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2026 IEHC 316

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW Record No. 2025/348 JR [2026] IEHC 316 Between DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS APPLICANT AND SINEAD HENEGHAN RESPONDENT Judgment of Mr. Justice Cian Ferriter dated 21st May 2026 Introduction

  1. This case raises the important question of judicial impartiality in the hearing of criminal proceedings.
  2. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant ("the DPP") seeks an order quashing an order made in Portlaoise District Court on 19 December 2024 dismissing a complaint in relation to a speeding offence charge in circumstances where the respondent was found on the evidence to have exceeded the relevant speed limit but where the District Court judge declined to record a conviction, despite having found the facts proven, on the basis that it would be "unjust to do so".
  3. The issues arising in these proceedings are identical to the issues arising in a number of related sets of judicial review proceedings (DPP v Adam Kitson 2025/349 JR, DPP v Dylan Mahon 2025/345 JR and DPP v Gordon Scully 2025/347 JR) arising from orders made in the same terms and in the same circumstances in respect of other speeding offence cases in the list before the District Judge on 19 December 2024 which all arose from charges of exceeding the speed limit at a particular location. 1
  4. In each case, the DPP seeks an order from this Court quashing the order made by the District Judge and a declaration that the District Court Judge, having found the facts proven, was obligated in law to record a conviction and impose a penalty in accordance with the applicable statutory scheme.
  5. The issues in the case arise from pre-prepared remarks which the District Judge made at the outset of the list of some 40 speeding offence cases which all arose from exceeding the speed limit at the same location (a stretch of road at Clogheen, near Monasterevin, Co Kildare) in which the Judge made clear his view that the 60km/h speed limit in that location was too low given the nature of the road and that there was a disproportionate number of speeding offences being prosecuted arising from breaches of that speed limit at that location. Background
  6. The relevant background is as follows. The respondent was detected driving a car at a speed of 75 km/h in a 60 km/h special speed limit zone on 18 November 2023 on the R4045, Clogheen, Monasterevin, County Kildare (“Clogheen”).
  7. The applicable speed limit had been set by special speed limit bye-laws made by Kildare County Council pursuant to s.9 of the Road Traffic Act
  8. The detection was carried out using a GoSafe speed detection device operated by a GoSafe employee.
  9. The offence of exceeding a speed limit contrary to s.47 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (as inserted by s.11 of the Road Traffic Act 2004) and s.102 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (as amended by s.18 of the Road Traffic Act 2006) constitutes both a fixed charge offence within the meaning of Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 2010 and a penalty point offence within the meaning of the Road Traffic Act
  10. Reference No. 7 of the First Schedule to the 2002 Act prescribes that five penalty points must follow on conviction for such an offence.
  11. A fixed charge notice was issued to the respondent on 23 November 2023 pursuant to s.36 of the Road Traffic Act
  12. It afforded 56 days to pay the prescribed fine and accept three penalty points. The notice warned that failure to pay, and a subsequent 2 conviction, would attract five penalty points. No payment was made within the period specified.
  13. A summons then issued requiring the respondent’s attendance at Portlaoise District Court on 16 May
  14. Pursuant to s.44 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, a further and final opportunity to pay was afforded, but not availed of. The respondent did not appear on 16 May 2024 and the matter was adjourned to 19 December
  15. The respondent was notified of the adjourned date by registered post.
  16. It appears that there were some 40 cases in the list on 19 December 2024 relating to speeding offences at the same location at Clogheen. The Judge’s pre-prepared written remarks
  17. Before any of these cases was called, the District Judge orally delivered pre-prepared written remarks from the bench concerning prosecutions arising from alleged speeding offences at this location. It appears that the document containing the judge’s written remarks was circulated by him in court, including to the prosecution.
  18. The document was a detailed one, running to some five pages. It was headed "Prosecution of GoSafe offences for the Townland of Clogheen, Monasterevin". The document noted that "The 60km speed zone in the Townland of Clogheen is 700m long and represents 0.003% of the road network of this District Court area". The document went on to state that "For the past two years I have been very concerned about the excessive number of prosecutions by GoSafe for exceeding the speed limit in the Townland of Clogheen". The next section of the document was headed "Number of prosecutions" and set out in considerable detail, apparently based on the judge’s own research, the fines generated in relation to this stretch of road and how that level of fines compared to fines generated in 2022 from other District Court areas. It contained observations such as "The question has to be asked how can a 700m of roadway have the same level of prosecutions as all of Kilkenny, Louth or Mayo and over five times for the entire County of Leitrim?".
  19. The document referenced the judge’s view on the process of the setting of speed 3 limits. It referenced Department of Transport guidance to local authorities and appropriate speed limits, and quotes from those guidelines. The document expressed the view that drivers on the Clogheen road in issue “could be forgiven for believing they are travelling in a 100kph zone".
  20. The Judge then noted in his pre-prepared remarks that a Senior Engineer in the Roads and Transport Department of Kildare County Council had recommended in July 2021 that both the 60 km/h and 80 km/h zones in Clogheen be increased to 100 km/h, and that this recommendation had not been implemented. He then stated that:"The current speed limits were set by Kildare County Council in 2011 and should have been reviewed twice by now, once in 2016 and again in
  21. The setting of this or any speed limit is not for this Court, and it is entirely a matter for Kildare County Council, in their wisdom, to set these speed limits but I would ask that they review the speed limit as a matter of urgency. There is no doubt in my mind that Kildare County Council are in dereliction of their duties to the citizens of Kildare, Laois and Offaly and the entire State by failing to review the speed limits in accordance with their duty."
  22. The Judge then noted: "This court has been convicting people here for the last two years of a criminal offence for travelling at speeds as low as 67kph in the speed zone, adding five penalty points to their licence. 67kph on this stretch of road is travelling at a speed that according to the Council engineers tasked with such assessment is safe and in normal circumstances pose no danger of any description to anyone else using that road".
  23. The Judge then asked himself "Why then is there such a wholly disproportionate number of speeding prosecutions by GoSafe against motorists driving to the Townland of Clogheen?". He answered his own question with observations as to how, in his view, drivers rely on their perception of the road conditions and judge their speed safety and appropriateness almost entirely by information that they can see. He went on to 4 question the even-handedness of the approach of prosecutions throughout the district. He then stated:"While I accept that the Townland of Clogheen has historically been the location of fatalities and this should be one of the factors to be taken into account, in determining the location of speed checks, I have come to the conclusion that the huge number of prosecutions by GoSafe for the 60kph zone in Clogheen has also nothing to do with criminality and little to do with road safety and are driven not by safety but by targets, statistics and finance."
  24. He then went on to state that:"Prosecutions that are driven by targets, statistics and finance have no place in this courtroom and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I have come to the conclusion that GoSafe deliberately targeted an unjust speed zone in the Townland of Clogheen where there were rich pickings and as the saying goes they were ‘shooting fish in a barrel’."
  25. The Judge then stated that "In taking an oath of office under Article 34 of the Constitution I dutybound myself to upholding the laws of the land". He then stated: “However I am also cognisant of the Supreme Court's decision in The People (DPP) v Casey [2019] IESC 7” and set out a passage from the judgement of Charleton J in that case. That passage (from para 38 of that judgment) is as follows:“The Constitution, at Article 34.1, in requiring justice to “be administered in courts established by law by judges appointed in the manner provided for in this Constitution” does more than lay down a procedural framework or merely set up a structure for the system of civil and criminal litigation. Rather, it devolves ultimate responsibility onto judges to ensure that what occurs in legal actions heard before the courts is the pursuit of justice through a diligent, reasoned, detached and proportionate search for the truth. Article 38.1, in requiring criminal offences to be tried in “due course of law”, amounts to an imperative that courts pursue the aim of justice. In responding to a criminal charge with an account which asserts that while there has been a breach of the law, an 5 outcome of a guilty verdict would amount to an affront to justice, an accused both admits the commission of an offence and also seeks the application of constitutional fairness. This is not an assertion which comes within Article 38.4, which provides that “no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.” Rather, it is a plea within the judicial forum, and to that forum, that the law be diverted from its normal course. That arises because in some important respect, and unrelated to the elements of the offence, or to the capacity of the prosecution to adduce evidence in relation to such elements, the prosecution, or continued prosecution, of the charge would fall short of the constitutional administration of justice.” (the underlined emphasis was supplied by the District Judge).
  26. The District Judge then, towards the end of the document, stated "These are my views generally and I will consider each of the speeding summonses today on their own merits considering what I have already said".
  27. He concluded the document, and his observations, by making clear that he was not being critical of the rank-and-file members of An Garda Síochána, particularly those in the road traffic unit in Portlaoise. Course of District Court proceedings
  28. The evidence before me is that the District Judge dismissed the complaints in some 34 of the 40 speeding offence cases arising from the Clogheen location which were before him in his list. In each of the cases he dismissed, he found the facts as proven by the relevant prosecution evidence but considered it “unjust” to enter a conviction. While not in evidence before me, counsel for the DPP confirmed his understanding that the six cases in which convictions were entered involved levels of speeding which the District Judge regarded as meriting a conviction. These judicial review proceedings
  29. Neither the respondent in this case nor the respondents in any of the four related judicial review proceedings appeared at the judicial review hearing before me. 6
  30. It might be usefully explained, given that this is a case which deals with the concept of judicial impartiality (which embraces hearing both sides with an open mind), why the District Judge is not a party to this action. Order 84 Rules Superior Courts sets out the rules governing the bringing of judicial review proceedings. Order 84 rule 20(2A) (which was inserted by SI 163 of 2024, effective 26 April 2024) provides that: “Where the application for judicial review relates to any proceedings in or before a court and the object of the application is either to compel that court or an officer of that court to do any act in relation to the proceedings or to quash them or any order made therein (a) the judge of the court concerned shall not be named in the title of the proceedings by way of judicial review, either as a respondent or as a notice party, or served, unless the relief sought in those proceedings is grounded on an allegation of mala fides or other form of personal misconduct by that judge in the conduct of the proceedings the subject of the application for judicial review such as would deprive that judge of immunity from suit…”
  31. This rule emanated from court decisions which questioned the propriety of naming judges as respondents to judicial review proceedings where orders of those judges were impugned in such proceedings (see discussion in de Blacam Judicial Review (3rd edn. 2017) at paras [46.08] and [46.09], pp. 781/782). The rationale of the rule is to prevent judges themselves becoming embroiled as litigants in proceedings simply as a result of their decisions being challenged. The rule properly recognises that the position is different where there is an allegation of mala fides (bad faith) or other form of personal misconduct in the conduct of the impugned proceedings; in such case the judge will have a right to defend him- or herself.
  32. I should stress that there is no question of mala fides or misconduct on the part of the District Judge here. The allegation is that he legally erred in the manner in which he approached the speeding offence hearings before him. Judges make mistakes in the course of their work as all humans do and mechanisms such as appeals and judicial review exist to ensure that such judicial mistakes can be corrected. 7
  33. While the respondent was free to appear at these proceedings to defend the course of the District Court proceedings, she chose not to do so. I am conscious therefore that only the DPP made submissions in the hearing before me. I am satisfied that Counsel for the DPP properly drew my attention to the relevant legal principles and authorities and that my decision properly identifies and engages with those principles and authorities. The DPP’s case
  34. The DPP grounds her application on a submission that the orders made by the District Judge were tainted by pre-determination and by having regard to irrelevant considerations and contends further that the approach adopted by the District Judge amounted to an inappropriate interference with the prosecutorial function of the DPP. The statutory and legal framework
  35. The mandatory statutory framework governing penalty point offences has entirely displaced any residual common law or inherent judicial discretion to decline to record a conviction once the commission of such an offence has been established. Three interlocking statutory provisions define the mandatory nature of the applicable scheme: - Section 47 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (as amended) creates the substantive offence of exceeding a speed limit. - Section 2

(2)of the Road Traffic Act 2002 provides, in mandatory terms, that “where a person is convicted of a penalty point offence, the number of penalty points ... shall ... be endorsed on the entry relating to the person in respect of the offence.” The legislative language is obligatory and not permissive. - Section 55 of the Road Traffic Act 2010 expressly disapplies s.1
(1)of the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 (“the Probation Act”) to penalty point offences, thereby precluding recourse to an alternative disposal mechanism. The exclusion of the Probation Act reflects a deliberate legislative choice that, for this class of offence, a court may not decline to convict by recourse to that jurisdiction. 8
  1. I should make clear that there are conceivable circumstances in which a defence might be made out in respect of a speeding offence; there might be very exceptional circumstances, for example, in which the defence of necessity is made out (e.g. in the case of a genuine medical emergency that necessitated the driver to exceed the speed limit in the particular circumstances). However, absent such a defence being made out in evidence and law, the District Court does not retain any residual discretion in relation to the conviction of such road traffic act offences once the facts are proved.
  2. This was made clear by Hogan J in Kennedy v Gibbons [2014] IEHC 67 where he rejected the contention that the District Court retained a discretion to accept a donation to the poor box in lieu of recording a conviction on a plea of guilty to speeding contrary to s. 47 of the Road Traffic 1961 Act, in the following terms (at paras. 20 and 21):“[T]he Oireachtas has here prescribed a mandatory penalty and sanction upon conviction, namely, the endorsement of four [now five] penalty points upon the offender's licence ... The cumulative effect of these statutory provisions is to override the District Court's power at common law to accept a donation to the poor box in lieu of proceeding to a formal conviction in the case of those road traffic offences which attract the application of penalty points on a mandatory basis.”
  3. Hogan J made clear that the legislative choice for the imposition of mandatory penalties cannot be circumvented by recourse to residual common law discretion.
  4. A similar conclusion had been arrived at by Ó Caoimh J in DPP v Maughan (Unreported, High Court, 3 November 2003) where a guilty plea in the District Court to drunk driving contrary to s. 49 of the Road Traffic Act 1961, as it was, led to the District Judge there striking out the charge on payment of a sum to a specified charity, owing to the extenuating circumstances of the offence (the respondent had been woken in the middle of the night and travelled in a car while over the drink-driving limit to attend his seriously ill father on an emergency basis in hospital). Section 49 precluded the use of s. 1
(1)of the Probation Act; it followed that, once the facts were proven, a conviction was mandatory. Ó Caoimh J held that the District Judge acted in excess of 9 jurisdiction "as he was obliged at the time to determine the case before him and to proceed in accordance with law to enter conviction and to impose a penalty as required by law. He was not entitled to strike out the charge, notwithstanding the circumstances outlined to him." (at p. 3).
  1. I note that Kearns P in DPP v Ryan [2011] 3 IR 641 confirmed that a District Judge may accept a poor box donation on a plea of guilty to an offence which is not the subject of mandatory sanction upon conviction by virtue of statute. The position in respect of the cases before me is fundamentally different as the legislature has made the policy choice of mandatory sanctions on conviction for penalty point road traffic offences, thereby depriving the court of any residual discretion. Discussion
  2. As we have seen, the law is clear: once the prosecution proved that the speed limit in question was exceeded by the respondent, the District Judge was obliged to convict. He had no discretion, irrespective of how unjust he thought the underlying speed limit was. The question of fixing speed limits in any given area is a matter for the legislature and any authority (such as a county council) to which the legislature has lawfully delegated that power. It is not a matter for the judiciary.
  3. The passage of Charleton J in his judgment in the Casey case relied upon by the District Judge to apparently ground his view that he could exercise some judicial discretion in the speeding cases before him was taken entirely out of context. That judgment related to an appeal against a conviction for conspiracy to defraud arising out of the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank. The judgment concerned a defence of "officially induced error" that was sought to be relied upon by the former Chief Executive of Irish Life and Permanent in the context of what was colloquially referred to as the "bed-andbreakfast" loan transactions reflected on the balance sheet of Anglo Irish Bank. Mr Casey sought to rely on an argument that ex post facto silence from the financial regulator in relation to the actions in question could found a defence of officially induced error (or "entrapment by estoppel"). The passage quoted by the judge comes in a consideration of the parameters of that form of defence (the defence was rejected on the facts of that case). The passage simply has no application to the circumstances of 10 the cases before the District Court here; no defence of officially-induced error was raised or could have been raised on the facts before the District Judge. As counsel for the DPP noted, a more appropriate analogy in a road traffic context might, in theory, arise if a local authority had mistakenly erected 100 km/h signs in an area to which a lower limit applied, thereby leading to an officially induced error. No such issue arose here and the District Judge’s attempt to justify his refusal to record convictions by reference to that case was, with respect, misconceived.
  4. In my view, the approach of the District Judge in this case was wrong on a number of legal bases, including by having regard to irrelevant or illegitimate factors contrary to the well-established jurisprudence: see, for example, P&F Sharpe Ltd v Dublin City and County Manager [1989] IR 701 where Finlay C.J. stated that a decision-making authority “...must have regard to all relevant and legitimate factors which are before it and must disregard any irrelevant or illegitimate factor which might be advanced.” (at pp. 718–719)
  5. The District Judge also acted in breach of fair procedures by delivering remarks which gave the reasonable apprehension of pre-determination: see e.g. the principle stated by Flood J. in People (DPP) v W.C. [1994] 1 I.L.R.M. 321, at p.325: “It is not open to a judge in a criminal case when imposing sentence, whether for a particular type of offence, or in respect of a particular class of offender, to fetter the exercise of his judicial discretion through the operation of a fixed policy, or to otherwise pre-determine that issue.”
  6. While the District Judge sought to stress his objectivity by stating that these were his views "generally" and that he would consider each of the speeding summonses on their own merits, he immediately undermined that statement with the qualifying words "considering what I have already said" i.e. considering his clearly expressed views that the 60kmph speed limit was inappropriate and unjust, that the local authority was in dereliction of its duties, and that GoSafe was improperly motivated in assisting these prosecutions. 11
  7. I therefore agree with the DPP’s submissions that the orders made were arrived at in breach of fair procedures, are invalid by reason of the judge’s pre-determining remarks at the outset of the list and by reason of the judge having regard to clearly irrelevant and illegitimate considerations when trying the speeding cases in question.
  8. It is important given the facts of this case to elaborate as to the basis upon which judicial pre-determination is contrary to law and in particular is contrary to the core judicial obligation of impartiality.
  9. During the course of his preprepared remarks, the judge made reference to him being duty-bound by virtue of his oath of office under Article 34 of the Constitution to upholding the laws of the land. The terms of what are commonly referred to as “the judicial oath” but which is more correctly described as the judicial declaration are set out at Article 34.6.1 of the Constitution. Every newly appointed judge declares before the Chief Justice, in the Supreme Court, to execute the judicial office and to uphold the Constitution and the laws “to the best of my knowledge and power… without fear or favour, affection or ill will towards any man” (in the Irish text, “chomh maith agus is eol agus is cumas dom … gan eagla gan claonadh, gan bá gan drochaigne chun duine ar bith”).
  10. In his recent judgment in Kelly v UCD [2025] IESC 6 (“Kelly”), O’Donnell CJ said as follows (at paras 107 to 109): “
  11. Over 100 years ago, the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 established a new and independent courts system in Ireland and s. 99 thereof sets out the terms of the declaration which is to be made by the Chief Justice on appointment, and by each newly appointed judge in the presence of the Chief Justice or the most/next senior available judge, and which must be made in open court. The terms of s. 99 were incorporated into the Constitution itself in 1937 by (at that stage) Article 34.6.1°, which provides that every judge appointed shall make the declaration that they will perform the task and execute their office “without fear or favour, affection or ill will towards any man, and that [they] will uphold the Constitution and the laws”. This declaration is so fundamental to the judicial function that it must be made before a judge can enter upon their duties, and if 12 not made for any reason within ten days of their appointment, then the appointment of the judge made by the President on the advice of the Government simply lapses.
  12. The terms of the declaration are instructive. They are an adaptation of declarations and oaths made across the common law world, and indeed in civil law jurisdictions. The terms do not mean that the only candidates who may be appointed to judicial office are those who can say that they have no views, fears, likes, affections, or antipathies. Instead, the terms of the declaration in Article 34.6.1° are a recognition that judges are people first and foremost, capable of fear, favour, affection, and ill will, but who acknowledge that they are obliged to consciously put all these matters aside when adjudicating in a case, and not permit them to form part of their decision.
  13. While this is a demanding standard, it is not necessarily difficult to achieve in most cases: the negative obligation to administer justice without fear or favour is achieved by the positive performance of the function of doing justice solely by reference to the facts and law in each case. The performance of that positive obligation necessarily excludes extraneous considerations.”
  14. While the language of the judicial declaration might be somewhat archaic to contemporary ears, the declaration embodies an obligation on judges which is of timeless and enduring vitality to the proper administration of justice and the rule of law, namely the obligation to hear cases impartially and without any pre-determination.
  15. Dr Bryan Barry in his article Judicial Impartiality in the Judicial Council Act 2019: Challenges and Opportunities [2022] Irish Judicial Studies Journal Vol 6
(1)38, at page 40 notes that “Judicial impartiality, as a principle of good judicial conduct, has longstanding prominence in several ancient legal systems and foundational works of legal philosophy: the Babylonian code of Hammurabi and Indian and Mongolian legal systems recognised it as a key value, Socrates identified it as an essential quality of a judge, and Biblical and Roman sources referred to it. It is accepted in key modern international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct” (footnotes omitted). 13 46. To this list he could have added Irish Brehon Law. Professor Fergus Kelly in “A Guide to Early Irish Law”
(2015)at p.54 notes that under Brehon law a judge passing judgment after hearing only one side of a case was regarded as having committed a serious breach of duty which could result in deprivation of his office and his honour price.
  1. The judgment of the Chief Justice in Kelly involves an extensive examination of the principles relating to objective bias. As O’Donnell CJ stated in the opening paragraph of his judgment in Kelly: “A hearing and decision before an impartial tribunal is not simply the personal entitlement of the parties. It is a basic, perhaps the basic, requirement of the administration of justice guaranteed to citizens by Article 34 of the Constitution, and by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is also a longestablished feature of the common law, and indeed any developed legal system. So fundamental is it that where impartiality is questioned, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the actual hearing and outcome of any case was fair whether on the balance of probabilities or to some higher standard. Justice holds itself to a much higher standard.”
  2. The Chief Justice noted at para 3 of his judgment in that case that “The law has recognised a list of factors which may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias” and listed as one such factor where a judge “has made a prior public commitment to the position of one or other party relating to the merits of the action” and as a further factor, “where the judge has extraneous information or knowledge of some kind not acquired from the evidence in the case”.
  3. In the course of his judgment, the Chief Justice refers to the terms of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 2003 (“the Bangalore Principles”), which were heavily drawn on for the drafting of the Guidelines on Judicial Conduct and Ethics adopted by the Irish Judiciary in June 2022 pursuant to s. 7
(2)(d)(i) of the Judicial Council Act, 2019 (“the Judicial Conduct Guidelines” or “Guidelines”). 14
  1. Principle 2 of the Judicial Conduct Guidelines (which is drawn from the Bangalore Principles) is headed "Impartiality" and states as the guiding principle: "Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made."
  2. Under the heading "Application" (of principle 2), in a clear echo of the language of the judicial declaration in article 34.6.1, principle 2.1 of the Guidelines states that “a judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, bias or prejudice”.
  3. Principle 2.4 of the Guidelines states that “A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.”
  4. The Judicial Conduct Guidelines also address circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a Judge to recuse themselves including (in principle 2.5 ) where “it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially”.
  5. I should make clear that there is no suggestion that the District Judge here has been the subject of any judicial conduct complaint in relation to his remarks; as O’Donnell CJ stated in Kelly (at para 55) “as both the Guidelines and the Act make clear…breach of the Guidelines does not per se amount to misconduct.” My purpose in referring to the content of the Guidelines is simply to highlight the long-recognised principle of judicial impartiality and its continuing importance and how that principle is intended to operate in practice. I have no doubt that the District Judge made his remarks bona fide in an attempt to call out what he regarded as an unjust setting of a speed limit based on the experience of his court. But the role of a judge is not to express a view as to the wisdom or correctness of the speed limits in criminal cases before him or her and to proceed to deal with such cases on the basis of that view; the judge’s role is to faithfully apply the 15 law as it is, not as he or she thinks it should be, however well-intentioned any criticisms of the policy behind that law might be.
  6. If an application to the District Judge to recuse himself following the making of these remarks had been made on behalf of the prosecution (and I stress I am not criticising the prosecution for not having made such an application) it would undoubtedly have had to have been acceded to, in light of the well-established test for objective bias as re-iterated in Kelly, namely whether a reasonable and informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge, in the sense of a reasonable doubt as to whether the judge will be impartial (see judgment of O’Donnell CJ at paras 71 and 162).
  7. In fairness to the Judge, he appears to have been alive to the question of possible objective bias when he made the statement that "These are my views generally and I will consider each of the speeding summons today on their own merits". However, as already noted, that statement was immediately qualified by the Judge saying “considering what I have already said” i.e. considering his clearly expressed views that the 60kmph speed limit was inappropriate and unjust, that the local authority was in dereliction of its duties, and that GoSafe was improperly motivated in assisting these prosecutions.
  8. At the risk of stating the obvious, it is not generally appropriate for a judge to express views calling into question the decisions of members of the executive in relation to legislative policy as the judge sought to do here when making his criticisms on the approach of Kildare County Council to the question of the speed limit on the stretch of roadway in question. It was inappropriate of the judge, moreover, to go on to express the view that the County Council were in "dereliction of their duties" in failing to review the speed limits in circumstances where neither the Council nor any issue as to the discharge by the Council of their functions was properly before him.
  9. It was also inappropriate to impugn the bona fides of those involved in the collection of evidence in relation to the commission of speeding offences and the prosecution of such offences; the statement by the judge that he had "come to the conclusion" that the "huge number of prosecutions by GoSafe" for the relevant 60kmph zone "had 16 absolutely nothing to do with criminality and little do with road safety and are driven not by safety but by targets, statistics and finance" was manifestly not an appropriate one for a judge to make in a list of cases where GoSafe were about to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution in perfectly proper discharge of their duties to the court. Conclusion
  10. In the circumstances, I will grant the orders of certiorari sought in this and the related judicial review proceedings where the material facts and legal issues are materially identical and the same outcome is appropriate. I do not think that declarations are necessary given the terms of this judgment.
  11. I should record that the DPP did not seek the remittal of the speeding offence matters to the District Court which I think is a sensible course of action in all the circumstances. 17

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