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2026 IEHC 343

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 343 THE HIGH COURT 2024 196 SP IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 327 OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE CONSOLIDATION ACT 2005 BETWEEN JOHN FITZGERALD APPELLANT AND MINISTER FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION CHIEF APPEALS OFFICER SOCIAL WELFARE APPEALS OFFICE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 5 June 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. This matter comes before the High Court by way of an appeal on a question of law from a decision of an Appeals Officer of the Social Welfare Appeals Office. The decision under appeal is a determination which disallowed the Appellant’s 2 administrative appeals against (

  1. i)a reduction in his weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance, in the sum of €44 per week; and (
  2. ii)two ensuing periods of disqualification from receipt of jobseeker’s allowance. 2. The reduction and the disqualifications were imposed under the activation regime contained in sections 141A, 141B and 141C of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The resolution of the appeal requires consideration of the proper interpretation of those legislative provisions and, in particular, of the formal preconditions which must be satisfied before a recipient of jobseeker’s allowance may be subjected to a reduced rate and disqualification. APPEAL ON A QUESTION OF LAW 3. The appeal comes before the High Court pursuant to section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. That section permits a person who is dissatisfied with the decision of an Appeals Officer (or the decision of the Chief Appeals Officer under section 318) to appeal that decision to the High Court on any question of law arising from the decision. See, generally, Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer [2026] IESC 22. 4. The principles governing the High Court’s jurisdiction on an appeal on a question of law or a point of law are well established. See, in particular, Fitzgibbon v. Law Society [2014] IESC 48, [2015] 1 IR 516 (at paragraphs 127 and 128 of the reported judgment). The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this case law in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v. Labour Court [2024] IESC 38. 3 5. The general principles have been applied in the specific context of an appeal under the social welfare legislation by the Supreme Court in Petecel v. Minister for Social Protection [2020] IESC 25, [2024] 2 IR 685 (at paragraph 111): “In this form of appeal, the High Court is asked to determine whether or not the task of interpreting and applying the provisions of the relevant legislation has been carried out correctly, by reference to the legislation and the evidence grounding the decision under appeal, and without reference to issues such as jurisdiction, vires, or the constitutional validity of the legislation under consideration. Where a litigant seeks to argue such an issue, the court will decline to rule on the matter on the basis that it does not properly arise from the decision under appeal, since it could not have been determined by the decision-making body.” 6. There are three aspects of the case law which are of potential relevance to the present appeal. First, the High Court is not required to defer to the statutory decision-maker in relation to the interpretation of documents. The High Court is in as good a position as the decision-maker to determine the meaning of documents and should reverse findings based on an incorrect interpretation. This principle has been applied in the specific context of a social welfare appeal in Henry Denny & Sons (Ireland) Ltd v. Minister for Social Welfare [1998] 1 IR 34. 7. Second, an appeal on a point of law or a question of law extends to errors such as “defective or no reasoning” (Attorney General v. Davis [2018] IESC 27, [2018] 2 IR 357). 8. Third, in the case of some appeals it will be appropriate for the High Court to substitute its own order, rather than remit the matter. The position is explained as follows in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v. Labour Court (at paragraph 64): “Where the High Court concludes that there is an error of law, the order it may make depends upon the error identified, in the same way as the order this Court or the Court of Appeal may make in an appeal. In some cases, if the court concludes 4 that there has been an erroneous finding of primary fact which led to a conclusion in favour of a party, then the court may allow the appeal and set aside the order made and substitute the order which follows from that conclusion. Similarly, if there is an error of law and the correct understanding and application of the law would lead to the contrary conclusion, then the court is entitled to allow the appeal and substitute that conclusion. There may, however, be circumstances where the error identified cannot lead to the substitution of a final order by the court, and may mean that the case has to be remitted to the primary decisionmaker. None of this however, expands the court’s jurisdiction to substitute an order it considers appropriate for that made by the primary decision-maker. The order which the court makes on an appeal on a point of law, is still constrained because it is an appeal on a point of law.” SOCIAL WELFARE CONSOLIDATION ACT 2005 9. Sections 141A and 141B of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 contain two related regimes for the reduction of, and ultimately disqualification from, jobseeker’s allowance in the case of a recipient who does not engage with what the legislation describes as “activation”. Both regimes are, in their structure, of the same general character. Each is engaged by a written notice imposing a statutorily prescribed requirement upon the recipient. Each permits a reduction in the weekly rate of allowance where the recipient refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with that requirement. Each also permits the imposition of a period of disqualification, not exceeding nine weeks, where a second notice has been given and the recipient continues to refuse or fail to comply. 10. Section 141C requires that a notice under section 141A or section 141B shall be given in writing and may be given in such other form as may be considered appropriate, including electronic form. 11. The proper approach to statutory interpretation has been restated by the Supreme Court in Heather Hill Management Company v. An Bord Pleanála 5 [2022] IESC 43, [2024] 2 IR 222, [2022] 2 ILRM 313 (“Heather Hill”). Murray J., writing for the Supreme Court, emphasised that the literal and purposive approaches to statutory interpretation are not hermetically sealed. In no case can the process of ascertaining the legislative intent be reduced to the reflexive rehearsal of the literal meaning of words, or the determination of the plain meaning of an individual section viewed in isolation from either the text of a statute as a whole or the context in which, and purpose for which, it was enacted. Rather, it is necessary to consider the context of the legislative provision, including the pre-existing relevant legal framework, and the object of the legislation insofar as discernible. 12. In the present case, the literal meaning of the legislative provisions is clear. Sections 141A and 141B prescribe a sequence of procedural steps which, if properly taken, may culminate in the recipient of jobseeker’s allowance being disqualified from receipt of that allowance for a period of up to nine weeks. The purpose of the legislative provisions is also readily discernible. They are intended to secure compliance by a recipient with notices or requests validly given or made under the statutory scheme. The consequence of non-compliance is a reduction in, and ultimately the temporary loss of, jobseeker’s allowance. 13. The graduated structure of the statutory scheme is significant. It reflects a legislative intention that a recipient should first be made aware, with sufficient clarity, of what is required of him, and should then be afforded a further opportunity to comply before the more serious sanction of disqualification is imposed. These are important safeguards. Jobseeker’s allowance is a meanstested payment directed to the subsistence needs of persons who, by definition, have limited or no alternative means. The statutory scheme contemplates that 6 such a payment may be suspended, for a period not exceeding nine weeks, only where the recipient has been properly notified of what is required of him—and of the financial consequences of non-compliance—and has nevertheless failed, without good cause, to comply. 14. Section 141A regulates the provision of information and assessments. It authorises the Minister to give a notice requiring the recipient to do one of two things at a specified time. The first, under subsection

(3)(a), is to attend at a meeting “for the purpose of providing information” to the recipient about the employment, work experience, education, training and development opportunities available to him or her. The second, under subsection
(3)(b), is to attend for or submit to an assessment of his or her education, training or development needs. 15. Where a notice under section 141A
(1)has been given and the recipient refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirement so notified, the weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance is reduced pursuant to subsection
(2). At the material time, the stipulated reduction was €44 per week. 16. Section 141A
(4)provides that, where a recipient has been on the reduced rate for a period of not less than twenty-one days on account of a refusal or failure to comply with a notice under subsection
(1), a further notice may be given requesting compliance with the requirement specified in the first notice. It is only where the recipient then refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the second notice—that is, the notice under subsection
(4)—that the Minister may proceed, under subsection
(5), to disqualify the recipient from receipt of jobseeker’s allowance for a period not exceeding nine weeks. 7 17. Section 141B addresses participation in prescribed schemes, programmes or courses. The structure of section 141B is broadly analogous to that of section 141A: a reduction in the weekly rate of allowance for a first refusal or failure (subsection
(1)); a power to issue a further notice or make a further request (subsection
(2)); and a power to disqualify upon continued refusal or failure (subsection
(3)). However, section 141B can only be engaged where the condition precedent or “gateway” under subsection
(1)(a) has been satisfied. 18. The condition precedent is that, “as a consequence of attendance for or submission to an assessment in accordance with section 141A
(3)(b)”, a request is made by or on behalf of the Minister that the recipient participate in, agree to participate in, or avail himself or herself of an opportunity of participating in, a scheme or programme of employment or work experience, or a course of education, training or development. The scheme, programme or course must be one which is “prescribed for the purposes of this section” and which is considered “appropriate having regard to the education, training and development needs of that person and his or her personal circumstances”.
  1. The schemes, programmes and courses prescribed for the purposes of section 141B are specified in article 120A of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007) (as amended by S.I. No. 551 of 2019) (“the Regulations”).
  2. The Regulations identify a number of specific schemes and courses, including the Community Employment scheme and courses of training or development provided by or on behalf of An tSeirbhís Oideachais Leanúnaigh agus Scileanna (“SOLAS”) or by an Education and Training Board. 8
  3. The Regulations also purport to “prescribe” for the purposes of section 141B such other schemes, programmes of employment and work experience, and such other courses of training and development “as may be approved by or on behalf of the Minister from time to time” (“the proviso”).
  4. The Appellant has questioned the validity of this proviso. He submits that it purports to treat as “prescribed” schemes, programmes and courses which have not themselves been identified in a statutory instrument laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas pursuant to section 4 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, but instead depend upon a subsequent administrative approval by or on behalf of the Minister.
  5. There may be a question to be considered as to whether a regulation framed in this way is consistent with the statutory requirement that schemes, programmes and courses be “prescribed” for the purposes of section 141B. It is not, however, necessary or appropriate to determine that question on the present appeal. The validity of a statutory instrument is, in substance, a vires issue. For the reasons explained by the Supreme Court in Petecel v. Minister for Social Protection (cited above), such an issue does not properly arise on an appeal confined to a question of law from the decision of an Appeals Officer. It is not an issue which the Appeals Officer could herself have determined.
  6. Nor is it necessary to resolve the point in order to dispose of this appeal. The appeal succeeds on the more fundamental ground that the statutory preconditions to the application of section 141B were not satisfied. In particular, the Appellant had not first been validly required to attend for, or submit to, an assessment under section 141A
(3)(b), and no request was thereafter made, as a consequence of such an assessment, to participate in an identified prescribed scheme, 9 programme or course. The question of the validity of the proviso to article 120A is therefore better left to a case in which its resolution is necessary to the outcome and in which the point has been fully argued. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
  1. By letter dated 25 September 2023, the Appellant was notified that he had been “selected” for the “Intreo Partner: National Employment Service” and that an appointment had been scheduled for 5 October
  2. The operative part of the letter reads as follows: “I am writing to inform you that the Department of Social Protection has selected you for the Intreo Partner: National Employment Service (NES), a new 52-week employment service which will provide intensive employment support services to help you find employment. The Department’s Intreo Partner has scheduled an appointment with you as below: [Details of time and venue] During this appointment the Department’s Intreo Partner will explain more about the service and how they can help you to access education and training opportunities, gain work experience with employers, and find suitable local jobs. They will also be able to answer any questions you may have about the service. As you know all jobseekers in receipt of a jobseeker payment are required to avail of any opportunity to improve their employment prospects and are expected to take up any offers of support including offers of group and individual meetings and any subsequent offers of training, education and development opportunities. Accordingly, any refusal or failure, without good cause, to attend this appointment or to subsequently participate with the service may result in your jobseeker payment being reduced. If the time above is not suitable, please contact the Intreo Partner [...] and they will arrange an alternative appointment. 10 On behalf of the Department of Social Protection, we welcome you to the Intreo Partner Service.”
  3. It should be explained that the same template was used for two subsequent appointment letters sent to the Appellant. It will be necessary to consider the precise text of the template in detail, with a view to ascertaining whether it constitutes a notice capable of triggering any aspect of the statutory scheme. See paragraphs 39 to 45 below.
  4. By letter dated 11 October 2023, a Deciding Officer notified the Appellant that his weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance was being reduced by €44 per week. The operative part of the decision reads as follows: “Your Jobseeker’s Allowance will be reduced because, in accordance with Section 141A or Section 141B of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, as amended: ☐ Without good cause, you failed to attend at a meeting arranged by or on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of providing information which is intended to improve your knowledge of the employment, work experience, education, training and development opportunities available to you (Group OR Individual Activation Meeting) ☒ Without good cause, you failed to attend for, or submit to, an assessment of your education, training or development needs (Individual Activation Meeting) ☒ Without good cause, you refused or failed to participate in or failed to avail yourself of an opportunity of participating in, or dropped out of a suitable education, training or development opportunity or specified employment programme which is considered appropriate to your circumstances Reason for Decision In your appointment of 05/10/2023 and to date, you have failed to agree to a personal progression plan with National Employment Service. 11 In your appointment of 05/10/2023 and to date, you have failed to participate in your appointments with the National Employment Service.”
  5. The Appellant applied to have this decision revised. The first-instance decision was affirmed on 19 October
  6. Relevantly, the reviewing decision-maker shared the Deciding Officer’s view that no statutory assessment had been carried out. In particular, the review decision states as follows: “On referral to the National Employment Service (NES), your first appointment would be an opportunity to agree, with your dedicated Case Worker to a Personal Progression Plan (PPP). The PPP allows you to identify your work experience and qualifications, your job goals and any barriers to employment you may have. It is an integral part of the Activation service that represents an assessment of your education, training or development needs which can be reviewed and updated on an ongoing basis as a tool to assist you in finding work. I note that in your appointments with the NES to date you have failed to provide the required information in order to allow your Case Worker to draw up a PPP and as such I am satisfied that without good cause you have refused to submit to an assessment of your education, training or development needs.”
  7. The Department sent an appointment letter to the Appellant on 26 October
  8. This appointment letter follows the exact same template as the first. The Appellant is, again, welcomed to the Intreo Partner Service. There is no reference to the supposed failure to have attended for, or submitted to, an assessment.
  9. By notice dated 15 November 2023, the Appellant was informed that he was being disqualified from receipt of jobseeker’s allowance for a period of nine weeks. The operative part of the notice reads as follows: “In accordance with Section 141A or Section 141B of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, as amended: Jobseeker’s Allowance is not payable to you for the period from 15/11/2023 to 16/01/2024 12 ☒ You have been on Reduced Rate for a period of not less than 21 days and have continued, without good cause, to fail to attend for, or submit to an assessment of your education, training or development needs. ☒ You have been on Reduced Rate for a period of not less than 21 days and have continued, without good cause, to refuse or fail to participate in, or to avail yourself of an opportunity, of participating in a suitable education, training or development opportunity or a specified employment programme which is considered appropriate to your circumstances. The reason(s) for my decision is/are: In your appointment of 9/11/2023 and to date, you have failed to agree a personal progression plan with National Employment Service. In your appointment of 9/11/2023 and to date, you have failed to participate in your appointments with the National Employment Service.”
  10. The Department sent a further appointment letter to the Appellant scheduling an appointment on 15 February
  11. This appointment letter follows the exact same template as the first. The Appellant is, again, welcomed to the Intreo Partner Service. There is no reference to the supposed failure to have attended for, or submitted to, an assessment.
  12. A second nine-week disqualification was imposed by notice dated 6 March 2024, covering the period 6 March 2024 to 7 May
  13. The terms are similar to those of the earlier notice, save as to the relevant dates.
  14. The Appellant appealed each of these three decisions. The appeals were determined on the papers, without an oral hearing. A single, omnibus determination issued on 28 November 2024 and was received by the Appellant on 5 December
  15. The Appeals Officer disallowed each of the appeals. That determination is the decision now under appeal, on questions of law, to this court. 13 APPEALS OFFICER’S DETERMINATION
  16. The Appellant’s three appeals had been directed to an asserted mismatch between the statutory requirements relied upon by the Department and the appointment letters actually issued to him. The Appellant accepted that he had been notified of appointments with the Intreo Partner: National Employment Service. The Appellant contended that none of the appointment letters constituted a written notice for the purposes of section 141A
(3)(b) requiring attendance for, or submission to, an assessment. The Appellant further contended that he was never requested, following an assessment, to participate in an identified scheme, programme or course for the purposes of section 141B. 35. The Appellant made a further complaint that he had never been served with a statutory notice or request of the type required to trigger a period of disqualification from receiving jobseeker’s allowance. These notices or requests are required under section 141A
(4)and section 141B
(2).
  1. The operative part of the Appeals Officer’s decision reads as follows: “Regarding the notices you received, the appointment letters before me are for meetings scheduled for 5 October 2023, 9 November 2023 and 15 February
  2. Other than the date, location and start and end times of the meetings, the letters adhere to the following common template: • First paragraph – states that the National Employment Service is the Intreo Partner. • Second paragraph – outlines the purpose of the appointment. Of note, the National Employment Service uses this appointment to explain how they can help applicants access opportunities, gain work experience and find suitable local jobs. (emphasis added) • Third paragraph – alerts applicants that they must avail of any opportunity to improve their employment prospects and are expected to take up 14 any offers of support. Refusal or failure to attend an appointment or to subsequently participate with the service may lead to the reduction of a jobseeker payment. (emphasis added) The first paragraph of the appointment letter implies that, as an Intreo Partner, the NES operates on behalf of the Department of Social Protection to provide assistance with employment and/or training to people claiming a jobseeker’s payment. The authority granted to the National Employment Service derives from the provisions in the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005, related to employment, education and/or training supports for people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance. In your appeal dated 24/11/23, you stated that the Department is not clear about the purpose of the National Employment Service and that people cannot know what any meeting is due to be about ‘until the Department subsequently makes a claim regarding some fictitious failure to comply’. This is contradicted by the second paragraph of the appointment letters issued to jobseekers. While I acknowledge that the letters do not explicitly refer to an ‘assessment’, a reasonable interpretation of the second paragraph would lead to the conclusion that a jobseeker must share some information about their goals and circumstances so that the service can determine ‘suitable local jobs’. In your appeal of 25/10/23, you stated you attended all scheduled appointments and that there is no legal requirement of ‘participation’ in these information meetings. However, the third paragraph of each appointment letter alerts jobseekers to the consequences of refusing to or failing to participate with the service. On 24 July 2023, you signed a declaration that you had read the grounds on which a penalty rate could be implemented, including ‘fails to engage with the EAP (employment action plan) process’. The legal basis for this is Section 141B of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act,
  3. I have carefully considered all the evidence made available to me as part of this appeal. You have not established that you participated in the National Employment Service as required to continue receiving the full rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance. Therefore, your appeal is disallowed.” 15 DETAILED DISCUSSION
  4. Section 141B can only be engaged where its gateway condition in subsection
(1)(a) is satisfied. The gateway condition has two cumulative limbs: first, that the jobseeker has attended for, or submitted to, an assessment pursuant to a valid notice under section 141A
(3)(b); and second, that, as a consequence of that attendance or submission, a request has subsequently been made for the jobseeker to participate in a scheme, programme or course which is prescribed for the purposes of section 141B.
  1. Having regard to the grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant, the Appeals Officer was obliged to consider whether both limbs had been satisfied in this case. The proper starting point would have been for the Appeals Officer to acknowledge that the two limbs needed to be satisfied, and then to assess the documentation to confirm whether this had been done. Regrettably, the Appeals Officer never properly engages with the wording of the legislation. The legislation is relegated to an appendix of the determination without any attempt to consider it. This failure to keep the language of the legislative provisions in mind resulted in the Appeals Officer falling into significant error.
  2. The Appeals Officer accepted that none of the appointment letters explicitly referred to an “assessment”. Notwithstanding this, the Appeals Officer purported to find that the appointment letters were open to a “reasonable interpretation” that the recipient must share some information about their goals and circumstances so that the service can determine suitable local jobs. The implication being that such supposed “sharing” is equivalent to a statutory assessment of that person’s education, training or development needs. The 16 Appeals Officer goes on then to uphold the periods of disqualification by reference to section 141B.
  3. This determination can only have been reached on the basis of a misinterpretation of the statutory notice requirements, or, alternatively, on the basis of a misinterpretation of the content of the letters of appointment. On either version, the determination is vitiated by an error of law amenable to appeal. The interpretation of legislation is quintessentially a question of law for determination by the High Court. As to the interpretation of documents, such as the appointment letters, the High Court is in as good a position to determine the meaning of documents as the Appeals Officer and should reverse the decisionmaker’s findings on appeal if they are incorrect: see paragraph 6 above.
  4. The statutory notice requirements are explicit. The recipient of jobseeker’s allowance may be required to do one of two things: (a) attend at a meeting arranged by or on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of providing information to that person which is intended to improve his or her knowledge of the employment, work experience, education, training and development opportunities available to that person, or (b) attend for or submit to an assessment of that person’s education, training or development needs.
  5. The passage from the appointment letters relied upon by the Appeals Officer reads as follows: “During this appointment the Department’s Intreo Partner will explain more about the service and how they can help you to access education and training opportunities, gain work experience with employers, and find suitable local jobs. They will also be able to answer any questions you may have about the service.” 17
  6. The language of the appointment letter mirrors the language of subsection (a) of section 141A
(3). The purpose of the meeting, as described in the appointment letter, is the conveyance of information to the recipient about employment, education and training opportunities. The appointment letters cannot be construed as a notice under subsection (b). This is because the appointment letters do not require the recipient to attend for, or to submit to, an assessment of his education, training or development needs. The Appeals Officer’s contendedfor interpretation seeks to rewrite the appointment letters by introducing an assessment requirement which is simply not there. 44. The Appeals Officer’s invocation of section 141B is predicated upon a misinterpretation of the section. It is a condition precedent to the reduction in the payment of jobseeker’s allowance that (
  1. i)the recipient had been required to attend for or submit to an assessment of that person’s education, training or development needs; (
  2. ii)the recipient had attended for, or submitted to, such an assessment and the assessment had been carried out; (iii) the recipient had been requested, in consequence of that assessment, to participate in a prescribed scheme, programme or course; and (
  3. iv)the recipient refused or failed, without good cause, to participate. An additional step is required before disqualification from payment: a second-stage notice or request must be served or made, as appropriate. 45. Here, the Appellant was never validly notified of a requirement to attend for, or submit to, an assessment. It follows as a corollary that no statutory assessment was ever carried out. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the application of section 141B were not fulfilled. The Appeals Officer’s error is all the more serious in circumstances where each of the three decisions under appeal had been 18 predicated on the fact that there had been no assessment, a predicate which precluded reliance on section 141B. In each instance, the complaint had been that the Appellant had failed to submit to assessment. 46. Even if, counterfactually, an assessment had been carried out, such as to open the section 141B gateway, no document capable of constituting a statutory request was ever served on the Appellant. The appointment letters do not make a “request” of the recipient to participate in, to agree to participate in, or to avail himself of an opportunity of participating in, a prescribed scheme, programme or course within the meaning of section 141B
(1)(a). The appointment letters do not identify any such scheme, programme or course. They make no reference to the Community Employment scheme; to SOLAS or to any Education and Training Board; nor to any other scheme, programme or course of the kind prescribed under article 120A of the Regulations. 47. The Appeals Officer committed a further error of law in seeking to attach significance to the third paragraph of the appointment letters. The proposition that “any refusal or failure, without good cause, to attend this appointment or to subsequently participate with the service may result in your jobseeker payment being reduced” is an inaccurate paraphrase of section 141A
(2). The additional reference to a failure “to subsequently participate with the service” is unsupported by the legislative provisions, insofar as it purports to treat participation with the service at large as equivalent to compliance with a notice or request of the specific kind required by sections 141A and 141B. There is no statutory duty upon a recipient of jobseeker’s allowance to “participate with the service” at large. A public authority cannot arrogate jurisdiction to itself by misstating the legal position in correspondence. 19
  1. Similarly, the Appeals Officer erred in law in seeking to attach significance to the statement signed by the Appellant on 24 July
  2. The Appellant deleted part of the pro forma wording, with the result that the declaration merely acknowledged that he had “read” the statement. The Appellant’s general acknowledgement that he had merely read a document which does not accurately state the legislative provisions cannot be substituted for the specific written notice which sections 141A, 141B and 141C require to be given before any sanction may be imposed in respect of any particular act of non-compliance. A document which misstates the legal position cannot be relied upon to enlarge upon the Department of Social Protection’s statutory powers. Moreover, the document only refers to a “penalty rate”, not to disqualification. Disqualification without requisite notice
  3. The statutory scheme allows for the possibility of a jobseeker being disqualified from receipt of jobseeker’s allowance for a period of nine weeks. This represents a significant escalation from the initial sanction, i.e. a reduction in the weekly payment. As discussed at paragraphs 16 to 18 above, disqualification is dependent upon the prior service of a second-stage notice, i.e. a notice under section 141A
(4), or, as the case may be, a notice or request under section 141B
(2). The second-stage notice is not a mere formality. It is a substantive precondition without which the power of disqualification is not engaged. The structure of sections 141A and 141B reflects a deliberate legislative choice to interpose, between the reduction in the rate of allowance and the more severe consequence of disqualification, a discrete second-stage notice or request. The purpose is plain. A recipient who has, by reason of a first refusal or failure, been reduced to a lower rate of allowance is to be given a 20 specific further opportunity, in writing, to come into compliance before disqualification. The interposition of this second notice is a procedural safeguard which the Oireachtas has considered necessary: see paragraphs 12 and 13 above. It is not open to the Department, or to the Appeals Officer, to dispense with it.
  1. The Appellant had raised this issue squarely in his grounds of appeal in respect of his second and third appeals. The Appeals Officer’s determination does not engage with this contention at all. The Appeals Officer either failed to address her mind to one of the principal grounds of appeal, or, alternatively, did address her mind to it but failed to disclose her findings and reasoning in relation to the ground of appeal. Both contingencies constitute an error of law which is amenable to correction by way of an appeal on a question of law.
  2. In many instances, the failure of the decision-maker whose decision is under appeal to address one of the principal issues will mean that no findings of fact have been made in relation to that issue. This may make it difficult for the High Court to resolve the issue, and it may be necessary to remit the matter to a different decision-maker for reconsideration, including the making of the requisite findings of fact. Here, the position is different. The resolution of the question of law turns on the interpretation of the correspondence and notices sent to the Appellant. This court is in as good a position to determine the meaning of those documents as the Appeals Officer would have been.
  3. The letters scheduling appointments on 9 November 2023 and 15 February 2024—which the Appeals Officer found “adhere to the following common template” as the letter scheduling the appointment of 5 October 2023—do not constitute notices under section 141A
(4), or a notice or request under 21 section 141B
(2). Nothing in the template purports to identify the document as a notice requesting compliance with a pre-existing requirement following a continuing failure to comply. Rather, the appointment letters were, on their face, no more than fresh invitations to attend information meetings. It follows that each of the two periods of disqualification was invalid on this additional ground. STATUS OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
  1. The Appellant has sought, as one of the reliefs in his special summons, a declaration that the National Employment Service (“NES”) is not prescribed for the purposes of section 141A of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act
  2. The reference to the NES being “prescribed” for the purposes of section 141A is not to be understood as a submission that section 141A contains an express prescription requirement equivalent to that found in section 141B. Rather, the point being made is that, if attendance with the NES is to be treated as attendance for, or submission to, a statutory assessment under section 141A
(3)(b), then there must be an identifiable legal basis upon which the NES is authorised to perform that function on behalf of the Minister. The Appellant’s complaint is, in substance, that such authority cannot be supplied merely by administrative arrangement, or by the wording of an appointment letter.
  1. The Appellant contends that the Department treated the NES as though it possessed statutory authority to require him to engage with it, to participate in its process, to provide information to its personnel, and to agree a personal progression plan, with adverse consequences for his entitlement to jobseeker’s allowance if he did not do so. He says that the legal source of that asserted authority was never identified. The Appellant further contends that the 22 Department may not treat the NES interchangeably as an information service, an assessment mechanism, a prescribed course or programme, and a compliancepolicing body, unless each such function is supported by a proper statutory basis.
  2. The Appeals Officer did not undertake a detailed examination of the statutory or contractual basis, if any, upon which the NES, as operated by Turas Nua, might have been established or authorised. Rather, the Appeals Officer stated that the grounds of appeal relating to the specific legal basis for the National Employment Service operated by Turas Nua were outside her remit. The basis for this statement is not explained in the determination.
  3. The Appeals Officer did address the role of the NES in more general terms. She observed that the appointment letters identified the NES as the Department’s Intreo Partner. She considered that this implied that the NES operated on behalf of the Department of Social Protection in providing assistance with employment and/or training to persons claiming a jobseeker’s payment. She further stated that the authority granted to the NES derived from the provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 relating to employment, education and/or training supports for persons claiming jobseeker’s allowance.
  4. In principle, it would be open to the court to remit this aspect of the statutory appeal for reconsideration by a different Appeals Officer. An order for remittal is not appropriate in the present case, however, for the following reasons. First, the Appellant’s success on other of his grounds of appeal has the consequence that the periods of disqualification have been held to be invalid in any event. Second, it would be necessary to decide whether an examination of the statutory or contractual basis, if any, upon which the National Employment Service has been authorised to act on behalf of the Minister is properly amenable to the 23 appellate mechanisms under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act
  5. The answer to this preliminary jurisdictional issue is not clear-cut and would require careful consideration.
  6. In summary, it is not necessary for the resolution of the appeal before the court to address the complex jurisdictional, legal and factual issues presented by the grounds of appeal relating to the specific legal basis for the National Employment Service. It is preferable to defer any decision on these issues to a case where their resolution is necessary to the outcome of the appeal and where the issues have been more fully argued. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER
  7. The Appeals Officer’s determination discloses a series of errors of law. These are summarised at paragraphs 37 to 52 above. The principal error of law is the failure to appreciate that the Appellant was never served with a statutory notice requiring him to attend for or submit to an assessment of his education, training or development needs. It follows that the condition precedent to the making of a statutory request under section 141B was never satisfied: there was no lawful assessment capable of grounding a request to participate in a prescribed scheme, programme or course. The Appeals Officer also failed to appreciate that the sanction of disqualification is dependent upon the prior service of a second-stage notice, i.e. a notice under section 141A
(4), or, as the case may be, a notice or request under section 141B
(2).
  1. All of the identified errors are of a type which is amenable to the statutory appeal on questions of law under section 327 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act
  2. Accordingly, the Appeals Officer’s determination will be set aside. The 24 Appellant is entitled to be paid the sums withheld by reason of the unlawful reduction and unlawful disqualifications.
  3. The Appellant has been “entirely successful” in his appeal within the meaning of section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act
  4. The Appellant represented himself in these proceedings and thus did not incur any expense in relation to the retention of legal practitioners. I propose, therefore, to make an order allowing the Appellant, as a litigant in person, to recover his outlay and other out-of-pocket expenses. The recoverable costs include court fees and stamp duty paid; travel and accommodation expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings and properly vouched; and reasonable copying and postage expenses. The recoverable costs do not, however, include any sum in respect of the Appellant’s own time, expertise or labour in conducting the litigation (Dawson v. Irish Brokers Association [2002] IESC 36, [2002] 2 I.L.R.M. 210; Skoczylas v. Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201).
  5. If either party wishes to contend for a different form of order than that proposed, they will have an opportunity to make oral submissions when the matter is next listed.
  6. It is proposed to list the proceedings for submissions and the making of final orders on 1 July 2026 at 10.30 a.m. The parties may opt to attend remotely if they so wish. If this date does not suit the parties, they are asked to contact the Registrar with alternative dates. Appearances The Appellant appeared as a litigant in person Cian McGoldrick for the Respondents instructed by the Chief State Solicitor

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AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.