← Nederland

ECLI:NL:PHR:2024:457

PROCUREUR-GENERAAL BIJ DE HOGE RAAD DER NEDERLANDEN Nummer 22/04034 Datum 26 april 2024 Belastingkamer A Onderwerp/tijdvak Omzetbelasting - april 2015 t/m december 2016 Nrs. Gerechtshof 21/00131; 21/0

Article 6§ 1 of the Convention (….).

  1. The Court has found that cases concerning tax surcharges – or tax fines – differ from the hard core of criminal law for the purposes of the Convention, and that, consequently, the guarantees of Article 6 under its criminal head will not necessarily apply with their full stringency (see Jussila, cited above, § 43; Segame SA v. France, no. 4837/06, § 59, ECHR 2012 (extracts); Chap Ltd v. Armenia, no. 15485/09, §§ 41 and 44, 4 May 2017; and, in the context of a complaint under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, A and B v. Norway [GC], nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11, § 133, 15 November 2016).” Ölçer schreef in EHRC 2022/248 over deze verwijzing naar de Jussila-versoepeling in De Legé: “
  2. (…) dan is er ook nog par. 62 van de De Legé-uitspraak, waarin het Hof de ‘Jussila-exceptie’ als tweede inleidende algemene principe neerlegt. (…). De Jussila-exceptie komt op het volgende neer. Het Hof heeft (…) de reikwijde van de notie van een strafvervolging (…) sterk uitgebreid, door daaronder ook sui generis procedures te begrijpen, voor zover die volgens de criteria van het Hof als punitief kunnen worden aangemerkt. (…). In de Jussila-uitspraak heeft het Hof de ingrijpende impact van die rechtspraak ingeperkt, door te bepalen dat ook indien art. 6 EVRM, onder het strafrechtelijk hoofd daarvan, van toepassing is bij zo een procedure, (…) dit niet met zich meebrengt dat alle deelrechten op eerlijkheid ook met dezelfde striktheid dienen te worden verwezenlijkt als die geldt in ‘hard core’ strafvervolgingen. De Legé is een non-hard core zaak, waardoor wellicht niet meteen opvallend is dat het Hof de Jussila-exceptie noemt. De toevoeging is echter wel opmerkelijk. In de ‘Jussila-rechtspraak’ gaat het vooral (evenals in Jussila zelf), om een ander deelrecht op eerlijkheid, te weten het recht op een zitting, daarbij aanwezig te zijn en mondeling argumenten te voeren. De exceptie is ook wel toegepast bij andere deelrechten, [maar; PJW] bij het nemo tenetur-beginsel en het zwijgrecht tot, aan De Legé, niet.
  3. Het Hof is in deze zaak (…) gestopt met toetsing toen het kwam tot de analyse dat het hier niet ging om wilsafhankelijk materiaal. De vraag is dan welke invloed de toevoeging van de Jussila-exceptie zou hebben gehad op de beoordeling, in het geval het Hof was uitgegaan van wilsafhankelijke informatie. Mogelijk zou dat met zich mee hebben gebracht dat, ondanks dat daarvan sprake was, omdat deze zaak een non hard core strafvervolging betreft, ook het nemo tenetur-beginsel op dit punt nader vatbaar is voor ‘Jussila-nuancering’. Dat zou betekenen dat dit beginsel (maar ook zwijgrecht?) minder strikte gelding hebben in non-hard core strafvervolgingen. (…). Tegelijkertijd geldt (…) dat dergelijke analyses strikter dienen te worden uitgevoerd in hard core strafvervolgingen. Dit alles zou (…) nadere complexiteit opleveren in reeds moeilijke materie, ook waar het gaat om situaties waarin nog niet duidelijk is via welke weg (bestuurlijke beboeting, hard core strafvervolging of anderszins) tot afdoening zal worden overgegaan. Het Hof maakt de omgang met art. 6 EVRM-rechten, waaronder ook het nemo-tenetur-beginsel (en het zwijgrecht), in ieder geval niet gemakkelijker voor de nationale rechter.” 5.7 In onder meer de genoemde zaak De Legé overwoog het EHRM expliciet dat schending van een bepaald aspect van art. 6 EVRM op zichzelf niet betekent dat overall geen fair hearing heeft plaatsgevonden en dat het gaat om een beoordeling van ‘the development of the proceedings as a whole and not on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect or one particular incident.’ Hij verwees daarbij naar zijn arrest in de zaak Beuze v Belgium (zie 5.15 hieronder), dat specifiek het niet-wijzen op het recht op verhoorbijstand betreft. Het gaat volgens het EHRM om de overall fairness van de totale procedure. In De Legé overwoog hij: “(a) General principles (i)

Article 6

§ 1 of the Convention 60.

Article 6§ 1 is an unqualified right.

However, what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case (see O'Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, § 53, ECHR 2007-III). The Court's primary concern under Article 6 § 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings (see, among many other authorities, Beuze v. Belgium [GC], no. 71409/10, § 120, 9 November 2018).

  1. Compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be examined in each case having regard to the development of the proceedings as a whole and not on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect or one particular incident, although it cannot be excluded that a specific factor may be so decisive as to enable the fairness of the trial to be assessed at an earlier stage in the proceedings (see, inter alia, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, § 251, 13 September 2016, and Beuze, cited above, §§ 121-22).” 5.8 In zijn dissenting opinion in de zaak A en B tegen Noorwegenschreef de Portugese rechter Pinto de Albuquerque dat het EHRM in Jussila noch in latere arresten duidelijk heeft gemaakt waar de scheidslijn tussen hard core en ander straf(achtig)recht ligt (ik laat voetnoten weg): “
  2. Unfortunately, the Court has not made any effort, either in Jussila or subsequently, to develop a coherent approach to the magna quaestio of the dividing line between “hard-core criminal law” and the rest of criminal law, which echoes the outdated distinction between the mala in se and the mala prohibita. Besides being too simplistic, the Grand Chamber’s distinction seems rather artificial. In Jussila, as in a few other cases, the social stigma criterion resembles a merely rhetorical argument that the Court does not really use to solve caseshttps://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng - _ftn
  3. In fact, the Court decided the Jussila case very pragmatically, on the basis of the fact that the applicant was given ample opportunity to put forward his case in writing and to comment on the submissions of the tax authorities.
  4. The lack of conceptual clarity on the definition of “hard-core criminal law” under Article 6 is further aggravated by the fact that the application of the Engel criteria is normally more a matter of degree, depending on the weight of the applied and applicable penalties, than a matter of the nature of the charges levelled against the defendant. The Court more often than not prefers to solve the question of the applicability of the Engel criteria by resorting to a purely quantitative evaluation, rather than a qualitative one, of the offences at issue. When it embarks on a substantive analysis of the nature of the offence, it frequently uses the erroneous Öztürk argument of the limited personal scope of the norm.
  5. In sum, the Öztürk policy choice to “criminalise” petty administrative offences for the purposes of Article 6 was fundamentally reviewed in Jussila. The apparent extension of this policy choice to tax penalties was diluted in the end by the efficiency-oriented, pragmatic stance of the Court, which labelled these petty offences as, although “criminal”, not “hard core criminal”, and therefore undeserving of the full protection of the criminal limb of Article
  6. The interests of efficient mass tax collection speak louder than any other.” 5.9 De zaak Salduz v. Turkey betrof de 17-jarige Salduz die op 29 mei 2001 werd aangehouden en in bewaring gesteld op verdenking van deelname aan een niet-verboden demonstratie tot steun aan de PKK en van ophanging van een verboden spandoek aan een brug. Hij was door de politie ondervraagd zonder advocaat. Volgens zijn aldus afgelegde verklaring had hij gedemonstreerd en het spandoek opgehangen. Op 1 juni 2001 daarentegen verklaarde hij tegenover de openbaar aanklager en de onderzoeksrechter dat hij ter plekke was om een vriend te bezoeken en dat hij geen deel had gehad aan enige illegale activiteit. De onderzoeksrechter beval niettemin voorlopige hechtenis; Salduz kreeg pas toen toegang tot een advocaat. Hij werd uiteindelijk door een ‘State Security Court’ veroordeeld tot tweeëneenhalf jaar gevangenis. Zijn zonder advocaat afgelegde belastende verklaringen werden als bewijs gebruikt. Het EHRM achtte art. 6

(3)juncto art. 6
(1)EVRM geschonden door het ontbreken van een advocaat vanaf het begin van het politieverhoor en overwoog dat het beste rechtsherstel zou zijn een nieuw proces (retrial) waarin alle waarborgen van art. 6 EVRM wél worden gerespecteerd: “(
  1. a)The general principles applicable in this case (…). 51. The Court (…) reiterates that although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (….). Nevertheless, Article 6 § 3 (
  2. c)(…) leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is secured in their judicial systems, the Court’s task being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial. In this respect, it must be remembered that the Convention is designed to “guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective” and that assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance he may afford an accused (…). 52. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right has so far been considered capable of being subject to restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, has therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (…). 53. These principles (…) are also in line with the generally recognised international human rights standards (…) which are at the core of the concept of a fair trial and whose rationale relates in particular to the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities. They also contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused. 54. In this respect, the Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (...). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (…). Early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination (...). In this connection, the Court also notes the recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) (see paragraphs 39‑40 above), in which the CPT repeatedly stated that the right of a detainee to have access to legal advice is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies. 55. Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective” (…), Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 (…). The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction. (
  3. b)Application of the above principles to the present case 56. In the present case, the applicant’s right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody, pursuant to section 31 of Law no. 3842, as he was accused of committing an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. As a result, he did not have access to a lawyer when he made his statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively. Thus, no other justification was given for denying the applicant access to a lawyer than the fact that this was provided for on a systematic basis by the relevant legal provisions. As such, this already falls short of the requirements of Article 6 in this respect, as set out at paragraph 52 above. 57. The Court further observes that the applicant had access to a lawyer following his detention on remand. During the ensuing criminal proceedings, he was also able to call witnesses on his behalf and had the possibility of challenging the prosecution’s arguments. It is also noted that the applicant repeatedly denied the content of his statement to the police, both at the trial and on appeal. However, as is apparent from the case file, the investigation had in large part been completed before the applicant appeared before the investigating judge on 1 June 2001. Moreover, not only did the İzmir State Security Court not take a stance on the admissibility of the applicant’s statements made in police custody before going on to examine the merits of the case, it also used the statement to the police as the main evidence on which to convict him, despite his denial of its accuracy (…). It is also significant that all the co-defendants, who had testified against the applicant in their statements to the police and the public prosecutor, retracted their statements at the trial and denied having participated in the demonstration. 58. Thus (…) the applicant was undoubtedly affected by the restrictions on his access to a lawyer in that his statement to the police was used for his conviction. Neither the assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the ensuing proceedings could cure the defects which had occurred during police custody. However, it is not for the Court to speculate on the impact which the applicant’s access to a lawyer during police custody would have had on the ensuing proceedings. 59. (…). 60. Finally, the Court notes that one of the specific elements of the instant case was the applicant’s age. Having regard to a significant number of relevant international law materials concerning legal assistance to minors in police custody (…), the Court stresses the fundamental importance of providing access to a lawyer where the person in custody is a minor. 61. Still, in the present case, as explained above, the restriction imposed on the right of access to a lawyer was systematic and applied to anyone held in police custody, regardless of his or her age, in connection with an offence falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 62. In sum, even though the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the evidence against him at the trial and subsequently on appeal, the absence of a lawyer while he was in police custody irretrievably affected his defence rights. (…). The Court's assessment 72. The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress for a violation of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in the position in which he would have been had this provision not been disregarded (…). The Court finds that this principle applies in the present case as well. Consequently, it considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the retrial of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, should the applicant so request (…).” 5.10 Kuralic werd verdacht van moord op zijn vrouw. Ondanks mogelijke gebreken in de respectering van het recht op rechtsbijstand in de eerste fasen van de strafprocedure achtte het EHRM de overall fairness van de procedure tegen hem niet aangetast, nu zijn latere verklaringen mét bijstand van een advocaat als ‘expressions of his true will’ konden worden aangemerkt, mede gegeven dat hij steeds (wel) op zijn zwijgrecht was gewezen, terwijl zijn verklaringen strookten met ander bewijsmateriaal: “46. The Court notes that the applicant gave his evidence before the investigating judge on three occasions, namely on 24 April, 25 May and 8 June 2004. Each time he was warned about his right to remain silent and to be legally represented. Before the first interview the applicant expressly stated that he understood the warnings and that he chose to defend himself in person, without being legally represented. Although in his letter of 6 October 2004 the applicant stated that he wanted to retract his confession given on that occasion, the Court notes that the applicant did not confess to having murdered his wife, but only to having disposed of her dead body. During the second interview on 25 May 2004 when the applicant was legally represented, he repeated his statement from 24 April 2004. During the interview of 8 June 2004, also in the presence of the applicant's defence counsel, the applicant again admitted to having disposed of D.K.'s dead body and gave some further details about it. 47. The Court notes that the applicant asserted that owing to his fear of the threats allegedly made by the police officers he not only repeated that he had found his wife dead and had disposed of her body, but also refrained from complaining of police brutality before the investigating judge. The Court accepts that these arguments might carry some weight in relation to the applicant's interview on 24 April 2004, shortly after he had allegedly been ill-treated by the police and in circumstances where the police officers had actually brought him before the investigating judge and where the applicant knew that they would also return him to custody, and in view of the fact that at that stage the applicant was not legally represented. However, at the second and third interviews, on 25 May and 8 June 2004, the applicant had legal representation. The Court reiterates that although not absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (….). Nevertheless, Article 6 §

🔗 Naar officiële bron

AI-uitleg op basis van de officiële wettekst. Indicatief, vervangt geen juridisch advies.