ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:9933

THE HAGUE DISTRICT COURT Criminal law Full Trial Chamber Case numbers : 09/748012-19 and 09/748012-19-P (joined at the hearing) Judgement date : 29 June 2021 Judgement in a defended action (Promis Judgement) On the basis of the indictment and following the examination in court, the District Court of The Hague rendered the following judgement in the case of the Public Prosecutor against defendant: [name defendant], born on [date of birth] in [place of birth], currently detained at the Penitentiary Institution [place]. Investigation reference: 26Humble INDEX

1. Hearing in court 5
2. Indictment and preliminary observations 5 2.1 Indictment 5 2.2 Difference in assessment of terrorist crimes and war crimes 5 2.3 Reading guide 6
3. Jurisdiction 6 3.1 War crimes 6 3.2 Sanctions Act 1977 7
4. Indictment I: establisment of the facts 7 4.1 Introduction 7 4.2 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 7 4.3 Position of the defence 8 4.4 The evidence 8 4.4.1 With regard to the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the Islamic State combat group 8 4.4.2 Telegram, data carriers and intercepted communications (OVC) 13 4.5 Interim conclusions of the Court 38
5. Indictment I: participation in a terrorist organisation and in a criminal organisation whose object is to commit war crimes (count 1) 41 5.1 Introduction 41 5.2 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 42 5.3 Position of the defence 42 5.4 Assessment of the charges 43 5.4.1 Organisation 43 5.4.2 Object to commit terrorist crimes 44 5.4.3 War crimes: considerations regarding the applicability of the international humanitarian law 45 5.4.4 Object to commit war crimes 47 5.4.5 Participation 50 5.4.6 Complicity 53 5.4.7 Conclusion 54 5.5 Judicial finding of facts 54
6. Indictment I: Committing the war crime referred to as outrages upon personal dignity (count 5) 55 6.1 Introduction 55 6.2 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 55 6.3 Position of the defence 55 6.4 Assessment of the charges 56 6.4.1 Legal framework 56 6.4.2 Assessment 56 6.5 Conclusive evidence 59
7. Indictment I: Incitement and dissemination for incitement to a terrorist crime and to a war crime (counts 3 en 4) 61 7.1 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 61 7.2 Position of the defence 61 7.3 Assessment of the indictment 61 7.3.1 Introduction 61 7.3.2 Legal framework 62 7.3.3 Observations regarding the charges 63 7.3.4 Incitement and dissemination for incitement to commit terrorist crimes: preliminary considerations 64 7.3.5 Are the messages inciting in terms of content to commit terrorist crimes?. 64 7.3.6 In view of the context, are videos a, c and e still inciting to commit terrorist crimes? 70 7.3.7 Incitement and dissemination for incitement to commit war crimes 71 7.3.8 Final considerations 71 7.4 Conclusive evidence 72
8. Indictment I: training for committing a terrorist crime (count 2) 77 8.1 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 77 8.2 Position of the defence 78 8.3 Assessment of the charges 78 8.3.1 Introduction 78 8.3.2 Legal framework 78 8.3.3 Assessment 79 8.4 Conclusive evidence 82
9. Indictment II: violation of the Sanctions Act 1977 in conjunction with the Sanctieregeling Terrorisme 2007-II (Netherlands Regulation on Sanctions for the Suppression of Terrorism) 82 9.1 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 83 9.2 Position of the defence 83 9.3 Assessment of the charges 83 9.3.1 Introduction 83 9.3.2 Legal framework 83 9.3.3 The evidence 84 9.3.4 Assessment 86 9.4 Conclusive evidence 87
10. Criminality of the proven facts 87
11. Liability for punishment of the defendant 87
12. Imposition of the penalty and measure 87 12.1 The demand of the Public Prosecution Service 87 12.2 Position of the defence 87 12.3 Assessment of the Court 88 12.3.1 Seriousness of the offences 88 12.3.2 The defendant as a person 89 12.3.3 Disorder and accountability 93 12.3.4 Hospital order (tbs) with compulsory treatment? 93 12.3.5 Punishment to be imposed 94
13. Seized items 94 13.1 Position of the Public Prosecution Service 95 13.2 Position of the defence 95 13.3 Assessment of the Court 95
14. Applicable statutory provisions 96
15. Judgement 97 Appendix I: Text of the indictment 100 Appendix II: Endnotes 110 1The hearing in court The hearing of the case in court took place during the sessions of 18 November 2019, 10 February 2020, 16 April 2020, 18 June 2020, 14 September 2020 and 3 December 2020 (all pro forma-hearings) and the sessions of 11 February 2021, 29 March 2021, 7 June 2021 and 21 June 2021 (substantive hearings). The court has taken note of the demand of the public prosecutors mr. C.D. Kardol and mr. W.J. Veldhuis (hereinafter jointly: Public Prosecution Service) and of what has been put forward by the defendant and her lawyer, mr. Y. Özdemir (hereinafter: the defence). 2Indictment and preliminary observations 2.1 Indictment Two indictments were brought against the defendant, namely under public prosecutor's office number 09/748012-19 (hereinafter: indictment I) and under public prosecutor's office number 09/748012-19 P (hereinafter: indictment II), which state the charges against her. The charges in indictment I were amended at the hearings on 18 June 2020 and 29 March
16. The text of the two (amended) indictments is attached to this judgement referred to as Appendix I. In indictment I, in short, the defendant is accused of committing multiple terrorist crimes, namely participating in IS as a criminal organisation with the intent to commit terrorist crimes (terrorist organisation), collaborating and participating in training for terrorism and incitement and dissemination of incendiary writings/images to commit a terrorist crime. The criminalisation of these crimes aims to protect public order, in particular the protection of society against terrorist crimes. This also applies to the charges against the accused under indictment II, namely that she has violated the Sanctions Act
17. Under indictment I, the defendant is also charged with crimes that are also related to IS, namely participation in IS as a criminal organisation that (also) has the intention of committing war crimes, committing a war crime herself, namely assaulting the personal dignity, and incitement to commit war crimes. 2.2 Difference in assessment of terrorist crimes and war crimes War crimes are violations of international humanitarian law, i.e. the entirety of rules that apply during (non-)international armed conflicts. International humanitarian law aims to protect persons who do not or no longer participate in hostilities in an armed conflict. The criminalisation of these crimes thus protects an interest that differs from that of terrorist crimes, which aim to protect public order. The war crime charged against the defendant is punishable under the International Crimes Act, hereinafter: ICA). Article 1, fourth paragraph, of the ICA also provides that, among other things, incitement to a war crime and participation in an organisation whose object is to commit war crimes must be equated with a crime from the ICA. The ICA is a so-called lex specialis and with regard to the criminalisation of war crimes, it is inspired by the Rome Statute concerning the International Criminal Court. Where the judge in the assessment of terrorist crimes, all punishable under the Criminal Code (hereinafter: the Cc), mainly focuses on general (Dutch) law, when assessing war crimes the judge can orientate on the international law, in particular the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and the international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2.3 Reading guide Now that the assessment frameworks for terrorist crimes and war crimes (and assimilated crimes) differ substantially from each other in certain respects, the court will set out these frameworks for each fact and each time state which facts and circumstances are important for the assessment of that fact. Although the offences charged against the defendant are related, the court will deal with them in separate chapters because of the different assessment frameworks. It is inevitable that this will cause some repetition. In Chapter 3, the court will first rule on jurisdiction. Then, in Chapter 4, it will determine the actual conduct that is important for the assessment of indictment I. This refers to the evidence on the basis of which the court arrives at these findings. Chapter 5 will then discuss participation in a criminal organisation for the purpose of committing terrorist offences and war crimes. Chapter 6 will look at the charged war crime ‘outrages on personal dignity.’ Subsequently, Chapter 7 will look at incitement and dissemination for incitement to a terrorist offence and a war crime. In this chapter reference will be made to evidence on the basis of which the court assesses the facts. Chapter 8 discusses the alleged training for committing a terrorist offence. Finally, the court will discuss indictment II in Chapter
18. Reference to evidence is made in footnotes. In addition, endnotes refer to literature and case law. 3Jurisdiction 3.1 War crimes Under indictment I, count 1, second cumulative, and under count 5, the defendant is charged with committing war crimes in the Netherlands, but also in Syria and/or Iraq. Pursuant to Article 15 of the International Crimes Act (hereinafter: ICA), the District Court of The Hague has jurisdiction to hear the charged war crimes. Article 2 of the ICA provides that the Netherlands has jurisdiction over crimes under that Act that are committed outside the Netherlands if the defendant is a Dutch national, a foreign national treated as a Dutch citizen, or is located on Dutch territory. The defendant has Dutch nationality, so that the Netherlands has jurisdiction. Insofar as the defence has still argued that the offences committed by the defendant were not sufficiently serious, so that there is no jurisdiction under the ICA, does not apply in view of the foregoing. 3.2 Sanctions Act 1977 Under indictment II, the defendant is accused of violating the Sanctions Act 1977 in the Netherlands and/or Turkey. Article 13 of the Sanctions Act 1977 provides that Dutch criminal law is applicable to Dutch nationals who are guilty of an offence outside the Netherlands that has been made punishable by or pursuant to this Act. The Netherlands therefore also has jurisdiction over this fact. 4Indictment I: establishment of the facts 4.1 Introduction The criminal investigation against the defendant was started as a result of findings in another investigation called '26 Cochran' against the defendant [person involved 1] (hereinafter: [person involved 1]). Data relating to a Telegram user, who was known to [person 1] as '[first name defendant]', was found in his telephone, i.e. eleven Telegram chats in which jihadist material was shared and disseminated online. In the current investigation called '26Humble', investigation was conducted into that person '[first name defendant]', into several Telegram profiles that could be traced back to the defendant and with which jihadist material was shared and disseminated. An investigation was also carried out into the contents of various data carriers that were seized from the defendant's home in Uithoorn. The defendant was arrested by the police on 10 October
19. The court will make factual findings in this chapter. The legal qualification that can be given in this respect will not yet be discussed. 4.2 Position of the Public Prosecution Service The Public Prosecution Service has taken the position that there is sufficient legal and convincing evidence that the defendant made use of the different Telegram accounts: NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB, with which extremist jihadist material was disseminated and shared. 4.3 Position of the defence The defence has taken the position that there is insufficient legal and convincing evidence that the defendant was the only person to make use of the different Telegram accounts NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB, now that the defendant had given her login details to third parties. The counsel does not dispute that extremist jihadist material was shared and distributed with those accounts, but does dispute that the defendant did so. 4.4 Evidence 4.4.1 With regard to the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the Islamic State fighting group The conflict in Syria and Iraq In the spring of 2011, the uprising in Syria started with protests to force reforms in President Assad's regime. The regime tried to crush the call for reforms with brute force, but this did not silence the resistance. At the end of 2011, the opposition began using weapons in response to the regime's violence. Armed groups and various states are involved in this struggle.Human rights violations took place on the side of the government forces and paramilitary militias, but also on the side of the armed opposition. In 2013 and 2015, chemical attacks were launched by the Syrian regime, resulting in a large number of victims. In the last months of 2013 and the early months of 2014, the Syrian regime appeared to have stepped up attacks with so-called barrel bombs. Also in the course of 2014 and the first half of 2015, airstrikes and barrel bomb attacks by the Syrian regime in various parts of Syria cost many lives, especially of civilians. As the struggle in Syria progressed, the influence of jihadist groups increased. Their aim was not only to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but also – or above all – to establish a strict Islamic state on the territory of Syria and the return to 'pure Islam.’ This was justified, among other things, on the basis of the ideology of Salafism. One of the combat groups involved: IS One of the jihadist groups is the Islamic State in Iraq (hereinafter referred to as: ISI). The group claimed an attack on 11 March 2013 that killed 48 Syrian soldiers and nine Iraqi guards. It would be the first action in which ISI confirmed its involvement in the Syrian conflict. ISI renamed itself Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (hereinafter: ISIL) in April
20. ISIL aimed to violently impose a purely Islamic society and/or state based on Sharia – all as perceived by them – on the civilian population. With this they aimed to destroy the fundamental political structure of Syria and Iraq. On 29 June 2014, ISIL proclaimed the Islamic Caliphate in IS-conquered territory in Syria and Iraq and ISIL was renamed IS. In 2014 and 2015, IS territory was in Syria and Iraq. As a 'caliphate', IS claimed religious, political and military authority over all Muslims around the world. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of IS, was appointed as 'caliph' of IS. All Muslims in the world were then called on to take the oath of allegiance to the self-crowned 'caliph' Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and settle in IS territory. The oath of allegiance was not optional; whoever took the oath committed to the common goal of IS. Armed violence also took place in neighbouring Iraq from the end of 2013 between, among others, Iraqi government forces (supported by an international coalition from August 2014) and IS. In the course of 2014, hostilities expanded to the rest of the country and several cities were captured in northern Iraq. In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul, a city of 1.4 million inhabitants, and IS claims that 1,700 Iraqi soldiers were executed in the Tikrit area on 12 June 2014, some of whom were thrown into the Tigris. Hostilities continued in the following year. Thousands of civilians lost their lives in the hostilities, many thousands were injured and more than a million people had to flee. In 2014, an official IS magazine, Dabiq, called for the killing of infidels, whether civilian or military (“Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling”). In the second half of 2014 and early 2015, several foreign journalists and aid workers were taken hostage and beheaded in retaliation by IS, including James Foley, Steven Sotloff and Alan Henning. The UN Rapporteur on Human Rights and Displaced Persons reported in April 2016 that IS was carrying out mass executions, public executions, amputations and beheadings of, among others, soldiers and religious minorities as part of a ‘campaign of terror.’ IS thus committed serious crimes on a large scale, such as torture, deportation, mutilation, rape, murder and summary executions of prisoners and civilians, after which the bodies of these persons were exhibited, for example by hanging them on the side of the road. In July 2014, the Christian residents of Mosul were given an ultimatum by IS to convert before 19 July, otherwise they would be killed. Sunnis who had worked for the Iraqi government or military were required to apologize for their past actions or face execution. Alawites were also executed and Shiite mosques destroyed within IS territory. Opponents of IS, persons captured by IS, prisoners and dissenters were beheaded, executed, mutilated and exhibited. For example, in August 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council reported that public executions in Aleppo were being organised weekly by IS, informing residents in advance and encouraging them to come. The bodies were then put on public display for days, often on crucifixes, as a warning to the local population and to force submission among the population through instilling fear. By publicly displaying bodies and failing to bury the victims in accordance with the victim's religious rituals, IS has violated customary international humanitarian law, according to the Human Rights Council. Thus IS violated the rights of dissenters - Christians, Jews, Shiites, Alawites and also non-fundamentalist Sunnis - in a very violent way. The number of fighters who joined IS in 2014 was estimated to be between 20,000 and 31,
21. In 2014, IS leadership was subdivided into several councils: a command council, a so-called majlis al-shura (advisory council), a judiciary council, a security council, a military council, an intelligence council, a combatant aid council, a media council and a financial department. The fighters' aid council had the task of arranging the arrival of foreign fighters to the IS and helping them find housing. The majlis al-shura consisted of nine to eleven members and was responsible for transmitting orders from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to the lower command structures and verifying that these orders were followed. In addition, it decided on laws and their application and thus had duties that overlapped with the duties of the Sharia Council (which decided on religious matters). With the founding of the caliphate and the conquest of territory in 2014, IS further established ministries or committees, which also had to administer the territory conquered by IS. IS training camps were located in various places in Syria and Iraq, where lessons were given in legal rules and Islamic religion, and where the recruit was also taught combat techniques and how to handle weapons. The IS army was allegedly made up of special units, air defence troops, a sniper brigade and an administration, among others. Continuation of IS's struggle in Syria and Iraq Since 2016, several cities and areas have been captured from IS. In February 2019, the Secretary General of the United Nations (hereinafter: the Secretary General) reported that IS still consisted of an estimated 14,000-18,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. In March 2019 the conquest of the last IS territory took place in Baghouz, during which fierce fighting took place and many people were displaced. For example, the population in the Al Hawl refugee camp was reported to have increased sevenfold to 70,000 in early
22. On 8 April 2019, IS announced a ‘Campaign of Vengeance for the blessed al-Sham Province’, claiming several attacks. Between 8 and 10 April 2019, ten attacks were claimed by IS, several of which were claimed via Amaq. On 7 January 2019, IS carried out a suicide attack on a building of the Syrian Democratic Forces (hereinafter referred to as SDF) council building in Raqqa, killing at least five and injuring more than
23. On 3 March 2019, IS killed two SDF fighters in Karama. On 29 April 2019, a bomb attack by IS in Raqqa City killed several SDF fighters and civilians. In August 2019, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that as of 1 July 2019, 5.6 million Syrian refugees had been registered and that 5.9 million were internally displaced. More than eleven (11.7) million residents, the organisation said, were in need of humanitarian aid. The United Nations had already stopped collecting data on civilian casualties in 2014 due to lack of access to and reduced reliability of the necessary sources. Estimates in 2019 ranged from 200,000-500,000 conflict-related deaths. IS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi was killed in October
24. Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla has been the new leader of IS since late 2019; according to a UN report, the strategy of IS has not changed after his arrival. After the loss of territory, IS now consists of so-called underground cells, and IS continues to pose a significant threat in the region. The Secretary General has reported that IS is increasingly operating underground, but has centralised leadership. Media strategy of IS From the outset, IS has adopted a clear media strategy, using official publications from IS channels as well as messages produced by IS supporters or members, so-called ‘user generated content.’ Thus, as many media channels as possible are used to produce and disseminate propaganda. Online supporters are called upon to participate and contribute to this 'electronic jihad' as 'media mujahid' (fighter on the media front). An important part of IS's media strategy is filming attacks and executions and then sharing them through official channels. IS has several official central media outlets, including Ajnad Media Production Company and Al-Hayat Media Centre. The Central Media Department (or Ministry) of IS ('Diwan al'lam at-Markazi) monitors what and how is published by local media agencies. IS also uses 'Amaq News Agency': a news agency that is presented as an independent news agency, but is part of the Media Ministry of IS. Since its inception, this news agency has been the main source of information about attacks and the ideology of the Islamic State. These official IS publications emphasize the central role of the media in the jihad. For example, issue number 12 of Dabiq talks about two kinds of struggle that reinforce and support each other, i.e. the struggle on the battlefield and the media campaign on the ideological battlefield. According to a publication by Maktabat Al-Himma, also an official media outlet of IS, the role of the 'media operative' in the jihad is not inferior to the struggle on the battlefield, with 'media operative' being a broad concept of the maker of footage to the supporters who spread online propaganda. Also, an October 2018 video by Al-Hayat Media Centre titled ‘Inside the Khilafa No. 8’ calls for action online to support their khilafah on the digital front. This video specifically talks about the sharing of propaganda by supporters. ISIS supporters who repost IS content are identified by researcher Benigni as a vital part of IS media strategy because of their participation in the IS online extremist community, in which they contribute to the broad reach of IS propaganda. According to researcher Benigni, such networks are also sometimes targets of recruiters. A survey of 636 pro-IS channels and groups from November 2015 to October 2018 shows that Telegram is at the centre of IS supporters' online communication strategy. In addition to being the medium for the dissemination of official IS propaganda and user-generated propaganda, Telegram was part of a ‘larger infrastructure of digital communication technologies with various intertwined functions’ for the network of IS supporters, such as: dissemination of information and communication , one-to-one operational communication, strengthening and broadening the network. On the channels investigated, (un)official IS propaganda was disseminated, as well as audio messages, documents, photos, announcements and calls to action. Police have declared that the Telegram groups 'Greenb1rds' are not among the official media outlets recognised by IS. 4.4.2 Telegram, data carriers and OVC-recordings Operation of Application Telegram Telegram is a digital messaging service where messages can be shared in groups, channels and one-to-one chats. Telegram distinguishes the roles owner, administrator (admin) and member. Below is an overview of the rights and capabilities per role in Telegram groups: Rights and capabilities of groups Owner Administrator Member Send messages V V V Send media V V V Send stickers and GIFS V V V Send polls V V V Send link example V V V Add users V V V Save messages V V V Modify chat information V V V Adjust information V V V View subscribers and administrators V V V Delete messages V V X Block members V V X Invite via link V V X Adjust permissions per member V V X Add exceptions (permissions) V X X Add and delete administrators V X X Adjust permissions of administrators V X X Transfer ownership V X X Delete group X X X Each group or channel has its own name, ID and URL. The name and URL can be modified, but an ID cannot. To create a Telegram profile, a phone number must be entered, to which a verification code is then sent via SMS by Telegram. With this original phone number it is possible to log in on multiple devices at the same time. With every first login on a new device, a new verification code will be sent via SMS to the original phone number to activate the account on that new device. Within Telegram groups, all members can post messages unless specifically granted less permissions by an administrator of the group. There are at least two types of groups within Telegram: Private groups: to access these groups you must be added by the administrator or you will receive a link with which you can access them. With private groups you can set whether new members can view the history of the group chat. Open groups: these are groups that can be found via a search function in Telegram. These groups can be found through open searches and through a direct link. There are two types of one-to-one chats within Telegram, where users can chat one-to-one: Private chats: users can exchange messages and files one-to-one here. Secret chats: users can exchange one-to-one messages and files here like in private chats. In addition, a self-destruct timer can be set so that chats disappear after (for example) five seconds after reading. Messages from secret chats cannot be forwarded. [person involved 1] was in contact with '[first name defendant]', administrator of the Telegram group called 'Greenb1rds' In the investigation against [person involved 1] it became known that [person involved 1] had contact with a Dutch Telegram user known to him under the name '[first name defendant]', with Telegram user-id [user-ID 1 ] (hereinafter: [user ID 1]). [first name defendant] was administrator of a group called ‘Greenb1rds.’ Invitations to Telegram groups or Telegram channels such as Greenb1rds were sent by [first name defendant]. In addition, [first name defendant] sent PayPal payment links to donate to IS fighters and their families, and [first name defendant] issued an appeal to Muslim men to join the armed jihad. One-to-one contact between [person 1] and [first name defendant involved] also took place via Telegram (chat 6). Messages were sent between them about someone who became an administrator, but who [first name defendant] says did not make him an "admin." Also, [person 1] wrote to [first name defendant involved] that he would share Greenb1rds in all his channels, to which he sent a link. He received a new link from [first name defendant]. In the phone of [person involved 1] the police found a screenshot of a group called ‘GreenB1rds’, which bears the words "[first name defendant]" and ‘admin.’ Further investigation into the phone led to a Telegram group called 'Greenb1rds', with 142 messages, in which [first name defendant] participated. The telephone [person involved 1] contained three Telegram contacts under the name [defendant's first name], i.e. with telephone number [telephone number 2] (ID [user ID 2]), with telephone number [telephone number 1] (ID [user ID 1]) and with telephone number [telephone number 3] (ID [user ID 3]). The telephone number [telephone number 2] (hereinafter: number [telephone number 2]) has been registered by the police since 12 March 2019 as a means of communication for [name of the defendant], the defendant. During the search of the defendant's house, SIM cards were found that belong to the telephone numbers ending in [telephone number 2] and [telephone number 1]. The demanded historical traffic data showed that in the period from 17 March 2019 to 17 September 2019, the telephone numbers [telephone number 2], [telephone number 1] and [telephone number 3] communicated via the same three radio masts in the vicinity of the house of the defendant. On 24 June 2019 at 10:51 hrs a telephone conversation took place between [person involved 1] and the user of the telephone number [telephone number 2], which conversation was overheard by the police. In this conversation [telephone number 2] said: 'I will have to go to court on Friday, in Rotterdam.’ An overheard conversation between [person involved 1] and [telephone number 2] on the same day at 12:32 hrs shows that they are arguing. An intercepted conversation between [person involved 1] and [telephone number 2] on 7 July 2019 shows that [person involved 1] calls the user of the number [telephone number 2] '[first name defendant].’ From June 24 to June 30, 2019, a Telegram private chat between [person involved 1] and '[first name defendant]' (NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1])) took place, in which the following messages were shared ('chat 6'). On 24 June 2019 at 15:41 hrs [first name defendant] says 'May Allah forgive us', to which [person involved 1] replies 'Forgive me for my jealousy and anger.’ On 25 June 2019 [first name defendant] sends a message titled ‘Talk yourself into martyrdom operations.’ The following day this message is shared by [first name defendant] in the Telegram chat with ID [ID chat 10] (court: see ‘chat 10’). On 25 June 2019 [person involved 1] asks ‘U got GB link?’, after which [first name defendant] sends a link. On 25 June 2019 (at 23:56 hrs and 23:59 hrs) and 26 June 2019 (at 00:03 hrs and 00:05 hrs) this link is shared in the Telegram group chats with the ID’s [ID chat 3] (court, see ‘chat 3’), [ID chat 4] (court, see ‘chat 4’), [ID chat 5] (court, see ‘chat 5’) and [ID chat 7] (court, see ‘chat 7’). On 26 June 2019 at 18:27 hrs [person involved 1] says: ‘Share my channel on the group’ and he sends a link to that channel. Then, [first name defendant] shares that link at 18:28 hrs in the Telegram group chat with ID [ID chat 10] (court, see ‘chat 10’). On 26 June 2019 [person involved 1] says: ‘I can see your name’, to which [first name defendant] responds: ‘That’s how u saved me in ur phone. They see nesmumutawahiddeen.’ On 26 June 2019 [first name defendant] sends a message titled ‘Would you be interested in joining a Group which will be leading the war of mind and souls against the international coalition?.’ This message is then shared by [first name defendant] in the Telegram chat with ID [ID chat 10] (court, see ‘chat 10’) on 26 June
25. On 30 June 2019 [first name defendant] says: ‘If I don’t come back from Maruecos (court: Morocco) make dua for me.’ In the Huawei tablet of the defendant tickets were found for flights to Morocco (on 2 July 2019) and back to Eindhoven (on 17 July 2019). Telegram chats (chat 1-11) found between [person involved 1] and ‘[first name defendant]’ from investigation 26Cochran Eleven Telegram chats were found in data stored in [person involved 1]'s phone, in which Telegram profile with ID [user-ID 1] participated. It concerns ten Telegram group chats and one private chat (chat 6) between [person involved 1] and the Telegram profile NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]). Those chats were investigated by a Middle East expert who concluded the following: ‘User [first name defendant] can be classified as an IS sympathizer/supporter on the basis of the messages sent. [first name of the defendant] actively promotes the ideas of IS, for example by citing IS leader Al-Baghdadi, and disseminates radical Islamic material in a general sense, including from Al-Qaida. The posts that are circulated frequently call for armed jihad, glorify the mujahideen, and attempt to justify the use of violence against ‘infidels’ (such as Western countries) and ‘renegades’ (such as Shiites and Islamic reformers). Some posts are used repeatedly, in multiple reports and sometimes multiple times per report: invitations to Telegram chats, often mentioning Greenb1rds (unofficial IS social media channel); payment links (PayPal), sometimes together with an incentive to donate to IS fighters and their families ('financial jihad'); a call for Muslim men to join the armed jihad against the 'infidels.’ Chat 1 Police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 1] (chat 1), which was active from 2 March 2019 up to and including 17 July
26. The group image reads: 'Al-Shahaba' , which is a designation for 'companions of the prophet.’ The chat contained 28 participants. In the chat many messages were shared from official IS media channels and messages from well-known pro-IS media channels, such as Furat Media, Al-Battar and Ahlut-Tahwid Publications. An example is the sharing of the magazine titled “From Dabiq to Rome” from Ahlut-Tawhid Publications. As for the content of the shared messages, the police state that they glorify the combat against the 'infidels', that they call for the combat against the 'infidels', that messages have been shared about security awareness, advice and relationships with 'infidels' and that they are salafist in content. ‘[first name defendant]’ (ID [user-ID 1]) posted seven messages in this chat, including: on 29 June 2019: a message stating that [first name defendant] had previously shared a 'fundraising event for those sisters' and now wonders if it was reliable; on 30 June 2019: a link with the caption 'Bismillah' (interpreter: in the name of Allah); on 30 June 2019: a message to Australian members calling for non-voting and rejecting democracy as ‘shirk.’ Chat 2 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 2] (chat 2), which was active from 2 March 2019 up to and including 17 July
27. The chat was called 'Lions of the media’ and included 53 participants. In this chat many messages were shared that contained pro-IS publications from pro-IS media channels or pro-IS messages. Official IS publications from Al-Bayan Media and Al-Furqan Media were also shared. An example of this is the sharing by a participant of an 29 April 2019 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi speech published by Al-Furqan. ‘[first name defendant]’ posted fifteen messages in this chat, including: on 19 June 2019: a report citing the Amaq News Agency (part of the IS media ministry) media channel, which speaks of a military confrontation between the Taliban and ‘fighters of the Islamic State’ in which members of the Taliban were killed and injured; a 'neuer spendenlink' on 21 June 2019; on 23 June 2019: a message with a lecture by Anwar al-Awlaki (a radical preacher, killed in Yemen), who calls Muslims who do not commit violence in the name of Islam not real Muslims, but ‘munafiq’ (hypocrites); on 24 June 2019: A report from Amaq News Agency about an attack on the Chechen president, in which several security guards were killed. The attacker is described as 'inghimasi' (fighters who fight to the death) and the message ends with 'May Allah accept him'; on 26 June 2019: a link to Telegram page 'Greenb1rds.’ Chat 3 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 3] (chat 3), which was active from 7 May 2019 up to and including 17 July
28. The chat was called ‘followers of the truth.’ Many messages were shared in the chat that came from official IS media channels, such as messages published by the 'wilayat' (provinces) of IS, al-Bayan Radio, a-Furqan, al-Hayat Media, al-Naba' and Dabiq . Furthermore, messages were shared from pro-IS media channels. As for the content of the shared messages, the police stated that they glorify IS and that they are called upon to continue the fight of IS, that they glorify the armed struggle against the infidels and that those messages are Salafist in content. Examples of messages include the message of 7 May 2019, which talks about when 'takfir' (declaring one to be a disbeliever) may be applied, and the message of 17 July 2019, which reads below a quote from the Koran: 'Warning against the enemy of God. He is even afraid of the slaughter. I'm thankful to God for turning me into a terrorist. Crush them. We come to slaughter you o Jews.’ ‘[first name defendant]’ posted thirtyeen messages in this chat, including: on 21 June 2019: a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds; on 21 June 2019: a ‘neuer spendenlink’; on 23 June 2019: a lecture by Anwar al-Awlaki who calls Muslims who do not commit violence in the name of Islam not real Muslims, but ‘munafiq’ (hypocrites). Chat 4 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 4] (chat 4), which was active in the period from 4 May 2019 up to and including 17 July
29. Many messages were shared in the chat that came from official IS media channels, such as al-Bayan Radio, al-Furqan, al-Hayat Media al-Naba' and Dabiq. Furthermore, messages were shared from pro-IS media channels. As for the content of the shared messages, the police stated that they glorify IS, that calls are made to continue the fight of IS, they glorify the armed struggle against the infidels, they share messages that include quotes from leaders of jihadist organisations , including Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (leader of the fighting group Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) in Iraq) and that those messages are Salafist in content. ‘[first name defendant]’ posted twenty three messages in this chat, including: on 21 June 2019: a link to Mutarjim Foundation (mutarjim means translator. In January 2019, the al-mutarjim foundation of IS was established, with the aim of translating IS's Arabic-language news into various other languages); on 21 June 2019: a 'neuer spendenlink' to PayPal; on 21 June 2019: a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds; on 23 June 2019: a lecture by Anwar al-Awlaki who calls Muslims who do not commit violence in the name of Islam not real Muslims, but 'munafiq' (hypocrites); on 24 June 2019: a report from Amaq News about an attack in Chechnya on behalf of IS; on 26 June 2019: a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds; on 29 June 2019: a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds. Chat 5 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 5] (chat 5), which was active in the period from 17 May 2019 up to and including 17 July
30. The chat was named 'The hunters of the collaborators = the servants of the slaughter' and contained 85 participants. The tendency of the group is pro-IS. Pro-IS and jihadist messages were shared in the chat. Furthermore, messages were shared that come from official IS media channels. ‘[first name defend]’ posted nine messages in this chat, including (all on 21 June 2019): - a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds; a PayPal payment link with the caption 'neuer spendenlink'; an appeal to Muslim men to participate in the armed jihad against 'infidels', namely an English-language message that includes: ‘Where are the men who will defend this Ummah? Where are the men who will stand up? (…) When you were able to drive over the kuffar or stab them with a knife wallahi nothing is impossible!.’ Chat 7 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 7] (chat 7). The first and second chat with this ID were active from 12 June 2019 up to and including 10 July 2019 and featured eight and seven participants respectively. The second chat shared messages from official IS media channels, such as from IS's wilayat (provinces) and al-Naba.’ Furthermore, messages were shared that come from pro-IS media channels. As for the content of the messages, the police stated that they glorify IS’s fight against the 'infidels' and that they are Salafist in content. ‘[first name defendant]’ posted thirty three messages in this chat, including: on 21 June 2019: een link naar een PayPal-page met het bijschrift ‘neuer spendenlink’; on 21 June 2019: a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds; on 21 June 2019: a message in English that asks where the men are who defend this ummah (Islamic community), and which also mentions: ‘When you were able to drive over the kuffar (infidels) or stab them with a knife wallahi (I swear by Allah) nothing is impossible.’; on 22 June 2019: an message in English about the necessity and importance of the 'financial jihad', which refers to donating money for the armed struggle or to support the fighters and their families. The message contains a link to a PayPal page and a warning not to use "Islamic terms" with the donation as the account may be closed. Chat 8 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 8] (chat 8), which was active in June
31. The tendency of the group is pro-IS. Messages were shared in the chat about the fight against the infidels (including the English message of 12 June 2019 with an explanation of reasons why people fight against the 'infidels', with the first sentence 'Message to the Kuffar… Why we hate you and why we fight you'), pro-IS propaganda was shared (including three links to three issues of the magazine 'From Dabiq to Rome') and propaganda from official IS media channels was shared (including a description of the lives of leaders of IS and predecessors of IS and English translations of speeches by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu I-Hasan al-Muhajir). ‘[first name defendant]’ posted one message on this chat on 16 June 2019, in which a link was shared tot an article in the English-language newspaper The Washington Post, titled ‘The kidnapped yazidi children who don’t want to be rescued.’ Chat 9 The police have investigated the chat with ID [ID chat 9] (chat 9), which was active in June
32. Besides some system messages, this chat contained only four messages shared by ‘[first name defendant]’, (all on June 21, 2019) including the following: a message with an English text explaining the malice of the ‘enemy’ mentioning America by name. The text begins with the words ‘In the defence of our Beloved Prophet [May blessings and peace be upon him].’; a message with an English text, being a translation of a song in which it is stated in the text that the 'martyr' who made the 'enemy' suffer is in paradise and in which the martyr is mentioned as an example for 'us' ; a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds. Chat 10 The police have investivgated the chat with ID [ID chat 10] (chat 10), which was active op 26 June
33. Messages were shared in two chats with this ID. The second chat shared messages from official IS media channels, such as from IS's wilayat (provinces) and al-Naba.’ Furthermore, messages were shared from pro-IS media channels. As for the content of the messages, the police stated that the fight against the 'infidels' is glorified, that they call for the fight against the 'infidels' and that these messages are Salafist in content. ‘[first name defendant]’ posted fifty three messages in this chat (all on 26 June 2019), including: an English message from the official IS media channel Al-Hayat Media Center with an English translation of a speech 'Be Patient, For Indeed the Promise of Allah Is True'; an English message announcing the publication of issue 12 of the IS magazine Dabiq, published by Al-Hayat Media; an English message referring to the 'Situation of Uighur muslims' and then an English message with a call to drive through 'China town in your city' because of the situation of the ummah (Islamic community) and 'terrorize them wherever you even find them'; an English message with a reference to Osama bin Laden and a call from bin Laden to Muslims to join the fight. The message reads: ‘#GreenB1rds, Osama bin Laden, urges Muslims to join him in Holy War’; an English message talking about ‘the Islamic State’ and stating that the ‘Islamic State’ is permanent, using the term baqiya (permanent); an English message with a call to open Telegram channels and invite others to do so. The report states that one must fight as long as one can to keep ‘high the flag of tawhid (true monotheism)’; an English message about the struggle against 'the international coalition' in the 'battle of the spirit and souls', and the question of whether people want to participate in this struggle. The message states, among other things: 'Would you be interested in joining a group which will be leading the war of mind and souls against the international coalition?' The message states that those interested must provide proof that some form of aid (nusra) has been offered to the 'Islamic State' in the past. Chat 11 The police have investivgated the chat with ID [ID chat 11] (chat 11), which was active in June 2019 and contained six participants. Messages were shared in the chat from official IS media channels, such as from IS's wilayat (provinces) and from al-Naba.’ A message was also shared that came from a pro-IS media channel. With regard to the content of the messages, the police state that they call for the fight against the 'infidels' and that those messages are Salafist in content. On 27 June 2019, an English-language post was shared by a user, i.e. an excerpt from a lengthy speech by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, published in August 2018, titled ‘And give glad tidings to the patient.’ In the clip, media war supporters are referred to by Al-Baghdadi as 'lions of information and warriors of media', underlining the importance of their work by assuring them that the struggle is currently conducted in 'their arena' ( of the media). So they must be steadfast and contribute to the struggle, just like their ‘brothers’ who are fighting elsewhere. ‘[first name defendant]’ posted forty messages in this chat, (all on 27 June 2019) including: a message from the pro-IS media channel At-Taqwa Media Foundation titled ‘And the best outcome is for the pious’; a message asking where the men are who defend 'this ummah (Islamic community)'; an English message warning against talking too much about possible actions, because the 'infidels' are listening in and spying, and so one can expose oneself. Instead of talking so much, one should take action; an English message stating that Allah has sent ‘the Caliphate’ that like a lion rips ‘youth’ from the teeth of the West so that the youth becomes part of ‘the Islamic State’; an English message that opens with the text 'Showing the strength of Mujahideen and their bravery when meeting the enemy' and talks about how to wage jihad: not as a theoretical concept but by actually standing up against the enemy: It is said that the enemy will be intimidated and afraid for what will come, while at the same time the fighter is a role model for others: ‘Also the hero of the battle of Toulouse will be an example and a role model for whomever is behind him among the Muslim youth in the West, especially those who have not joined up with Mujahid groups’; an English message that opens with the text ‘Destabilizing the security of the enemy and revealing its weakness and fragility to Muslims’ and mentions the need to break the unity of the enemy, who has united against the Muslims. France in particular must be attacked by the 'fighters' (mujahidin); calls to join the fight against the enemy (also online); a link to the Telegram page Greenb1rds. Investigation into Telegram groups with the name ‘Greenb1rds’ Telegram group Greenb1rds with ID [ID Telegram group 1] (TG1) This group contained 90 members. A lot of jihadist material was shared in this group. For example, media reports from Amaq-Agency, the official news agency of IS in Iraq and Syria, were shared. A video was also shared showing a woman committing a suicide attack. Among others, NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]) and GB (Telegram ID [user-ID 3]) were administrators of this group. Telegram group Greenb1rds with ID [ID Telegram group 2] (TG2) This group contained 147 members. Many IS promotional videos were posted in this group. Some of the contents of this group are similar to those of Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 1] (TG1). A video of a beheading and videos with battle songs have also been shared. Telegram profile GB (ID [user-ID 3]) was administrator of this group and invited three other Telegram users to this group. Telegram group Greenb1rds with ID [ID Telegram group 4] (TG4) This group had 80 members and posts were shared in it by Telegram profiles NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]) and GB (ID [user-ID 3]). Both NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB were members and administrators of this group. On 25 September 2019 at 22:45 hrs, GB shared an English message titled ‘Take precautions 7, Traps on the path of Jihad.’ This English text is a translation of an Arabic-language article that appeared in Al-Naba on 20 June
34. Al-Naba is a weekly newsletter published by the Central Media Ministry of IS. On 25 September 2019 at 23:13 hrs NesmuMutawahiddeen shared two videos with images of men on a hill and somewhat later an explosion. On 25 September 2019 at 23.19 hrs, NesmuMutawahiddeen shared a video with an Arabic caption and it the video shows a man being shot in the head. This video was also found in the data of the defendant’s Huawei-tablet. The video came from Telegram chat with ID [ID Telegram group 4]. On 26 September 2019 at 00:34 hrs, a video was shared by NesmuMutawahiddeen in this group showing four men in orange overalls with chains on hands and feet, hanging from a scaffold and being set on fire with the use of a flammable substance. An Arabic text was also placed below the video. A few seconds later, NesmuMutawahiddeen added the comment ‘Like roasted chicken’ below the video. Investigation has shown that between 25 September 2019 at 22:47 hrs and 26 September 2019 at 01:25 hrs, NesmuMutawahiddeen posted a total of twenty-five messages in this Telegram group. During that period, the police intercepted and recorded conversations in the home of the defendant (hereinafter: the OVC recordings). The OVC recordings showed that between 25 September 2019 at 22:45 hrs and 26 September 2019 at 01:30 hrs, no conversations or interactions took place, except for two short moments where the voice of the defendant was recognised. Furthermore, the OVC recordings showed that on 25 September 2019 at 23:19 hrs an Arabic text was played in the residence, which has been recognised as part of a speech by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, an IS spokesman who died in
35. Simultaneously with the text being played in the residence, this speech was posted as an audio message in this Telegram group on 25 September 2019 at 23:19 hrs by NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]). The OVC recordings show that on 26 September 2019, between 15:46 hrs and 15:50 hrs, the defendant's voice was recognised in the residence and the defendant said, ‘Here I am again. (…) I was an awful lot on Telegram (…).’ Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 5] (TG5) This group contained 56 members and in it messages were shared by the Telegram profiles NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]) and GB (ID [user-ID 3]). Both NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB were members and administrators of this group. On 26 September 2019 at 11:21 hrs NesmuMutawahiddeen shared an image of a bloodied hand with the text 'Spilling the blood of the Mushrikin is the greatest form of disavowal' underneath. After posting the aforementioned photo, an English text and a number of images/posters were shared, which text deals with the shedding of blood of the 'polytheists' (mushrikin). Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 6] (TG6) This group contained 137 members and in it messages were shared by Telegram profile GB (ID [user-ID 3]). Both NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB were members and administrators of this group. In this group, GB shared messages with threats towards infidels. On 27 September 2019 at 16:52 hrs, in this group GB shared a video with the Arabic caption ‘The legends of the van de Islamic State in Mosul.’ On 27 September 2019 at 16.51 hrs, GB posted the oath of allegiance (bay'a) to the Islamic State. GB also posted in this group, also at 16.51 hrs, English texts glorifying the Ummah (the Islamic faith community) and the jihad, an image of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (leader of the Islamic State). Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 7] (TG7) This group contained 140 members and in it messages were shared by the Telegram profile GB (ID [user-ID 3]). GB was a member and also one of the administrators of this group. In this group, many violent images and videos of beheadings and threats to the West were shared. On 30 September 2019, GB shared two messages in this group. First, an English message that begins with the text 'Message from camps sent in.’ The report speaks of outside attacks on the camp and on the 'clinic', in which at least two women were killed. According to the writer of the text, the attack is an attempt to pretend to the outside world that the prisoners are fighting, but this is a lie. The message continues and then ends with a supplication to Allah for the liberation of "our brothers and sisters", and a prayer for warriors (mujahidin) who will liberate them. Second, a video showing images of a fire and silhouettes of people. The caption reads: ‘Video of the fire in #Hol-Camp yesterday. The fire was in the sixth phase. The damage was the burning of the tent and the stuff inside it and the injury of its inhabitants. #kafe_project..’ Another administrator of this group (ID [ID group admin 1]) shared a post titled "Knife attacks" on 30 September 2019 at 20:08 hrs. Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 8] (TG8) This group contained 151 members and on 1 October 2019 messages were shared. GB was one of the administrators of this group. Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 9] (TG9) This group contained 190 members. GB was one of the members of this group. The content of this group was pro-Islamic State and violent in nature, with many threats to the West and the infidels. GB (ID [user-ID 3]) shared an English message in this group on October 3, 2019 that begins with the text: 'You were free....’ This is followed by a text which expresses astonishment that "you", who were "free", chose to pass over to the enemies. This text has been recognised by a Middle East expert as the English translation of the nashid 'Kunta Hurran', published by Ajnad Media, an official media channel of IS and contains accusations against the people who once lived in IS territory, but left it. to the lands of ‘kufr’ (disbelief). They have exchanged the freedom and honor of IS for oppression and humiliation, the song says. Telegram group with ID [ID Telegram group 10] (TG10) This group contained 144 members and on 3 October 2019, messages were shared. GB was one of the members of this group. The content of this group was pro-Islamic State and violent in nature, with many threats to the West and the infidels. Police have stated that the messages shared by NesmuMutawahiddeen and GB in the Telegram groups discussed above contain official publications from IS and publications of pro-IS media channels, reports with news about the armed struggle against the infidels, messages that glorify and substantiate the armed struggle against the infidels, calling for the killing of the infidels, and talking about the reward for the fighter and martyr, messages glorifying IS and calling for IS to continue its struggle and messages with a more general Salafist content in which the dichotomy believers/unbelievers is discussed and substantiated. Contacts ‘[first name defendant]’ with [person involved 2] [person involved 2] (hereinafter: [person involved 2]) was sentenced to life imprisonment in Great Britain on 3 July 2020 for preparing a terrorist attack on St. Pauls Cathedral and for distributing terrorist publications. On 18 August 2019, [person involved 2] was stopped when she wanted to fly from Luton Airport (court: London, United Kingdom) to Amsterdam and her passport was confiscated. In secured data obtained by the Dutch police from the United Kingdom, private chats have been found between: [person 2] and [first name defendant] (telephone number [telephone number 2]) via the WhatsApp application; [person involved 2] and Telegram profile GB (ID [user-ID 3]) via the Telegram application; [person involved 2] and Telegram profile NesmuMutawahiddeen (ID [user-ID 1]) via the Telegram application; [person involved 2] and Nesmu_Mutawahiddeen via the Threema application. Furthermore, the following group chats were found: 'GB Admins 2' (ID [ID 'GB Admins 2']), in which Telegram profile GB posted messages; 'GB Admins (ID [ID 'GB Admins']), in which Telegram profiles GB and NesmuMutawahiddeen posted messages; 'Strangers Admins 2' (ID [ID 'Strangers Admins 2']), in which Telegram profile GB posted messages. On 17 August 2019 at 14:57 hrs, number [telephone number 2] started a WhatsApp-conversation with [person involved 2] that lasted up to and including 18 August
36. OVC recordings show that around 20:00 hrs the defendant said to [son 1 defendant] (son of the defendant) that they are going to pick up aunt [person involved 2] tomorrow. The defendant said to [defendant's daughter] (defendant's daughter) that they are going to pick up [person involved 2] from the airport. When asked by [son 1 of the defendant], the defendant said "[person involved 2]". On 18 August 2019 at 03:59 hrs [person involved 2] sent: 'I’ve left, sister.’ On 18 August 2019 at 06:01 hrs, number [telephone number 2] sent: 'In principle I'll come to the airport with my kids to pick you up.’ On 18 August 2019 at 07:51 hrs [person involved 2] sent: 'On second bus to airport now.’ OVC recordings show that the defendant spoke to someone in English at 08:52 hrs and explained that the person only needs to go to 'the gate', there is no need to check in. On 18 August 2019 at 09:18 hrs number [telephone number 2] sent 'Your flight is at 12 hrs or something' and at 11:44 hrs 'I'm coming with my two kids (…).’ OVC recordings from 18 August 2019 between 16:00 hrs and 16:30 hrs show that the defendant said she did not come because her passport was taken. Defendant said she's coming from London airport and it's a shame [person involved 2] didn't come. Two boarding passes in the name of [person involved 2] of Easyjet were found on the defendant's Huawei tablet with an arrival date of 18 August 2019 and a departure date of 20 August
37. On September 21, 2019, the following Telegram private chat took place between [person involved 2] (Greenb1rdsTM) and GB (ID [user-ID 3]): [person involved 2] : ‘Your children okay?’ GB : ‘We go to a bird place and animals to view.’ [person involved 2] : ‘That's fun.’ GB : ‘My health has deteriorated and I am yelling at them all the time, subhan Allah.’ [person involved 2] : ‘Such a shame I couldn't come.’ GB : ‘Yes, very annoying!!!! They knew Auntie was coming and we were at the airport. They were also sad.’ (…) GB : ‘I'll talk to you later have to go to the bird zoo thing, see you later xx.’ The OVC recordings in the defendant's home of 22 September 2019 show that the defendant spoke to her children about where they were yesterday. [defendant's daughter] said: ‘Avifauna.’ Avifauna is a bird park that also includes other animals. On 23 September 2019, a Telegram private chat took place between [person involved 2] and GB (ID [user-ID 3]), with GB sending [person involved 2] at 15:40 hrs: ‘Will watch video and send you a threema request.’ At 15:41 hrs, a chat started between [person involved 2] and Nesmu_Mutawahideen via the Threema app: Nesmu_Mutawahideen : ‘This is NesmuMutawahideen.’ [person involved 2] : ‘I've added your groups.’ Nesmu_Mutawahideen : ‘I don't like Threema. Telegram is better. Threema is only good for private, super private.’ On 25 September 2019, the following private chat took place via Telegram between Telegram-profile GB (ID [user-ID 3]) and [person involved 2] (named 'GreenB1rds’): At 18:13 hrs [person involved 2] sent an image of a green bird with the text GreenBird below. [person involved 2] : 'Use this as your profile picture, looks better.’ GB : 'Yes, I wanted to but I didn't dare to ask.’ [person involved 2] : 'Of course you can, sister.’ GB : 'I don't know, thought you might say no.’ [person involved 2] : 'I am not like that sister, we are all part of gb.’ GB : 'Because greenb1rds is your baby so I didn't want to go too far.’ (…) [person involved 2] : 'And in sha Allah I will not be there anymore soon.’ GB: ‘I asked [person 1] and he didn't want to be an admin. Yes inshaa'Allah, I save everything, put me in all backup and give me permission. I'm going through with it inshaa'Allah.’ Via the Threema app, the following private chat took place between [person involved 2] and Nesmu_Mutawahideen as of 18:26 hrs: [person involved 2] : ‘It's so hard, I wish I could tell you. But I know that's not possible for your safety and mine.’ Nesmu_Mutawahideen : ‘Don't do it. Insha'Allah I will see it. I can't wait. Alhamdulilah. Very exciting!’ [person involved 2] : 'Go make baya video, gave me Dawlah IS media so you will see that through them. Insha Allah. I'll keep that poem and your admins can publish it when I'm gone.’ Nesmu_Mutawahideen used the logo of IS as profile picture in this Threema chat. Then at 20:34 hrs [person involved 2] and GB continued talking in the aforementioned Telegram private chat: GB: ‘Why did [person 2] leave?’ [person involved 2] then sent a print screen of a forwarded message from '[person 2].’ It was a print screen of a chat in the Telegram group 'GB-Admins', with 22 participants. The print screen shows that GB sent the message 'May Allah curse him' in that group at 10:21 PM. In the private chat with [person involved 2], GB then said, ‘I didn't curse him. I said may Allah curse him.’ The Telegram group 'GB Admins' (ID [ID 'GB Admins']) showed the following message on 25 September 2019 around 19:20 hrs: '[person 2] left the group.’ Digital files found on the defendant’s Huawei-tablet, Samsung-tablet and in Google Drive During the search of the defendant's home on October 10, 2019, a Huawei tablet and a Samsung tablet were found and seized. The Google Drive application with stored data was found on the Huawei tablet, which data were also secured. The police have investigated the contents of the data from the Huawei tablet. In those data, an instruction for making the explosive substances TATP and lead azide and the preparation of a bomb belt, which came from Telegram, were found. With regards to the instruction for making the lead azide, the instruction shows that is originates from the ‘The jihadist cookbook.’ The other files found on the two tablets and in Google Drive were examined (randomly) by a Middle East expert. Many files came from official IS media channels or pro-IS media channels, or from past and present ideologues used by Salafist and jihadi-Salafist groups and individuals to substantiate their views, such as Anwar al-Awlaki. For example, an English text was found regarding the principle 'al-wala wa'l-bara', which according to the expert can be translated as “loyalty and disavowal” (“loyalty and disavowal”) and which is a central principle within Salafism to distinguish true Islam from the rest. According to Salafists, the believing Muslims should show complete loyalty to God, to Islam and to their fellow believers, and on the other hand, show total dislike or hatred toward the infidels and anything considered non-Islamic. In the text it is explained that this should manifest itself in, among other things, participating in jihad. In addition, the following was found: Islamic State news reports from Al-Bayan (an official media channel of IS); a speech by an IS spokesperson from Al-Hayat Media (an official media channel of IS); two issues of the English-language magazine 'From Dabiq to Rome' by Ahlut-Tawhid Publications (a pro-IS media channel); an English document titled '44 ways to support jihad' by Anwar al Awlaki; an abbreviated version of a book, known in English as 'The book of Jihad', by Anwar Al-Awlaki; videos featuring executions, explosions and a sung song of the determination of the "soldiers of Allah" on the path of Islam; a video with the logo of 'Greenb1rds'; an image showing the Big Ben in London with the text 'Greenbirds' above it and the text 'Know o crusader infidel that you – Allah willing – will soon be pursued in your own homeland'; an image showing Big Ben in London with the effects of an explosion; an image with the text 'Greenbirds' at the top and on which three hands can be seen, one of which is handcuffed. At the bottom is the text 'And remember when those who disbelieved plotted against you to restrain you or kill you or evict you. But they plan, and Allah plans. And Allah is the best of planners', with the hashtag '#Maastricht' at the bottom; audio speeches from the IS spokesperson and other pro-IS speeches. The contents of the Samsung tablet have also been investigated by the police. Bookmarks were found in the extracted data with a reference dated 11 October 2017 to an article on the internet 'Shirk in Tahakum', a reference dated 19 December 2017 to an audio recording of a lecture by the Imam Anwar al-Awlaki, a reference of 27 September 2018 to search results about 'Islamic State Caliphate' and a reference of 2 February 2019 to the website www.specshop.pl entitled 'Handguns | Shooting'. Furthermore, internet history showed that (among other things) the website Anwar-alawalaki.blogspot.nl had been visited. OVC recordings in the defendant’s residence As described above, the police recorded confidential communications at the defendant's residence. According to the police, the recordings show that the defendant discusses and shares jihadist and radical Islamic ideas with her children [defendant]