CHALA v. UKRAINE and 7 other applications

Published on 9 December 2024   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 19981/17 Alla Petrivna CHALA against Ukraine and 7 other applications (see list appended) communicated on 22 November 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASES The applications concern the dismissal of judges of local and appellate courts in 2019-2022 for a “significant disciplinary misdemeanour, gross or systematic disregard of duties, which is incompatible with the status of a judge or has shown incompatibility with the position held”, allegedly committed between December 2001 and February 2014. Between June 2010 and September 2016, following proposals of the High Council of Justice (“the old HCJ” – Вища рада юстиції), all of the applicants, except for the applicant in application no. 38743/21, were dismissed by Parliament for a “breach of oath”[1]. Those dismissal decisions were subsequently quashed by the courts due to the breach of a procedure for their adoption by Parliament (applications nos. 19981/17, 8816/21, 46296/21, 25838/23 and 42750/23) or because of the review of the applicants’ cases after the delivery of the Court’s judgment in the case of Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 5114/09 and 17 others, 19 January 2017), where they were applicants (applications nos. 38810/21 and 50426/21). Following the 2016 major judicial reform conducted in Ukraine, the old HCJ was replaced by a newly established HCJ (“the new HCJ” – Вища рада правосуддя), which, having new competence to take a final decision on the dismissal of judges, dismissed the applicants again based on the same proposals of the old HCJ. In application no. 38743/21, the applicant was dismissed by the new HCJ twice with reference to the materials of the old HCJ (the first such decision of 31 October 2017 was set aside by the courts due to the breach of a procedure for its delivery). The applicants further challenged their dismissal before the Supreme Court (“the SC”), which was also reorganised as a result of the aforementioned judicial reform, but to no avail. The SC rejected their claims noting, inter alia, that the applicable three-year limitation period for imposing disciplinary sanctions on them stopped running when the relevant dismissal proposals were lodged. Several judges of the SC disagreed with that reasoning and the overall outcome in the applicants’ cases attaching their dissenting opinions to the final court decisions. The applicants complain that the proceedings regarding their dismissal were not compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, they allege that their dismissal cases were not considered by an independent and impartial tribunal given that some of the new HCJ’s members had already expressed their position while proposing to dismiss/dismissing the applicants for the first time (applications nos. 19981/17 and 38743/21), and the fact that the SC’s judges were under the jurisdiction of the new HCJ, so they could be subject to disciplinary proceedings by the latter (applications nos. 8816/21, 38743/21, 38810/21, 50426/21, 25838/23 and 42750/23). The applicants also complain that the principle of legal certainty was not observed in their cases since the existing limitation period for their dismissal was not respected. Relying expressly or in substance on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants complain that their private lives were substantially affected by their dismissals which they consider unlawful. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.  Do the applicants’ complaints disclose a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular: (a)  Were the High Council of Justice (Вища рада правосуддя) and the Supreme Court dealing with the applicants’ cases independent and impartial? (b)  Was the scope of the review of the applicants’ cases by the Supreme Court sufficient to address their complaints? (c)  Was the principle of legal certainty respected in view of the domestic authorities’ interpretation of application of the limitation period for imposing disciplinary sanctions in the applicants’ cases?   2.  Has there been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, on account of their dismissal for a “significant disciplinary misdemeanour, gross or systematic disregard of duties, which is incompatible with the status of a judge or has shown incompatibility with the position held”? If so, was that interference in accordance with the law and necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention?       APPENDIX No. Application no. Case name Lodged on Applicant Year of Birth Place of Residence Nationality 1. 19981/17 Chala v. Ukraine 04/03/2017 Alla Petrivna CHALA 1973 Kyiv Ukrainian 2. 8816/21 Reva v. Ukraine 11/01/2021 Sergiy Viktorovych REVA 1953 Odesa Ukrainian 3. 38743/21 Kozyatnyk v. Ukraine 23/07/2021 Lyudmyla Grygorivna KOZYATNYK 1971 Malyutyanka Ukrainian 4. 38810/21 Strebkov v. Ukraine 22/07/2021 Yuriy Oleksiyovych STREBKOV 1967 Genichensk Ukrainian 5. 46296/21 Lysenko v. Ukraine 06/09/2021 Volodymyr Vasylyovych LYSENKO 1956 Dmytrivka Ukrainian 6. 50426/21 Konyakin v. Ukraine 29/09/2021 Sergiy Mykhaylovych KONYAKIN 1962 Golovanivsk Ukrainian 7. 25838/23 Bets v. Ukraine 15/06/2023 Oleksandr Vadymovych BETS 1953 Kyiv Ukrainian 8. 42750/23 Bartashchuk v. Ukraine 13/11/2023 Lyudmyla Viktorivna BARTASHCHUK 1957 Kyiv Ukrainian     [1] This ground for dismissal of judges, which had been criticised by the Court due to the non-compliance with the requirement of the “quality of law” (see Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, §§ 173-80, ECHR 2013), existed until September 2016 when it was replaced by a “significant disciplinary misdemeanour, gross or systematic disregard of duties, which is incompatible with the status of a judge or has shown incompatibility with the position held”.