← Ireland

[2026] IECA 109

THE COURT OF APPEAL Neutral Citation No. [2026] IECA 109 Record No: 321/2024 Kennedy J. Butler J. Owens J. BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS) RESPONDENT -VDECLAN DONAGHEY APPELLANT JUDGMENT of the Court delivered ex tempore by Ms. Justice Butler on the 19th of May 2026 Introduction 1. This is an appeal brought by Mr. Declan Donaghey (“the appellant”) against the severity of a sentence imposed on him by Dublin Circuit Criminal Court in respect of his conviction for three offences, namely riot contrary to s.14 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 (Count 1), arson contrary to s.2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991 (Count 3), and criminal damage contrary to s.2 of the 1991 Act (Count 4), committed on 23rd November 2023. Two further counts were taken into consideration - a count of violent disorder and a further count of criminal damage (Counts 2 and 5). All of these offences took place during a period when a large group of people had assembled at the O’Connell Street/Parnell Street area in Dublin city centre apparently in response to a serious incident which had occurred at a local school earlier that day. The events of that evening, which involved a large number of people in addition to Mr. Donaghey, are colloquially known as “the Dublin riots”. 2. The appellant pleaded guilty to the three offences having earlier made admissions as to his involvement during the course of a Garda interview following his arrest in January 2024. On 20th November 2024 he was sentenced to 4.5 years for the riot offence; 7.5 years for the arson offence with the final year suspended; and 3 years for the criminal damage offence, all sentences to run concurrently. This sentence was backdated to 18th November 2024. 3. The thrust of the appellant’s appeal is that the sentencing judge erred in nominating a headline sentence of 10 years in respect of the arson offence and failed to have sufficient regard to mitigation and to the objective of rehabilitation. In the course of argument, counsel for the appellant acknowledged that the sentencing judge had allowed a reasonable discount for these latter factors but contended that because the headline sentence was too high, the ultimate result was still disproportionate in comparison to (

  1. a)other sentences imposed in arson cases and (
  2. b)the sentences imposed on other participants in the Dublin riots for similar actions. Background to the Offences 4. Detective Inspector Ken Hoare gave evidence to the effect that on the night of 23rd November 2024 the appellant was involved in the Dublin Riots, which he described as “the gravest public disorder incident in the history of the State”. 5. The appellant’s offending was captured on CCTV and, through careful scrutiny, the Gardaí were able to identify him. It was noted that the appellant wore a mask during the “active phase” of his offending. A 15-minute video comprising a compilation of CCTV clips was shown both to the sentencing court and to this court. The appellant is initially seen in a local shop at approximately 5pm. His easily identifiable as his face is uncovered and his hood is down. At this stage people are beginning to gather in the area. The appellant appears to have left the area and is not picked up again on CCTV until an hour or so later when he reappears with his face covered and his hood up. 6. The Appellant’s offending, all of which is shown on the CCTV footage, included throwing rubbish bags at Gardaí, kicking and stomping on a patrol car breaking the windscreen, and then taking a burning cardboard box and placing it into a second patrol car causing it to burst into flames. After doing this the appellant is seen returning to the vehicle and wiping the handle of the door through which he had gained access to the vehicle, presumably to remove fingerprints and other forensic residue. The value of the patrol car which was set alight was €20,136. The damage to the first-mentioned patrol car was €8,116.47. 7. The appellant was also seen throwing a bicycle saddle at the window of a direct provision centre called Dublin City Dorms where 90 international protection applicants were housed. This occurred in circumstances where a large group of people had gathered at the hostel and were smashing windows and shouting “Get out”. The appellant admitted in interview that this element of his offending was racially motivated and that he had attacked the hostel because “that’s where a lot of them are staying”. The estimated losses in relation to this damage is €16,000, with an extra €63,000 being spent by the owners of the hostel on additional security personnel. Sentencing Judge’s Determination 8. The sentencing judge considered the very serious nature of the offending and identified the facts that the appellant was the sole offender involved in burning the patrol car, that he had rioted with others, damaged garda property and damaged an international protection centre as aggravating features. The judge had regard to the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his unemployment, his medical difficulties, and that he has been dealing with a drink problem and attending meetings (although this seems to have commenced only after his arrest in connection with these matters). In terms of mitigation, regard was had to the admissions made to the Gardaí by the appellant, his early guilty plea, his expression of remorse and his involvement in community activities including a local football club. 9. The sentencing judge was clearly not impressed with the appellant’s claim that he had acted in the manner he did because he had a close relation in the school which was the subject matter of the attack earlier that day. In fact, the connection was quite tenuous, a child of his partner’s cousin attended the school. Although this explanation was still relied on in the appellant’s written legal submissions as regards “how he came to be in the area and his frame of mind at the time”, counsel on his behalf did not rely on it in his oral submissions at the appeal hearing. In our view a connection of this nature could never justify the type of behaviour the appellant engaged in that evening, and the sentencing judge was quite right to reject it. This is not in any way to minimise the impact on the local community of the very serious crimes committed at the school earlier that day. However, it can never be an appropriate response to such events to gather en masse and to attack the Gardaí while they are attempting to investigate the earlier crimes. 10. It was noted that although the appellant has previous convictions, they are very minor and he never served a custodial sentence. Consequently, the sentencing judge expressly did not treat these as an aggravating feature. The judge nominated a headline sentence of 6 years for the riot count, reducing it to 4.5 years in light of the mitigating circumstances. In respect of the arson offence, a headline sentence of 10 years was nominated, which was reduced to 7.5 years in light of the same mitigating factors with the final year suspended to incentivise rehabilitation. In respect of the criminal damage offence, a headline sentence of 4 years was nominated which was then reduced to 3 years. In effect, looking at the sentence for arson which, in the circumstances, will determine the total custodial sentence to be served by the appellant, the sentencing judge allowed a 25% discount in respect of mitigation with another 10% suspended to incentivise rehabilitation, leaving an effective sentence of 6.5 years, a reduction of 35% from the nominated headline sentence. Grounds of Appeal 11. The appellant contends that the sentencing judge imposed a sentence which was excessive and disproportionate by nominating a headline sentence of 10 years on the arson count and in failing to have sufficient regard to mitigation and the objective of rehabilitation. As noted above, in oral argument counsel for the appellant acknowledged that the discount allowed in respect of mitigation and the period which was suspended were not in themselves insufficient, but argued that because the headline sentence was excessive, even when those discounts were allowed the sentence was still disproportionate. He also suggested that a suspended period of one year was inadequate in circumstances where the appellant is a young man who had never served a custodial sentence. Again, he acknowledged that sentencing may serve a deterrent function but contended that the level of sentence imposed on the appellant was such that it was being used to make an example of him. 12. The appellant accepts that the arson was a very serious incident but argues that the offending should not be placed in the ‘most serious’ category for sentencing (10-15 years per DPP v. Shannon [2023] IECA 325). The appellant distinguishes his offending from cases where there is significant planning and premeditation, such as the case of DPP v. Lyons [2025] IECA 172. In the case of DPP v. Flynn [2015] IECA 290 the accused had deliberately set fire to the premises using an accelerant and the fire spread to two adjoining premises, resulting in in excess of €1 million worth of damage. The accused had 65 previous convictions and had fled the country on two occasions, requiring two European Arrest Warrants. A headline sentence of 7 years was identified, with the final two years suspended. The appellant also refers to media reports of the sentences imposed on other participants in the Dublin riots. Based on these comparator cases, it is submitted that the headline sentence in this case is disproportionately high. 13. In relation to mitigation and rehabilitation, it is submitted that a discount of 25% did not adequately take into account the substantial mitigation in this case, including his admissions, early plea of guilty, his personal circumstances, his insight into his offending, his remorse, the lack of serious previous convictions and his efforts to rehabilitate. Respondent’s Submissions 14. The respondent submits, citing DPP v. Andy Donohue [2025] IECA 219, that the racially and politically motivated nature of the offending can be regarded as an aggravating feature. In that case the appellant had deployed petrol bombs to set fire to an IPAS centre which, although at the time unoccupied save for a security guard, was intended to house international protection applicants. 15. The respondent disputes the appellant’s characterisation of the incident as “spontaneous” or “a moment of madness” as the appellant had been present in the city centre earlier in the day and returned with his face covered to engage in the rioting. It was also open to him to leave the area at any time once the crowd became hostile, but he chose not to do so. 16. In relation to the comparator cases put forward by the appellant, the DPP refers to the comments of Edwards J. in DPP v. O’Connell [2020] IECA 237 in which he states “we have said many times that direct comparison of individual cases is unlikely to be helpful in a situation where every case is different… the true value of comparators lies in their indication of a trend…”. It is submitted that “no discernible trend” has been identified by the appellant. Similarly, the appellant’s reference to media reports in respect of sentences arrived at for other participants in the rioting are of “negligible value” and each “are unique from the others as they concern different levels of culpability and different accused.” Discussion and Analysis 17. In our view this is an extremely serious case. Whilst the judge was sentencing only for those offences to which the appellant had pleaded guilty, she was entitled to look at his offending in the context in which it occurred and in particular to look at the behaviour comprising the two other offences which were “taken into account”. The context of this offending was unique in that it took place as part of what Detective Inspector Hoare rightly described as the “gravest public disorder incident in the history of the State”. It also involved two very significant aggravating features. 18. The first of these is that the appellant’s actions were part of a targeted attack on members of An Garda Síochána who were attempting to carry out their lawful duties in investigating a serious criminal offence which had taken place earlier that day. Members of An Garda Síochána when they go to work, and even when that work is difficult and must be carried out in circumstances where people are distressed and tensions are high, should not have to fear for their own personal safety. The role of An Garda Síochána is fundamental to the preservation of peace and public order in our society. As the sentencing judge rightly remarked, an attack on the Gardaí is an attack on all of society. 19. In this case one member of An Garda Síochána had remained with three garda vehicles (a van and two cars) whilst his colleagues were deployed in the crowd. The crowd then turned on that member who for his own safety had to retreat into the parked garda van. The two garda cars parked immediately in front of the van were those attacked by the appellant who set one alight and caused extensive damage to the other whilst a crowd surrounded the van. This was undoubtedly an extremely frightening incident for the Garda involved and indeed for those of his colleagues who had to return in an attempt to rescue him. 20. The second of these features is the racially motivated nature of the appellant’s actions and indeed of the riots themselves. Suspicion that a criminal act has been carried out by a member of a minority group can never justify a concerted attack on other members of that group. In this instance the appellant was centrally involved in an attack on a hostel housing applicants for international protection. Many of these people are very vulnerable, having left their countries of origin due to persecution. To find themselves barricaded into the hostel in which they were living with the shutters pulled down and the lights switched off to deflect attention whilst a mob outside chanted racist slogans and threw objects at the windows must have been a terrifying experience. 21. We also accept the submission made on behalf of the DPP characterising the appellant’s actions as signifying a change in the level and type of violence being carried out by the crowd and a representing a marked escalation. The appellant, in setting the garda car alight, was responsible for the first act of arson that evening. A bus and a tram were subsequently set ablaze by others. 22. For these reasons we find the comparator cases concerning arson relied on by the appellant to be of limited value. The argument made on his behalf is that in these other cases the evidence showed the arson attacks to have been planned and premeditated, for example because an accelerant was brought to the scene, and often significantly more damage was caused by the fire. That may be so, but it is difficult to draw a realistic comparison between the burning of an industrial premises in order to make an insurance claim and the burning of a garda car in the middle of a riot. The appellant’s actions were not preplanned in that sense, but they were premeditated in the sense that having been in the area an hour earlier, the appellant returned with his face covered obviously intent on participation in some form in the events that were unfolding. Further, having set the garda car alight, he then took steps to wipe the door handle to remove his fingerprints and other trace evidence. These actions were not simply opportunistic and impulsive. 23. A comparison with the sentences imposed on others involved in the Dublin riots needs to be approached cautiously. Whilst obviously there should be a degree of consistency in sentences imposed for similar crimes, and it must be acknowledged that the context in which all offending took place in the Dublin riots is broadly similar, different considerations will apply to each individual case and to each individual offender. 24. The appellant sought to draw comparisons based on newspaper reports of the sentences imposed in other cases (which do not appear to have been the subject of appeal to this court). In one instance the offender was very young, just 18 years of age, and clearly allowance was made for that fact. In another the offender was an older man with a history of addiction and homelessness and a complex medical condition which would make imprisonment especially difficult. That particular offender had also voluntarily contacted the Gardaí to identify himself after his photo was included in a batch of photos released by the Gardaí of persons of interest to them in connection with the Dublin riots. Other offenders received sentences comparable to that imposed on the appellant being five and a half and six years respectively. Without further details as to how those sentences were structured, it is not possible to make an objective comparison. 25. This court must also bear in mind that in a sentence appeal the issue is not whether this court might have imposed a different sentence, but whether there was an error of principle in the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. In our view the trial judge did not make such an error in fixing a headline sentence of 10 years for the offence of arson. This was undoubtedly a very serious offence. Arson carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The appellant argues that the offence should not have been placed in the band reserved for the most serious offending (with higher sentences of over 15 years reserved for exceptional or egregious cases). However, the bands, which are only ever indicative and not binding, run from 1 – 5 years, 5 – 10 years, 10 - 15 years and 15 years plus. Thus, the headline sentence here can be characterised as either falling at the lowest end of the higher (but not the highest) band or the highest level of the middle band. Either way we are satisfied that the sentencing judge did not err in principle in fixing the headline sentence at this point. Whilst the incident was not preplanned in the manner in which some arson cases are, it was not an entirely spontaneous action on the part of the appellant. He deliberately returned to the scene of the riots, with his face concealed and actively took part in a number of different violent acts. When regard is had to the particular context in which this offence took place, it is clear that it is offending of a very serious kind. 26. In the course of argument, counsel acknowledged that the 35% discount (including the suspended portion of the sentence) was not unreasonable. It is clear that the sentencing judge took account of all of the positive factors listed on behalf of the appellant. She expressly did not have regard to his previous convictions which were for minor, unrelated offences. She built a rehabilitative element into the sentence by suspending a portion of it. Again, although the matter was not pushed, we cannot see that there was any error of principle in the manner in which she approached the reductions from the headline sentence. The ultimate sentence imposed on the appellant is not, in our view, disproportionate. 27. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.

🔗 To official source

AI explanation based on the official legal text. Indicative, not a substitute for legal advice.