s0021000 - jf

(1)subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. if the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.

(2)every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.

(3)in the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely… section 20

(1)every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true. if it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract.

(2)a representation is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk.

(3)a representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact or as to a matter of expectation or belief.

(4)a representation as to matter of fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is to say, if the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not be considered material by a prudent insurer.

(5)a representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true - 3 - if it be made in good faith.

(6)a representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is concluded.

(7)whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each case, a question of fact. parterne er enige om at der i sagen ikke er spørgsmål om afgivelse af urigtige oplysninger (”misrepresentation”), men alene spørgsmål om ft har tilsidesat sin pligt til at afgive oplysninger (”duty to disclose”) i forbindelse med genetableringen af forsikringen i august

1. der er under sagens forløb og under indtryk af bl.a. erklæringen fra richard youell, jf. nedenfor, opnået enighed om at tvisten alene vedrører begivenhedsforløbet i august 2000, ikke gentegningen af forsikring pr.
2. april
3. påstande ft har nedlagt påstand om at shrewsbury skal betale ham 150.000 gbp med tillæg af rente, principalt beregnet som dansk procesrente fra sagens anlæg den
4. august 2001, subsidiært beregnet som den engelske ”base rate” med tillæg af 2% fra den
5. oktober
6. shrewsbury har påstået frifindelse. sagsfremstilling ft der har været ejer af lystbåde siden 1975, anskaffede i begyndelsen af 1998 en båd for en købesum på ca. 150.000 gbp. han søgte en kaskoforsikring for båden gennem et engelsk forsikringsmæglerfirma, the miller kelsh insurance brokers limited, som han tidligere havde benyttet, og anmodede om en forsikring på 150.000 gbp. mægleren skaffede forsikringstilbud gennem firmaet tldallas (london) ltd. på hvis foranledning ft den
7. marts 1998 udfyldte og underskrev en forsikringsbegæring (proposal form). ud over at give forskellige konkrete oplysninger om båden og dens benyttelse afgav ft oplysninger om sin fortid som bådejer og eventuelle tidligere skader eller krav. han erklærede således at han ikke havde haft skader på sine både, og at han altid havde tegnet forsikring på normale vilkår. i skemaets punkt e – crewing/ location/usage punkt 5, blev ft spurgt: - 4 - ”have you or any person you allow to use your vessel ever been charged with or convicted for any offence involving dishonesty of any kind e.g. fraud, arson, robbery, smuggling, theft or handling stolen goods?” ft besvarede spørgsmålet med “never”. han oplyste videre at båden hørte til i vedbæk havn, og at den skulle benyttes til sejlads i danske og svenske farvande. i begæringen under important var anført: ”it is important to remember that failure to disclose all material facts (i.e. facts which an insurer would regard as likely to influence his acceptance and assessment of the proposal) may invalidate the insurance. if you are in any doubt as to whether facts are material, you should disclose them. a specimen copy of policy conditions is available on request. in the event of an insurance being effected, it is important to consider the form in conjunction with the policy condition because the latter may contain exclusions which override anything stated on the proposal form.” forsikring blev tegnet for et år fra den
8. april
9. da forsikringen skulle fornys i foråret 1999, ønskede ft at få dækning gennem lloyds, hvilket han meddelte sin forsikringsmægler der den
10. marts 1999 rettede henvendelse til firmaet yachtsure ltd. der tegner forsikringer på vegne underwriters tilknyttet lloyds, herunder shrewsbury. forsikringsforholdet blev etableret som ønsket. ft blev ikke afkrævet oplysninger i den forbindelse. yachtsure udstedte "certificate of insurance" den
11. marts 1999 for perioden 1/4 1999 - 1/4 2000 med samme forsikringsdækning som hidtil for båden. det fremgår af policen at forsikringen er omfattet af yachtsures almindelige vilkår. af disse fremgår bl.a. under overskriften ”11 general conditions” i punkt 11.1 om proposal form: the proposal form which you have completed … forms the basis of the contract between you and us. you guarantee the accuracy of the information in the proposal form. if any of the information is materially untrue or if any material information is omitted, we have the option to cancel this insurance form its inception” under pkt. 11.13 om cancellation and return of premium fremgår bl.a. at opsigelse kan ske med 30 dages varsel. - 5 - ved fax af
12. marts 2000 anmodede forsikringsmægleren om en fornyelse for en 12-måneders periode. forud herfor havde yachtsure til forsikringstageren sendt en renewal quotation af
13. februar 2000 hvori forsikringstageren anmodes om at erklære at der ikke er nogen ændring i forsikringen. der henvistes i den forbindelse til en passus på side 2 hvori det hedder: n.b. any material alteration in the facts previously disclosed in connection with this insurance which could affect the insurers decision on the terms and conditions quoted must be notified to insurer’s or the insurance may be voided by reason of non-disclosure. if there are any material changes of which the insurer’s should be aware, please provide details below.” der blev ikke afgivet supplerende oplysninger fra forsikringstagers side. the miller kelsh insurance brokers ltd. udstedte på shrewsburys vegne den 13 marts 2000 en ny police for perioden
14. april 2000 til
15. april 2001 på uændrede vilkår. præmien var 1.150 gbp med fradrag af 57,50 gbp (5%) i no claims bonus. den
16. maj 2000 blev ft anholdt og sigtet for groft skattesvig. han blev varetægtsfængslet og sad i varetægt til den
17. september
18. som led i sagen blev den forsikrede båd beslaglagt til sikkerhed for det offentliges krav, men efter at disse omkring midten af september var blevet opfyldt af ft, blev beslaglæggelsen ophævet. i mellemtiden havde ft fået båden overført fra vedbæk havn til ishøj havn og givet den i kommission til en skibsmægler. fts hustru gik fejlagtigt ud fra at båden var solgt og sendte den
19. august 2000 en fax til forsikringsmægleren hvori hun på ægtefællens vegne anmodede om at få ophævet forsikringsaftalen og refunderet præmie. faxen lyder således: ”… please cancel the above insurance police no. … as i have sold the yacht, and please send check to the above address. …” den
20. august 2000 meddelte mægleren yachtsure følgende: ”assured advised yesterday, this policy is to be cancelled with effect 7th august 2000 – he has sold the vessel. …” - 6 - der blev udstedt kreditnota for præmien for den resterende periode på 746,71 gbp med fradrag af mæglersalær på 149,34 gbp, dvs. netto 595,37 gbp. endvidere udstedt yachtsure tillæg til policen, endorsement no a 1, med angivelse af den nævnte ristorno. over opgørelsen af ristorno er anført: ”all other terms, clauses and conditions remain unaltered” da misforståelsen blev opklaret, sendte fts ægtefælle den
21. august 2000 på en fax til mægleren: “… dear sir, i cancelled the above by fax the 7th of aug 2000 – that is a mistake, the boat is not sold, so please continue the assurance…” mægleren gav denne besked videre til yachtsure med fax af
22. august 2000: ”… thanks for the endorsement to cancel this policy. however, i have now had a fax from the assured (attached) which states he made a mistake – the boat is not sold so please continue cover. strange!!!! but perhaps he has more than one boat. anyway please reinstate cover with effect 7th august and confirm. …” modtageren hos yachtsure accepterede og anførte på faxen der blev returneret til mægleren: ”agreed sub no known or reported losses at 17/8/
23. file already lapsed on system will take a day or so to sort out.” i overensstemmelse hermed udstedtes endorsement no a 2 af
24. august
25. i en boks under angivelse af forsikringssum mv. er anført: - 7 - ”it is hereby understood and agreed that the cover herein is reinstated with effect from 7th august 2000". subject to no known or reported losses @ 17/08/2000 …" under boksen er endvidere anført: "all other terms, clauses and conditions remain unaltered" præmien for den resterende periode blev angivet til 746,71 gbp brutto med fradrag af 37,34 gbp (5%) no claims bonus. mægleren sendte den
26. august 2000 følgende til ft: ”… i confirm cover has been maintained on the vessel – warranted no known or reported losses from the 7th august 2000 (the period during which you have advised the boat sold). …” den
27. september 2000 blev ft af retten i lyngby idømt straf af fængsel i 1 år 6 måneder for overtrædelse af straffelovens § 289,
28. pkt., jf. skattekontrollovens § 13, stk. 1, samt en tillægsbøde på 4,8 mio. kr. kort forinden havde ft indgået forlig med skattevæsenet om efterbetaling af 4,8 mio. kr. bødekravet og skattekravet blev opfyldt kort tid efter. ft blev løsladt efter dommen. den
29. september 2000 ca. kl. 03.00 opstod en større brand i ishøj havn, hvorved 5-6 lystfartøjer, herunder fts båd, udbrændte. ft indgav anmeldelse til forsikringsselskabet den
30. september
31. ekspertudtalelser parterne har til dokumentation af engelsk ret indhentet en ”legal opinion” fra advokat (barrister) michael crane, q.c., og to sagkyndige vurderinger fra forsikringsekspert richard youell. michael crane af michael cranes erklæring fremgår bl.a.: - 8 - “d1.1: please explain the duty of disclosure owed by an assured to an underwriter under ss.17, 18 and 20 of the marine insurance act 1906 and as a matter of general principle under the english law of insurance. c1: is determining whether, within the context of s.18

(1)of the marine insurance act 1906, there has been a failure to disclose a material circumstance, in each case a question of fact? and, if so, is it one to be determined by the judge on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties? the general framework

1. the assured party under a contract of insurance owes the same duties to his insurer under sections 17, 18 and 20 of the marine insurance act 1906 (“mia”) as at common law,1 although the practical application of those duties may vary according to the type of insurance.2 it is well settled that the mia applies equally to non marine as well as to marine insurance and that it codified english common law at the date of its enactment. although i have described the scope of those duties below solely by reference to the act, my comments apply equally as a matter of general principle.
2. sections 17, 18 and 20 of mia provide as follows: …
3. section 17 in effect imposes on the parties a general duty to act in good faith in their dealings with one another, both before the contract is concluded and during its performance. the scope of the duty varies, however, according to the circumstances. the assured’s duties as to disclosure and representation are two specific aspects of the wider duty of good faith, and are set out in detail in sections 18 and 20.3 the duties imposed on the assured by sections 18 to 20 of the mia fall to be performed only “before the contract is concluded”. i consider below the implications of this in the context of renewals, variations and cancellations (followed by reinstatements) of insurance contracts. the duty of disclosure
4. the assured owes a duty to disclose to the insurer all circumstances which would be considered material by a prudent insurer and which are known to the assured, subject to the exceptions set out in section 18

(3)mia. where the assured is seeking to obtain insurance in the ordinary course of business, section 18

(1)further provides that the duty of disclosure extends to material circumstances which he ought to know in that capacity; where 1 see pan atlantic insurance co ltd v pine top insurance co ltd [1995] 1 ac 510 at 518,

1. 2 macgillivray on insurance law, ed. n.legh-jones, 10th edn (sweet and maxwell, 2003) at 17-
2. 3 see macgillivray at 17-1 – 17-
3. - 9 - the assured is a consumer, however, the duty extends only to facts within his actual knowledge, subject to the caveat that he may not deny knowledge of facts to the evidence of which he deliberately shut his eyes.4
4. whether the assured failed to disclose a particular circumstance is a question of fact. section 18

(4)provides that whether a particular undisclosed circumstance is material is also a question of fact. similarly, whether a representation made before the conclusion of the contract is material is also a question of fact (section 20

(7)). the sort of evidence which an english court would typically receive in order to decide these questions, is discussed below. 11. as set out in section 18

(2)mia, the materiality of a particular fact or circumstance is assessed objectively by reference to the opinion of the hypothetical prudent insurer. the opinions of the assured5 or of the particular insurer who actually underwrote the risk6 are irrelevant to this question. a material circumstance is one which would have influenced the judgment of a hypothetical prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk or on what terms to take the risk. if the circumstance in question is shown to be one which would have “influenced” that decision making process, it is not necessary to go further and show that it would have had a decisive impact on the decision. this is settled by house of lords authority.7 the question of materiality is assessed at the date the contract was entered into.8

1. entirely separate from the question whether a material fact or circumstance was undisclosed, is the question whether that non disclosure induced the insurer to underwrite the risk or to write it on the particular terms that, in the event, were agreed. issues of “inducement” are directed to determining whether the non disclosure was causative in a legal sense. in contrast to questions of “materiality”, questions of inducement depend upon evidence as to what the reaction of the insurer who actually wrote the risk would have been had the circumstance in question been disclosed before the contract was concluded. the question of inducement is referred to further below. misrepresentation … 4 joel v law union and crown insurance co [1908] 2 kb 863 at 880, 884; economides v commercial union assurance co [1998] qb 587 at 601-3, 607; see macgillivray at 17-
2. 5 see, for example, roselodge ltd v castle [1966] 2 lloyd’s rep 113 at
3. 6 glasgow assurance corp v symondson

(1911)16 comcas 109 at

1. 7 pan atlantic, supra at 516-518, 530-541,
2. 8 re yager and guardian assurance co

(1912)108 lt 38; see also pan atlantic, supra at 531-2; brotherton v aseguradora colseguros sa [2003] ewca civ 705, ca (22 may 2003), new law online 203059701 at pages 6,

1. - 10 - 1.
2. please explain how, if at all, the duty of disclosure identified in response to question 1.1 is varied by clauses 2.8 and 11.1 of the yachtsure policy conditions. …
3. the assured’s duties under sections 17, 18 and 20 mia are not, therefore, varied by clauses 2.8 and 11.1 of the conditions, although clause 11.1 provides the insurer with an additional remedy for breach of warranty in circumstances where an answer in the proposal form is actually untrue. d
4. so far as you have not addressed the following matters in your answers to question 1, please identify: 2.1 when the assured owes an underwriter a duty of disclosure; 2.2 the rights of underwriters if an assured does fail to comply with his duty of disclosure; 2.3 what test or tests apply under english law in order to determine whether the assured has failed to comply with his duty of disclosure towards underwriters. time at which the duties are owed
5. as stated above, the duty of utmost good faith imposed by section 17 mia governs both parties’ conduct throughout the negotiations for and performance of the contract, whereas the particular duties imposed by sections 18 and 20 apply only during pre-formation negotiations and then, only to the assured. the negotiation period continues up until the moment at which the contract is concluded, so that, for example, the assured is obliged to disclose any material circumstances which come to light after he has submitted the proposal form or to notify the insurer if any of the information he provided in the form subsequently becomes inaccurate.9
6. sections 18 and 20 also apply during negotiations to vary, extend10 or renew the contract, as the purpose of such negotiations is the creation of a new contract or the addition of fresh rights and obligations to an existing contract. in such cases, the assured must disclose both circumstances which arose during the expiring period of cover and also the fact, if it be the case, that he had consciously and deliberately omitted to disclose a circumstance which he knew to be material when presenting the risk originally.11 in cases of renewal or other changes which amount to the creation of a new contract, the duties apply in full as during negotiations for 9 see macgillivray at 17-
7. 10 except where extension is a matter for the unilateral decision of the insured: macgillivray at 17-
8. 11 see macgillivray at 17-
9. - 11 - the original contract. where all that is proposed is a variation of the subsisting contract, the duties are limited to facts material to the change in risk; the assured need not disclose matters relating to the original unaltered risk.12 remedies of the insurer for breach of duty by the assured
10. if the assured fails to comply with his duties under sections 18 and 20, the insurer is entitled to avoid the contract so long as he can prove that he was induced by the non-disclosure or representation to enter into the contract on the relevant terms. the remedy of avoidance was explained by lord mustill in pan atlantic insurance co ltd v pinetop insurance co ltd [1995] 1 ac 501 in the following terms: “

(1)a circumstance may be material even though a full and accurate disclosure of it would not in itself have had a decisive effect on the prudent underwriter’s decision whether to accept the risk and if so at what premium. but,

(2)if the misrepresentation or non- disclosure of a material fact did not in fact induce the making of the contract (in the sense in which that expression is used in the general law of misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely on it as a ground for avoiding the contract.”13 i have already explained the requirements of establishing inducement as well as material non disclosure or misrepresentation. in english law avoidance is a draconian remedy; it involves the insurer rescinding the contract from the outset and repaying the premium. in contrast to some other legal systems, once there is a finding of material non disclosure/ representation along with inducement, there is no discretion in english law to adjust the premium and direct that the insurance contract should continue. of course, an insurer may lose the right to avoid through subsequent affirmation of the contract with knowledge of the matters giving rise to a right to avoid, but that issue does not appear to arise in the present case. in principle, in cases of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, or even in cases of fraudulent non disclosure, the insurer may have a remedy in damages. but an insurer will almost inevitably opt to avoid the contract from the outset rather than claim as damages the financial loss which he has sustained through having been induced to enter into it. avoidance followed by repayment of claims and premium will cure any such loss. 12 lishman v northern maritime

(1875)lr 10 cp 179 at 181, 182; manifest shipping co ltd v uni- polaris co ltd (the star sea) [1997] 1 lloyd’s rep 360 at

1. this case went on appeal to the house of lords but these points in the decision of the court of appeal were not affected. see also macgillivray at 17-
2. 13 at
3. - 12 -
4. it is no defence for the assured to claim that his failure to disclose was innocent, for “it is immaterial whether the omission to communicate a material fact arises from indifference or a mistake or from it not being present to the mind of the assured that the fact was one which it was material to make known.”14 the same principle applies to avoidance of the contract for misrepresentation.
5. where the assured is in breach of the limited duty of disclosure which is owed during negotiations to vary the contract of insurance, the insurer’s remedy is to avoid the agreement by which the contract was varied, not to avoid the entire contract ab initio.15 test for breach of duty by the assured
6. as explained above the test for determining whether the insured has complied with his duties of disclosure/ representation under sections 18 or 20 mia is an objective one, namely, whether the relevant non-disclosure or misrepresentation would have influenced the hypothetical prudent underwriter in his judgment to take the risk on the relevant terms. the test to be applied to determine whether the insurer can exercise the remedy of avoidance is a subjective one, however, namely, whether the relevant non- disclosure or misrepresentation in fact induced him to take the risk on the relevant terms. … inducement
7. finally, [shrewsbury] must also prove that the alleged non-disclosure(s) made by mr ft induced it to enter into the contract on the relevant terms. as set out above, it will not be entitled to a remedy for any non-disclosure without proof of this causative link between the non-disclosure and the making of the contract on the particular terms. relevant evidence
8. the onus is on [shrewsbury] to prove that it is entitled to avoid the policy. the applicable standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. were this case to be tried in the english courts the relevant categories of evidence would be as follows: (a) evidence relevant for establishing whether mr ft was in breach of his duty of disclosure, including the documentary evidence of the 14 bates v hewitt

(1867)lr 2 qb 595 at 607. 15 k/s merc-scandia xxxxii v certain lloyd’s underwriters subscribing to lloyd’s policy no.25t 105487 and ocean marine insurance co ltd (the mercandian continent) [2001] 2 lloyd’s rep 563 at 571. - 13 - negotiations for the contract, mr ft’s evidence as a witness, and the evidence of any other witnesses of fact who can prove or disprove the extent of his knowledge of circumstances (

1. a)– (d). expert evidence is irrelevant to this issue. (
2. b)evidence to determine whether mr ft’s alleged non-disclosures were material to the decision to take the risk is a question which, typically, would be determined by independent expert evidence focusing on the practice of the marine insurance market. although the materiality of a particular fact may in some cases be so obvious that no such evidence is required,16 in view of fisher j’s diffidence in gate v sun alliance regarding the materiality of tax evasion as a matter of general principle, this would probably not be such a case. both mr ft’s and [shrewsbury]’s opinions are irrelevant to the question of materiality; the court is concerned only to establish the opinion of the hypothetical prudent underwriter. (
3. c)to determine whether [shrewsbury] was in fact induced by the alleged non-disclosures to enter into the contract on the relevant terms, the court will look at the evidence of [shrewsbury]’s witnesses of fact and any pertinent documentary or other factual evidence. expert evidence is irrelevant to this issue. d4. please identify: 4.1. the principles of english law and/ or any relevant contractual terms which you consider the court should apply; and 4.2. the evidence that you would consider (
4. a)relevant and (
5. b)irrelevant as a matter of english law; when deciding whether the reinstatement of cover in august 2000 amounted to (
6. a)a new contract of insurance or (
7. b)a renewal or sufficient modification of the contract of insurance so as to impose on the assured a duty of disclosure in relation to any material change of circumstance since march 2000. c3. under english law, would the question whether reinstatement of insurance cover after some days’ break is equal to taking out a new insurance policy or not, be determined by the judge as a matter of fact? c4. is the question under 3) to be decided according to ordinary contract rules, or do any special insurance rules apply (in addition or instead)? 41. there is one point which should be noted at the outset concerning cancellation of the policy before considering the principles to be applied in determining the legal consequences of the agreements to cancel and reinstate the insurance in august 2000. 16 schoolman v hall [1951] 1 lloyd’s rep 139 at 144; glicksman v lancashire and general insurance co ltd [1927] ac 139 at 143. - 14 - cancellation of the policy 42. with regard to cancellation, the conditions provide as follows: … 43. where the terms of a contract expressly require that a party wishing to terminate the contract give notice in a specified manner, those requirements must usually be observed closely if the purported cancellation is to be valid.17 in the present instance, the requirements of clause 11.13 were not complied with, as mrs ft did not give notice 30 days in advance of the date on which she wished to cancel the contract, but sought to cancel it with immediate effect.18 it follows that notice of termination of the contract was not given according to its terms and conditions as required by clause 11.3 and it was, therefore open to the insurers to decline to accept termination prior to the due date. 44. in accordance with general contractual principles, however, contractual requirements as to notice may be waived expressly or by conduct; further, a party who induces the other to forbear from enforcing the letter of the agreement may not subsequently repudiate the waiver.19 in this case, notwithstanding that mr. ft had not given due notice of cancellation, [shrewsbury] agreed to terminate the policy from 7 august 2000 and to return the pro rata value of the premium as soon as it received miller’s fax on 8 august 2000. it is clear, therefore, that [shrewsbury] was content to waive its entitlement to 30 days’ notice and acknowledge the contract as terminated with immediate effect. in those circumstances, in my view mr ft would be estopped from contending that his purported cancellation of the contract was ineffective. principles to be applied in determining the effect of [shrewsbury]’s decision to go back on risk 45. the question whether particular changes to a given contract constitute a renewal, extension or variation of that contract is answered by applying basic principles of the english law of contract, including principles of construction. 20 the object of rules of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties.21 but this reference to the intentions of the parties is apt to confuse. by speaking of “the intentions of the 17 see chitty on contracts, ed. h.g.beale, 28th edn (sweet and maxwell, 1999) at 23-049. 18 documents 7, 8 and b. 19 ogle v earl vane

(1868)lr 3 qb 272 at 279; hickman v haynes

(1875)lr 10 cp 598 at

1. see chitty at 23-050, 23-
2. 20 kensington v inglis

(1807)8 east 273; royal exchange assurance co v hope [1928] 1 ch 179 at 191, 195; cornhill insurance co v assenheim

(1937)58 ll.l.rep 27 at

1. see also macgillivray at 17-25; the law of insurance contracts, m.a.clarke (llp, 2002) at 23-4d. 21 chitty at 12-
2. - 15 - parties” the reference is to the presumed intentions of the parties collectively, to be established by objective inference, principally, from how they expressed themselves in the contractual documents. although in interpreting contracts due importance will be given to the circumstances in which the transaction occurred and the relevant commercial background, the court will not have regard to the parties’ subjective intentions or negotiating aims. in the particular context of renewals, cancellations and variations the approach taken by the courts suggests that the parties’ intention is usually evidenced by construction of the terms of the changes agreed, seen in the context of their existing or previous contractual relationship.22 this rule is probably a particular application in the insurance context of the general contractual principle that the object of construing the terms of an agreement is to ascertain objectively the presumed intention of the parties.23
3. there is authority to suggest that where a policy has lapsed and is subsequently revived, the revived policy is not a continuation of the old contract but the creation of a new one.24 further, it has been suggested that if an original insurance contract has run its course or has been cancelled and offers no guidance as to what should follow, it is presumed that the insurer can refuse further cover and that any further cover which is agreed must, therefore, be a matter of renewal.25 i should say that, in my view, the case relied upon in clarke to establish this proposition with regard to cancellation of an original contract, pengelly v british empire assurance co

(1974)38 dlr

(3d)624, does not in fact support such a presumption. on the facts found by the judge, the case simply concerned a succession of new motor insurance policies which were agreed by the parties when the old contract expired; there was therefore no question of cancellation by either party. nevertheless, the proposition appears sound with regard to policies that have expired.

1. the case-law would seem to suggest that where changes are made to the policy during its term and while the insurance is current, the principal factor in determining the intention of the parties may well be the extent to which those changes altered the nature of the risk. for example, where an assured suspended cover for one vehicle of a particular make and then completed a new application to substitute two vehicles of a different make on the same policy, for which he paid a new premium, this amounted to entering into a new contract.26 where, on the other hand, an assured 22 this seems to be the approach taken in the cases cited in note 41 above; see macgillivray at 17-
2. 23 on the general contractual principle, see chitty at 12-
3. 24 doe d pitt v shewin

(1811)3 camp 134; handler v mutual reserve fund life association

(1904)90 lt 192. see general principles of insurance law, e.r.ivamy hardy, 6th edn (butterworths, 1993) at 276. 25 clarke at 23-4d. 26 cornhill v assenheim, supra at 29. - 16 - obtained a short extension of the period of cover under a life assurance policy, it was held that the old contract had simply been continued and extended.27 in appropriate cases, the fact that the relevant changes are effected by means of an endorsement to the original policy seems to be a significant, but not necessarily decisive, factor.28 48. the approach taken where an original contract has lapsed places particular importance on the insurer’s right to consider any fresh substantial alterations in the risk for the future. in this context a key factor in indicating an intention to enter into a new contract for the future is the insurer’s right, following the lapse of the original policy, to refuse future cover altogether. in contrast, in cases where the insurer is already bound by particular obligations under the subsisting contract, there is no reason why the assured should owe the full duty of disclosure in respect of those obligations simply because he requests a minor variation; the insurer has already made his decision in respect of those matters and remains on risk in relation to them. where the insurer is not so bound, however, he is in effect considering afresh whether or not to provide cover. in mr. ft’s case there was an agreement to cancel cover with effect from 7th august 2000 and to refund the premium for the unexpired term. a credit note was raised in favour of the insured’s brokers for that premium. according to the documents which i have seen, until insurers agreed to reinstate cover there was no insurance. insurers were not bound to reinstate cover; they were free to decline to do so or to do so only conditionally and subject to new conditions. just as in a renewal of an expiring policy, insurers had the choice whether or not to enter into a contract for the future. 49. depending upon whether the court decides this was a variation of an existing contract or an agreement for a fresh contract, so the insured’s duties of disclosure will vary in scope as i have described above. if this was a new contract the insured would have the full range of disclosure obligations set out in mia sections 18 and 20. if this was a variation to a subsisting contract then the only obligation would be to disclose matters material to new features of the varied risk. relevant evidence 50. the intention of the parties during their negotiations in august 2000 is a matter to be inferred objectively from the evidence, including in particular those documents passing between the parties or their agents by which the 27 royal exchange v hope, supra at 191, 195; see also tomlin j at first instance at 184. see also kensington v inglis, supra. 28 in royal exchange v hope, supra the court of appeal took into account the fact that the change was effected by means of endorsement, whereas mackinnon j in cornhill v assenheim assumed that an endorsement had been drawn up but did not consider that factor decisive. - 17 - cancellation and reinstatement were effected. as i have stated above, the parties’ intention would be ascertained by construing the terms of the changes agreed, in the context of the parties’ existing or previous contractual relationship. the relevant legal principles are those established by the common law for ascertaining contractual intention. expert evidence is irrelevant on this issue. in english law contractual construction is a matter of law, emphasising again the point that “intention” is a reference to presumed, rather than actual, intention the ascertaining of which involves a process of objective inference. particular regard would be had to any authorities decided in an insurance context which, by analogy, could be viewed as shedding light on the approach to be adopted on the particular facts of this case. d5. please identify: 5.1. the principles of english law which you consider the court should take into account; and 5.2. the evidence that you would consider (

1. a)relevant and (
2. b)irrelevant as a matter of english law; when deciding whether underwriters were entitled to avoid the contract of insurance for the policy year 2000/2001 on the grounds that mr ft failed to disclose to underwriters at the time of reinstating cover in august 2000 that: (
3. a)he had been charged under danish criminal law with gross tax fraud in relation to his failure to disclose to the danish tax authorities the existence of his overseas trust and his receipt of income from that trust; (
4. b)he had been in custody since 22 may 2000 in connection with the charges against him; (
5. c)the danish police had seized the insured vessel as security for the tax authorities’ claims against him; (
6. d)the tax authorities were looking to recover from mr ft additional taxes and fines. 51. there is no dispute that mr ft did not disclose the circumstances set out in paragraphs (
7. a)– (
8. d)of question d5 to [shrewsbury] at the time of reinstating cover in august 2000. whether [shrewsbury] is entitled to avoid paying out on that ground will be determined by three factors: (
9. a)what was the scope of the duties owed by mr ft during the negotiations to reinstate the contractual relationship; (
10. b)whether the non-disclosures were material to [shrewsbury]’s decision to reinstate the contractual relationship on the relevant terms; (
11. c)whether the non-disclosures in fact induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate the contractual relationship on the relevant terms. 52. the scope of the duties owed by mr ft in august 2000 depends upon whether the reinstatement of cover constituted a new agreement or a - 18 - variation of the policy. the extent of the duties owed is a question of law to be determined on the principles which i have set out above. 53. i have previously described the approach to be taken in determining whether, as a matter of principle, the non-disclosures were material, and how, as a matter of principle, the scope of disclosure would vary depending on the court’s decision as to whether the agreement in august 2000 varied a subsisting contract or amounted to an agreement for a fresh contract for the unexpired term incepting on 7th august 2000. 54. whether the non-disclosures actually induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate cover on the relevant terms is a question of fact, to be decided on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses of fact and any pertinent documentation.” richard youell af richard youells erklæring af 30. juni 2004 fremgår bl.a.: ”7 marine hull and machinery underwriters constitute a separate and distinct market, and the yacht market form an even more particular sector of that market. the information that a prudent yacht underwriter requires, and by which his underwriting judgement will be coloured, is of a particular type, and it is quite different to that which an underwriter considering a directors & officers (d&o), a bankers blanket bond or an errors and omissions propositions, as examples, would demand. 8 the yacht underwriter is concerned that his potential assured is a competent and experienced yachtsman who has the means and the inclination to look after his vessel, has proper respect for the perils of the seas and the welfare of other vessels, and has demonstrated these virtues by having a beneficial loss record. his business activities, and even his business ethics, are considered to be a matter quite distinct from and irrelevant to his concern for the safety of his vessel. … 14 b would the judgement of a prudent underwriter in determining whether to renew or reinstate cover for the claimant in august 2000 and if so on what terms, have been influences by knowing one or more of the following facts: i. that by august 2000 the claimant had been charged under danish criminal law with gross tax fraud in relation to his failure to disclose to the danish tax authorities the existence of his overseas trust and his receipt of income from that trust; ii. that he had been in custody since 22nd may 2000 in connection with the charges against him; - 19 - iii. that the tax authorities were looking to recover from the claimant additional taxes and fines? 15 i understand that there remains a legal issue as to whether the reinstatement of the cover in august 2000 constituted a new agreement or a variation of the policy. if disclosure was in fact required at that time, the facts summarized in paragraphs i., ii. and iii. above would, in my opinion, have exerted influence upon a prudent underwriter in his assessment of the risk. 16 the reasons for this are several, but all reflect that a situation existed at this point which a prudent underwriter would wish to consider. the fact that the assured had been in custody and had been charged with gross tax fraud is a wholly different proposition from the mere existence of a tax scheme of questionable legality or of initial enquiry into it. 17 the assured’s ability to look after the vessel might now be in question, and the possibility of the moral hazard and the temptations attaching to an unperforming asset or one that is its owner might be unable to enjoy, as well as the assured’s ability to fund potential fines, would all be issues for the underwriter to ponder. 18 some underwriters might be unwilling, as a matter of general policy, to insure an owner who has been charged with an offence involving fraud, or might be concerned that a man whom it was alleged had acted fraudulently in one sphere might be inclined to be less honest in others. an assured who is in custody, or has been heavily financially penalised, may not find it easy to pay the premium for the policy, or to meet the inevitable expenses involved in the ownership and maintenance of the vessel.” af richard youells tillægserklæring af 20. december 2004 fremgår bl.a.: ”4. the hypothesis on which my opinions in paragraphs 15 to 18 of my first report were made was that the claimant had already been charged with the criminal offence of gross tax fraud and had been in custody for some considerable time. in paragraph 1. (
12. i)of the second questionnaire i am invited to accept that a prudent yacht underwriter would or might have considered it material in april 2000 to know if an assured was engaged in tax evasion that was a criminal offence which might lead to a custodial sentence and/or a significant financial penalty. i am unable to accept such a proposition. 5. a yacht policy is a physical damage policy and its principle focus is always on the property that it is designed to protect. the character or ethical standards of the owner are of interest only to the extent that they directly affect the insured property or the way in which it will be maintained and operated. they are subsidiary to the physical characteristics of the insured property – its age, its condition, the quality of its build, - 20 - where and how it will be employed. underwriters do not make random moral judgements beyond the area of their particular business interest, as indicated in paragraph 17 of my first report, and they have no right or ability so to do. they would however operate on the assumption that a man is innocent until he is proved guilty, that is, until he is convicted of an offence. after conviction, an underwriter should be able to consider whether the offence committed has any bearing on the contract of insurance which he is considering, and it is for this reason that actual convictions may be material information if they have a demonstrable connection to the nature of the insurance in contemplation. … 7. the explanation of the prudent underwriter’s expectations, summarized above, indicates the distinction between the situations postulated in the first questionnaire, and answered in paragraphs 9-13 and 17-18 respectively, and approached somewhat differently in paragraph 2. of the second questionnaire. the assumptions offered in the second questionnaire produce a response more akin to the former (ie paragraphs 9-13) than the latter (paragraphs 17-18). 8. underwriters do not make moral judgement of their assureds and although their experience in the world of both personal and commercial insurance will almost certainly leave them with a low expectation of ethical standards, it is with the quality and safety of the physical objects that they are insuring that they are concerned. 9. the nature of the information that is material will vary depending on the type of insurance that is in contemplation. the opinions expressed in this report would not stand if the insurance at issue was a fidelity or professional errors and omissions policy, or other type of financial insurance. in the case of a yacht policy the underwriter is not concerned with the possible moral turpitude of its owner, unless that has a direct influence on the quality of the vessel and the care and competence with which it will be operated.” forklaringer ft har forklaret at han efter anbefaling valgte en mægler tilsluttet lloyds. the miller kelsh insurance brokers limited var derfor hans forbindelse med tldallas. han udfyldte i forbindelse med tegningen af forsikringen en forsikringsbegæring (proposal form). da forsikringen skulle fornys året efter, blev den flyttet til yachtsure hvilket han erklærede sig indforstået med. han udfyldte ikke en ny forsikringsbegæring og fandt ikke grund til at afgive yderligere oplysninger. han modtog policen vedrørende perioden april 1999 – april 2000. han anmodede om fornyelse af forsikringen i marts måned 2000, formentligt efter at han havde modtaget en renewal quotation fra yachtsure. der var ikke ændringer af betydning i forsikringsmæssig henseende. han havde intet - 21 - kendskab til skattesagen ved fornyelsen af forsikringen. han blev først klar over sigtelsen den 22. maj 2000 kl. 10.03 da han blev anholdt. han var varetægtsfængslet indtil dommen den 18. september 2000. båden lå i vedbæk havn, da han var varetægtsfængslet og lå der indtil den blev flyttet til ishøj havn den 6. august med henblik på salg. båden var beslaglagt ligesom hans faste ejendom. han satte båden til salg bl.a. på grund af udtalelser fra politiets side om at tvangssalg måske kun ville indbringe 500.000 kr. hans hustru troede at båden var solgt da den blev sejlet til ishøj havn med henblik på salg, hvorfor hun opsagde forsikringen. opsigelsen skete uden forudgående drøftelse med ham. hun nævnte opsigelsen af forsikringen for ham en uge senere, og han bad hende snarest sørge for at få tilbagekaldt opsigelsen. der kom ingen forespørgsler, hverken skriftlige eller mundtlige, i forbindelse med at forsikringen blev sat i kraft på ny. han modtog sin dom i retten i lyngby mandag den 18. september 2000 ca. kl. 14 og blev derefter løsladt. inden da havde han indgået aftale med skattevæsenet om efterbetalingskrav m.v. forliget blev indgået den foregående torsdag eller fredag. indtil da havde han ikke erklæret sig skyldig i sigtelserne. han erkendte sig skyldig i retten i overensstemmelse med forliget og således som det fremgår af dommen. efter forliget som han opfyldte hurtigt, frafaldt politiet beslaglæggelsen. han blev bekendt med branden tirsdag den 19. september 2000. paul miller, underwriting risk services, london, har forklaret at han har været i lloyds i 27 år. han har været underwriter siden 1985 og har for yachtsure, som er et ”brandname”, og andre tegnet forsikringer af bl.a. lystbåde. de forsikrer ca. 11.000 lystfartøjer over hele verden. grunden til at forsikringsbegæringen indeholder spørgsmål om ”fraud” er at det er forsikringsteknisk rimeligt at forholde sig til forsikringstagerens hæderlighed i almindelighed, således at man kan vurdere de moralske risici ved forsikringen. hvis der foreligger svigagtige forhold som nævnt, kan det endvidere betyde at forsikringstageren kan komme i finansielle vanskeligheder mv.. det er derfor rimeligt at forlange oplysninger i så henseende fra forsikringstageren eller den der søger om en forsikring. - 22 - fts opsigelse af forsikringen i august 2000 som følge af salg af båden fremtrådte som en sædvanlig opsigelse. det er almindelig praksis at lade en forsikring ophøre fra den dag meddelelsen om salget modtages. der var tale om en sædvanlig ekspedition, der i almindelighed foregår meget hurtigt. forsikringen var efter opsigelsen ophørt. i forbindelse med gentegning af den samme forsikring som i det foreliggende tilfælde er det normalt at betinge dette af at der ikke er indtrådt skader mv. i mellemperioden. det er sædvanlig praksis ikke at sende en ny begæring (proposal form) til forsikringstageren i forbindelse med en sådan fornyelse. der er i hele forsikringsforholdet en stående pligt for forsikringstageren til at give meddelelse om ændringer som kan få væsentlig betydning for forsikringen (”materially may affect the insurance”). yachtsure blev først bekendt med dommen vedrørende ft og den forudgående varetægtsfængsling et par uger efter afsigelsen af dommen. oplysninger om dommen, hvor ft blev dømt for skattesvig, og om varetægtsfængslingen i anledning af sigtelse for skattesvig, ville ganske givet have betydning for forsikringsforholdet. meddelelse om sigtelsen og fængslingen ville have medført at forsikringen ikke var blevet sat i kraft på ny således som det skete ved endorsement no 2 a. fængslingen betød bl.a. andet at båden var ude af forsikringstagers kontrol, og at hans muligheder for at vedligeholde den var væsentligt ændret. efter vidnets opfattelse er der ingen forsikringsgiver der ville påtage sig risikoen i den situation som forelå for ft i august 2000. også det forhold at båden var beslaglagt, ville have haft betydning. beslaglæggelse kan føre til at værdien af det forsikrede formindskes fordi båden kommer ud af forsikringstagers kontrol. vidnet bekræftede at den oprindelige forsikringsbegæring (proposal form) er grundlaget for forsikringen, og den er en standardformular. man accepterer sædvanligvis en udfyldt proposal form som grundlag for en forsikring indtil den er to eller tre år gammel. nogle mæglere anvender en renewal quotation form som grundlag for en fornyelse, andre fornyer uden en sådan, men det ændrer ikke på forsikringstagerens oplysningspligt vidnet har været ude for at tegning af en forsikring blev afvist på grund af oplysninger om bedrageri og smugleri, men han har ikke kendskab sager om afvisning af forsikringsbegæringer på grund af skattesvig. - 23 - det er væsentligt at vide om den forsikrede er dømt for strafbart forhold. vidnet er hidtil gået ud fra at ft blev dømt fire måneder tidligere end det er oplyst i dag. det gør naturligvis en forskel om forsikringstageren er dømt eller blot sigtet. hvis han er sigtet, må han jo anses for ikke skyldig indtil andet viser sig at være tilfældet. procedure fts advokat har gjort gældende at ft over for de sagsøgte forsikringsgivere skal behandles som forbruger. han har ved den oprindelige forsikringstegning givet fuldstændige og korrekte oplysninger om alle relevante forhold, såvel hvad angår den forsikrede båd som sin egen person. han blev ved shrewsburys overtagelse af forsikringen i 1999 hverken præsenteret for en ny forsikringsbegæring eller andre spørgsmål fra de sagsøgtes side, og ved fornyelsen af policen i 2000 krævede shrewsbury kun oplysninger om eventuelle ændringer i forsikringen. efter at have opsagt forsikringen den 7. august 2000 opnåede ft tilsagn fra shrewsbury den 23. august 2000 om genoptagelse af forsikringsdækningen med virkning fra den 7. samme måned. der blev i den forbindelse ikke blev afkrævet ft nye erklæringer eller oplysninger. forsikringen blev således videreført i uændret form. shrewsbury kunne muligvis have krævet at der blev indgået en ny forsikringsaftale og i den forbindelse afkrævet ft oplysninger af betydning for forsikringsforholdet, men det gjorde man ikke, og man markerede heller ikke at tilsagnet om genoptagelse af dækning skulle betragtes som nytegning. af policen der fortsatte med samme policenummer, fremgår at præmien var uændret, inkl. rabatten for skadefrit forløb, men intet om at der var tale om en nytegning, hvilke jo klart viser at der er tale om et vedvarende forhold der midlertidig var blevet afbrudt. under disse omstændigheder havde ft ikke pligt til af egen drift at fremkomme med yderligere oplysninger. hvis det antages at genetableringen af forsikringen i august 2000 må sidestilles med en nytegning, kan shrewsbury alene unddrage sig dækning hvis det må antages a. at ft undlod at give oplysninger han havde pligt til at afgive, b. at disse oplysninger var af væsentlig betydning (”material”) for forsikringsgiver, og c. at undladelse af at give disse oplysninger var årsag til at shrewsbury tegnede en forsikring man ikke ville have tegnet hvis oplysningerne forelå (spørgsmålet om ”inducement” eller årsagsforbindelse). - 24 - disse betingelser er ikke opfyldt. fts personlige og skattemæssige forhold i august 2000 var uvæsentlige (”immaterial”) for forsikringen og for forsikringsgiveren. hans forhold var ikke ændrede i forhold til tegningen pr. 1. april 1999 og fornyelsen pr. 1. april 2000, bortset fra at han nu var tiltalt for skattesvig og sad i varetægtsfængsel, men shrewsburys risiko blev ikke påvirket af disse ændringer. der blev da heller ikke afkrævet ft nogen som helst oplysninger i forbindelse med genetableringen, herunder ikke om der var ændringer i forhold til perioden indtil opsigelsen, bortset fra det selvfølgelige forbehold med hensyn til skade i perioden op til genetableringen. genetableringen var en rutinesag for shrewsbury således som det fremgår af de foretagne ekspeditioner. uagtet at den ekspederende fandt fejltagelsen med bådsalget ”strange”, gjorde man intet for at skaffe nærmere oplysninger. det anerkendes at der er en videregående oplysningspligt efter engelsk forsikringsret end efter dansk forsikringsret, men det er en betingelse for at eventuelle undladelser kan påberåbes af forsikringsgiver, at de er væsentlige for forsikringstegningen. shrewsbury har ikke sandsynliggjort at oplysningerne om sigtelsen og varetægtsfængslingen ville have ført til at selskabet ikke havde medvirket ved en gentegning. det er ikke forhold der ville få en forsigtig forsikringsgiver til at undlade at tegne en forsikring af den omhandlede type. der henvises i denne forbindelse til richard youells erklæring, pkt. 16-18. hvis det antages at der var en pligt til at give oplysning om sigtelsen og varetægtsfængslingen, gøres det gældende at meddelelse af disse oplysninger ikke ville have fået en forsigtig forsikringsgiver til at undlade at tegne. risikoen ved fartøjet var ikke forøget, ft var i stand til at betale præmie, og han var i stand til at tage vare på båden. straffesagen bevirkede ikke at hans økonomiske forhold ikke længere tillod ham at passe på båden. shrewsbury har således ikke bevist at de manglende oplysninger ved genoptagelsen af forsikringen i august 2000 har formået dem til at tegne eller videreføre en forsikring de ellers ikke ville have videreført. over for paul millers forklaring må anføres at den ikke stemmer med youells vurderinger, og den stemmer heller ikke med selskabets adfærd i forbindelse med gentegningen. forsikringsgiver foretog sig intet i anledning af anmodningen om genoptagelse ud over at gennemføre genoptagelsen med det nævnte og for sagen betydningsløse forbehold. forsikringsgiver har da heller ikke kunnet - 25 - angive tidligere tilfælde af skattesvig der har ført til nægtelse af tegning af forsikring. paul millers forklaring var i øvrigt farvet af den fejlopfattelse som først blev korrigeret under sidste del af hans forklaring, at ft var dømt på gentegningstidspunktet. det var han ikke, og som forklaret af miller skulle ft indtil domfældelse anses for ikke skyldig, også i forsikringsmæssig henseende. til rentepåstanden bemærkes at den principale påstand er baseret på at rentetabet er lidt i danmark og derfor bør følge sædvanlige danske regler. den subsidiære rentepåstand er baseret på oplysninger om hvad der er normal praksis i engelske retssager hvor udgangspunktet er den såkaldte ”base rate”, hyppigt med tillæg af 1, 2, 3 eller 4 procent, afhængigt af parternes forhold. til belysning af ”base rate” henvises til den fremlagte oversigt: 2000 13 jan 5,75 10 feb 6,00 2001 8 feb 5,75 5 apr 5,50 10 may 5,25 2 aug 5,00 18 sep 4,75 4 oct 4,50 8 nov 4,00 2003 6 feb 3,75 2003 10 jul 3,5 6 nov 3,75 2004 5 feb 4 6 may 4,25 10 jun 4,5 5 aug 4,75 shrewsburys advokat har anført at ft opsagde forsikringen pr. 7. august 2000. shrewsbury udstedte kreditnota som følge af opsigelsen. ft anmodede om gentegning af forsikringen den 17. august 2000. fts forsikring var derfor opsagt i perioden fra den 7. til den 17. august 2000, og det var en reel opsigelse. fts anmodning om gentegning (genoptagelse) af forsikringen skal sidestilles med tegning af en ny forsikring, idet shrewsbury frit kunne vælge om man ville gentegne forsikringen og i givet fald på hvilke vilkår. det er uden betydning om shrewsbury benyttede sig af sin ret til at afvise tegning af forsikringen eller betingede forsikringstegning af ændrede forsikringsvilkår, ligesom det er uden - 26 - betydning at forsikringen blev gentegnet med tilbagevirkende kraft til den 7. august 2000. ft var derfor forpligtet til på ny at give shrewsbury de oplysninger som han også afgav i forbindelse med den oprindelige tegning af forsikringen, og oplyse om der var ændringer heri i forhold til de tidligere afgivne oplysninger. han var underlagt fuld oplysningspligt, herunder om oplysning om at han havde været varetægtsfængslet og sigtet for groft skattesvig siden 22. maj 2000, og at lystbåden var eller havde været beslaglagt af politiet. fts forpligtelse til at afgive sådanne oplysninger bestod uafhængigt af om shrewsbury anmodede om specifikke oplysninger. som forsikringstager har han ansvaret for at shrewsbury modtog alle relevante oplysninger, og at disse oplysninger var opdaterede. hans undladelse af at opfylde sin oplysningspligt udgjorde ”non-disclosure” som berettigede shrewsbury til at afvise forsikringsdækning. såfremt det antages at anmodningen om gentegning (genoptagelse) af forsikringen ikke skal sidestilles med tegning af en ny forsikring, men må anses for en videreførelse af forsikringen, gøres det gældende at ft under alle omstændigheder og uanset om der var tale om tegning af en ny forsikring, gentegning eller fornyelse af en forsikring, var forpligtet til at oplyse om forhold som i henhold til engelsk ret anses for ”material”, jf. michael cranes responsum pkt. 49. undladelse af at afgive sådanne oplysninger udgjorde ”non-disclosure”, og shrewsbury er derfor berettiget til at afvise forsikringsdækning. om en undladt oplysning er væsentlig, afhænger af om en ”prudent underwriter” ville have ladet sin vurdering af hvorvidt forsikring kunne antages og på hvilke vilkår påvirke af oplysningerne. oplysningerne om at ft, da forsikringen blev opsagt og anmodning om genoptagelse fremkom, havde været varetægtsfængslet siden 22. maj 2000 og sigtet for groft skattesvig, samt at lystbåden var eller havde været beslaglagt af politiet, var oplysninger som ville have haft betydning for en ”prudent underwriters” vurdering af forsikringsrisikoen og dermed af om forsikring kunne tegnes på ny. disse oplysninger må således karakteriseres som ”material”, jf. richard youells første erklæring pkt. 15–18. der henvises endvidere til votum afgivet af fisher j. i sagen gates v. sun alliance insurance ltd [1995] lrlr 385, jf. pkt. 33 i michael crane erklæring: - 27 - ”a prudent insurer would wish to know about anything which would increase the risk associated with the proposed insurance contract. i accept that anything, which increases the likelihood that a proposed insured will later make a fraudulent claim on his or her policy is logically capable of being material for present purposes. …. the most reliable guide to moral character is past conduct. if the proposed insured has acted fraudulently in the past, this will be logically relevant to the risk that he or she will do so again in the future. in principle, therefore, i accept that incidents of prior dishonesty of the part of a proposed insured are capable of being material for present purposes.” det er uden betydning for sagen om ft er forbruger. overfor fts rentepåstande gøres det gældende at rente først kan tillægges efter udløbet af en vis periode hvori shrewsbury har haft lejlighed til at undersøge kravet om forsikringsdækning. dette tidspunkt kan tidligst fastsættes til 3 måneder efter anmeldelsen af skaden, dvs. til den 24. december 2000. rente ikke skal beregnes i henhold til den danske rentelov, men med ”base rate” plus 1% således som det i engelsk ret er sædvanligt for forsikringskrav. shrewsbury henviser herved til følgende: “the commercial rate is commonly used in commercial cases, including claims on bills of exchange. the practice of the commercial court is to award interest at a base rate plus one per cent. … shearson lehman hutton inc. v. maclaine watson & co. ltd (no.2) [1990] 3 all e.r. 723”. rettens afgørelse det fremgår af michael cranes responsum at der ved sagens afgørelse som det første skal tages stilling til om endorsement no a 2 indebar en udstedelse af en ny police eller en fornyelse/ændring (”variation”) af en police. problemstillingen er beskrevet således af michael crane: “52. the scope of the duties owed by mr ft in august 2000 depends upon whether the reinstatement of cover constituted a new agreement or a variation of the policy. the extent of the duties owed is a question of law to be determined on the principles which i have set out above. 53. i have previously described the approach to be taken in determining whether, as a matter of principle, the non-disclosures were material, and how, as a matter of principle, the scope of disclosure would vary depending on the court’s decision as to whether the agreement in august 2000 varied a subsisting - 28 - contract or amounted to an agreement for a fresh contract for the unexpired term incepting on 7th august 2000. 54. whether the non-disclosures actually induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate cover on the relevant terms is a question of fact, to be decided on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses of fact and any pertinent documentation”. forsikringen blev senest fornyet ved police dateret den 13. marts 2000 ved police nr. m/00/03573. den årlige præmie var 1.150 gbp med fradrag af 5% bonus for skadefrit forløb. ved faxbrev af 7. august 2000 til sin forsikringsmægler anmodede forsikringstager om at police nr. 03573 blev bragt til ophør på grund af salg af den forsikrede genstand. forsikringsmægleren viderebragte anmodningen ved faxbrev af 8. august 2000. anmodningen blev imødekommet uden undersøgelser eller forespørgsler således som det fremgår af påtegningen på sidstnævnte brev og af tillægget af 8. august 2000 til forsikringspolicen (endorsement no a 1). der blev endvidere udstedt kreditnota for den resterende forsikringsperiode fra den 7. august 2000 til den 1. april 2001. ristornoen udgjorde 746,71 gbp med fradrag af mæglerhonorar på 149,34 gbp. ved faxbrev af 16. august 2000 meddelte forsikringstager at ophævelsen beroede på en fejl fra forsikringstagers side, og anmodede om at forsikringen blev fortsat (”please continue the assurance”). denne anmodning blev straks videregivet til forsikringsgiver der med det samme og tilsyneladende uden nærmere overvejelser accepterede dette, således som det fremgår af påtegningen af 17. august 2000 på telefaxen fra mægleren. fortsættelsen af forsikringen der skete på samme policenummer, blev alene betinget af at der ikke var kendte eller oplyste skader på båden i tiden indtil den 17. august 2000. i overensstemmelse hermed blev udstedt et tillæg til policen (endorsement no a 2) i henhold til hvilket forsikringen blev sat i kraft igen (”reinstated”) med virkning fra den 7. august 2000 med betingelse som anført (”subject to no known or reported losses @ 17/08/2000”). præmien for perioden fra den 7. august 2000 til den 1. april 2001 var i henhold til tillægget 746,71 gbp med fradrag af bonus på 5% for skadefrit forløb. ligesom på tillæg nr. 1 var på dette tillæg anført: ”all other terms, clauses and conditions remain unaltered”. der blev ikke rettet forespørgsel til forsikringstageren i forbindelse med dette forløb. det må på dette grundlag fastslås at det var parternes hensigt at forsikringspolicen ved tillæg nr. 2 skulle sættes i kraft på ny. dette kan - 29 - beskrives som en ”variation”, jf. afsnit 52 i michael cranes erklæring, men må snarere, da forsikringen hvad angår den forsikrede genstand, forsikringssummen, præmie eller andre forhold ikke undergik nogen ændringer, betegnes som en ”reinstatement” eller en genetablering af det afbrudte forsikringsforhold. der blev således ikke indgået en ny forsikringsaftale. forsikringstageren havde derfor ikke pligt til at afgive oplysninger til forsikringsgiver som nævnt i marine insurance act section 18, og forsikringsgiver var derfor ikke berettiget til at nægte dækning efter forsikringspolicen. retten må herefter tage stilling til om ft har opfyldt pligten til højeste grad af loyalitet (”the utmost good faith”) der følger af bestemmelsen i section 17. i sommeren 2000 under fts varetægtsfængsling lå fartøjet i vedbæk havn i nærheden af ejerens bopæl indtil det den 7. august 2000 hvor fartøjet i forbindelse med salgsbestræbelser blev bragt til ishøj havn hvor det lå indtil det blev ødelagt ved brand omkring kl. 3 den 19. september 2000. der foreligger ikke oplysninger om omstændigheder der gør det antageligt at fartøjet i den forbindelse var udsat for risikoforøgelse der kunne få betydning for forsikringsforholdet. fartøjet der henlå ubenyttet i havnen, var fortsat under opsyn, og forsikringstageren var fortsat i stand til at betale omkostninger i forbindelse med fartøjet. bestemmelsen i section 17 kan derfor heller ikke føre til at nægtelse af dækning er berettiget, da der som anført i forbindelse med straffesagen og bådens flytning ikke opstod nogen relevant fareforøgelse. shrewsbury skal derfor betale ft 150.000 gbp. da forsikringsforholdet er underlagt engelsk ret, kan der ikke tilkendes renter efter den danske rentelov eller den danske forsikringsaftalelov. betaling i forsikringsforhold er ikke omfattet af den almindelige engelske (britiske) rentelov, late payment of commercial debts (interest) act 1998. ved forsinket betaling af erstatning tillægges efter de foreliggende oplysninger i sådanne tilfælde rente med en sats svarende til bank of englands base rate med et tillæg på 1, 2 eller 3% afhængig af forholdene. retten finder efter de tilvejebragte oplysninger om praksis at tillægget til base rate i fts tilfælde passende kan sættes til 2%. der er mellem parterne enighed om at base rate i denne sag skal være repo renten som fremgår af den tilvejebragte - 30 - oversigt fra bank of englands ”changes in bank rate, minimum lending rate, minimum band 1 dealing rate and repo rate”. da de oplysninger der var nødvendige til at fastslå at betingelserne for betaling af erstatning var opfyldt, har foreligget kort efter anmeldelsen, bør der tillægges rente fra den 24. oktober 2000. thi kendes for ret: inden 14 dage efter denne dom skal shrewsbury underwriting capital limited til ft betale 150.000 gbp med rente svarende til den engelske base rate med et tillæg på 2% fra den 24. oktober 2000 samt 150.000 kr. i sagsomkostninger. ejgil kromann jens feilberg helle lehmann (sign.) ___ ___ ___ udskriftens rigtighed bekræftes p.j.v. sø- og handelsretten, den