2026 IEHC 354

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 354 [Record No. HP/2023/6020] BETWEEN DEAN KANE PLAINTIFF AND CIARAN HEARNS DEFENDANT JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Carmel Stewart delivered on the 5th of June

2. The plaintiff has brought a claim for personal injuries allegedly suffered by him on 27 September 2021, whilst he was riding on a Kawaski 250 scrambler bike along the public highway at or near Glin Road, Coolock, Dublin
3. It is his claim that he was driving along Moatview Avenue when, without warning, the defendant drove across the road into his path of travel, thereby crashing into the plaintiff. It is alleged that this was due to the manner in which the defendant drove and managed his vehicle. The facts of the case are as follows. The defendant was stopped at a junction where Clonshaugh Avenue joins Moatview Avenue, which had a yellow junction box. 2 The plaintiff claims that he was travelling in the opposite direction to the defendant’s car (i.e., that he was driving towards the defendant). The plaintiff’s evidence is as follows. As he was driving over speed bumps on Moatview Avenue, approaching Glin Road and intending to turn left, he observed a car stopped at the junction box in front of him, who was indicating to make a right turn. As he turned left, the defendant pulled out in front of him. Following this, he remembers being flung into the air and landing on the ground, in severe pain. He claims to have initially not noticed that his leg was broken, but that he looked down, saw a bone protruding and thought it would require amputation. An ambulance arrived shortly thereafter, and he was taken to hospital, where his treatment comprised of a series of medical procedures.
4. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff was seriously injured following the collision with the defendant’s vehicle on 27 September
5. However, it must be determined if the defendant is liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was riding a self-described “scrambler bike”, referred to as an e-scooter by the plaintiff in a later updated medical report. During his cross-examination, it was expressed that he had been advised by his parents to lie and claim that his bike was an e-scooter as it was neither taxed nor insured.
6. The other witnesses as to fact in relation to this case are the defendant, Mr Ciaran Hearns and Ms Edel Quinn. In addition, the defendant called on Garda Enda O’Reilly, although it was established that he arrived at the scene after the collision occurred, thereby not bearing witness to the events as they took place.
7. There are many issues of concern governing this case, specifically the inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s account throughout both his direct evidence and cross-examination. It should be highlighted at this juncture that the plaintiff, as part of his evidence, explained he had been diagnosed with attention deficit/hyperactivity 3 disorder (ADHD) during childhood. This was somewhat reflective in his speech pattern during proceedings. However, in my opinion he was adept at evading questions asked and justifying propositions unhelpful to his case.
8. In his evidence, the defendant claimed to be a resident of the area adjacent to the scene of the collision, an estimated minutes’ drive away, hence he was familiar with the area. He claimed to be on his commute home from work, on his typical route. This included driving on the M50 and taking multiple backroads to cut onto Clonshaugh Avenue, a journey he claims to have made every day. He finished work at approximately 2pm that day. He explained that as he made his way to Coolock, he travelled down Clonshaugh Avenue and was about to turn onto Glin Road, as was his normal route home. He described that Clonshaugh Avenue goes into Moatview Avenue, with a turn onto Glin Road. Before the Glin Road turn, approximately 50m back, there is another right turn for Clonshaugh Glin, a small housing estate. He claimed to have brought his vehicle to a complete stop at that junction as there was a large truck turning into Clonshaugh Avenue . He explained that once the truck had made its way into the estate, he continued his route. He claimed to have been travelling between ten and fifteen kilometres per hour as he negotiated his turn onto Glin Road. He claimed there was no visible traffic against him at this time. He explained there is a mandatory stop for drivers diverging off Glin Road, thereby vehicles going left (into Moatview Avenue) or right (into Clonshaugh Avenue) must halt to an exact stop. He explained the only reason one would give way would be for oncoming traffic, but from what he could see that wasn’t the case on this day. He slowed the vehicle down, not bringing it to a complete stop, indicated to turn right and began to negotiate the turn. Once the vehicle was turned and the defendant was on Glin Road, he began approaching what he describes as a mini roundabout to negotiate 4 the traffic coming towards him. He claimed that whilst he was focusing on the roundabout ahead, the vehicle was struck. He noted the vehicle was struck on the left wheel arch. He said that at the time of the impact, he wasn’t certain of what had occurred. He described a loud bang sound. To the best of his recollection, the car did come to a complete stop upon impact, although he acknowledges being disorientated for a few seconds. He claims this disorientation was as a result of a combination of the impact and his almost-instantaneous jamming of the brakes in reaction to the incident. Referring to one of the photographs submitted to the court, he highlighted the straight positioning of his vehicle, and suggested that it could not have been straighter if it had been parked. The defendant claimed that he had been hit before he managed to turn his car into the roundabout, as it would be inconceivable for the vehicle to be perfectly straight if it was ready to negotiate the roundabout. The defendant claims that the plaintiff collided with his vehicle, specifically the left passenger wheel arch. The plaintiff crashed into the windscreen but didn’t fall through it. He describes the shattered glass from the windscreen being both on him and the passenger seat. He said that after a few seconds, he observed the plaintiff move. The defendant describes the plaintiff beginning to pull himself off the bonnet, standing up and moving toward the passenger side of the defendant’s car. Ms Edel Quinn, the other eyewitness and the driver of the vehicle behind the defendant’s, was heard screaming at the defendant saying that the plaintiff had “come out of nowhere” before she approached the defendant. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff moved to the boot of the defendant’s car and began walking towards the railings of the Priorswood Church. As the defendant’s vehicle was directly in front of Priorswood Church, this would mean the plaintiff would have walked across the grass. He had been clearly injured and so was moving at a slow pace. The defendant then describes the plaintiff sitting down in 5 front of a bin near the railings. According to the defendant, the plaintiff’s bike was either still etched in the side of the defendant’s vehicle or had tipped over, but regardless, was beside the passenger wheel arch. After approximately two minutes, the defendant described a van coming from the direction of Moatview Avenue and parking behind his vehicle. Three men are described to have climbed out of the vehicle and walked past the defendant. They are said to have picked up the bike, returned to their van and loaded the bike, as well as the helmet, onto the van. There were no words spoken between the men and the defendant. During these events, the plaintiff remained by the railings. To the best of the defendant's recollection, the guards arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, followed by the Fire Department. The defendant recalled being assisted into the back seat of his vehicle by an unidentified individual. A first ambulance arrived and tended to the plaintiff, followed by a second ambulance for the defendant a few minutes later. The defendant confirmed that he subsequently made a statement to Garda Enda O'Reilly, a witness called on by the defendant. The defendant confirmed he was breathalysed by Garda O’Reilly, that Garda O’Reilly took his details and that, days later, he attended the Garda station and made a statement regarding the matter.
9. At the defendant’s cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff, he was firm in his view that he was closer to the roundabout than to the junction and/or to the road in which he had turned off. He stated that he didn't see the plaintiff on Moatview Avenue. In his view, he didn’t believe the plaintiff could have been on Moatview Avenue as there wasn’t a vehicle coming from that direction. In evidence given to the court by Garda O’Reilly, he stated that he arrived at the scene and observed a black Kia Optima (the defendant’s vehicle) stopped on Glin Road, approaching the roundabout. He stated it was clear that the vehicle had previously taken a right turn 6 and was committed to the Glin Road roundabout. Garda O’Reilly noted that he observed the defendant in the vehicle and, in his view, he was visibly shaken. Garda O’Reilly further detailed his observation of the damage to the left wheel arch and to the front windscreen of the defendant’s vehicle. He noted a buildup of traffic in the area at the time. A second ambulance arrived shortly after Garda O’Reilly began his assessment. Following this, he shifted his focus to the details of the incident, however his initial concerns were for the well-being of the defendant. The plaintiff was not present at the scene of the accident when he arrived, nor was his vehicle or helmet. Garda O’Reilly confirmed the scene consisted of the defendant, his vehicle and the build-up of traffic which continued to accumulate. Garda O’Reilly confirmed that, by this point, he had none of the plaintiff’s details, the type of vehicle he was driving, nor did he have a record of his presence at the scene in general. During crossexamination, Garda O’Reilly confirmed that no measurements were taken at the scene. In response to being questioned if this was standard practice, he advised the court that he has never taken measurements at the scene of an accident. When asked about the presence of the plaintiff at the scene, Garda O’Reilly stated that he had assumed the plaintiff was taken in an ambulance before his arrival, based on confirmation by witnesses that an ambulance had been present earlier.
10. Ms. Edel Quinn gave evidence on behalf of the defendant. She confirmed that she resides close to the scene of the accident and that she was familiar with the area. She confirmed she can recall the events of 27 September
11. She describes it as being a nice day, nothing out of the ordinary. She confirmed she finished work at half two and was going home, stopping for shopping on the way. This would mean she would have been at the junction for Moatview Avenue and Glin Road at approximately a quarter to three. She was driving a silver Toyota Yaris. She described 7 driving down Priorswood Road, going round the roundabout onto Glin Road and stopping at the junction in question. She described being stopped at the junction and waiting. She confirmed she was the first car stopped at the junction. She stated that she was stopped at the junction, waiting to turn left while the defendant’s vehicle was indicating to turn onto Glin Road. She referred to the defendant by his first name, but confirmed she did not know him prior to the accident. She expressed that she had failed to note the plaintiff’s presence on the road, likely due to the high speed at which he was travelling. She claimed that the defendant was on the turn when she foresaw the collision occurring, due to the plaintiff’s high speeds. In response, she described putting her hands up to shield her vision from the accident. She expressed that, based on the plaintiff’s path and speed, he would have collided with either the defendant or her vehicle. She notes that, following the impact, the scrambler bike was in front of her on the road. She claimed that she directed her attention towards the defendant initially, rushing to him. She noted seeing the plaintiff near the railings of Priorswood Church and that he was holding his leg. This would mean the plaintiff was sitting in the direction of Moatview Avenue. She observed the plaintiff get off the road and sit by the bin. When asked if she observed what happened to the scrambler bike, she claimed that as she turned her head in its direction, she noticed it had since been taken off the road. She confirmed that she stayed with the defendant during this time as she felt he needed assistance given his shocked state, bloodied face, hands and shattered windscreen. She confirmed that she left the scene for a medical appointment after someone, who the defendant contacted directly, arrived to assist him
12. During her cross-examination, Ms Edel Quinn was asked if she was biased against scrambler bikes or motorbikes. She responded no to the former but yes to the latter. She explained that from personal experiences of living in her area, one grows 8 cautious of scrambler bikes on the road. She confirmed that it was after the defendant had begun to make the turn that she first observed the plaintiff’s scrambler bike. She expressed that, in her view, motorbikes differ from scrambler bikes as they have indicators and other features scrambler bikes lack. She conceded that it is possible for her prejudices against scrambler bikes to have influenced her impression of the plaintiff’s speed. It should be stated at this point that Ms Edel Quinn was interposed during the plaintiff’s evidence
13. During the cross-examination of the plaintiff (which continued after Ms Quinn completed her evidence), he stated that the bike he was driving was a Kawasaki scrambler. It was put to him that he had met with O ’Sullivan & Devine, vocational assessors on behalf of the plaintiff, who prepared a report in relation to his career opportunities and other relevant observations. It was further confirmed in evidence by the plaintiff that a vocational assessor, namely a Ms Fiona Ryan, prepared a report in relation to his prospects. In his interview with O’Sullivan & Devine, the plaintiff reported that he had been interested in buying an e-scooter, and that the time of the accident was his first trial with the vehicle. In court, when asked if this was an accurate account of his exchange with O’Sullivan & Devine, he admitted “Yes, I told that story, that was only a couple of weeks ago. I think my father had suggested to me that because I didn't want to get into trouble for not having insurance… so I said it was an e-scooter.” He expressed his uncertainty regarding when he told the account about the e-scooter, but confirmed it was recently. He further elaborated in evidence that he was uninsured and that he fabricated the detail of the e-scooter to avoid punishment. He said that this fabrication was based on his parents’ advice, as they feared the potential impact the uninsured scrambler bike may have on their son’s case. He expressed his concerns regarding the potential repercussions he may suffer 9 pertaining to the scrambler bike’s lack of insurance. He explained that he had informed the vocational assessors that it was an e-scooter because “you wouldn’t be prosecuted for no insurance on an e-scooter.” In court, he confirmed the vehicle was in fact a scrambler bike, as he had outlined in all other reports. When asked where the vehicle was today, he explained that it had since been scrapped. He detailed “It was scrapped after the accident, straight after. It was in bits; I was on the ground and a friend of mine got rid of it and he told me it was in bits and there was nothing that could be done to the bike. It couldn’t be fixed or nothing, so it was scrapped. I don’t know what happened to it afterwards.” When asked what he had said earlier, he reiterated that he didn't see the bike following the accident. He claimed to only remember crashing it and that “a friend of (his) got rid of it”. He continued that it was “mangalised [sic] it was in bits and there was nothing that could be done to fix it. I don't know … anything after that what happened to the bike.” When pressed, he confirmed the friend who collected the bike to be a Mr Justin Kelly, a resident of the locality. He asserted that Mr Justin Kelly was the individual from whom he had been given the bike to drive. At the time of the accident, he had been driving from Mr Kelly’s residence to the plaintiff’s aunt’s home, where he ordinarily stored the bike. When asked as to when the bike had been scrapped, he expressed his uncertainty, however he presumed it was after the accident. He confirmed “it couldn’t be fixed”. When asked again if the bike had been scrapped, he conceded “well I don’t know about scrapped. I’m saying scrapped he just said that he got rid of it there could be nothing done about it. It couldn’t be fixed. I never asked any more because I was in such bad injuries and state and I didn’t really care about the bike”. It was then put to him that he had said three or four times that the bike had been scrapped, but appeared now to be contradicting this sentiment. He responded by reiterating that the bike had 10 been gotten rid of, “that’s all I’m saying that’s all I know”. He confirmed he had never followed up on the bike. He confirmed that shortly after the accident, he knew that the bike had been destroyed beyond repair and that he knew Mr Kelly was responsible for its destruction. He confirmed the details in a Notice of Particulars were correct regarding the vehicle, which described it as a Kawasaki 250, purchased by the plaintiff in early
14. In response to the salvage and value of the vehicle in the Notice of Particulars, it was listed that the plaintiff had been taken to hospital in the immediate aftermath of this incident and isn’t aware of what happened to the vehicle. The plaintiff explained, “well I said that because I didn't want to get my friend into trouble”.
15. The circumstances in which the collision between the plaintiff’s vehicle and the defendant’s occurred raise many concerning issues. Firstly, the inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s evidence highlighted by the defendant’s counsel during crossexamination of the plaintiff. There is the issue of the vehicle and whether it was the scrambler bike introduced further into the course of the pleadings, or Mr Kelly’s escooter on a trial run. The fact that within the first moments following the accident’s occurrence, a van arrived at the scene wherein two men emerged and wheeled the vehicle into it, together with the helmet, passing the defendant, shaken and bloodied in his vehicle, without expressing concern or alarm at his condition. The plaintiff’s vehicle has not been seen since, and while it is suggested that it had been scrapped, there is no evidence to verify this assertion. Moreover, the plaintiff’s original replies to the Notice of Particulars in respect of what happened to the vehicle were that he had been taken to hospital and was unaware of what happened to it or its whereabouts. 11
16. It must be acknowledged that the outcome of the vehicle’s hasty removal from the scene was to eliminate the opportunity for it and the damage it suffered to be assessed. The vehicle was not available for subsequent engineering inspections, as is standard practice in cases such as this. Furthermore, there was no opportunity for photographs to be taken at the scene. There is no evidence to determine the speed at which the plaintiff was driving and the effects of the collision on his vehicle. I found the plaintiff to be evasive in his answers with the regard to how the vehicle was disposed of.
17. The plaintiff has claimed for loss of earnings in this case. The defendant complied with S. I. 319 on the 10th day of October 2025 and identified witnesses they intended to call, including a private detective. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff responded with an updated Notice of Particulars which indicated he had been working for his father and uncle for the previous two years. However, the plaintiff was adamant in his evidence that this did not constitute work, as he received no payment. When cross-examined, he indicated that his uncle would have records of his attendance at work and that no records would suggest he was in receipt of payment. Neither the plaintiff’s father nor his uncle were on the list of witnesses to give evidence, nor were either of them called on to give evidence at any point during the course of these proceedings. It is difficult to accept that the plaintiff would have been working, at a minimum somewhat consistently, over the previous two years for his uncle and father and had not received any remuneration whatsoever over that period. This impacts the credibility of the plaintiff’s evidence.
18. Overall. I found this case to be unsatisfactory in nature, specifically pertaining to the manner in which the plaintiff's case changed throughout, as if responding to the defendant’s strong and consistent version of events. This is not a denial of the 12 plaintiff’s injuries, which were grave and required a lengthy period of rehabilitation. However, I unfortunately am not confident in the credibility of the plaintiff’s evidence. This is due to the evasive nature of his answers in court and the many inconsistencies in the details he supplied to various medical professionals, expert witnesses and in his evidence to the court.
19. By way of contrast, the court had the benefit of hearing evidence from the defendant and Ms Edel Quinn. The consistency in the defendant’s and Ms Quinn’s versions of events is striking, particularly when compared to the plaintiff’s variation in detail and account. It should be reiterated at this juncture that Garda O’Reilly was not an eyewitness to the event.
20. Despite the court’s sympathetic disposition in regard to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, I cannot hold a defendant liable for causation as an act of benevolence to a misfortunate plaintiff. Unfortunately, due to the many inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s evidence, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the accident occurred as a result of negligence on behalf of the defendant. I therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.
21. Given the success of the defendant in this case, the plaintiff would ordinarily be held liable for the defendant’s costs. However, the parties are at liberty to mention this matter before me on 16th of June 2026, or at such other reasonable date as may be agreed upon by the parties so that final orders can be made.