2026 IEHC 227

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2025 No.1261 JR] [2026] IEHC 227 BETWEEN PATRICK JOHN RIGNEY APPLICANT AND GOVERNOR OF CLOVERHILL PRISON RESPONDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS NOTICE PARTY EX-TEMPORE RULING of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on the 15th day of April, 2026

1. The law in relation to leave applications is very well established. The Applicant must establish that the facts as set out in his affidavit would be sufficient, if proven, to support a stateable ground for the relief he seeks. The Supreme Court confirms that: “It must be a case that has a prospect of success (otherwise it would not be an arguable case) but does not require more than that”, per O’Donnell C.J., para. 39 in O’Doherty v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 IR
3. In Chubb European Group SE v. HIA [2020] IECA 91 Mr. Justice Murray held that: 1 [if there is] an alternative remedy …relief should be refused unless that remedy is not in fact adequate or there is a particular exigency in the interests of justice which requires otherwise. The onus is on the party seeking leave to establish that judicial review is the appropriate remedy or that justice requires the remedy.
4. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that the unitary nature of the criminal trial and the potential for unjustified disruptions of the trial process, together with the limitations on the jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings, underpin the jurisprudence against the interference with the trial process. The Supreme Court has strongly endorsed the principle that the Court of Appeal is the appropriate remedy for an applicant dissatisfied with a trial judge’s ruling. Judicial review of a trial, especially when initiated mid-trial, will only succeed in exceptional cases and one of the very rare examples, D.P.P. v. Special Criminal Court, [1999] 1 IR 60, is discussed in E.R. v. D.P.P. [2019] IESC
5. One could not read the E.R. judgment without realising how rare it is for a criminal trial to be successfully interrupted in this way.
6. The prohibition of criminal trials was the subject of H. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] IESC 55, 3 I.R. 575 and was addressed in Director of Public Prosecutions v. C.C. [2019] IESC 94, in which latter case, the primacy of the role of the trial judge was re-emphasised. The relevant principles, in brief, are: each case turns on its own facts; this is a wholly exceptional remedy; refusal of leave returns the case to the trial judge, anticipating that she will ensure a fair trial; the courts are slow to interfere with the Director’s independent decision to prosecute; few cases can reproduce all the evidence that might once have been available; the Applicant must show manifest, unavoidable prejudice that cannot be cured at trial; if there is an allegation of corruption such as would prevent a fair trial, there must be an evidential basis for that claim.
7. Mr. Rigney has been prosecuted under animal health legislation in relation to events which occurred on 17th September
8. He was convicted in the District Court on the 19th of May 2025, he was remanded in custody and the Judge 2 refused to fix recognisances in his case. The Applicant, who was then represented, made an application for his immediate release from prison and this Court opened an enquiry, the Governor did not contest the application, and he was released on bail on 23rd May
10. The application for leave was moved today, 15th April 2026, under the same title. It is still addressed to the Governor. This is the wrong Respondent. The Director of Public Prosecutions is on notice. The Applicant sought a date in the Ex Parte list, to challenge the further prosecution of this case. Meanwhile, he has appealed to the Circuit Court. The appeal is listed for hearing tomorrow.
11. The Article 40 application for release was listed on 19th June 2025 and that case was struck out as the Governor agreed to pay his costs. Mr. Rigney understood that the June date in 2025 was to proceed with his judicial review proceedings. This was incorrect as he had not, at that time, made any such claim. This is unfortunate but all the papers in the case confirm that only his Article 40 application was before the High Court in April and June of
13. A new file was lodged, and a date for an ex parte application for leave was given in January of
14. The Applicant was advised to notify the Respondent and the Notice Party of his application. Unfortunately, the prosecutor, which is Offaly County Council, was never notified of this application. The Notice Party has appeared and advised the Court that she has not taken part in the District Court prosecution. The case came before me at least once, and I advised Mr. Rigney that I had no papers in the case. He tells me that he did not know it was up to him to lodge papers, and that he had great difficulty in lodging papers. Further, he tells me that his papers were shredded which may be the case in that the courts shred papers after applications are made but insofar as I can tell, this can only refer to the papers in respect of his Article 40 application.
15. Mr. Rigney has produced emails which suggest that he tried to file this case on 22nd August of
16. He sent an email on 18 th August 2025, which was the last date on which he would have been within time in respect of the District Court 3 case. He tells me that he had tried to move this application in June of 2025, but it is clear from the file that nothing relating to his current complaints which ground his judicial review application was filed until the application he made in January of
17. So, there was no progress in the case until January of
18. Even then, there was no application made to the Court until last Monday, 13 th April
19. Again, papers had not been lodged until the working day before that date, last Friday. This is an application which should have been pressed with much more urgency. I will return to that point.
20. It is important that justice be done but also that procedural rules be followed. The substance of the case is an application to prevent the further prosecution of Mr. Rigney on the basis of insufficient disclosure, unlawful warrants and failure to prove authorised entry. He asks that the High Court decide this case.
21. There are also complaints about the solicitors for the Applicant and their failure to act on instructions. Mr. Rigney described to me how the evidence ran in the District Court. He is challenging the authorisation of the dog warden to enter his property, amongst other issues. He submits that the officer who applied for the warrant was not available to the District Court and therefore not available for cross-examination. He points out that there was insufficient proof of service, insufficient proof of location of allegations and of lawfulness of authorisation to enter. He points to charge sheet numbers from different stations.
22. This summary of the challenges he makes persuades me that judicial review is not the appropriate relief for this Applicant, particularly in a case where the Circuit Court hearing is listed for tomorrow. All of these matters are matters for the trial judge: the correct prosecutor; the adequacy of service; the lawfulness of the warrant; the authorisation to enter; the evidence that the state prosecutor proposes to give; the evidence of the relevant state actors; the weight to be attached to all that evidence; the evidence of Mr. Rigney himself if he chooses to give evidence: all are matters for the Trial Judge. The issues, in summary, are a mixture of fact and law and are appropriate matters for a court 4 of trial which court can hear the witnesses and assess the weight of the evidence. There is no unfairness exposed which suggests that this is such an exceptional case that the High Court must now interfere with the trial process.
23. The case the Applicant now makes was, or should have been, clear to him from the 19th of May,
24. He received disclosure, in respect of which he makes his complaint, on 21st March 2025 according to the papers in front of me. There is no reason to explain why he waited, even until the 18th of August 2025, to file his leave application. While that was still within time, there is no adequate reason for the further delay since then. I fully appreciate that he was in contact with his solicitors and that there were communication difficulties, but it is the Applicant’s case to make. Now that I have reviewed the subject matter of his application, I am satisfied that it is not unfair to refuse this application on the basis that it was made too late. The arguments made are suitable to be made in the Court of Trial and that is the appropriate venue for this case.
25. Given the communication difficulties for Mr. Rigney with various court offices and with his own solicitors, I am making no order as to costs. The Governor was wrongly joined as Respondent and remained named in the case. As the Applicant is a litigant in person, I am reluctant to penalise him in that regard. 5