Obsah (22)
Article 4Article 5Article 6Article 7Article 19Article 10Article 11Article 12Article 15Article 17Article 23Article 38Article 31Article 26Article 32Article 39Article 41Article 43Article 44Article 27Article 20Article 22Λαμβάνοντας υπόψιν τον Κανονισμό (ΕΕ) 2019/943 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 5ης Ιουνίου 2019, σχετικά με την εσωτερική αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, και ιδίως το άρθρο 59(2)(ε), ε
Article 4
of the present methodology; (b) assess the possible consequences of a cyber-attack compromising the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information used in them,
Article 5
of the present methodology; (c) identify the Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes,
Article 6
of the present methodology; anddevelop the Electricity Cybersecurity Impact Indices (ECII) and highimpact and critical-impact thresholds,
Article 7of the present methodology.
ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Article 4 Identification of electricity sector processes At the start of the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment, ENTSO-E in cooperation with the EU DSO entity shall create a list of potential Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes. The list shall contain all processes that may affect the operational security of the electricity system. The processes may involve any of the entities in Article 2
(1)of the NCCS Regulation, or a combination of such entities. Article 5 Analysis of consequences
(1)For every process on the list of potential Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes defined
Article 4
of the present methodology, ENTSO-E in cooperation with the EU DSO entity shall analyse the possible consequences if the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information used is compromised by a cyber-attack using the impact metrics in Annex I.
(2)When analysing the possible consequences, ENTSO-E in cooperation with the EU DSO entity shall consider: (
- a)intentional compromises through a cyber-attack, possibly affecting multiple entities; (
- b)indirect consequences, including cascading effects; (
- c)controls that would limit the consequences of a cyber-attack, such as backup processes or manual workaround processes; and (
- d)possible changes in the consequences during the next three years because of trends in the electricity sector or other developments.
(3)When analysing the possible consequences of a compromise of availability, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO, entity shall determine for each process the relevant duration over which an outage should be analysed. They shall select a duration that is long enough so that all relevant consequences have materialized. But they shall also take into account if the outage lasts very long, emergency measure will be taken to resolve the outage or limit the consequences. They shall report the relevant duration used in the analysis in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report. Article 6 Identification of Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes
(1)For every process on the list of potential Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes defined
Article 4
of the present methodology, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall evaluate if the consequences are above the high-impact and critical-impact thresholds in Annex II.
(2)If one of the impact metrics is above the critical-impact threshold, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO, entity shall identify the process as a critical-impact process.
(3)If one of the impact metrics is above the high-impact threshold and the process has not been identified as critical-impact, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall identify the process as a high- ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 impact process. Article 7 Definition of ECII and high-impact and critical-impact thresholds For each high-impact and critical-impact process identified in Article 6 of the present methodology, ENTSOE, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall develop ECII and high-impact and critical-impact thresholds, as follows: (
- a)Identify which of the types of entities listed in Article 2 of the NCCS Regulation are involved in the process. (
- b)For each of the entities involved, determine which of the impact metrics in Annex I are relevant to the entity. The impact metrics relevant to the entity will be a subset of the impact metrics that are relevant to the associated processes. These metrics are considered relevant if their value is above the threshold in Annex II of the present methodology, and if the type of entity involved influences the metric. (
- c)Derive for each metric in point
(2)an ECII that provides a good estimate of the metric, and that the entity itself can calculate based on the information and knowledge available to them. (d) Convert the high-impact and critical-impact thresholds for the metrics identified in point
(2)into thresholds for the ECII in point
(3). In the conversion, a cyber-attack affecting multiple entities shall be considered, so that the threshold for the ECII may be lower than for the impact metric. Article 8 Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report The Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report, created
Article 19
of the NCCS Regulation, shall include a list of Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes identified according to Article 6 of the present Methodology. For each of these processes, the report shall include: (a) an assessment of the possible consequences of a cyber-attack compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information used in the process, as assessed
Article 5
(1)of the present methodology; (b) a list of the types of entities involved in the process, determined
Article 7
(1)of the present methodology; and (c) ECII and high-impact and critical-impact thresholds developed
Article 7
(4)of the present methodology that the competent authorities shall use to identify high-impact and critical-impact entities involved in the Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact processes. (d) The risk impact matrix
Article 19(2)(b) of the NCCS Regulation.
TITLE 3 Regional cybersecurity risk assessment and mitigation ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Article 9 Objective of the regional cybersecurity risk assessment
(1)The objective of the regional risk assessment is to identify, analyse and evaluate the risks of cyber-attacks affecting the operational security of the electricity system and disrupting cross-border electricity flows.
(2)During the regional cybersecurity risk assessment, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall for each of the high-impact and critical-impact processes identified in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment: (a) aggregate the results from the Member State cybersecurity risk assessments to determine the consequences and likelihood of a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information used,
Article 10
of the present methodology; (b) evaluate the risks analysed in point (a)
Article 11
of the present methodology; (c) determine the cybersecurity threats that lead to high and critical risks
Article 12of the present methodology. Article 10 Aggregating the Member State risk assessment results
(1)ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall aggregate the results from the member state cybersecurity risk assessments. The Member State risk assessment results are reported as the risk of a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of each Union-wide high-impact or criticalimpact process using the template in Annex V. The risks are reported on the risk impact matrix that will be defined in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report.
(2)ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, may use quantitative analysis or the judgement of their experts to aggregate the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment results. The aggregation method shall be described in the comprehensive Cross-border cybersecurity risk assessment report. The method shall: (
- a)Assess the total risk that a Union-wide process is compromised through any entity in the system operations region. (
- b)Consider the cyber-attacks that affect multiple entities in the system operations region. (
- c)Assess the risks with the cybersecurity controls that the entities had implemented at the moment they performed the entity-level risk assessment.
(3)When reporting the risk of a compromise of availability, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall report the outage duration that corresponds to the reported risk.
(4)ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, may request additional information from the competent authority for further clarification regarding the results of the Member State cybersecurity risk assessments.
(5)If Member State cybersecurity risk assessment report is not available or not complete, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall not consider the cybersecurity risks for that Member State. In that case, they shall state in the cross-border electricity cybersecurity risk assessment report that risk information from the Member State is missing. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097
(6)ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall not validate the information received from Member States. In their analysis, ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall assume that the information received is correct and up to date.
(7)ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall, at the request of ACER in accordance with Article 12 of NCCS Regulation, support ACER for the monitoring of the implementation of the NCCS Regulation, with the following information aggregated per system operations region: (a) the implementation status of the cybersecurity measures as gathered
Article 15
(2)and 15
(3); (
- b)the current and residual risks per Union-wide high-impact and critical-impact process reported using the risk-impact matrix; (
- c)statistics on the cybersecurity cyber-attacks and cyber threats gathered
Article 17(1).
Article 11 Evaluating the risks ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall evaluate the cybersecurity risks analysed
Article 10
of the present methodology using the risk impact matrix that will be defined in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report. Article 12 Determining cyber threats ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall determine the cyber threats in accordance with Annex III which may lead to the high and critical risks identified in Article 11 of the present methodology. They shall take into account the information on cyber threats provided in the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment reports. Article 13 Cross-border cybersecurity risk assessment report ENTSO-E, in cooperation with the EU DSO entity, shall report the results of the regional cybersecurity risk assessment in the Comprehensive Cross-border electricity cybersecurity risk assessment report
Article 23of the NCCS Regulation. TITLE 4 Member state cybersecurity risk assessment Article 14 Objective of the member state cybersecurity risk assessment
(1)The objective of the member state risk assessment level is to identify and analyse the risks of cyberattacks affecting the operational security of the electricity system disrupting cross-border electricity flows. All high-impact and critical-impact entities in the Member State are in the scope of the ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 assessment.
(2)During the member state cybersecurity risk assessment, the competent authority shall: (a) determine the implementation status of the minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls defined
Article 15
of the present methodology; (
- b)aggregate the risk analysis results from the risk assessments at entity level to determine the consequences and likelihood of a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information used in them; (
- c)summarize the information on cyber-attacks and cyber threats gathered
Article 38
(3)and
(6)of the NCCS Regulation; and (d) recommend additional cybersecurity controls to mitigate high and critical risks to ENTSO-E andthe EU DSO entity.
(3)The competent authority may use the outcomes of the risk assessment to mitigate cybersecurity risks at Member State level. The NCCS Regulation does not include requirements for such risk mitigation. Risks are only treated at the level of system operations regions after the regional cybersecurity risk assessment. Article 15 Determining the implementation status of the cybersecurity measures
(1)The competent authority shall determine the status of the implementation of the minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls for the Member State. For this purpose, it may use verification evidence presented by entities
Article 31of the NCCS Regulation or request additional information from the high-impact and critical-impact entities.
(2)The competent authority shall report the implementation status for each minimum and advanced cybersecurity control, by reporting for each control: (
- a)the percentage of entities that have implemented the control; (
- b)the percentage of entities that have derogations for the control.
(3)The competent authority shall also report the percentage of entities that have implemented the following NCCS measures: (a) the entity-level risk assessments
Article 26
(4)of the NCCS Regulation; (b) the entity-level risk treatment plan
Article 26
(5)of the NCCS Regulation; (c) the cybersecurity management system
Article 32
of the NCCS Regulation; (d) the CSOC capabilities
Article 38
(1)(
- a)of the NCCS Regulation; (
- e)the capabilities to handle detected cyber-attacks
Article 39
(1)of the NCCS Regulation; (f) the entity-level crisis management plan
Article 41
of the NCCS Regulation; (g) the entity- or Member-State level cybersecurity exercises
Article 43
of the NCCS Regulation; and ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 (h) the participation in regional cybersecurity exercises
Article 44of the NCCS Regulation.
(4)The competent authority shall separately report the implementation status of the minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls in paragraph 2 of this article and of the security measures in paragraph 3 of this article for the high-impact and the critical-impact entities in the Member State. The competent authorities may use the templates in Annex V(B) to report the implementation status. Article 16 Aggregating the entity results
(1)The competent authority shall aggregate the results from the cybersecurity risk assessments at entity level. The entity risk assessment results are reported as the risk of a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability through a cyber-attack of each Union-wide high-impact or critical-impact processes in which the entity is involved. The risks are reported on the risk impact matrix that will be defined in Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report.
(2)The competent authority may use quantitative analysis or the judgement of their experts to aggregate the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment results. The aggregation method shall be described in the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment report. The method shall: (
- a)Assess the total risk that a Union-wide process is compromised through any entity in the member state. (
- b)Consider the cyber-attacks that affect multiple entities in the member state. (
- c)Assess the risks with the cybersecurity controls that the entities had implemented at the moment they performed the entity-level risk assessment.
(3)When reporting the risk of a compromise of availability, the competent authority shall report the outage duration that corresponds to the reported risk.
(4)The competent authority shall request for each risks assessed high or critical
Article 27
(2)of the NCCS Regulation the following additional information from the high-impact and critical-impact entities: (
- a)a list of cyber threats from Annex III that contribute significantly to the risk; (
- b)a list of recommended controls selected from European and international standard to mitigate the risk to below high; and (
- c)the estimated residual risk after applying the controls in point (
- b)according to the risk impact matrix.
(5)The competent authority may use the template in Annex IV to collect the results of the risk assessment at entity level from the high- and critical-impact entities.
(6)When entities report the risk of a compromise of availability, the competent authority shall require them to report the outage duration that corresponds to the reported risk.
(7)The competent authority shall analyse the lists of critical ICT service providers received from entities ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097
Article 27
(3)of the NCCS Regulation to assess the cybersecurity risks coming from the dependency on a single supplier of ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes. They shall analyse the risk both for individual entities and for the whole Member State. If dependency on a single supplier is assessed as a high or critical risk for a Union-wide high-impact or critical-impact process, the competent authority shall report this risk in the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment report. Article 17 Summarizing the information on cyber-attacks and cyber threats
(1)The competent authority shall provide the following statistics on the cybersecurity cyber-attacks and cyber threats over the last three years to ENTSO-E and EU DSO entity: (a) Number of cyber-attacks reported
Article 38
(3)of the NCCS Regulation, categorized according to the NCCS cyber-attack classification scale methodology and the cyber threat types defined in Annex III; and (b) Number of cyber threats reported
Article 38
(6)of the NCCS Regulation, categorized according to the cyber threat types defined in Annex III.
(2)For each of the risks analysed in Article 16 of the present methodology that are classified as high or critical according to the risk impact matrix that will be defined in Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report, the competent authority shall provide an analysis of which cyber threats contribute significantly to these risks. The competent authority shall in the analysis at least consider the cyber threats in Annex III. The competent authority may consider additional cyber threats. Article 18 Recommending cybersecurity controls
- For each of the risks analysed in Article 16 of the present methodology that are classified as high or critical according to the risk impact matrix that will be defined in Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report, the competent authority shall recommend in the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment report cybersecurity controls that would mitigate the risk to below high.
- The competent authority shall base the recommendation referred in paragraph 1 on the status of the implementation of the cybersecurity controls, the information on cyber-attacks and cyber threats, the risks reported by the entities from the cybersecurity risk assessments at entity level, and on any other information they have from their supervision activities.
- Whenever possible, the competent authority shall recommend cybersecurity controls from European and international standards that are commonly used in the electricity sector.
- The competent authority shall report the expected residual likelihood, impact, and risks to the member state if the recommended controls in point
(1)have been implemented. The risks are reported on the risk impact matrix that will be defined in Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Article 19 Member state cybersecurity risk assessment report The competent authority shall report the results of the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment to ENTSO-E and the EU DSO entity in the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment report
Article 20(2) of the NCCS Regulation.
The competent authority may report the risks according to the template provided in Annex V(A). TITLE 5 Final provisions Article 20 Implementation timeline
(1)This methodology shall be implemented according to the timelines given in the NCCS Regulation.
(2)The implementation of this methodology includes the following deliverables: a. the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report
Article 19of the NCCS Regulation; b.
the Comprehensive cross-border cybersecurity risk assessment report
Article 23of the NCCS Regulation; c.
the regional cybersecurity risk mitigation plans
Article 22of the NCCS Regulation; and d.
the Member State cybersecurity risk assessment reports
Article 20of the NCCS Regulation.
Article 21 Language The reference language for this cybersecurity risk assessment methodology Proposal shall be English. For the avoidance of doubt, where TSOs and DSOs need to translate this cybersecurity risk assessment methodology Proposal into their national language(s), in the event of inconsistencies between the English version published by TSOs and DSOs in accordance with Article 5
(10)of the NCCS Regulation and any version in another language, the relevant TSOs shall, in accordance with national legislation, provide the relevant national competent authorities for the NCCS Regulation with an updated translation of the cybersecurity risk assessment methodology Proposal. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Annex I: Impact metrics The following impact metrics are used to measure the consequences of a compromise of confidentiality, integrity or availability of information: Impact metric Loss of load Description The reduction caused by the cyber-attack in the total load of the affected TSOs. The total load means a load equal to generation and any imports deducting any exports and power used for energy storage as defined in Article 2
(27)of Regulation (EU) 543/2013. Reduction of power generation The reduction in the total aggregated generation output of the TSOs involved in the process caused by the cyber-attack. The aggregated generation output per market time unit and per production type is defined according to Article 16
(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 543/2013. For the impact metric, the aggregated output over all production types is considered. Frequency degradation Deviation from the standard frequency in combination with the duration of the deviation. Violation of standards on voltage Operations of a node of the transmission system in steady state outside of the voltage ranges defined in Article 27 of SO GL within time range (which are different for each synchronous area) specified in Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2016/631 (RfG). Reduction of capacity in the primary frequency reserve A reduction in the reserve capacity for the Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), as defined in the System Operations Guideline (Regulation (EU) 2017/1485). The reduction of reserve capacity is calculated using the minimum reporting time which is determined by each TSO’s scheduling resolutions of power generating facilities. These resolutions may vary between 5 and 30 minutes across different TSOs and the reduction in reserve capacity is related to the pre-fault levels. Reduction of capacity in the other frequency reserves A reduction in the reserve capacity for the Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR), both automatic and manual, and the replacement reserves (RR), as defined in the System Operations Guideline (Regulation (EU) 2017/1485). The reduction of reserve capacity is calculated using the minimum reporting time which is determined by each TSO’s scheduling resolutions of power generating facilities. These resolutions may vary between 5 and 30 minutes across different TSOs and the reduction in reserve capacity is related to the pre-fault levels. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Loss of capacity for a black start The loss of availability any tools, means and facilities as defined in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 that are needed for a black start. This includes the tools, means and facilities needed to communicate with and operate the power sources in the TSO's control area necessary to reenergise its system with bottom-up re-energisation strategy having black start capability, and the substations which are essential for its restoration plan procedures as identified under Article 23
(4)of Regulation (EU) 2017/2196. TSOs have redundant power sources in their control area to perform a black start. The capacity for a black start is only to be lost if not enough power sources can be operated to perform a black start. The expected duration of outage affecting customers in combination with the scale of the outage in customer numbers The sum of all customer interruption durations for the interruptions caused by the cyber-attack. Annex II: High-impact and critical-impact thresholds The tables below give the thresholds for determining when the impact of a cybersecurity risk should be considered high-impact or critical-impact for the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment, the cybersecurity regional risk assessment, and the member state cybersecurity risk assessment. Note that different thresholds may be used for the ECII,
Article 7
of the present methodology; ECII thresholds are determined during the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment The table below gives the thresholds for determining when the impact of a cybersecurity risk should be considered high-impact or critical-impact for the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. Table 1: High-impact and critical-impact thresholds for the Unionwide cybersecurity risk assessment. Impact metric High-impact threshold Critical-impact threshold Loss of load 250 MW 3,000 MW Reduction of power generation 250 MW 3,000 MW Frequency degradation >50 mHz for > 15 min >200 mHz for >30 sec OR >100 mHz for >5 min. Violation of standards on voltage <0,85 pu, for >30 seconds OR Same as high-impact but with consequences on at least one neighbouring TSO ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 <= 0,90 pu for >60 min. OR >1,05 pu for >60 min. OR >1,10 pu, for >30 seconds No consequences on neighbouring TSO Reduction of capacity in the primary frequency reserve More than 20 % reduction, with a duration of more than 30 minutes Reserve capacity unavailable more than 30 minutes Reduction of capacity in the other frequency reserves More than 20 % reduction, with a duration of more than 30 minutes Reserve capacity unavailable more than 30 minutes Loss of capacity for a black start Loss of any tools, means and facilities needed for a black start with consequences for neighbouring TSOs for more than 30 minutes Loss of all tools, means and facilities needed for a black start within a TSOs control area, for more than 30 minutes OR The unplanned evacuation to the back up control room The expected duration of outage affecting customers in combination with the scale of the outage in customer numbers 50,000,000 customer outage minutes 100,000,000 customer outage minutes Regional cybersecurity risk assessment The table below gives the thresholds for determining when the impact of a cybersecurity risk should be considered high-impact or critical-impact for regional cybersecurity risk assessment. Table 2: Thresholds for the loss of load and reduction of power generation impact metrics for the regional cybersecurity risk assessment. Central Europe High-impact threshold Critical-impact threshold SEE SWE Nordic Baltic 250 MW 250 MW 250 MW 500 MW 500 MW 3,000 MW 3,000 MW 3,000 MW 3,000 MW 900 MW ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Table 3: Thresholds for frequency degradation impact metric for different system operation regions. Central Europe Nordic Baltic >50 mHz for > 15 min >100 mHz for > 15 min >50 mHz for > 15 min OR OR OR >100 mHz for >5 min. >200 mHz for >30 sec >250 mHz for >5 min. >500 mHz for >1 min >200 mHz for >10 min. >400 mHz for >1 min SEE SWE High-impact threshold Critical-impact threshold OR >1 Hz Table 4: Thresholds for the voltage impact metric at the connection point between >110 kV and ≤300 kV for different system operation regions. (Here pu stand for per-unit.) Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold <0,85 pu, for >30 seconds <0,90 pu, for >30 seconds <0,85 pu, for >30 seconds OR OR OR >1,05 pu for >60 min. <= 0,90 pu for >60 min. OR OR >1,10 pu, for >30 seconds >1,118 pu for >60 min. <= 90 pu for >30 min. OR >1,118 pu for >20 min. OR OR >1,15 pu, for >30 seconds Critical-impact threshold >1,15 pu, for >30 seconds No consequences on neighbouring TSO Same as high-impact but with consequences on at least one neighbouring TSO. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Table 5: Thresholds for the voltage impact metric at the connection point above 300 kV for different synchronous areas. Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold <0,85 pu, for >30 seconds <0,90 pu, for >30 seconds <0,88 pu, for >30 seconds OR OR OR >1,05 pu for >60 min. <= 0,90 pu for >60 min. <= 90 pu for >30 min. OR OR >1,10 pu, for >30 seconds OR >1,05 pu for >60 min. >1,097 pu for >20 min. OR OR >1,10 pu, for >30 seconds >1,15 pu, for >30 seconds No consequences on neighbouring TSO Same as high-impact but with consequences on at least one neighbouring TSO. Critical-impact threshold Table 6: Thresholds for the reduction of capacity in the primary frequency reserve impact metric for different system operation regions. Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold Critical-impact threshold More than 20 % reduction, with a duration of more than 30 minutes Reserve capacity unavailable more than 30 minutes Table 7: Thresholds for the reduction of capacity in the other frequency reserves impact metric for different system operation regions. Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold More than 20 % reduction, with a duration of more than 30 minutes ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Critical-impact threshold Reserve capacity unavailable more than 30 minutes Table 8: Thresholds for the loss of capacity for a black start impact metric for different system operation regions. Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold Loss of any tools, means and facilities needed for a black start with consequences for neighbouring TSOs for more than 30 minutes OR Critical-impact threshold The unplanned evacuation to the back up control room Loss of all tools, means and facilities needed for a black start for more than 30 minutes. Table 9: Thresholds for the expected duration of outage affecting customers in combination with the scale of the outage in customer numbers impact metric for different synchronous areas. Central Europe Nordic Baltic SEE SWE High-impact threshold 50,000,000 customer outage minutes Critical-impact threshold 100,000,000 customer outage minutes Member state cybersecurity risk assessment The thresholds for the member state cybersecurity risk assessment are the same as for the regional cybersecurity risk assessment. Member states use the thresholds of their system operation region. The only exception is for the loss of load and reduction of power generation impact metrics. For those metrics, member states use the thresholds in Table 10. Table 10: Thresholds for the loss of load and reduction of power generation impact metrics for the member state cybersecurity risk assessment. Member state High-impact threshold Critical-impact threshold Austria 500 MW 3,000 MW Belgium 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Bulgaria 250 MW 3,000 MW Croatia 250 MW 3,000 MW Cyprus 250 MW 800 MW ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 Czech Republic 500 MW 3,000 MW Denmark 1,000 MW 3,000 MW Estonia 500 MW 900 MW Finland 500 MW 3,000 MW France 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Germany 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Greece 500 MW 3,000 MW Hungary 500 MW 3,000 MW Ireland 500 MW 800 MW Italy 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Latvia 500 MW 900 MW Lithuania 500 MW 900 MW Luxembourg 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Malta 250 MW 500 MW Netherlands 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Poland 1,000 MW 3,000 MW Portugal 250 MW 3,000 MW Romania 1,000 MW 3,000 MW Slovakia 500 MW 3,000 MW Slovenia 1,000 MW 3,000 MW Spain 1,000 MW 3,000 MW Sweden 1,500 MW 3,000 MW Annex III: List of cyber threats The table below gives a list of cyber threats that shall be considered during the regional cybersecurity risk assessment. Cyber threat Description Severe and unexpected corruption of the supply chain The supply chain of a high-impact and critical-impact entity is severely and unexpectedly corrupted through a cyber-attack. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 The unavailability of ICT products, ICT services, or ICT processes from the supply chain Because of a cyber-attack, products, services, or processes in the supply chain are not available. This includes for instance network services not being available. Cyber-attacks initiated through actors in the supply chain Cyber-attacks are initiated through actors in the supply chain of a high-impact or critical-impact entity. This includes the abuse of remote access rights of service providers, malware infections of laptops used by contractors, and failures in separating resources (memory, storage, routing) between different tenants of shared (cloud) infrastructure. Leaking of sensitive information through the supply chain, including supply chain tracking The confidentiality of high-impact or critical-impact information assets is compromised through service providers or other actors in the supply chain that have access to the assets. The introduction of weaknesses or backdoors into ICT products, ICT services, or ICT processes through actors in the supply chain Weaknesses or backdoors are deliberately inserted into ICT products, ICT services, or ICT processes used in the highimpact or critical-impact perimeters through actors in the supply chain. This includes the inclusion of software backdoors by developers, in third party software, or in open-source software, and the inclusion of hardware backdoors during design and production. Attacks through communication networks The confidentiality, integrity or availability of high-impact or critical-impact assets are compromised when they are sent over a communication network. This includes eavesdropping, manipulation of data in transit, man-in-themiddle attacks, DDoS attacks, or failure in telecommunication equipment due to cyber-attacks. When analysing this threat, entities should in particular analyse the risks of disrupting communication for systems with real-time requirements. Attacks through removable media The confidentiality, integrity or availability of high-impact or critical-impact assets are compromised when they are stored on removable media. This includes theft of media, and retrieval of recycled or discarded media. When analysing this cyber threat, entities should in particular analyse the cyber threat of removable media to legacy system. Unauthorized system access Threat actors gain unauthorized access to network and information systems within the high-impact or criticalimpact perimeter. This includes unauthorized remote access with compromised credentials or by exploiting software vulnerabilities. When analysing this cyber threat, entities should in particular analyse the risks of unauthorized access to legacy systems. Malware intrusion Malware is introduced into the high-impact or criticalimpact perimeter. This includes worms, viruses, remote ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟ Ρυθµιστική Αρχή Αποβλήτων Ενέργειας και Υδάτων 17/06/2025 Α. Π.: I-397097 access toolkits, wipers, and ransomware. Both targeted and untargeted malware should be considered. When analysing this cyber threat, entities should in particular analyse the cyber threat of malware being introduced into legacy systems. Social engineering Social engineering attacks are performed on staff or contractors involved in the high-impact and critical-impact processes to compromise the information used in them. This includes phishing and spear-phishing. Physical attacks Attackers physically attack assets in the high-impact or critical-impact perimeter to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the high-impact or critical-impact information assets. This includes breaking in on locations with high-impact or critical-impact information assets, or physically tampering or destroying hardware components that process high-impact or criticalimpact information assets. Insider threats Employees at the high-impact or critical-impact entities intentionally compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the high-impact or critical-impact assets. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | Annex IV: Entity reporting template The table below provides a template for high- and critical-impact entities to report the results of cybersecurity risk assessment at entity level according to Article 27 of the NCCS Regulation. Not all information in the template is required by the NCCS Regulation. Competent authorities may have to request additional information according to Article 16 of the present methodology. Process Art 27 NCCS Property compromised Art 27 NCCS Current risk Art 27 NCCS Likelihood <Process 1> Impact Cyber threats causing risk Art 16
(4)Risk Duration analysed Art 16
(3)Recommended controls to mitigate the risk Art 16
(4)Residual risk after recommended controls Art 16
(4)Likelihood Impact Confidentiality Integrity Availability <Process 2> Confidentiality Integrity Availability Remarks: • Risks must be reported for all processes on the list of Union-wide high- and critical-impact processes (see NCCS Regulation Article 27). • The current and residual risks are reported on the risk-impact matrix that will be provided in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report (see NCCS Regulation, Article 27 and Article 16
(4)). • The cyber threats are selected from Annex III (see Article 16
(4)). All relevant threats should be listed. When a threat affects several processes, it should be listed at each process. • The controls should be selected from European and international standards (see Article 16
(4)). ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | Risk • Besides the information in the template, competent authorities should separately report a list of critical ICT service providers for their criticalimpact processes according to Article 27
(3)of the NCCS Regulation. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | Annex V: Member state reporting template A. Reporting template for member state cyber security risk assessment The table below provides a template for competent authorities to report the results of the member state cybersecurity risk assessment according to Article 22. Process Art 16
(1)Property compromised Art 16
(1)Current risk Art 16
(1)Likelihood <Process 1> Impact Cyber threats causing risk Art 17
(2)Risk Duration analysed Art 16
(3)Recommended controls to mitigate the risk Art 18
(1)Residual risk after recommended controls Art 18
(4)Likelihood Impact Confidentiality Integrity Availability <Process 2> Confidentiality Integrity Availability Remarks: • Risks must be reported for all processes on the list of Union-wide high- and critical-impact processes (see Article 16
(1)). • The current and residual risks are reported on the risk-impact matrix that will be provided in the Union-wide cybersecurity risk assessment report (Article 16
(1)and 18
(4)). • The cyber threats are selected from Annex III (Article 17
(2)). All relevant threats should be listed. When a threat affects several processes, it should be listed at each process. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | Risk • The controls should be selected from European and international standards (Article 18
(3)). • Use of the reporting template by competent authorities is voluntary. They may report the risk assessment results also in another format. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | B. Reporting template for the implementation of controls The table below provides a template for competent authorities to separately report the percentage of entities that have implemented the NCCS minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls according to Article 15
(2)of the present methodology and the NCCS measures according to Article 15
(3)of the present methodology. Note that according to Article 20
(4), competent authorities should not report the implementation status of controls if the information can be linked to specific entities or assets. NCCS Minimum cybersecurity controls Percentage of entities that have implemented the control Percentage of entities with derogations for the control Percentage of entities that have implemented the control Percentage of entities with derogations for the control <Control 1> … … <Control n> NCCS Advanced cybersecurity controls <Control 1> … … <Control n> ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu | NCCS Measure Percentage of entities that have implemented the control Percentage of entities with derogations for the control Entity-level risk assessment Art 26
(4)Entity-level risk treatment plan Art 26
(5)Cybersecurity management system Art 32 CSOC capabilities Art 38
(1)Capabilities to handle detected cyber-attacks Art 39(a) Entity-level crisis management plan Art 41
(6)Participation in Entity/Member State level cybersecurity exercises Art 43 Participation in (cross)regional cybersecurity exercises Art 44 Remarks: • Implementation status of minimum and advanced cybersecurity controls and implementation status of NCCS measures must be reported for separately. • Use of the reporting template by competent authorities is voluntary. They may report the risk assessment results also in another format. ENTSO-E asbl | Rue de Spa, 8 | 1000 Brussels | info@entsoe.eu | www.entsoe.eu | @entso_e EU DSO Entity | Rue du Luxembourg, 3 | 1000 Brussels | info@eudsoentity.eu | www.eudsoentity.eu |