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2026 IEHC 313

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 313 [Record No. HFJ.2026/000001] IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 35 OF REGULATION (EU) NO. 1215/2012 ON JURISDICTION AND THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS AND IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 42A OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS AND IN THE MATTER OF LUXEMBOURG PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN ELISA RENATE COLEMAN AND ADDLESHAW GODDARD (IRELAND) LLP, PYRIAT LIMITED, COLACO LIMITED AND ARNAUD SAGNARD BETWEEN ELISA RENATE COLEMAN PLAINTIFF AND PYRIAT LIMITED DEFENDANT AND ADDLESHAW GODDARD (IRELAND) LLP NOTICE PARTY JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger dated the 15th day of May 2026 2

  1. This is the plaintiff’s application for Mareva injunctive relief pursuant to Article 35 of Brussels/Recast restraining the defendant from reducing or dissipating monies held to the defendant’s benefit in the Notice Party’s client account pending the determination of proceedings the plaintiff has issued in Luxembourg against the defendant and other parties. For the reasons set out below I am refusing this application. Background
  2. The plaintiff is a former director and shareholder of the defendant company, which she incorporated in the Isle of Man in January
  3. In March 2006, the defendant and another company Wycolla Ltd, of which the plaintiff was also the sole shareholder and director, purchased a substantial property in Ireland. In 2019, the Wycolla interest in the property was transferred to the defendant. In 2021, the plaintiff agreed to transfer one of her two shares in the defendant to an English registered company Colaco Ltd which was beneficially owned and controlled by Maitre Arnaud Sagnard, a Luxembourg lawyer. the defendant to Colaco. In 2024, the plaintiff transferred her remaining shareholding in All the documents governing those transactions are governed by Luxembourg law.
  4. Colaco later brought a claim against the defendant and since the institution of the within proceedings and the grant of an interim injunction, that claim has been settled. The plaintiff submits this is a transparent attempt to circumvent this Court’s interim order and to contract out of its equitable jurisdiction and emphasises the risk of dissipation of the funds the subject matter of this application
  5. In December 2025, the Irish property was sold for €2,750,
  6. A portion of the proceeds of sale in the amount of €510,086.99 are currently held by solicitors who are the notice party to these proceedings and is the subject of the interim Mareva injunction made on 22 January
  7. The balance of the proceeds of sale was transferred to the defendant.
  8. The plaintiff claims to be the defendant’s principal creditor in the amount of approximately €5 million arising from a director’s loan that is shown in the defendant’s 2023 accounts.
  9. On 9 January 2026, the defendant made a written demand against the plaintiff for €3,861,339.54 for interest, costs, occupancy fees, vehicles and horses. The plaintiff contends that the claim constitutes a fraudulent device designed to extinguish her entitlement as the defendant’s largest creditor and to enable Mr Sagnard, the principal shareholder of the defendant and a co-defendant in the Luxembourg proceedings, to appropriate the entirety of the sale proceeds. 3
  10. On 14 January 2026, the plaintiff brought proceedings in Luxembourg against the defendant, Colaco and Mr Sagnard in reliance on the jurisdiction clauses in the financial agreements referred to above. On 16 January 2026, the plaintiff issued a statutory letter of demand in the Isle of Man seeking payment of her debt of €5,288,048 from the defendant. Application for a Mareva Injunction
  11. The plaintiff’s application is pursuant to Article 35 of Brussels/Recast which provides; “Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.” The application is premised on the Luxembourg proceedings and the plaintiff seeks preservation of the interim Mareva pending their determination which the plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer has averred may take many months.
  12. The parties agree that the test for this Court to grant a Mareva injunction is as summarised in Kirwin ‘Injunctions: Law and Practice’ (3rd Ed., 2020) that an applicant must: "(i) demonstrate a substantive cause of action; (ii) show a good arguable case; (iii) identify assets within the jurisdiction; (iv) demonstrate that the anticipated disposal is to prevent recovery and not for the normal course of business; and (v) satisfy the court of behaviour of the defendant and the balance of convenience.” In addition, the defendant contends that a Mareva injunction cannot be used to effectively create a security for an applicant or to make recovery easier for them, relying on the UK decision of Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v Artis [2004] A11 ER.
  13. The Luxembourg proceedings clearly involve a substantive cause of action and the defendant clearly has assets. The question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has satisfied the court that she has a good arguable case and if she establishes that she does, then the court must proceed to consider whether there is an anticipated disposal to prevent recovery and not for the normal course of business and must also satisfy the court on the behaviour of the defendant on the balance of convenience.

(1)Good arguable case 11. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to prove that she has a good arguable case in the Luxembourg proceedings. The plaintiff identifies the threshold as more than barely capable of 4 serious argument, not necessarily one with a better than 50% chance of success (Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Gmbh [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600). The plaintiff goes on to address what she says are the merits of her Luxembourg case, for example by taking issue with the defendant’s occupancy claim against her. However, it is not for this court to assess the merits of the claim the plaintiff has taken before the Luxembourg court but rather to consider the evidence the plaintiff has put before this court as to the strength of that claim pursuant to Luxembourg law. In that regard, the defendant highlights the absence of an Affidavit of Laws and criticises the adequacy of the affidavit sworn by the plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer on which the plaintiff relies in asserting that she has a good arguable case. 12. I will examine this aspect of the plaintiff's case by reference to firstly, the Luxembourg proceedings and secondly, to the evidence that has been put on affidavit by the plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer. (
  1. i)The Luxembourg proceedings 13. The Luxembourg proceedings are described as an “action paulienne” under Article 1167 of the Luxembourg Civil Code. The plaintiff pleads that the defendant made certain payments to Colaco in fraud of her rights as the defendant's creditor. She asks the Luxembourg Court to declare such payments as an undue payment within the meaning of Article 1235 of the Civil Code and an act of fraudulent impoverishment of the plaintiff’s rights within the meaning of Article 1167 of that Civil Code. The plaintiff also seeks the payment of the surplus that she says was wrongly received by Colaco from the defendant but significantly, she seeks that financial relief from Colaco and not from the defendant. She also asks the court to declare certain payments by the plaintiff to Colaco to be void. The only liquidated sum she seeks from the defendant is €5,000 "procedural damages" and her costs. (
  2. ii)The affidavit of the plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer 14. Both parties agree that this is not an Affidavit of Laws, but the plaintiff asserts no such affidavit is required. The plaintiff’s written submission to this court describes her claim in Luxembourg as "compelling and fully particularised". She relies on the analysis that her Luxembourg lawyer sets out, quite briefly, at paras. 22 and 46 as follows: "22. The ”good arguable case” is an Irish law criterion and I am not qualified to give an opinion. The actio pauliana brought by the plaintiff is based on a significant and serious case. I would not have put my name to such proceedings if I did not believe 5 that the circumstances warranted it and that there was a good prospect of succeeding in the action. …….. 46. The “good arguable case” is an Irish law criterion, and I am not qualified to give an opinion. The Luxembourg Interim Relief Summons and the allegations of civil fraud within the meaning of Luxembourg law are significant and serious. I would not have put my name to such proceedings if I did not believe that the circumstances warranted it and that there was a good prospect of succeeding in the Luxembourg Inter Partes Interim Relief Proceedings.” 15. The Luxembourg lawyer’s affidavit is long, totalling 59 paragraphs, much of which discusses procedural aspects of Luxembourg law and his criticisms of the defendant's refusal to accept service of the proceedings. There is no attempt to explain the concepts of Luxembourg law from the Civil Code or the law of fraud in Luxembourg law, on which the claim is based. Neither is there anything to assist a non-Luxembourg lawyer to understand what is required of a Luxembourg lawyer when signing pleadings that allege fraud against a defendant. 16. This Court is asked by the plaintiff to determine that she has satisfied the proof of establishing that her Luxembourg claim is a good arguable case because of her Luxembourg lawyer’s optimism that there is a good prospect of success. I simply cannot agree. The plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer may be an experienced lawyer as he has averred to in his Affidavit, but he has not shared nearly enough of whatever knowledge and experience he has of Luxembourg law to allow this Court any understanding of the basis for his optimism about the plaintiff's prospects in the litigation in which he acts for her. There may be many reasons why a lawyer believes their case has a good prospect of success, including for example, a settlement which might be motivated by reasons extraneous to the legal merits of the claim. I make no suggestion that this is what has informed the plaintiff’s Luxembourg lawyer’s belief that the plaintiff has a good prospect of success because, quite simply, I have insufficient evidence from him about the case and the features of Luxembourg law that the plaintiff relies on in making her case to enable this Court to have any understanding of what has informed his views and/or his optimism. 17. In addition, the reliefs sought in the Luxembourg proceedings are primarily against Colaco and not against the defendant. The plaintiff seeks modest damages and costs from the defendant. I have been given no understanding what the costs that are also sought from the defendant may be 6 but a damages claim of €5,000 and costs could not realistically justify the Mareva injunction that is sought here. 18. The defendant submits that the plaintiff seeks a Mareva injunction in summary proceedings that are not in being and which, in any event, could only be brought in the Isle of Man (over which Brussels/Recast has no jurisdiction) where the defendant company is incorporated. I find merit in that submission. 19. I have insufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s Luxembourg claim is a good arguable case, and I therefore find she has failed to discharge the burden of proof on her to overcome the first essential proof to secure the Mareva injunction that she seeks. 20. If I am wrong on that, I proceed to consider the other proofs that would be required of the plaintiff if she established a good arguable case.
(2)Dissipation of funds
  1. Since the institution of the within proceedings, the defendant has settled with Colaco and there can therefore be no risk of the funds being dissipated by being paid to that company. Nevertheless, the plaintiff remains concerned that the defendant will dissipate the monies by moving them to the Isle of Man. It is reasonable to expect that the monies will be moved to that jurisdiction given that the defendant company was incorporated (by the plaintiff) in the Isle of Man. The prospect of the money being moved to the Isle of Man does not in itself evidence an intention to put it beyond the plaintiff's reach or to deprive her of reliefs she may secure against the defendant in her Luxembourg proceedings.
  2. The plaintiff relies on the absence of an affidavit from Mr Sagnard which she says allows this Court to draw adverse inferences about the risk of dissipation of the funds and about what she says is the fraudulent character of the defendant’s claims against her. I do not consider the absence of an affidavit from Mr Sagnard is, in itself, sufficient to establish evidence of an intention to dissipate monies because they may well be returned to the jurisdiction in which the defendant was incorporated.
  3. The plaintiff highlights her pleas of fraud in the Luxembourg proceedings. I consider it inappropriate to draw this Court into making indirect findings of fraud pursuant to Luxembourg law in the management of transactions that are before a Luxembourg court, where this Court has been given no knowledge or understanding of what constitutes fraud in Luxembourg law.
  4. There is nothing to stop the plaintiff from considering bringing a claim against the defendant in the Isle of Man if or when the funds are moved there. Indeed, she has already threatened winding 7 up proceedings against the defendant, in her capacity as a creditor of that company, in the Isle of Man. Her submissions to this court describe this as "a routine parallel enforcement step in the debtor's jurisdiction of incorporation" (at para. 6.2).
  5. I have not been satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged the burden of proving the anticipated disposal of the funds by the defendant in order to prevent recovery and not for the purpose of carrying on its business in the normal way or for the purpose of discharging lawful debts. Balance of convenience
  6. The following are factors in assessing the balance of convenience: i) The plaintiff’s stated intention to seek to wind up the defendant company in the Isle of Man. ii) The settlement between the defendant and Colaco, which removed any risk of dissipation of funds by payments to Colaco. iii) There is merit to the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff is seeking to be preferred as a secured creditor in the absence of any such status. Those points all dissuade this Court from granting the Mareva injunction that is sought. The plaintiff’s non-disclosure of the Subordination Agreement
  7. The plaintiff did not disclose the subordination agreement in her original ex parte application and the defendant maintains that this should deny her the relief sought. Had I been persuaded of the proofs necessary as discussed above, I do not consider that this alone would have persuaded me to refuse an injunction I otherwise considered should be granted. Conclusion
  8. For the reasons set out above, I refuse this interlocutory application. Indicative view on costs
  9. My indicative view on costs in accordance with s. 167 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that the defendant, having succeeded in defending this injunction in its entirety, is entitled to its costs. I will hear the parties further on the issue of costs and any other orders that may require to be made. I will put the matter in at 10.00am on 20th May
  10. Any written submissions should be with the court 48 hours in advance of the matter coming back before me. Counsel for the plaintiff: Andrew J King BL Counsel for the defendant: Keith Rooney BL 8

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