Blewett) v. Derbyshire County Council [2003] 17 (vii) (viii) EWHC 2775 (Admin), [2004] Env. L.R. 29

para. 41; R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212, Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.; per O’Donnell C.J. (Dunne, Charleton and Baker JJ. concurring) in O’Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 May 2023)

para. 37. As stated by Peart J. in G.T. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] IEHC 287, [2007] 7 JIC 2708 (Unreported, High Court, 27 July 2007), para. 3: “It is not desirable that a decision be parsed and analysed word for word in order to discern some possible infelicity in the choice of words or phrases used and to hold that a finding of credibility adverse to the applicant is invalid, unless the matters relied upon have been clearly misunderstood or mis-stated by the decision maker. The whole of the decision must be read and considered in order to reach a view as to whether, when the decision is read in its entirety and considered as a whole, there was no reasonable basis for the decision maker reaching that conclusion”. See also A.I.M.Z. v. Refugee Applications Commission & Ors. [2008] IEHC 420, [2008] 11 JIC 0705 (Unreported, High Court, 7 November 2008)

para. 24 per Clarke J.; per McCarthy J. in S.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Anor. [2009] IEHC 383, [2010] 7 JIC 2803 (Unreported, High Court, 28 July 2009), para. 13; per Clark J. in Obuseh v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2010] IEHC 93, [2010] 1 JIC 1404 (Unreported, High Court, 14 January 2010), para. 21; per MacEochaidh J. in Bondo v. Minister for Justice & Ors. [2012] IEHC 454, [2012] 11 JIC 0903 (Unreported, High Court, 9 November 2012), para. 24; per Barr J. in P.M. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 497, [2014] 10 JIC 0204 (Unreported, High Court, 2 October 2014), para. 59; per Faherty J. in O.S. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 839, 2015 WJSC-HC 25494, [2015] 12 JIC 1505 (Unreported, High Court, 15 December 2015), para. 59; X.E. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 402, [2018] 7 JIC 0405 (Unreported, High Court, Keane J., 4 July 2018); B.D.C. (Nigeria) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2018] IEHC 460, [2018] 7 JIC 2006 (Unreported, High Court, 20 July 2018), para. 7; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13. Mere technicalities are not normally a proper basis for the grant of relief: see e.g. The State (Toft) v. Galway Corporation 1981 WJSC-SC 2110, [1981] ILRM 439 (O’Higgins C.J.; Walsh and Kenny JJ. concurring); Moore v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2016] IESC 70, [2017] 3 I.R. 42, [2017] 2 I.L.R.M. 21 (Clarke, Laffoy and O’Malley JJ.) para. 4.8 (distinguishing a substance point from “a technicality”); Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30, [2022] 2 I.L.R.M. 417 (Hogan J.; MacMenamin, Charleton, O’Malley and Baker JJ. concurring). In Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52, [2024] 1 I.R. 205

60, Woulfe J. (Dunne, Charleton, O’Malley and Hogan JJ. concurring) said (without needing to decide the point) that there was “a great deal of force” in the submission that it would be disproportionate to quash a decision on the basis of a “technical procedural error”. See also Watchhouse Cross Shopping Centre v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 520 (Unreported, High Court, 3 October 2025). Relatedly, a decision must be read in the round and in its context. One has to view an administrative decision in the round, and not place undue weight on semantic quibbles in respect of micro-sub-elements of it: O.A.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor. [2007] IEHC 169, [2007] 2 JIC 0904 (Unreported, High Court, Feeney J., 9 February 2007); J.B.R. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors. [2007] IEHC 288, [2007] 7 JIC 3110 (Unreported, High Court, Peart J., 31 July 2007); per Cooke J. in I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 510, [2015] 4 I.R. 144

p. 152; M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020), para. 6. A decision should be read not solely from an applicant’s point of view (an impossible standard), but from the starting point of it being valid rather than invalid where possible. One has to stand back and ask what the decision is fundamentally saying (O’Donnell & Ors. v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023), para. 54; St. Margaret’s Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 20 February 2024)

§57; Moran v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

13. Judicial review is not an exercise in pointless formalism: see for example Okunade v. Minister for Justice [2018] IESC 56, [2018] 11 JIC 1401 (Unreported, Supreme 18 (ix) (x) Court, 14 November 2018) per O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J. and O’Malley J. concurring)

para.

1. It is not a game where the respondents can score as many goals as they like, but if the applicant scores one goal, the game is over. The court must make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the overall sustainability of a decision, even if there is an argument for saying that limited parts of it are suboptimal: M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, [2020] 1 JIC 2903 (Unreported, High Court, 29 January 2020), para.
2. It is not for the applicant to dictate the procedures to be adopted or the form of a decision: see for example per Ryan P. (Peart and Hogan JJ. concurring) in A.B. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IECA 48, [2016] 2 JIC 2602, 2016 WJSC-CA 1525 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26 February 2016)

para. 43. A final important general point is that there is a presumption that material has been considered if the decision says so, the onus being on an applicant to evidentially displace that: see per Hardiman J. (Denham and Geoghegan JJ. concurring) in G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418, [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401; Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), para. 91 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 55; this includes documents before the decision-taker such as a Natura impact statement – such matters are considered for AA purposes – An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para.

1. Pleadings
2. Some relevant legal principles concerning pleading requirements which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) Applicants are confined to their pleadings: A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2, [2011] 1 I.R. 729, [2011] 2 I.L.R.M. 100, [2011] 1 JIC 2501; Khashaba v. Medical Council of Ireland [2016] IESC 10, [2016] 3 JIC 0701, 2016 WJSC-SC 12280 per O’Malley J. (Denham C.J. and Clarke J. concurring)

para. 56; Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42, [2021] 7 JIC 1606 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Baker J., 16 July 2021) (Clarke C.J., O'Donnell, MacMenamin and Dunne JJ. concurring)

§§29and 31; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v.

An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024) per Murray J.

paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Eglington Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 209 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 15 April 2025)

11. The rules of pleading are well-established, clear and mandatory, and are of particular importance in a context of special complexity such as technical EU-heavy areas of planning law; while exact specification of every jot and tittle of a case is an impossible standard, an applicant can only be permitted to advance

a hearing a point that is acceptably clear from the express terms of the statement of grounds, subject to the grant of any order allowing an amendment: Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27, [2024] 1 JIC 2401 (Unreported, High Court, 24 January 2024). (

1. ii)Pleading requirements in judicial review are “stringent”, allowing “little room for manoeuvre”: People Over Wind & Anor. v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. (No. 1) [2015] IEHC 271, [2015] 5 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, Haughton J., 1 May 2015). “It shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his grounds for the purposes of paragraphs (
2. ii)or (iii) of sub-rule

para. 308. (iii) Complex EU law arguments need to be articulated with particular clarity. It is particularly important, in the case of an allegation of a failure properly to transpose an obligation under EU law, that the requirements of O. 84, r. 20

para. 103 (cited with approval by Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring) 19 (

1. iv)(
2. v)(
3. vi)(vii) (viii) in Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024); Rushe v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 122, [2020] 3 JIC 0502 (Unreported, High Court, 5 March 2020) per Barniville J.;

tempts to launch for example non-transposition claims not set out on the pleadings are impermissible: Alen-Buckley v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 311, [2017] 5 JIC 1211 (Unreported, High Court, Costello J., 12 May 2017). Recital of high-level principles does not create certiorari by osmosis – an applicant must specify a route-map connecting the particular factual problem alleged with the particular relief sought via a chain of reasoning: Ballyboden Tidy Towns v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 648 (Unreported, High Court, 7 January 2022), para. 20; Foley v. Environmental Protection Agency [2022] IEHC 470 (Unreported, High Court, Twomey J., 24 January 2023), paras. 71-72; Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2024] IEHC 3 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 13 February 2024), para. 124. Scattergun pleadings are liable to be viewed as “a witch’s brew designed to spread maximum confusion and to permit any argument to be made

the hearing that ingenuity can suggest”: Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38, [2024] 1 I.R. 386, [2022] 10 JIC 2402 per O’Donnell C.J.

para. 22 (Dunne, Woulfe, Hogan and Murray JJ. concurring). MacMenamin J. (Fennelly and Clarke JJ. concurring) in Babington v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors. [2012] IESC 65 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 18 December 2012) referred to the pleading requirements in judicial review and said

para. 7: “Regrettably, these explicit stipulations are frequently not complied with, and the same grounds are set out in as many different, varying, (and wearying) reformulations of the same point as can be conceived. Practitioners should realise that, in this entirely counterproductive and unnecessary process, there is a real risk of not being able to see the wood for the trees. A good point does not gain force by repetition”. While the court has jurisdiction to grant unpleaded reliefs it can allow such relief only within the contours of the case as defined by the pleaded grounds: Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, [2024] 7 JIC 0402 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024), para. 42 per Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring). Therefore a court can’t grant relief if there is no supporting ground for it. It is not necessary that the specific provisions of national or EU law relied on are expressly enumerated if they are implicitly identifiable with acceptable clarity: Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 4) [2023] IEHC 713 (Unreported, High Court, 18 December 2023); Kennedy & Anor. v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570 (Unreported, High Court, 7 October 2024), para. 132; Leech v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 599 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 12 November 2024); Mount Salus Residents' Owners Management Company Limited by Guarantee v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2025] IEHC 14 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 15 January 2025), para. 39. The standard is acceptable clarity, not express enumeration. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Carvill v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IECA 84 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Barniville P., Collins and Faherty JJ., 11 April 2025)

para. 148, where a developed pleading objection is made, the court should not accept the point made by the applicant without first addressing the objection. That said, the court can reject a point without deciding the pleading objection if it fails either way. Onus of proof 45. Some relevant legal principles concerning the onus of proof which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) With only defined and extremely limited exceptions, in judicial review the onus of proof is on the applicant

all times: per Denham J. (Murray C.J. and Fennelly J. concurring) in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701

p. 743; Cork County Council v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 683 (Unreported, High Court, 5 November 2021)

§57; Monkstown Road Residents Association v.

An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 318 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2022)

para. 96 per Holland J.; that remains the case even when in a constitutional challenge it is proved that constitutional rights have been interfered with: O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 116; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 20 (ii) (iii) (iv) 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

14. To put the same point another way, there is a presumption of validity for administrative decisions: per Finlay P. in In re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (Unreported, High Court, 5 December 1977) and per Keane J. in Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] I.R. 88

102; Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 22; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

15. The onus shifts only in defined special circumstances. For example, where an error is demonstrated by an applicant, the onus shifts to opposing parties to show that the error is harmless: H.A. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IECA 166, [2022] 7 JIC 2201 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Donnelly J., 22 July 2022)

para. 48 (Ní Raifeartaigh and Collins JJ. concurring). An onus on a decision-taker in the administrative process (e.g. to conduct a valid AA) does not convert into an evidential or any burden in the judicial process to show that the decision is valid (for reasons explained in Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26, [2023] 1 JIC 2701 (Unreported, High Court, 27 January 2023)

para. 85). The onus of proof does not shift to a notice party merely because the decisiontaker does not defend the decision on a given point or generally. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s finding in Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 4 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Donnelly J., 22 February 2024) (O’Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Hogan and Collins JJ. concurring) that a notice party can defend a permission even if the decision-taker does not. In the context of a challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show, by evidence (normally expert evidence), or by demonstrating a flaw on face of material, that AA/EIA was defective, or that there were factual circumstances requiring a decision-taker to consider any other autonomous obligation, lies on the applicant: R v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 (Barrow J.)

paras. 36-38, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C 5141; Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 230, [2021] 4 JIC 1204 (Unreported, High Court, 12 April 2021), para. 19; An Taisce v. an Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J.

para. 124 (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring); Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 (Unreported, High Court, 20 May 2024)

§191(v) (leave to appeal refused in Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 9 (Charleton, Collins and Donnelly JJ., 27 January 2025)); Salmon Watch Ireland, Inland Fisheries Ireland, Sweetman & Ors. v. Aquaculture Licences Appeals Board & Ors. [2024] IEHC 421 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 12 July 2024), §1097; Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2024)

para. 115; Minoa Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 704 (Unreported, High Court, Heslin J., 10 December 2024), para. 333; Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

55; Oxigen v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 632 (Unreported, High Court, 19 November 2025) (for example, in relation to proving that a decision-taker lacks expertise). Thus, apart from (

1. i)failure to consider something that the decision-taker was autonomously required to consider, (
2. ii)patent flaw on the face of the materials, or (iii) other legal error, inadequate consideration or failure to dispel scientific doubt has to be established by admissible evidence (normally expert evidence) in the judicial review showing either that reasonable doubt was created by the material before the decision-taker

the time (albeit not limited to what was adduced by the applicant specifically), or that such material even if uncontradicted would on its face have created doubt in the mind of a reasonable expert: An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 422, [2021] 7 JIC 0205 (Unreported, High Court, 2 July 2021)

§7and §8; Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 (Unreported, High Court, 20 May 2024)

§191(v), leave to appeal refused: Carrownagowan Concern Group v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 9 (Charleton, Collins and Donnelly JJ., 27 January 2025); Kennedy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 570 (Unreported, High Court, 7 October 2024)

§§ 73and 105; Roache v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 311 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 21 May 2024)

§117; Ryanair DAC v.

An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 74 (Unreported, High Court, 14 February 2025)

§64et seq.; analogously, Donegal County Council v.

Planree [2024] IECA 300 (Unreported, Court 21 (

1. v)(
2. vi)(vii) (viii) of Appeal, Butler J., 18 December 2024), para. 141; Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 (Unreported, High Court, 11 April 2025). As noted in Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2024), summarised in the non-precedential determination refusing leave to appeal [2025] IESCDET 41 (O’Malley, Murray and Donnelly JJ., 10 March 2025)

para. 8, “the critical point was that scientific and factual shortcomings in EIA or indeed in an Appropriate Assessment, must be established by the applicant who bore the burden of proof”. Similarly, leave to appeal was refused in Eco Advocacy v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 74 (Dunne, Hogan and Donnelly JJ., 4 June 2025) where “The applicant’s claim failed for the reason that the High Court accepted that the respondent had come to a lawful conclusion of no doubt that an appropriate assessment was not needed and that the respondent had given reasons for that conclusion. On the judicial review the applicant had not displaced that conclusion by way of evidence” (para. 25). That is consistent with the general law: O’Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O’Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring). The Supreme Court determination in 100 Meter Tall Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 85 (Charleton, Hogan and Collins JJ., 1 July 2025) is to the same effect: “17. As [the trial judge] pointed out (

para. 196) the Court of Justice ruled in Case C-721/22 Eco Advocacy CLG (EU:C: 2023: 477) the Board simply provides ‘reasons sufficient to explain that the decision does not create reasonable scientific doubt as to impact on European sites.’ This was simply the test which [the trial judge] applied in the present case. He concluded (

para. 230) that the Board had addressed the issue of potential bird movements of water birds and hen harriers and ‘gives reasons for that conclusion which the applicants have not displaced evidentially.’ 18. The Court considers that this second issue involves the application of standard principles and does not meet the constitutional criteria”. See also Eco Advocacy CLG v. An Bord Pleanála & Statkraft [2025] IEHC 15 (Unreported, High Court, 15 January 2025)

§95; Concerned Residents of Coolkill v.

An Bord Pleanála & Midsal Homes [2025] IEHC 265 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 19 May 2025)

309. The onus of proof as to an inadequacy in the decision cannot be discharged by mere assertion: Joyce Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 601, [2020] 11 JIC 2402 (Unreported, High Court, Allen J., 24 November 2020)

§9; Murphy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 59 (Unreported, High Court, Bolger J., 6 February 2024)

§14; nor does mere assertion create scientific doubt for AA purposes: Harrington v.

An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 232, [2014] 5 JIC 0909 (Unreported, High Court, O’Neill J., 9 May 2014); Murphy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 59 (Unreported, High Court, Bolger J., 6 February 2024)

§14; Duffy v.

An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 27 September 2024)

§40-§41.

If demonstration of error depends on expert opinion, the onus of demonstration in that regard cannot be discharged by non-expert views articulated by or on behalf of an applicant. Such an exercise in ultracrepidarianism is generally inadmissible on standard evidential principles insofar as matters of opinion are concerned: Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 (Unreported, High Court, 11 April 2025). Where there is a conflict of admissible evidence, in the absence of cross-examination such a conflict must generally be resolved against the party carrying the onus of proof: RAS Medical Ltd v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] IESC 4, [2019] 1 I.R. 63, [2019] 2 I.L.R.M. 273 (Clarke C.J.) (O’Donnell, MacMenamin, Dunne and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring). That is normally the applicant but in the case of an opposing party asserting that a demonstrated error is harmless, the conflict will be resolved against the opposing party. That said, while conflict between equally inherently credible averments, with no cross-examination, is generally resolved against the party carrying the onus of proof, a court is not always obliged to regard all averments as being equally credible, or to disregard internal or evident problems with them (see by analogy the manner in which the Supreme Court considered it was entitled to prefer an affidavit over even oral evidence in Koulibaly v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2004] IESC 50, [2004] 7 JIC 2906 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Denham J. (Geoghegan and McCracken JJ. concurring), 29 July 2004)). Among the matters to which regard might be had would be included the failure to explain 22 patently relevant questions that are clearly within that party’s responsibility (Doorly v. Corrigan [2022] IECA 6 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 21 January 2022)

para. 137 (Ní Raifeartaigh and Pilkington JJ. concurring)). This specific and common sense power of the court to evaluate inherent defects in evidence remains notwithstanding caselaw on cross-examination such as RAS Medical or Re Bayview Hotel (Waterville) Limited [2022] IEHC 516 (Unreported, High Court, Butler J., 8 September 2022). This is consistent by analogy with the judgment of Hardiman J. (Hanna and Feeney JJ. concurring) in DPP v. Barnes [2006] IECCA 165, [2007] 3 I.R. 130, [2007] 1 I.L.R.M. 350

para. 95 – the court as finder of fact is “not ... constrained” to accept “the only account available” even if that account is provided by oral evidence. The evidence of experts is one area where the court is not automatically obliged to accept evidence absent cross-examination: Tesco Ireland Limited v. Stateline Transport Limited [2024] IECA 46 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Butler J., 23 February 2024). Inadequacy of assessments 46. Some relevant legal principles regarding inadequacy of assessments which have been rehearsed in previous caselaw include the following: (i) European assessments are an iterative process not a single document, so flaws

one point can be addressed

a later point in the process: per Lord Hoffman in R (Edwards) v. Environment Agency [2008] UKHL 22, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1587, para 38; R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

66 and 143; Cogent Land LLP v. Rochford District Council [2012] EWHC 2542 (Admin), [2013] 1 P & CR 2, Singh J. (paras. 111-126); No Adastral New Town Ltd v. Suffolk Coastal District Council [2015] EWCA Civ. 88, [2015] Env. L.R. 28 per Richards LJ. (Underhill and Briggs LJJ. concurring) (paras. 48-54); hence amendments to a plan under assessment can be introduced in the process, R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd

67. (ii) “Deciding whether an effect of a project on the environment is ‘significant’ clearly requires a value judgment and carries the potential for cases to arise in which different decision-makers may legitimately reach different conclusions without it being possible to say that any of them has made an error in interpreting or applying the term”: R (on the application of Finch on behalf of the Weald Action Group) v. Surrey County Council and others [2024] UKSC 20, [2024] 4 All E.R. 717, [2024] P.T.S.R. 988, [2024] 6 W.L.U.K. 315 per Lord Leggatt SCJ. (Lord Kitchin and Lady Rose SCJJ. concurring)

58 (emphasis added). (iii) Determining whether an effect is capable of being assessed, or whether it is a likely effect, is also evaluative: Finch

77-78. (

1. iv)Standard of assessment: AA must, by reference to best scientific knowledge, dispel all reasonable scientific doubt as to adverse effects on European sites (art. 6 habitats directive); EIA must be as complete as possible: judgment of 3 March 2011, Commission v Ireland, C-50/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:109. (
2. v)As with any evaluative conclusion by a decision-taker, the AA evaluation is one in the first instance for the decision-taker: Lord Carnwath in R. (on the application of Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3170

para. 41; per Sales L.J. in Smyth v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 174, [2015] P.T.S.R. 1417

para. 83; judgment of 7 November 2018, Holohan v An Bord Pleanála, C-461/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:883

para. 44; R. (on the application of Wyatt) v. Fareham Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 983, [2023] P.T.S.R. 1952, [2022], 7 W.L.U.K. 197, [2023] Env. L.R. 14 (Sir Keith Lindblom P., Singh and Males LJJ.) (vi) Ultimately it is for the national courts to carry out a thorough and in-depth examination of the scientific soundness of the AA: judgment of 7 November 2018, Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA and Vereniging Leefmilieu v College van gedeputeerde staten van Limburg and College van gedeputeerde staten van Gelderland, joined cases C-293/17 and C-294/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:882

para. 101. This may go beyond the mere review for reasonableness accepted in the UK: R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

143. (vii) While the standard for the decision-taker’s carrying out of AA is removal of reasonable scientific doubt as to effects on the integrity of European sites by reference to their conservation objectives, and by the application of best scientific knowledge, that does not require the decision-taker to disprove “any effect 23 whatsoever”, matters having “no appreciable effect”, or “hypothetical risk”: opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 29 January 2004 in Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, paras. 102-106; judgment of 7 November 2018, Holohan v An Bord Pleanála, C461/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:883

paras. 33–37; Holland J. in Heather Hill Management Company CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 146, [2022] 3 JIC 1603 (Unreported, High Court, 16 March 2022), citing R Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd v. The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2016] EWHC 2581 (Admin), [2016] 10 W.L.U.K. 396, [2017] Env. L.R. 14 (

para. 259). Absence of reasonable doubt therefore does not mean “absolute certainty” (paras. 44, 58, 59, and 61 of the CJEU's judgment and paras. 102 to 108 of the Advocate General's opinion in Waddenzee, the judgment in Holohan

paras. 33-37, and Lord Carnwath in R. (on the application of Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3170

para. 41). (viii) It is settled law that the EIA directive should not be read as imposing impossibly onerous obligations: An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (Kilkenny Cheese) [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281, per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring)

para. 105, rejecting “impossibly onerous and unworkable obligations”; Friends of Killymooney Lough v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 407 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025). (

1. ix)Given the very wide scope of matters coming within EIA, an argument that any impact should not have been considered is presumptively implausible. In particular, potential and unmitigated impacts are required to be considered in the EIA process: Oxigen v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 632 (Unreported, High Court, 19 November 2025). The requirement to have regard to relevant matters 47. As regards the obligation to have regard to relevant matters: (
2. i)The distinction between matters subject to a comply-with obligation and those subject to a have-regard-to obligation is foundational to administrative law, and the latter must not be elevated into the former (nor the former diluted into the latter): Cork County Council v. Minister for Housing [2021] IEHC 683, [2021] 11 JIC 1810 (Unreported, High Court, 18 November 2021), paras. 85-86; Mount Salus Residents' Owners Management Company Limited by Guarantee v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2025] IEHC 14 (Unreported, High Court, 15 January 2025), paras. 55 to 56 per Holland J.; Voyage Property v. Limerick City and County Council [2025] IEHC 696 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 December 2025)

41, 215. (ii) Matters which may be assessed in terms of consideration by a decision-taker fall essentially into three categories, those a decision-taker must consider (including where she must consider such matters if raised as opposed to in every case), those that she cannot consider, and all other matters in respect of which she has an evaluative entitlement to consider or not as she thinks appropriate: R. (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v. Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] 2 All E.R. 967, [2021] P.T.S.R. 190, [2020] 12 W.L.U.K. 212 (Lord Hodge and Lord Sales SCJJ.)

116-121. (iii) A decision as to the weight to give a matter in the evaluative category, or whether to consider it

all, is subject to reasonableness review. “There is no obligation on a decision-maker to work through every consideration which might conceivably be regarded as potentially relevant to the decision they have to take and positively decide to discount it in the exercise of their discretion” Heathrow Airport

120. (iv) As Holland J. put it in Colbeam v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2025] IEHC 437 (Unreported, High Court, 5 August 2025)

146: “a view that the decisionmaker could not but have decided in my favour if only it had had regard to my submission underlies many allegations of failure of regard to submissions”. (

1. v)A claim of failure to have “proper” regard to the plan is a merits complaint: Cummins v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 521 (Unreported, High Court, 3 October 2025). (
2. vi)The duty to have regard to certain matters only applies if they are relevant. Thus, “While section 28

1. 24 Reasons
2. Key elements of the law relating to reasons include: (i) The standard is the obligation to provide the main reasons on the main issues: Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 45 (Clarke C.J.) (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); Balz and Heubach v. An Bord Pleanála [2019] IESC 90, [2023] 3 I.R. 751, [2020] 1 I.L.R.M. 367 per O’Donnell J. (Clarke C.J., McKechnie, Charleton and Irvine JJ. concurring); Balscadden Road SAA Residents Association Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2020] IEHC 586, [2020] 11 JIC 2501 (Unreported, High Court, 25 November 2020);

lantic Diamond v. An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 322 (Unreported, High Court, 14 May 2021); Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 25 November 2024), para. 59; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 26 November 2024), para. 149; per Barr J. in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 (Unreported, High Court, 31 May 2024), leave to appeal refused in Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 22 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025); see also nonprecedentially Morris v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 25 (Dunne, Woulfe and Hogan JJ., 17 February 2025); Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

49; Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 (Unreported, High Court, 26 September 2025) per Farrell J.

33; reasons are to be understood in context of the “Broad issues” – Finlay C.J. (Griffin, Hederman and Lynch JJ. concurring) in O’Keefe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39, [1992] I.L.R.M. 237

p. 76 or “Broad gist” – Faulkner v. Minister for Industry and Commerce 1997 WJSC-SC 962, [1996] 12 JIC 1007 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 10 December 1996) per O’Flaherty J. (Hamilton C.J. and Barrington J. concurring). (ii) A decision-taker is not required to give “reasons for the reasons”: Munby L.J. (Tomlinson and Patten LJJ. concurring) in In re A. and L. (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ. 1611, [2011] 12 W.L.U.K. 725, [2012] 1 F.L.R. 1243, [2012] Fam. Law 285,

para. 35 (in the context of judicial reasoning – the administrative obligation can’t be greater); N.P.B.K. (D.R.C.) v. International Protections Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 450 (Unreported, High Court, 25 September 2020)

29; Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

49. (iii) Certain issues are to be viewed objectively as main reasons given the nature of the process or decision

issue – for example if it is in dispute as to whether key statutory criteria for the decision have been satisfied. Where the commission is disagreeing with a council (Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 26, [2023] 1 JIC 2701 (Unreported, High Court, 27 January 2023)) or with its own inspector on a point on which the grant or refusal of permission turns, such an issue is virtually by definition a main issue, speaking objectively, such that a decision not to give reasons on it would be held to be erroneous (Crekav Trading GP Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála and Ors. [2020] IEHC 400 (Unreported, High Court, Barniville J., 31 July 2020); Clonres CLG v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2021] IEHC 303 (Unreported, High Court, 7 May 2021); O'Donnell v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 (Unreported, High Court, 1 November 2023); Killegland Estates Ltd v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 21 December 2023) (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton, O'Malley, Baker, Woulfe and Donnelly JJ. concurring); Ventaway v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406 (Unreported, High Court, 16 July 2025); Phelan Walsh v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 533 (Unreported, High Court, Nolan J., 8 October 2025)

53 citing Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453 (Clarke C.J.)). In the case of the inspector, there is the additional factor that by contrast with a normal case where the commission adopts the inspector’s reasons, in a case where the commission disagrees it must come up with reasons of its own. Where the commission disagrees with the inspector’s conclusion but on a basis that was not dealt with

all by the inspector, then any enhanced reasons obligation does not apply: AAI Baneshane v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 641 (Unreported, High Court, 21 November 2025). (

1. iv)As to what are the main issues arising from submissions of interested parties, the decision in Friends of the Irish Environment CLG & Anor. v. Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage & Ors. [2025] IECA 128 (Unreported, Court of 25 (
2. v)(
3. vi)(vii) (viii) (
4. ix)(
5. x)Appeal, 5 June 2024) is clear that, per Hyland J. (Costello P. and Collins J. concurring)

para. 148, it is for the decision-taker in the first instance to decide whether submissions raise relevant issues. Failure to address an issue in a submission can be challenged in the normal way. There is no obligation to provide a discursive, narrative consideration or to “engage with” submissions in such a sense, or to provide an issue-by-issue or submission-by-submission response: see Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IESC 25, [2008] 3 I.R. 795, per Denham J. (Murray C.J., Fennelly, Kearns and Finnegan JJ. concurring) referring to the lack of a need for a “micro specific format” (

p. 819); per Clarke J. (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring) in Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 May 2012)

para. 6.9, referring to the need for a “reasoned but not discursive ruling”. Confusing a lack of narrative discussion with a lack of reasons is a classic applicant’s fallacy: see e.g. Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 (Unreported, High Court, Farrell J., 19 September 2025)

23. Reasons may be found anywhere, not necessarily in the decision itself, for example in an inspectors report: Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 I.R. 752, [2018] 2 I.L.R.M. 453, para. 9.2 per Clarke C.J. (O’Donnell, Dunne, O’Malley and Finlay Geoghegan JJ. concurring); Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 11 April 2024) per Woulfe J. (Charleton, O’Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring)

para. 129; thus no additional requirement for reasons is required when adopting a reasoned report (for example of a chief executive or indeed an inspector): Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022)

para. 65; Shadowmill v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 157 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 31 March 2023), para 84; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 26 November 2024)

para. 144. Reasons may be implicit from the context, for example it can be implicit that matters submitted were held not to be outweighing when placed against factors supporting the conclusion arrived

: Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O’Malley J., 18 October 2024), paras. 96-99 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring). Consistently with the principle that there do not need to be reasons for the reasons, a decision-maker doesn’t need to give reasons for not changing her mind from an already-articulated position absent a significant change in circumstances or a significant new point (Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022), para. 67; Pat O’Donnell v. Dublin City Council [2024] IEHC 671 (Unreported, High Court, 26 November 2024), para. 145 per Holland J.) or for not making an exception to a clear policy for which reasons have been previously articulated, unless there is a significant change in circumstances or the unusual case of a new point being made of such significance that it needs to be expressly addressed: AAI Baneshane v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 641 (Unreported, High Court, 21 November 2025). That principle in turn reflects an even broader principle that a re-iteration of a previous position or decision is not a new decision for the purposes of judicial review, and does not for example re-start the clock for challenge: Killegland v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022). That said, a new plan is indeed a new decision and can be challenged afresh even if it contains the proverbial old wine in a new bottle. But an individual decision does not become a fresh decision merely because the decision-maker is asked to change her mind and doesn’t. There is no obligation to give reasons for not changing the status quo, for example maintaining a previous plan provision, in respect of which reasons would have been given

an earlier stage: Jones v. South Dublin County Council [2024] IEHC 301 (Unreported, High Court, 11 July 2024)

§209, Voyage Property v.

Limerick City and County Council [2025] IEHC 696 (Unreported, High Court, Holland J., 16 December 2025)

106. There is no obligation to state reasons for what is obvious: Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393, [2022] 7 JIC 0106 (Unreported, High Court, 1 July 2022) (from which the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, [2023] IESC 39 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Hogan J., 21 December 2023) (O’Donnell C.J., Charleton, O’Malley, Baker, Woulfe and Donnelly JJ. concurring)), para. 83; 26 (

1. xi)(xii) (xiii) (xiv) (
2. xv)Industrial Development Agency v. Information Commissioner [2024] IEHC 649 (Unreported, High Court, Phelan J., 15 November 2024), para. 132. There is no obligation to give reasons for rejecting a legally incorrect point: see Ironborn v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2023] IEHC 477 (Unreported, High Court, Mulcahy J., 31 July 2023). Reasons are tied into the exercise of evaluation and judgement, so if the latter do not arise then neither does the former – thus there is no need for reasons if there is in fact no ev