højesterets kendelse

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1. e)of the framework decision. as has been made clear in brussels v cando armas, i must interpret section 2 so that is it not inconsistent with article 8. as it is made clear in king v france, there must be sufficient circumstances in the description of the offence(
2. s)to enable both sides to be able to consider barriers to extradition. the divisional court makes it clear that “particulars of conviction” include a requirement as to place of participation. though i might make some common sense inferences as to the place in which the relevant conduct occurred, guesswork by the court is not what is required. section 2 requires particulars. sufficient particulars have not been provided. this is not, in my judgment, a valid part 1 warrant.” anbringender t har anført navnlig, at den rumænske arrestordre ikke lever op til de gældende krav til indholdet, herunder beskrivelse af tid og sted for den strafbare handling, som ligger til grund for arrestordren. det blev fastslået ved den engelske dom af 17. februar 2016, og denne afgørelse er bindende for danske domstole. det er derfor ikke muligt at foretage udlevering af ham til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien på grundlag af den samme arrestordre. - 3 - udlevering af ham til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien vil endvidere være i strid med udleve- ringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, og den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3, da der ikke foreligger reelle og tilstrækkelige garantier for, at han ikke vil blive udsat for umen- neskelig og nedværdigende behandling. anklagemyndigheden har anført navnlig, at den omstændighed, at en domstol i et andet eu- land tidligere har truffet beslutning om, at en europæisk arrestordre ikke indeholder tilstræk- kelige oplysninger, hverken er bindende for de danske myndigheder eller udgør et tilstræk- keligt grundlag for et afslag. de danske myndigheder og domstole har med rette foretaget en selvstændig vurdering og fundet, at oplysningerne i arrestordren er fyldestgørende. betingelserne for afslag i medfør af udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, er heller ikke opfyldt. de rumænske myndigheder har taget kritikken, der tidligere er fremført af fængselsforholdene i landet, til sig, og man har forøget kapaciteten og forbedret forholdene. der må lægges afgø- rende vægt på de oplysninger og garantier, der fremgår af udtalelsen af 21. juni 2016 fra de rumænske myndigheder, således som landsretten også har gjort ved sin kendelse af 30. juni 2016. det er herefter med rette, at landsretten har lagt til grund, at der ikke er reel fare for, at t vil blive udsat for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling, hvis udlevering finder sted, og danmark er derfor forpligtet til at udlevere ham i henhold til rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre. retsgrundlaget bestemmelserne i udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, og § 18 a, stk. 1 og 3, har følgende ordlyd: ”§ 10 h. … stk. 2. udlevering må endvidere ikke finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den pågældende efter udleveringen vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdi- gende behandling eller straf. § 18 a. en europæisk arrestordre skal for at kunne danne grundlag for anholdelse og udlevering til en medlemsstat i den europæiske union indeholde oplysning om den eftersøgtes identitet og nationalitet, tid og sted for den strafbare handling, dennes be- skaffenhed og de anvendelige straffebestemmelser samt oplysning om, hvorvidt der er truffet beslutning om anholdelse eller fængsling, eller om der er afsagt dom. … - 4 - stk. 3. en europæisk arrestordre, der er udstedt med henblik på udlevering til straf- fuldbyrdelse, skal tillige indeholde oplysning om den idømte straf eller anden retsfølge.” bestemmelserne blev indsat ved lov nr. 433 af 10. juni 2003 i forbindelse med de ændringer af udleveringsloven, der var nødvendige for danmarks opfyldelse af rådet for den europæ- iske unions rammeafgørelse om den europæiske arrestordre mv. en europæisk arrestordre indeholder dels en anmodning om anholdelse og varetægtsfængsling med henblik på ud- levering, dels en anmodning om udlevering. i bemærkningerne til lovforslaget hedder det bl.a. (folketingstidende 2002-03, tillæg a, lovforslag nr. l 168, s. 4284 og s. 4297): ”almindelige bemærkninger 1. indledning … 1.3. den gældende udleveringslov indeholder ikke en udtrykkelig bestemmelse om, at udlevering ikke må ske i strid med danmarks internationale menneskeretlige forplig- telser, herunder f.eks. den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention. disse forpligtel- ser gælder imidlertid fuldt ud – også uden en sådan udtrykkelig bestemmelse. udleve- ring kan således f.eks. ikke ske, hvis udleveringen ville være i strid med artikel 6 i den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention om retten til en retfærdig rettergang. ram- meafgørelsen indebærer ingen ændringer af danmarks forpligtelser til at overholde de grundlæggende rettigheder og principper, der bl.a. følger af den europæiske menneske- rettighedskonvention. i lyset af den udtrykkelige bestemmelse i præamblen til rammeafgørelsen om forbud mod udlevering til tortur har justitsministeriet fundet det naturligt at indsætte en be- stemmelse, der præciserer, at udlevering ikke må finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den pågældende vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf. … 4. justitsministeriets overvejelser … 4.1.1. forholdet til den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention det fremgår af rammeafgørelsens præambelbetragtning nr. 12 og artikel 1, stk. 3, at reglerne i rammeafgørelsen er fastsat under iagttagelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder og grundlæggende retsprincipper, som fremgår af artikel 6 i traktaten om den euro- pæiske union (teu). efter artikel 6 i teu bygger unionen på principperne om frihed, demokrati og respekt for menneskerettighederne og de grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder samt retsstatsprin- cippet, der alle er principper, som medlemsstaterne har til fælles. det følger endvidere af bestemmelsen, at unionen respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder, således som de - 5 - garanteres ved den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention, og således som de føl- ger af medlemsstaternes fælles forfatningsmæssige traditioner, som generelle principper for fællesskabsretten. lovforslag indebærer således ingen ændringer af danmarks forpligtelse til at overholde de grundlæggende rettigheder og principper, der bl.a. følger af den europæiske menne- skerettighedskonvention. i præambelbetragtning nr. 13 i rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre mv. er anført, at personer ikke må udleveres til en stat, hvor der er alvorlig risiko for, at de vil blive udsat for dødsstraf, tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behand- ling eller straf. … i lyset af denne udtrykkelige bestemmelse i præamblen til rammeafgørelsen samt de indkomne høringssvar har justitsministeriet fundet det naturligt at indsætte en bestem- melse, der præciserer, at udlevering ikke må finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den på- gældende vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende be- handling eller straf. der henvises herved til de foreslåede bestemmelser i § 6, stk. 2 (om udlevering til stater uden for
3. eu)og § 10 h, stk. 2 (om udlevering til eu-medlems- stater).” den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 har følgende ordlyd: ”artikel 3. ingen må underkastes tortur og ej heller umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf.” artikel 4 i den europæiske unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder har følgende ordlyd: ”artikel 4 ingen må underkastes tortur, ej heller umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf.” af rådets rammeafgørelse af 13. juni 2002 om den europæiske arrestordre og om proce- durerne for overgivelse mellem medlemsstaterne (2002/584/ria) fremgår bl.a. følgende: ”rådet for den europæiske union har – … ud fra følgende betragtninger: … - 6 - 6) den europæiske arrestordre, som denne rammeafgørelse omhandler, er den første udmøntning på det strafferetlige område af princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som det europæiske råd har udråbt til en ”hjørnesten” i det retlige samarbejde. … 10) ordningen med den europæiske arrestordre er baseret på en høj grad af tillid mellem medlemsstaterne. anvendelsen af den kan kun suspenderes i tilfælde af, at en medlemsstat groft og vedvarende overtræder de principper, der er fastlagt i artikel 6, stk. 1, i traktaten om den europæiske union, hvilket skal fastslås af rådet i henhold til samme traktats artikel 7, stk. 1, med de følger, der er fastsat i stk. 2 i samme artikel. … 12) denne rammeafgørelse respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder og principper, som er anerkendt i artikel 6 i traktaten om den europæiske union, og som afspejles i den europæiske unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder, navnlig kapitel vi. … 13) personer må ikke overføres, udsendes eller udleveres til en stat, hvor der er alvorlig risiko for, at de vil blive udsat for dødsstraf, tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf. … vedtaget følgende rammeafgørelse: kapitel 1 almindelige principper artikel 1 definition af og pligten til at fuldbyrde en europæisk arrestordre 1. den europæiske arrestordre er en retsafgørelse truffet af en medlemsstat med det formål, at en anden medlemsstat anholder og overgiver en eftersøgt person med henblik på strafforfølgning eller fuldbyrdelse af en frihedsstraf eller en anden frihedsberøvende foranstaltning. 2. medlemsstaterne fuldbyrder enhver europæisk arrestordre på grundlag af princippet om gensidig anerkendelse og i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i denne ramme- afgørelse. 3. denne rammeafgørelse indebærer ikke nogen ændring af pligten til at respektere de grundlæggende rettigheder og grundlæggende retsprincipper, således som de er define- ret i artikel 6 i traktaten om den europæiske union. … artikel 8 den europæiske arrestordres indhold og form 1. den europæiske arrestordre skal indeholde følgende oplysninger i overensstemmelse med formularen i bilaget: …
4. e)en beskrivelse af, under hvilke omstændigheder lovovertrædelsen er begået, herunder tidspunkt, sted og omfang af den eftersøgtes deltagelse heri, … - 7 - kapitel 2 overgivelsesprocedure … artikel 15 afgørelse om overgivelse 1. den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed træffer afgørelse om overgivelse af den pågældende inden for de frister og på de betingelser, der er fastsat i denne ramme- afgørelse. 2. hvis den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed finder, at de oplysninger, den ud- stedende medlemsstat har fremsendt, ikke er tilstrækkelige til, at den kan træffe af- gørelse om overgivelsen, anmoder den om straks at få de nødvendige supplerende oplysninger, navnlig i forbindelse med artikel 3-5 og 8, og kan fastsætte en tidsfrist for fremsendelsen af disse oplysninger under hensyn til nødvendigheden af at overholde fristerne i artikel 17. 3. den udstedende judicielle myndighed kan til enhver tid fremsende supplerende nyttige oplysninger til den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed.” eu-domstolens dom af 5. april 2016 i de forenede sager c-404/15 (pál aranyosi) og c- 659/15 ppu (robert căldăraru) angår fuldbyrdelse af europæiske arrestordrer om henholdsvis strafforfølgning i ungarn af en ungarsk statsborger og staffuldbyrdelse i rumænien af en rumænsk statsborger. dommen er afsagt efter præjudiciel forelæggelse af spørgsmål fra en tysk domstol, der skulle tage stilling til fuldbyrdelsen af de to arrestordrer. i dommen hedder det bl.a.: 76. rammeafgørelsen har således med indførelsen af en ny forenklet og mere effektiv ordning for overgivelse af personer, der er dømt eller mistænkt for at have overtrådt strafferetten, til formål at lette og fremskynde det retlige samarbejde med henblik på at bidrage til at gennemføre unionens erklærede mål om at blive et område med frihed, sikkerhed og retfærdighed på grundlag af den høje grad af tillid, der skal være mellem medlemsstaterne (jf. domme melloni, c-399/11, eu:c:2013:107, præmis 37, f., c- 168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358, præmis 35, og lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 28). 77. princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som er grundlaget for ordningen for den euro- pæiske arrestordre, er i sig selv baseret på, at der mellem medlemsstaterne hersker en gensidig tillid til, at deres respektive nationale retsordener er i stand til at yde den samme effektive beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, som er anerkendt på eu- plan, og navnlig i chartret (jf. i denne retning dom f., c-168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358, - 8 - præmis 50, og analogt for så vidt angår civilretligt samarbejde dom aguirre zarraga, c- 491/10 ppu, eu:c:2010:828, præmis 70). 78. både princippet om gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne og princippet om gensidig anerkendelse er af grundlæggende betydning i eu-retten, idet de muliggør oprettelsen og bevarelsen af et område uden indre grænser. mere specifikt pålægger princippet om gensidig tillid, bl.a. for så vidt angår et område med frihed, sikkerhed og retfærdighed, hver af medlemsstaterne at lægge til grund, medmindre der er tale om helt særlige omstændigheder, at samtlige andre medlemsstater overholder eu-retten og navnlig de i denne ret anerkendte grundlæggende rettigheder (jf. i denne retning udtalelse 2/13, eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 191). 79. på det af rammeafgørelsen regulerede område er princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, der udgør »hjørnestenen« i det retlige samarbejde, således som det bl.a. fremgår af sjette betragtning til rammeafgørelsen, udmøntet i rammeafgørelsens artikel 1, stk. 2, i hen- hold til hvilken medlemsstaterne i princippet har pligt til at fuldbyrde en europæisk arrestordre (jf. i denne retning dom lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 36 og den deri nævnte retspraksis). 80. det følger heraf, at den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed kun kan nægte at fuldbyrde en sådan arrestordre af de – udtømmende opregnede – obligatoriske grunde til at afslå fuldbyrdelse, som er fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 3, eller fakultative grunde til at afslå fuldbyrdelse, som er fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 4 og 4a. desuden kan den europæiske arrestordres fuldbyrdelse kun underlægges de betingelser, der er udtøm- mende fastsat i rammeafgørelsens artikel 5 (jf. i denne retning dom lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 36 og den deri nævnte retspraksis). 81. i denne sammenhæng bemærkes, at det i tiende betragtning til rammeafgørelsen hedder, at anvendelsen af ordningen for den europæiske arrestordre kun kan suspenderes i til- fælde af, at en medlemsstat groft og vedvarende overtræder de værdier, der omhandlet i artikel 2 teu, og i overensstemmelse med proceduren i artikel 7 teu. 82. ikke desto mindre forholder det sig for det første således, at domstolen har anerkendt, at der kan gøres indskrænkninger i princippet om gensidig anerkendelse og princippet om gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne »under helt særlige omstændigheder« (jf. i den- ne retning udtalelse 2/13, eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 191). 83. for det andet kan rammeafgørelsen, som det fremgår af dens artikel 1, stk. 3, ikke indebære nogen ændring af pligten til at respektere de grundlæggende rettigheder, så- ledes som de er defineret bl.a. i chartret. … - 9 - 88. det følger heraf, at når den judicielle myndighed i den fuldbyrdende medlemsstat råder over oplysninger, der dokumenterer en reel risiko for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling af frihedsberøvede personer i den udstedende medlemsstat målt efter nor- men for beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, der er sikret ved eu-retten og navnlig ved chartrets artikel 4 (jf. i denne retning dom melloni, c-399/11, eu:c:2013:107, præmis 59 og 63, samt udtalelse 2/13, eu:c:2014:2454, præmis 192), skal myndigheden vurdere, om denne risiko foreligger, når den træffer afgørelse om overgivelse af en person omfattet af en europæisk arrestordre til myndighederne i den udstedende medlemsstat. fuldbyrdelsen af en sådan arrestordre må således ikke føre til en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling af den pågældende. 89. ved denne vurdering skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed først og fremmest basere sig på objektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte oplysninger om de forhold for frihedsberøvede, der hersker i den udstedende medlemsstat, og som påviser reelle mangler, der er systemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper eller visse centre for frihedsberøvede. disse oplysninger kan bl.a. fremgå af interna- tionale retsafgørelser, såsom den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols domme, den udstedende medlemsstats retsafgørelser samt afgørelser, rapporter og andre dokumenter, der udarbejdes af organerne i europarådet eller af fn-organer. 90. i denne forbindelse fremgår det af den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols prak- sis, at emrk’s artikel 3 pålægger myndighederne i den stat, på hvis område en fri- hedsberøvelse finder sted, en positiv forpligtelse til at sikre sig, at enhver fange fri- hedsberøves under forhold, der garanterer respekten for den menneskelige værdighed, at den måde, hvorpå foranstaltningen fuldbyrdes, ikke påfører den berørte person så stor nød eller så store prøvelser, at den grad af lidelse, som uundgåeligt er forbundet med enhver frihedsberøvelse, overskrides, og at fangens helbred og velfærd sikres på en passende måde under hensyn til praktiske fængselsmæssige krav (jf. den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols dom i sagen torreggiani m.fl. mod italien, sag nr. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10, og 37818/10, af 8.1.2013, § 65). 91. imidlertid kan en konstatering af, at der foreligger en reel risiko for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling på grund af de generelle forhold under frihedsberøvelse i den udstedende medlemsstat, ikke som sådan føre til et afslag på at fuldbyrde en euro- pæisk arrestordre. 92. når en sådan risiko er konstateret, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed dernæst også foretage en konkret og præcis vurdering af, om der er vægtige grunde til at antage, at vedkommende løber denne risiko på grund af de forhold under dennes frihedsberø- velse, som kan påregnes i den udstedende medlemsstat. - 10 - 93. den omstændighed, at der foreligger oplysninger, som vidner om mangler, der er sy- stemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper eller visse centre for frihedsberøvede, ved forholdene under frihedsberøvelse i den udstedende medlemsstat, indebærer således ikke nødvendigvis i sig selv, at den berørte person i en konkret sag vil blive udsat for en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling, såfremt vedkommen- de overgives til denne medlemsstats myndigheder. 94. med henblik på at sikre overholdelsen af chartrets artikel 4 i en konkret sag, hvor en person er omfattet af en europæisk arrestordre, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myn- dighed, som stilles over for objektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte op- lysninger, som vidner om, at der foreligger sådanne mangler, derfor prøve, om der efter omstændighederne i den foreliggende sag er vægtige grunde til at antage, at vedkom- mende efter sin overgivelse til den udstedende medlemsstat løber en reel risiko for i denne medlemsstat at blive udsat for en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling i denne artikels forstand. 95. med henblik herpå skal nævnte myndighed i medfør af rammeafgørelsens artikel 15, stk. 2, anmode den judicielle myndighed i den udstedende medlemsstat om straks at få de nødvendige supplerende oplysninger vedrørende de forhold, hvorunder det påregnes at frihedsberøve den berørte person i denne medlemsstat. … 98. kan den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed, henset til de oplysninger, der er afgivet i medfør af rammeafgørelsens artikel 15, stk. 2, samt alle øvrige oplysninger, som denne myndighed har til rådighed, konstatere, at der foreligger en reel risiko for, at den person, som er omfattet af den europæiske arrestordre, bliver udsat for en umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling som omhandlet i denne doms præmis 94, skal fuldbyrdelsen af denne arrestordre udsættes, men kan ikke opgives (jf. analogt dom lanigan, c-237/15 ppu, eu:c:2015:474, præmis 38). … 103. såfremt det på baggrund af de oplysninger, som den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed har modtaget fra den udstedende judicielle myndighed, kan afvises, at der foreligger en reel risiko for, at den berørte person gøres til genstand for en umenneskelig eller ned- værdigende behandling i den udstedende medlemsstat, skal den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed inden for de i rammeafgørelsen fastsatte frister træffe sin afgørelse ved- rørende den europæiske arrestordres fuldbyrdelse, uden at dette berører den pågældende persons mulighed for, når vedkommende er blevet overgivet, at udnytte de retsmidler i den udstedende medlemsstats retsorden, som giver denne mulighed for i givet fald at anfægte lovligheden af forholdene under sin frihedsberøvelse i et fængsel i denne medlemsstat (jf. i denne retning dom f., c-168/13 ppu, eu:c:2013:358, præmis 50). - 11 - 104. det følger af samtlige ovenstående betragtninger, at de forelagte spørgsmål skal besvares med, at rammeafgørelsens artikel 1, stk. 3, artikel 5 og artikel 6, stk. 1, skal fortolkes således, at den fuldbyrdende judicielle myndighed, som stilles over for ob- jektive, pålidelige, præcise og behørigt ajourførte oplysninger, som vidner om, at der ved forholdene under frihedsberøvelse i den udstedende medlemsstat foreligger mangler, der er systemiske eller generelle, eller som berører visse persongrupper eller visse centre for frihedsberøvede, skal foretage en konkret og præcis prøvelse af, om der er alvorlige grunde til at antage, at en person, som er omfattet af en europæisk arrest- ordre udstedt med henblik på retsforfølgning eller fuldbyrdelse af en frihedsstraf, på grund af forholdene under sin frihedsberøvelse i denne medlemsstat løber en reel risiko for at blive udsat for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling som omhandlet i chartrets artikel 4 i tilfælde af overgivelse til nævnte medlemsstat. med henblik herpå skal den anmode om supplerende oplysninger fra den udstedende judicielle myndighed, der skal meddele disse oplysninger inden for den i anmodningen fastsatte frist, efter om fornødent at have anmodet om bistand fra den eller en af de centrale myndighed(
5. er)i den udstedende medlemsstat som omhandlet i rammeafgørelsens artikel 7. den fuld- byrdende judicielle myndighed skal udsætte sin afgørelse vedrørende den berørte per- sons overgivelse, indtil den får supplerende oplysninger, som giver denne mulighed for at afvise, at der foreligger en sådan risiko. såfremt det ikke inden for en rimelig frist kan afvises, at der foreligger en sådan risiko, skal myndigheden beslutte, om overgivelses- proceduren bør bringes til ophør.” det fremgår af den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols praksis, at udlevering kan inde- bære en overtrædelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3, hvis den pågældende i givet fald vil blive udsat for en behandling, som er i strid med artikel 3 i det land, som vedkommende udleveres til, jf. således f.eks. menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 7. juli 1989 (soering mod england, nr. 14038/88). i dommen hedder det bl.a.: ”89. what amounts to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" depends on all the circumstances of the case... furthermore, inherent in the whole of the convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the com- munity and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. as movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice. conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the state obliged to harbour the pro- tected person but also tend to undermine the foundations of extradition. these consi- derations must also be included among the factors to be taken into account in the inter- pretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punish- ment in extradition cases. - 12 - 90. it is not normally for the convention institutions to pronounce on the existence or otherwise of potential violations of the convention. however, where an applicant claims that a decision to extradite him would, if implemented, be contrary to article 3 (art. 3) by reason of its foreseeable consequences in the requesting country, a departure from this principle is necessary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering risked, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided by that article (art. 3)… 91. in sum, the decision by a contracting state to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under article 3 (art. 3), and hence engage the responsibility of that state under the convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the per- son concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country. the establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of article 3 (art. 3) of the convention. nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the receiving country, whether under general international law, under the convention or otherwise. in so far as any liability under the convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing contracting state by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.” den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol har den 20. oktober 2016 afsagt dom i sagen muršić mod kroatien (nr. 7334/13). i dommen, der er en storkammerafgørelse og angår spørgsmål om krænkelse af den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 som følge af de fængselsforhold, den pågældende havde været undergivet i kroatien, hedder det bl.a.: ”c. the court’s assessment 1. introductory remarks 91. the court is frequently called upon to rule on complaints alleging a violation of article 3 of the convention on account of insufficient personal space allocated to prisoners. in the present case, the court finds it appropriate to clarify the principles and standards for the assessment of the minimum personal space per detainee in multi- occupancy accommodation in prisons under article 3 of the convention. 92. the court would further note that different questions might arise in the context of single-occupancy accommodation, isolation or other similar detention regimes, or waiting rooms or similar spaces used for very short periods of time (such as police stations, psychiatric establishments, immigration detention facilities), which are however not in issue in the present case (see paragraph 50 above; and georgia v. russia (
6. i)[gc], no. 13255/07, §§ 192-205, echr 2014 (extracts)). 93. the matter of prison overcrowding in multi-occupancy accommodation was one of the issues considered by the grand chamber in the idalov v. russia case ([gc], no. - 13 - 5826/03, §§ 96-102, 22 may 2012). it has also been addressed in several pilot and leading judgments in which the court has already indicated specific aspects related to the assessment of the problem of prison overcrowding, and the duty of the states to address the deficiencies identified by the court in these judgments. 94. in particular, the court has so far adopted pilot judgments addressing the question of prison overcrowding in respect of the following states: bulgaria (see neshkov and others v. bulgaria, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 january 2015); hungary (see varga and others, cited above); italy (see torreggiani and others, cited above); poland (see orchowski v. poland, no. 17885/04, 22 october 2009; and norbert sikorski v. poland, no. 17599/05, 22 october 2009); and russia (see ananyev and others, cited above), 95. the court has also addressed the question of prison overcrowding by indicating the necessity of improving conditions of detention under article 46 of the convention in leading judgments with regard to the following states: belgium (see vasilescu v. belgium, no. 64682/12, 25 november 2014); greece (see samaras and others v. greece, no. 11463/09, 28 february 2012; tzamalis and others v. greece, no. 15894/09, 4 december 2012; and al. k. v. greece, no. 63542/11, 11 december 2014); romania (see iacov stanciu v. romania, no. 35972/05, 24 july 2012); slovenia (see mandić and jović v. slovenia, nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 october 2011; and štrucl and others v. slovenia, nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, 20 october 2011); and the republic of moldova (see shishanov v. the republic of moldova, no. 11353/06, 15 september 2015). 2. recapitulation of the relevant principles (
7. a)general principles 96. article 3 of the convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of de- mocratic society. it prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treat- ment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see, for example, labita v. italy [gc], no. 26772/95, § 119, echr 2000-iv; and svinarenko and slyadnev v. russia [gc], nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, § 113, echr 2014 (extracts)). 97. ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of article 3. the assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circum- stances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, ireland v. the united kingdom, 18 january 1978, § 162, series a no. 25; jalloh v. germany [gc], no. 54810/00, § 67, echr 2006‑ix; idalov, cited above, § 91; and also, kalashnikov v. russia, no. 47095/99, § 95, echr 2002‑vi). 98. ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. however, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of article 3 (see, among - 14 - other authorities, idalov, cited above, § 92; and also, pretty v. the united kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 52, echr 2002‑iii; ananyev and others, cited above, § 140; varga and others, cited above, § 70). indeed, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity (see bouyid v. belgium [gc], no. 23380/09, § 81, echr 2015). 99. in the context of deprivation of liberty the court has consistently stressed that, to fall under article 3, the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention. the state must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprison- ment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured (see kudła v. poland [gc], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, echr 2000‑xi; idalov, cited above, § 93; svinarenko and slyadnev, cited above, § 116; mozer v. the republic of moldova and russia [gc], no. 11138/10, § 178, echr 2016; and also, valašinas v. lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 102, echr 2001‑viii; and ananyev and others, cited above, § 141). 100. even the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase a detainee by placing him or her in poor conditions, while being a factor to be taken into account, does not con- clusively rule out a finding of a violation of article 3 of the convention (see, inter alia, peers v. greece, no. 28524/95, § 74, echr 2001‑iii; mandić and jović, cited above, § 80; iacov stanciu, cited above, § 179; and generally under article 3, svinarenko and slyadnev, cited above, § 114, and bouyid, cited above, § 86). indeed, it is incumbent on the respondent government to organise its penitentiary system in such a way as to en- sure respect for the dignity of detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties (see, amongst many others, mamedova v. russia, no. 7064/05, § 63, 1 june 2006; orchowski, cited above, § 153; neshkov and others, cited above, § 229; and varga and others, cited above, § 103). 101. when assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. the length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions has also to be considered (see, amongst many others, idalov, cited above, § 94; and also orchowski, cited above, § 121; torreggiani and others, cited above, § 66; and ananyev and others, cited above, § 142). (
8. b)principles concerning prison overcrowding 102. the court notes that the relevant principles and standards for the assessment of prison overcrowding flowing from its case-law in particular concern the following issues:

(1)the question of minimum personal space in detention under article 3 of the convention;

(2)whether the allocation of personal space below the minimum require- ment creates a presumption or leads in itself to a violation of article 3 of the con- vention; and

(3)what factors, if any, could compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space. (

1. i)the question of minimum personal space under article 3 - 15 - (α) the relevant case-law 103. the court has stressed on many occasions that under article 3 it cannot determine, once and for all, a specific number of square metres that should be allocated to a de- tainee in order to comply with the convention. indeed, the court has considered that a number of other relevant factors, such as the duration of detention, the possibilities for outdoor exercise and the physical and mental condition of the detainee, play an impor- tant part in deciding whether the detention conditions satisfied the guarantees of article 3 (see samaras and others, cited above, § 57; tzamalis and others, cited above, § 38; and varga and others, cited above § 76; see further, for instance, trepashkin v. russia, no. 36898/03, § 92, 19 july 2007; semikhvostov v. russia, no. 2689/12, § 79, 6 february 2014; logothetis and others v. greece, no. 740/13, § 40, 25 september 2014; and suldin v. russia, no. 20077/04, § 43, 16 october 2014). 104. nevertheless, extreme lack of space in prison cells weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” within the meaning of article 3. 105. in a substantial number of cases when the allocation of space to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation fell below 3 sq. m, the court found the overcrowding so severe as to justify the finding of a violation of article 3 (see the cases cited in orchowski, cited above, § 122; ananyev and others, cited above, § 145; and varga and others, cited above, § 75). 106. when inmates appeared to have at their disposal personal space measuring be- tween 3 and 4 sq. m the court examined the (in)adequacy of other aspects of physical conditions of detention when making an assessment under article 3. in such instances a violation of article 3 was found only if the space factor was coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in a particular context, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of heating arrangements, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see orchowski, cited above, § 122; ananyev and others, cited above, § 149; torreggiani and others, cited above, § 69; vasilescu, cited above, § 88; and varga and others, cited above, § 78; see also, for example, jirsák v. the czech republic, no. 8968/08, §§ 64-73, 5 april 2012; culev v. moldova, no. 60179/09, §§ 35-39, 17 april 2012; longin, cited above, §§ 59-61; and barilo v. ukraine, no. 9607/06, §§ 80-83, 16 may 2013). 107. in the above-mentioned pilot and leading judgments the court has fixed for its assessment the relevant minimum standard of personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation at 3 sq. m of floor surface (see orchowski, cited above, § 123; ananyev and others, cited above, § 148; torreggiani and others, cited above, § 68; vasilescu, cited above, § 88; neshkov and others, cited above, § 232; samaras and others, cited above, § 58; tzamalis and others, cited above, § 39; varga and others, cited above, § 74; iacov stanciu, cited above, § 168; and mandić and jović, cited above, § 75). moreover, in the grand chamber idalov case (cited above, § 101), when finding a violation of article 3 on account of inadequate conditions of the applicant’s detention, the grand chamber noted, among other things, that “the - 16 - applicant’s detention [had not met] the minimum requirement, as laid down in the court’s case-law, of 3 square metres per person”. 108. however, in a minority of cases the court has considered that personal space of less than 4 sq. m is already a factor sufficient to justify a finding of a violation of article 3 (see, inter alia, cotleţ v. romania (no. 2), no. 49549/11, §§ 34 and 36, 1 october 2013; and apostu v. romania, no. 22765/12, § 79, 3 february 2015). this standard corresponds to the minimum standard of living space per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation as developed in the practice of the cpt and recently elaborated in its policy document (see paragraph 51 above). (β) the approach to be taken 109. the court reiterates that, while it is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in pre- vious cases (see, for example, christine goodwin v. the united kingdom [gc], no. 28957/95, § 74, echr 2002‑vi; scoppola v. italy (no. 2) [gc], no. 10249/03, § 104, 17 september 2009; and sabri güneş v. turkey [gc], no. 27396/06, § 50, 29 june 2012). 110. the court sees no grounds for departing from the approach taken in the pilot judgments and leading cases cited above and in the grand chamber idalov case (see paragraph 107 above). it therefore confirms that the requirement of 3 sq. m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation should be maintained as the relevant minimum standard for its assessment under article 3 of the convention (see paragraphs 124-128 below). 111. with regard to the standards developed by other international institutions such as the cpt, the court would note that it has declined to treat them as constituting a deci- sive argument for its assessment under article 3 (see, for instance, orchowski, cited above, § 131; ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 144-145; torreggiani and others, cited above, §§ 68 and 76; see also sulejmanovic, cited above, § 43; tellissi v. italy (dec.), no. 15434/11, § 53, 5 march 2013; and g.c. v. italy, no. 73869/10, § 81, 22 april 2014). the same applies with regard to the relevant national standards, which, although capable of informing the court’s decision in a particular case (see orchowski, cited above, § 123), cannot be considered decisive for its finding under article 3 (see, for instance, pozaić, cited above, § 59; and neshkov and others, cited above, § 229). 112. the central reason for the court’s reluctance to take the cpt’s available space standards as a decisive argument for its finding under article 3 relates to its duty to take into account all relevant circumstances of a particular case before it when making an assessment under article 3, whereas other international institutions such as the cpt develop general standards in this area aiming at future prevention (see paragraph 47 above; see also, trepashkin, cited above, § 92; and jirsák, cited above, § 63). likewise, the relevant national standards vary widely and operate as general requirements of adequate accommodation in a particular penitentiary system (see paragraphs 57 and 61 above). 113. moreover, as the cpt has recognised, the court performs a conceptually different role to the one assigned to the cpt, whose responsibility does not entail pronouncing on - 17 - whether a certain situation amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of article 3 (see paragraph 52 above). the thrust of cpt activity is pre-emptive action aimed at prevention, which, by its very nature, aims at a degree of protection that is greater than that upheld by the court when deciding cases concerning conditions of detention (see paragraph 47 above, the first general report, § 51). in contrast to the cpt’s preventive function, the court is responsible for the judicial application in individual cases of an absolute prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under article 3 (see paragraph 46 above). nevertheless, the court would emphasise that it remains attentive to the standards developed by the cpt and, notwithstanding their different positions, it gives careful scrutiny to cases where the particular conditions of detention fall below the cpt’s standard of 4 sq. m (see para- graph 106 above). 114. lastly, the court finds it important to clarify the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accom- modation for its assessment under article 3. the court considers, drawing from the cpt’s methodology on the matter, that the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell (see paragraph 51 above). on the other hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell should include space occupied by furniture. what is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally (see, for instance, ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 147-148; and vladimir belyayev, cited above, § 34). 115. the court would also observe that no distinction can be discerned in its case-law with regard to the application of the minimum standard of 3 sq. m of floor surface to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation in the context of serving and remand pri- soners. indeed, in the orchowski pilot judgment the court applied the same standards for the assessment of minimum personal space under article 3 with regard to prisons and remand centres (see orchowski, cited above, § 124), and the same standard was applicable in other pilot judgments relevant for the conditions of detention of remand prisoners (see ananyev and others, §§ 143-148) and serving prisoners (see torreggiani and others, cited above, §§ 65-69). other leading judgments on the matter followed the same approach (see iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 171-179; mandić and jović, cited above, §§ 72-76; and štrucl and others, cited above, § 80). moreover, the same stan- dard was applied in more recent case-law with regard to russian correctional colonies (see butko v. russia, no. 32036/10, § 52, 12 november 2015; for the previous case-law see, for example, sergey babushkin v. russia, no. 5993/08, § 56, 28 november 2013 and cases cited therein). (
2. ii)whether the allocation of personal space below the minimum requirement creates a presumption or in itself leads to a violation of article 3 (α) the relevant case-law 116. in assessing whether there has been a violation of article 3 on account of an extreme lack of personal space in detention the court has not always been consistent with regard to the question whether the allocation of personal space falling below 3 sq. m leads in itself to a violation of article 3 or whether it creates a presumption of a violation, which could be rebutted by other relevant considerations. different ap- proaches can be distinguished in this respect. - 18 - 117. first, in a number of cases the finding that a detainee had disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space in itself led to the conclusion that there had been a violation of article 3 (see, for example, sulejmanovic, cited above, § 43; trepashkin v. russia (no. 2), no. 14248/05, § 113, 16 december 2010; mandić and jović, cited above, § 80; lin v. greece, no. 58158/10, §§ 53-54, 6 november 2012; blejuşcă v. romania, no. 7910/10, §§ 43-45, 19 march 2013; ivakhnenko v. russia, no. 12622/04, § 35, 4 april 2013; a.f. v. greece, no. 53709/11, §§ 77-78, 13 june 2013; kanakis v. greece (no. 2), no. 40146/11, §§ 106-107, 12 december 2013; gorbulya v. russia, no. 31535/09, §§ 64-65, 6 march 2014; and t. and a. v. turkey, no. 47146/11, §§ 96-98, 21 october 2014). 118. there are also cases where the court has held that personal space allocated to a detainee below 3 sq. m was a violation of article 3, and then examined other conditions of detention only as further aggravating circumstances (see, for example, torreggiani and others, cited above, § 77; and vasilescu, cited above, §§ 100-104). 119. another approach is based on the “strong presumption” test set out in the ananyev and others pilot judgment (cited above). on the basis of a thorough analysis of its previous case-law on the matter, in the ananyev and others judgment, the court set out the following test for overcrowding:

(1)each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell;

(2)each must dispose of at least 3 sq. m of floor space; and

(3)the overall surface area of the cell must be such as to allow detainees to move freely be- tween items of furniture. it stressed that the absence of any of the above elements created in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading treatment and were in breach of article 3 (see ananyev and others, cited above, § 148).

1. similarly to the “strong presumption” test, in the orchowski pilot judgment (cited above, § 123) the court emphasised that all situations in which a detainee was deprived of the minimum of 3 sq. m of living space inside his or her cell would be regarded as giving rise to a strong indication that article 3 had been violated (see further olszewski v. poland, no. 21880/03, § 98, 2 april 2013). moreover, the “strong presumption” test has been reiterated in several of the above-mentioned pilot judgments on the question of prison overcrowding (see neshkov and others, cited above, § 232; and varga and others, cited above, §§ 74 and 77).
2. in line with that approach, the finding of a violation of article 3 was based on the assessment whether or not, in the circumstances, “a strong presumption” of a violation was rebutted by other cumulative effects of the conditions of detention (see orchowski, cited above, § 135; ananyev and others, cited above, § 166; lind v. russia, no. 25664/05, §§ 59-61, 6 december 2007; kokoshkina v. russia, no. 2052/08, §§ 62-63, 28 may 2009). accordingly, in a number of post-ananyev cases concerning various factual circumstances, the court consistently examined the cumulative effects of the conditions of detention before reaching a final conclusion as to the alleged violation of article 3 on account of prison overcrowding (see, for example, idalov, cited above, § 101; iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 176-178; asyanov v. russia, no. 25462/09, § 43, 9 october 2012; nieciecki v. greece, no. 11677/11, §§ 49-51, 4 december 2012; yefimenko v. russia, no. 152/04, §§ 80-84, 12 february 2013; manulin v. russia, no. 26676/06, §§ 47-48, 11 april 2013; shishkov v. russia, no. 26746/05, §§ 90-94, 20 - 19 - february 2014; bulatović v. montenegro, no. 67320/10, §§ 123-127, 22 july 2014; tomoiagă v. romania (dec.), no. 47775/10, §§ 22-23, 20 january 2015; neshkov and others, cited above, §§ 246-256; varga and others, cited above, § 88; and mironovas and others v. lithuania, nos. 40828/12, 29292/12, 69598/12, 40163/13, 66281/13, 70048/13 and 70065/13, §§ 118-123, 8 december 2015). (β) the approach to be taken
3. in harmonising the above divergences, the court will be guided by the general principles of its well-established case-law under article 3 of the convention. in this connection it would reiterate that according to this case-law the assessment of the minimum level of severity for any ill-treatment to fall within the scope of article 3 is, in the nature of things, relative (see paragraphs 97-98 above). the assessment of this minimum, as emphasised ever since the ireland v. the united kingdom case (cited above, § 162), will depend on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see paragraph 97 above).
4. accordingly, the court’s assessment whether there has been a violation of article 3 cannot be reduced to a numerical calculation of square metres allocated to a detainee. such an approach would, moreover, disregard the fact that, in practical terms, only a comprehensive approach to the particular conditions of detention can provide an accu- rate picture of the reality for detainees (see paragraphs 62-63 above).
5. nevertheless, having analysed its case-law and in view of the importance attaching to the space factor in the overall assessment of prison conditions, the court considers that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation.
6. the “strong presumption” test should operate as a weighty but not irrebuttable presumption of a violation of article
7. this in particular means that, in the circum- stances, the cumulative effects of detention may rebut that presumption. it will, of course, be difficult to rebut it in the context of flagrant or prolonged lack of personal space below 3 sq. m. the circumstances in which the presumption may be rebutted will be set out below (see paragraphs 130-135).
8. it follows that, when it has been conclusively established that a detainee disposed of less than 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation, the starting point for the court’s assessment is a strong presumption of a violation of article
9. it then remains for the respondent government to demonstrate convincingly that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space. the cumulative effect of those conditions should inform the court’s decision whether, in the circumstances, the presumption of a violation is rebutted or not.
10. with regard to the methodology for that assessment, the court refers to its well- established standard of proof in conditions-of-detention cases (see, for example, ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 121-125). in this context the court is particularly mindful of the objective difficulties experienced by applicants in collecting evidence to substantiate their claims about conditions of their detention. still, in such cases appli- - 20 - cants must provide a detailed and consistent account of the facts complained of (ibid. § 122). in certain cases applicants are able to provide at least some evidence in support of their complaints. the court has considered as evidence, for example, written statements by fellow inmates or if possible photographs provided by applicants in support of their allegations (see, for example, golubenko v. ukraine (dec.), no. 36327/06, § 52, 5 november 2013, and cases cited therein; see further tehrani and others v. turkey, nos. 32940/08, 41626/08 and 43616/08, § 88, 13 april 2010).
11. once a credible and reasonably detailed description of the allegedly degrading conditions of detention, constituting a prima facie case of ill-treatment, has been made, the burden of proof is shifted to the respondent government who alone have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. they are required, in particular, to collect and produce relevant documents and provide a detailed account of an applicant’s conditions of detention. relevant information from other international bodies, such as the cpt, on the conditions of detention, as well as the competent national authorities and institutions, should also inform the court’s decision on the matter (see further ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 122-125; and neshkov and others, cited above, §§ 71-91). (iii) factors which may compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space
12. in view of its findings above (see paragraphs 124-125 above), the court has to determine which factors may compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space to a detainee, and thus rebut the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arising where the detainee disposes of less than 3 sq. m of personal space in multi-occupancy acco- mmodation in prisons.
13. the court firstly notes, in the light of its post-ananyev case-law, that normally only short, occasional and minor reductions in the required personal space will be such as to rebut the strong presumption of a violation of article
14. this was, for example, the case in fetisov and others (cited above, §§ 134-138) where a prisoner disposed of approximately 2 sq. m of floor surface for nineteen days (see further dmitriy rozhin, cited above, §§ 52-53), or vladimir belyayev (cited above, §§ 33-36) where a prisoner disposed of 2.95 sq. m of personal space for a period of ten days, and then non- consecutively 2.65 sq. m for a period of two days and 2.97 sq. m for a period of twenty- six days. moreover, referring to its case-law in fetisov and others and dmitriy rozhin, the court found no violation of article 3 in the kurkowski case (cited above, §§ 66-67) where the applicant disposed of approximately 2.1 sq. m of floor space for four days, and then subsequently 2.6 sq. m of floor space for another four days.
15. nevertheless, the court has already held that, while the length of a detention period may be a relevant factor in assessing the gravity of suffering or humiliation caused to a detainee by the inadequate conditions of his or her detention, the relative brevity of such a period alone will not automatically remove the treatment complained of from the scope of article 3 if other elements are sufficient to bring it within the scope of that provision (see, for example, vasilescu, cited above, § 105; neshkov and others, cited above, § 249; and shishanov, cited above, § 95).
16. the court would further note that in other cases concerning the inadequate allocation of personal space to detainees it examined whether the reductions in the - 21 - required personal space were accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement and adequate out-of-cell activities, as well as confinement in, viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility (see, for example, samaras and others, cited above, §§ 63- 65; and tzamalis and others, cited above, §§ 44-45). the examples of cases in which the scarce allocation of personal space did not give rise to a violation of article 3 include: andrei georgiev v. bulgaria, no. 61507/00, §§ 57-62, 26 july 2007; alexov v. bulgaria, no. 54578/00, §§ 107-108, 22 may 2008; and dolenec, cited above, §§ 133-
17. in the court’s view, the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arising from the allocation of less than 3 sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation will normally be capable of being rebutted only where the requirements are cumulatively met, namely where short, occasional and minor reductions of personal space are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities and confinement in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility (see, mutatis mutandis, varga and others, cited above, § 77; and mironovas and others, cited above, § 122).
18. with regard to the question of sufficient freedom of movement, in particular, in the ananyev and others case (cited above, §§ 150-152) the court has referred to the rele- vant cpt standards according to which all prisoners, without exception, must be al- lowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a broader programme of out-of-cell activities, bearing in mind that outdoor exercise facilities should be reasonably spacious and whenever possible offer shelter from inclement weather (see further neshkov and others, cited above, § 234). indeed, according to the relevant international standards prisoners should be able to spend a reasonable part of the day outside their cells, engaged in purposeful activity of a varied nature (work, recreation, education). regimes in establishments for sentenced prisoners should be even more favourable (see further paragraphs 48, 53, 55 and 59 above).
19. lastly, with regard to the overall appropriateness of the detention facility, the court refers to general aspects of detention identified in its case-law (see further ananyev and others, cited above, §§ 153-159; and neshkov and others, §§ 237-244; see further iacov stanciu, cited above, §§ 173-179; and varga and others, cited above, §§ 80-92) and the relevant international standards (see paragraphs 48, 53, 55, 59 and 63- 64 above). accordingly, in addition to sufficient freedom of movement and adequate out-of-cell activities, no violation of article 3 would be found where no other aggrava- ting circumstance arises with regard to general conditions of an applicant’s detention (see, for instance, the approach in alver v. estonia, no. 64812/01, § 53, 8 november 2005; andrei georgiev, cited above, § 61; and dolenec, cited above, § 134).
20. it follows from the above that, when considering whether measures of compen- sation for the scarce allocation of personal space below 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi- occupancy accommodation are capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a viola- tion of article 3, the court will have regard to factors such as: the time and extent of restriction; freedom of movement and adequacy of out-of-cell activities; and general appropriateness of the detention facility. (c) summary of relevant principles and standards for the assessment of prison overcrowding - 22 -
21. in the light of the considerations set out above, the court confirms the standard predominant in its case-law of 3 sq. m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation as the relevant minimum standard under article 3 of the convention.
22. when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises. the burden of proof is on the respondent government which could, however, rebut that presumption by demonstrating that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space (see paragraphs 126-128 above).
23. the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met:

(1)the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occa- sional and minor (see paragraph 130 above):

(2)such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities (see paragraph 133 above);

(3)the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her deten- tion (see paragraph 134 above). 139. in cases where a prison cell – measuring in the range of 3 to 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate – is at issue the space factor remains a weighty factor in the court’s assessment of the adequacy of conditions of detention. in such instances a violation of article 3 will be found if the space factor is coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possi- bility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see paragraph 106 above). 140. the court also stresses that in cases where a detainee disposed of more than 4 sq. m of personal space in multi-occupancy accommodation in prison and where therefore no issue with regard to the question of personal space arises, other aspects of physical conditions of detention referred to above (see paragraphs 48, 53, 55, 59 and 63-64 above) remain relevant for the court’s assessment of adequacy of an applicant’s conditions of detention under article 3 of the convention (see, for example, story and others v. malta, nos. 56854/13, 57005/13 and 57043/13, §§ 112-113, 29 october 2015). 141. lastly, the court would emphasise the importance of the cpt’s preventive role in monitoring conditions of detention and of the standards which it develops in that connection. the court reiterates that when deciding cases concerning conditions of detention it remains attentive to those standards and to the contracting states’ observance of them (see paragraph 113 above). 3. application of the above principles in the present case - 23 - 142. the court observes at the outset that, although the problem of prison overcrowding has been examined in several cases against croatia in which a violation of article 3 was found (see cenbauer v. croatia, no. 73786/01, echr 2006-iii; testa v. croatia, no. 20877/04, 12 july 2007; štitić v. croatia, no. 29660/03, 8 november 2007; dolenec, cited above; longin, cited above; and lonić v. croatia, no. 8067/12, 4 december 2014), it has not so far considered that conditions of detention in croatia disclosed a structural problem from the standpoint of article 3 of the convention (see, by contrast, paragraphs 94-95 above). moreover, none of the cited cases concerned the conditions of detention in bjelovar prison which give rise to the applicant’s complaints in the present case. with regard to the conditions of detention in bjelovar prison the court has so far examined one case, in which it found no violation of article 3 (see pozaić, cited above). 143. the present case does not raise a structural issue concerning the conditions of detention in croatia. the court’s task is to address the applicant’s particular complaint of overcrowding in bjelovar prison, where he was serving a prison sentence in the period between 16 october 2009 and 16 march 2011 (see polufakin and chernyshev v. russia, no. 30997/02, §§ 155-156, 25 september 2008). 144. the applicant in particular complained that for several non-consecutive periods, amounting in total to fifty days, including a period of twenty-seven consecutive days, he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, and that there were also several non- consecutive periods in which he was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space in the cells (see paragraph 15 above). 145. in view of the relevant test enunciated above (see paragraphs 136-139 above), the court will address the applicant’s complaints separately with regard to the period in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, and the period in which he was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space in bjelovar prison. (

1. a)period in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space (
2. i)whether the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises in the present case 146. the court notes that the particular details of the personal space allocated to the applicant are based on the documentation provided by the respondent government which the applicant did not contest (see paragraph 17 above). specifically, during his stay in bjelovar prison, which lasted for one year and five months (see paragraphs 13- 14 above), the applicant was detained in four cells in which he had between 3 and 6.76 sq. m of personal space. only during the following non-consecutive periods did he have personal space which fell below 3 sq. m, by 0.45 and 0.38 sq. m: on 21 april 2010 (one day – 2.62 sq. m), and between 3 and 5 july 2010 (three days – 2.62 sq. m); 18 july and 13 august 2010 (twenty-seven days – 2.62 sq. m); 31 august and 2 september 2010 (three days – 2.55 sq. m); 19 and 26 november 2010 (eight days – 2.55 sq. m); 10 and 12 december 2010 (three days – 2.62 sq. m); 22 and 24 december 2010 (three days – 2.62 sq. m); and 24 and 25 february 2011 (two days – 2.62 sq. m). 147. there were also certain periods in which there were reductions in the minimum required personal space of 3 sq. m by 0.08, 0.04 and 0.01 sq. m (see paragraph 17 above). although such reductions are not of the same degree and extent as those noted above, particularly given that some of them can hardly be demonstrated and distin- - 24 - guished in terms of space, and are therefore not decisive for the determination of the case at issue, the court considers that they cannot be ignored in the overall assessment of conditions of the applicant’s confinement in bjelovar prison. 148. in view of these findings, and the relevant principles enunciated in its case-law (see paragraph 137 above), the court finds that a strong presumption of a violation of article 3 arises in the case at issue. accordingly, the question to be answered is whether there were factors capable of rebutting that presumption. (
3. ii)whether there were factors capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 149. the court notes that the relevant reductions in the applicant’s personal space below 3 sq. m were of relatively short duration. this is in particular true as to single non-consecutive periods of one (2.62 sq. m), two (2.62 sq.
4. m)and eight days (2.55 sq. m), three non-consecutive periods of three days during which the applicant had 2.62 sq. m of personal space, and one period of three days during which the applicant had 2.55 sq. m of personal space. the court notes, however, that there was also a period of twenty-seven days (between 18 july and 13 august 2010) in which the applicant disposed of 2.62 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 146 above). 150. in these circumstances, sharing the chamber’s concerns with regard to the period of twenty-seven days, the court will first consider whether that period could be regarded as a short and minor reduction in the required personal space. (α) the period of twenty-seven days 151. in this connection the court observes that in a comparably similar case of vladimir belyayev (cited above), concerning several non-consecutive periods of reductions in the applicant’s personal space below 3 sq. m, the longest period lasted twenty-six days during which the applicant disposed of 2.97 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 130 above). however, in the case at issue the applicant disposed of 2.62 sq. m of personal space for a period of twenty-seven days (see paragraph 146 above). 152. these circumstances are sufficient for the court to conclude that the period of twenty-seven days when the applicant had only 2.62 sq. m at his disposal cannot call into question the strong presumption of a violation of article 3. 153. accordingly, the court finds that in the period of twenty-seven days in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space in bjelovar prison, the conditions of the applicant’s detention subjected him to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and thus amounting to degrading treatment prohibited by article 3 of the convention. (β) the remaining periods 154. as regards the remaining periods which were of short duration and in respect of which the strong presumption of a violation of article 3 of the convention can accor- dingly be rebutted on other grounds, the court must have regard to other relevant - 25 - factors, namely the possibility of sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities and the general conditions of the applicant’s detention (see paragraphs 137- 138 above). the burden of proving that there were such factors is on the government. 155. with regard to the question of freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities, the court notes the government’s submissions concerning the amenities available for inmates in bjelovar prison. the government explained that the inmates were allowed to move freely outside their cells in the morning and afternoon, and to use the indoor and outdoor facilities of bjelovar prison. this in particular included two hours of outdoor exercise and in addition free out-of-cell movement inside the prison between 4 and 7 p.m. the government also explained in detail the prisoners’ daily regime and described the facilities available in bjelovar prison (see paragraphs 19-20 above). 156. in support of their claims the government provided photographs, floor plans and other relevant documentation related to the available facilities in bjelovar prison (see paragraph 21 above). this in particular concerns the photographs, taken in 2007, 2010 and 2011 in the context of the renovation of the prison and visits of various officials to the prison, showing the interior of bjelovar prison, the recreation yard, the cells and their sanitary facilities. these photographs correspond to the government’s description of the relevant facilities available to prisoners. the government also provided docu- mentation concerning the availability of entertainment for prisoners in bjelovar prison, which further supports the claims made in their submissions (see, by contrast, orchowski, cited above, §§ 125 and 129). 157. for his part, the applicant sought to challenge the government’s submission only in very general terms insisting on the fact that he had not been engaged in any work. at the same time he did not provide a detailed description disputing the government’s claims concerning the opportunities for outdoor exercise and other details of the relevant prison regime in bjelovar prison (compare golubenko, cited above, § 61). he conceded the fact that he had had a possibility of three hours per day of movement outside his cell but argued that the outdoor facilities were inadequate and insufficient, particularly given that there was only an open recreation yard (see paragraph 16 above). 158. the court observes at the outset that the government’s submissions are very detailed and consistent with their position in the pozaić case concerning the relevant facilities available to detainees in the same prison at the relevant time (see pozaić, cited above, §§ 15 and 60; and, by contrast, idalov, cited above, § 99). moreover, there is no indication that the relevant materials submitted by the government were prepared after they had been given notice of the applicant’s complaint. there is therefore no reason for the court to doubt the authenticity, objectivity and relevancy of such materials (see sergey chebotarev v. russia, no. 61510/09, §§ 40-41, 7 may 2014). 159. on the other hand, in the absence of any detailed information from the applicant about his daily routines at bjelovar prison, and regard being had to the materials sub- mitted by the government on the issue, the court is unable to accept the applicant’s submissions as sufficiently established or credible (see ildani v. georgia, no. 65391/09, § 27, 23 april 2013). it also attaches particular importance to the fact that the applicant never complained at the domestic level about certain aspects of his confinement, such as, in particular, the lack of outdoor exercise or insufficient time for free movement. - 26 - 160. in view of the above, the court’s task in the present case is to determine whether it can be ascertained, from the material submitted before it, that the applicant was given sufficient freedom of movement and adequate out-of-cell activities, which were capable of alleviating the situation created by the scarce allocation of personal space. 161. in this connection the court notes that in the ordinary daily regime in bjelovar prison the applicant was allowed the possibility of two hours of outdoor exercise, which is a standard set out in the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 43 above, section 14 (1.9) of the enforcement of prison sentences act above) and above the minimum stan- dards set out by the cpt (see paragraph 53 above). the photographs available to the court show the recreation yard, which according to the government’s undisputed submission, has a surface area of 305 sq. m and includes a lawn and asphalted parts as well as protection from inclement weather and is equipped with various recreational facilities, such as a gym, basketball court and ping-pong table. 162. furthermore, it is undisputed by the applicant that he was allowed three hours per day of free movement outside his cell within the prison facility. taking also into ac- count the period of two hours of outdoor exercise, as well as the periods necessary for serving breakfast, lunch and dinner, it cannot be said that the applicant was left to languish in his cell for a significant proportion of his day without any purposeful ac- tivity. this is particularly true given the entertainment facilities available in bjelovar prison, such as the possibility of watching tv or borrowing books from the local library, as follows from the material available before the court (compare valašinas, cited above, § 111). 163. against the above background, the court finds that, even taking into account that the applicant was unable to obtain work, which related not only to the objective im- possibility (see paragraph 20 above) but also arguably to the applicant’s previous behaviour (see paragraph 13 above), the possibility of free out-of-cell movement and the facilities available to the applicant in bjelovar prison could be seen as significantly alleviating factors in relation to the scarce allocation of personal space. 164. it remains to be determined whether the applicant was detained in generally appropriate conditions in bjelovar prison (see paragraphs 134 and 138 above). the court is of the view that the above considerations concerning the material available before it hold true for the general conditions of the applicant’s detention. in particular, the government’s detailed submission is corroborated by relevant evidence (see paragraph 21 above) and the findings of the competent domestic authorities in the applicant’s case, notably the competent judicial authorities, the ministry of justice prison administration and the ombudsperson (see paragraphs 25, 28, 30 and 38 above). in this context the court would note that there is no reason for it to call into question these findings of the competent domestic authorities. it also attaches particular im- portance to the fact that the applicant did not raise, let alone substantiate, allegations concerning poor hygiene conditions in the cells and poor nutrition, or notably in- adequate recreational and educational activities, in his constitutional complaint before the constitutional court. - 27 - 165. moreover, the applicant’s statements concerning the general conditions of his detention are inconsistent and contrary to the available evidence. specifically, at one instance the applicant argued that the cells where he had been accommodated were insufficiently equipped with the relevant furniture for every inmate (see paragraph 16 above), whereas elsewhere, when he intended to show that he had not had sufficient freedom of movement inside the cell, he argued that he had been unable to pace normally due to the furniture available to every inmate (see paragraph 80 above), which contradicts his own above-cited statement. moreover, the applicant argued that the sanitary facilities were in the same room as the living area from which they were not fully separated (see paragraph 16 above), while the photographs and floor plans of the prison dating back to 1993, the authenticity and relevancy of which are not in dispute, show that the prison cells in bjelovar prison were equipped with a fully partitioned sanitary facility. 166. likewise, the court observes that it appears from the material available to it that the food served to the prisoners was regularly inspected by the prison doctor and the competent state authorities, and that prisoners were served three meals per day which, on the basis of the menu presented by the government, do not appear substandard or inadequate (compare alexov, cited above, § 106; and, by contrast, kadiķis v. latvia (no. 2), no. 62393/00, § 55, 4 may 2006, where prisoners had only one meal per day). moreover, prisoners had free access to the sanitary facilities and there is no issue with regard to the access to natural light and fresh air in the cell. 167. there was also, as it appears from the available materials, a possibility to shower three times per week (see paragraph 26 above; see further paragraph 55 above, rule 19.4 of the european prison rules; and by contrast shilbergs v. russia, no. 20075/03, § 97, 17 december 2009, where the applicant had a possibility to shower no more than once every ten days). the facilities of bjelovar prison were constantly renovated and maintained, including in the period before and during the applicant’s stay in that prison (see paragraphs 18 and 38 above). in this connection the court notes the photographs, the authenticity of which is not in dispute, showing the interior of bjelovar prison, the recreation yard, the cells and their sanitary facilities, which appear to be in an adequate state of repair and cleanliness (see, by contrast for example, zuyev v. russia, no. 16262/05, § 59, 19 february 2013), and which accordingly correspond to the government’s description of the relevant facilities available to prisoners. 168. in view of the above, the court considers that the applicant was detained in generally appropriate conditions in bjelovar prison. 169. against the above background, as regards the other periods during which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, the court finds that the government have rebutted the strong presumption of a violation of article 3. those non-consecutive periods can be regarded as short and minor reductions in personal space, during which sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities were available to the applicant. moreover, he was detained in, viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility. 170. the court therefore considers that it cannot be established that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, although not completely adequate as regards personal space, - 28 - reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of article 3 of the convention. this conclusion is not altered by the fact that the relevant domestic law provided for a standard of 4 sq. m of personal space per detainee, which, as already indicated above, may inform the court’s decision but cannot be considered a decisive argument for its assessment under article 3 (see paragraph 111 above). this is particularly true in the context of the croatian dome- stic system given that the constitutional court, in its assessment of the minimum per- sonal space allocated to a detainee, referred to the court’s minimum standard of 3 sq. m of personal space set out in its ananyev and others judgment (see paragraph 45 above). 171. in the light of the above, the court considers that the conditions of the applicant’s detention during the remaining periods in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space did not amount to degrading treatment prohibited by article 3 of the convention. (γ) conclusion 172. the court finds that there has been a violation of article 3 of the convention with regard to the period of twenty-seven days (between 18 july and 13 august 2010) in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space (see paragraph 153 above). 173. conversely, with regard to the remainder of the periods in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m (see paragraph 171 above), the court finds that there has been no violation of article 3 of the convention.” højesterets begrundelse og resultat sagens temaer sagen angår udlevering til straffuldbyrdelse i rumænien af t i henhold til en europæisk arrestordre. spørgsmålet er for det første, om udlevering skal nægtes med den begrundelse, at arrestordrens indhold ikke lever op til kravene til beskrivelse af tid og sted mv. for den strafbare handling, og at en engelsk domstol den 17. februar 2016 traf beslutning om ikke at fuldbyrde den samme arrestordre med den begrundelse, at disse krav ikke fandtes opfyldt. hvis udlevering ikke skal nægtes med den anførte begrundelse, skal der tages stilling til, om udlevering skal nægtes i medfør af udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, sammenholdt med den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 og den europæiske unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder artikel 4. arrestordrens indhold og betydningen af den engelske afgørelse om at afslå fuldbyrdelse af arrestordren - 29 - højesteret finder, at den engelske afgørelse om at afslå fuldbyrdelse af arrestordren ikke er bindende for danske myndigheder. efter rådets rammeafgørelse af 13. juni 2002 om den europæiske arrestordre er de danske myndigheder derfor forpligtet til at foretage en selv- stændig vurdering af, om betingelserne for udlevering er opfyldt. herefter, og da højesteret af de i landsrettens kendelse af 9. juni 2016 anførte grunde finder, at kravene til indholdet af arrestordren er opfyldt, tiltræder højesteret, at der ikke er grundlag for at nægte udlevering af de formelle grunde, som t har gjort gældende. udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, spørgsmålet om krænkelse af eu-chartrets artikel 4 og den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 efter udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, må udlevering ikke finde sted, hvis der er fare for, at den pågældende efter udleveringen vil blive udsat for tortur eller anden umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf. bestemmelsen skal fortolkes i overensstemmelse med eu-chartrets artikel 4 og menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 3. eu-domstolen har i sin dom af 5. april 2016 i de forenede sager c-404/15 (pál aranyosi) og c-659/15 ppu (robert căldăraru) fastslået, at princippet om gensidig anerkendelse, som er grundlaget for ordningen for den europæiske arrestordre, er baseret på, at der mellem med- lemsstaterne hersker en gensidig tillid til, at deres respektive nationale retsordener er i stand til at yde den samme effektive beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, som er anerkendt på eu-plan. af dommen fremgår endvidere, at princippet om gensidig anerkendelse og gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaterne er af grundlæggende betydning i eu-retten, idet disse principper muliggør oprettelsen og bevarelsen af et område uden indre grænser. princippet om gensidig anerkendelse betegnes som en ”hjørnesten” i det retlige samarbejde. som udgangs- punkt kan risiko for umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling på grund af de generelle forhold under frihedsberøvelse i den eu-medlemsstat, som har fremsat anmodning om udle- vering, derfor ikke føre til afslag på at fuldbyrde en europæisk arrestordre, men alene til anmodning om supplerende oplysninger fra den pågældende stat med henblik på at sikre sig imod en sådan risiko. - 30 - i overensstemmelse med eu-domstolens dom har østre landsret foranlediget supplerende oplysninger om de forventede fængselsforhold for t tilvejebragt fra det rumænske justitsministerium. af det rumænske justitsministeriums udtalelse, der er citeret i landsrettens kendelse af 30. juni 2016, fremgår bl.a., at t efter udlevering til straffuldbyrdelse vil blive indsat i fængslet bukarest rahova med henblik på at gennemføre en karantæneperiode på 21 dage. han vil her få minimum 2-3 m2 personligt rum til rådighed. efter karantæneperiodens afslutning er det mest sandsynligt, at han i begyndelsen skal afsone i fængslet i tulcea. i udtalelsen er der redegjort for afsoningsforholdene i fængslet, herunder med hensyn til belysning, ventilation, sanitære forhold, gårdture, uddannelses-, arbejds- og fritidsaktiviteter mv. for så vidt angår pladsforholdene har den rumænske kriminalforsorg i udtalelsen garanteret, at t vil komme til at afsone straffen i fængslet i tulcea eller i en anden detention, som vil sikre ham personligt rum på mellem 2 m2 og 3 m2, inklusiv seng og møblement. den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol har i dom af 20. oktober 2016 i sagen muršić mod kroatien (nr. 7334/13, storkammerafgørelse) præciseret sin praksis vedrørende plads- forhold i fængsler. i dommen udtales bl.a., at der er en stærk formodning for, at den euro- pæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 3 er krænket, hvis en indsat har mindre end 3 m2 personligt rum til rådighed, og at denne stærke formodning normalt kun kan afkræftes, hvis en række kumulative betingelser er opfyldt, herunder at begrænsningen i forhold til et krævet minimumsareal på 3 m2 er ”short, occasional and minor”, jf. præmis 138. i dommens præmisser 151-153 fastslog domstolen, at det forhold, at en indsat i en periode på 27 dage kun havde haft 2,62 m2 personligt rum til rådighed, i sig selv var tilstrækkeligt til at konklu- dere, at den pågældende havde været udsat for nedværdigende behandling i strid med kon- ventionens artikel 3. udtalelsen fra det rumænske justitsministerium er afgivet den 21. juni 2016 og dermed forud for, at den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol afsagde dommen i sagen muršić mod kroatien. på den baggrund finder højesteret, at der inden endelig stillingtagen til, om en udlevering vil være i strid med udleveringslovens § 10 h, stk. 2, bør indhentes en fornyet udtalelse fra de - 31 - rumænske myndigheder om de forhold, som t efter en eventuel udlevering vil blive anbragt under, jf. artikel 15, stk. 2, i rammeafgørelsen om den europæiske arrestordre. sagen udsættes herefter på, at anklagemyndigheden i lyset af den europæiske menneske- rettighedsdomstols dom af 20. oktober 2016 indhenter en fornyet udtalelse fra de rumænske myndigheder om de forhold, der kan påregnes under frihedsberøvelse af t, såfremt han udleveres til rumænien. spørgsmålet om fortsat varetægtsfængsling afgøres særskilt. thi bestemmes: sagen udsættes med frist til den 24. marts 2017 på, at anklagemyndigheden indhenter en fornyet udtalelse fra de rumænske myndigheder om de forhold, der kan påregnes under frihedsberøvelse af t, såfremt han udleveres til rumænien.