CASE OF UKRAINE AND THE NETHERLANDS v. RUSSIA

  GRAND CHAMBER CASE OF UKRAINE AND THE NETHERLANDS v. RUSSIA (Applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20 and 11055/22)   JUDGMENT (Merits) Art 33 • Inter-State application • Multiple, flagrant and unprecedented Convention violations by the respondent State in Ukraine • Downing of flight MH17 • Administrative practices of military attacks on Ukrainian territory and of other acts in occupied areas in Ukraine and in Russian sovereign territory • Repeated violations officially tolerated by the Russian authorities • Drawing of inferences from limited access by independent monitors and external observers • Russian law and legal acts of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) and of the Russian occupying authorities not providing a valid legal basis for acts undertaken in Ukraine • General legal basis under international humanitarian law (“IHL”) for taking measures in occupied territory must be reflected in specific legal provisions and appropriate guidance in domestic legal order • Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis extending no further than 16 September 2022 when the respondent State ceased to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention Art 36 • Twenty-six High Contracting Parties intervening as third parties Art 35 § 1 • New complaints in application no. 11055/22 under Art 3, 8, 11, 13 and 14, and Art 2 P1 declared admissible Art 1 • Respondent State’s jurisdiction over areas in eastern Ukraine under separatist control from 26 January 2022 to 16 September 2022 • Respondent State’s jurisdiction over areas under control of Russian armed forces after the invasion on 24 February 2022 • Effective control exercised by the respondent State over such territory by virtue of its control by the Russian armed forces after the invasion • Respondent State’s jurisdiction for complaints concerning military attacks by separatists or the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory from 2014 to 2022 • Reality of extensive, strategically planned military attacks carried out with deliberate intention and indisputable effect of assuming authority and control, falling short of effective control, over areas, infrastructure and people in Ukraine wholly at odds with any notion of chaos • Degree of responsibility assumed by the respondent State over individuals affected by such attacks • Russian Federation’s exercise of authority and control over such individuals • Acts and omissions of the Russian armed forces and the armed separatists of the DPR and the LPR attributable to the Russian Federation • Respondent State’s jurisdiction for its authorities’ actions in Russian sovereign territory Art 32 • Importance of historical context of the Council of Europe • Nature and scale of violence and statements concerning Ukraine’s very right to exist representing a threat to peaceful co-existence within Europe • Respondent State’s disrespect for Council of Europe’s fundamental values • Relationship between Convention and IHL • Duty of harmonious interpretation so far as possible • Court may interpret and assess compliance with IHL where necessary to carry out its role Art 2 (substantive) • Downing of flight MH17 • Breach of the respondent State’s negative and positive obligations • Unjustified intentional use of force resulting in the downing of the flight and the deprivation of the lives of the civilians on board • Launching of missile from Buk-TELAR in eastern Ukraine in breach of IHL • Launching of missile not lawful act of war and not justified under Art 2 § 2 • Existence of a real and immediate risk to life • Respondent State’s failure to take preventive measures to significantly reduce or eliminate risk posed by Buk-TELAR to civilians travelling in civilian aircraft over eastern Ukraine Art 2 (procedural) • Downing of flight MH17 • Failure to conduct an effective investigation • Piecemeal inquiries with aim of showing lack of Russian involvement and deflecting responsibility onto Ukraine • Disclosure of inaccurate and fabricated information • Failure to cooperate effectively with the investigation of the international joint investigation team (“JIT”) • Obstructive approach of Russian Federation to attempts to elucidate cause and circumstances of crash • Refusal to execute requests for legal assistance • Material impact of failure to cooperate on ability of JIT to conclude its investigation into involvement of Russian armed forces and senior Russian politicians Art 13 (+ Art 2) • Downing of flight MH17 • Lack of access to effective remedies in the respondent State for the relatives of the victims of the flight capable of establishing liability of State officials and awarding compensation Art 3 (substantive) • Downing of flight MH17 • Continuing profound suffering of the next of kin of the victims of the flight amounting to inhuman treatment Art 2 and 3 (substantive) • Art 1 P1 • Art 8 • Administrative practice of intense and sustained military attacks throughout Ukrainian territory conducted in breach of IHL • Breach of the respondent State’s negative and positive obligations • Indiscriminate and disproportionate military attacks and attacks directed at residential areas and civilian infrastructure resulting in widespread death, injuries, suffering and damage to property and homes • Respondent State’s failure to protect civilian lives and well-being when conducting sieges Art 2 (substantive) • Administrative practice of extrajudicial killing of civilians and Ukrainian military personnel hors de combat in occupied territory in Ukraine Art 3 (substantive) • Administrative practice of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in occupied territory in Ukraine • Torture constituting a coordinated State policy of the Russian Federation in respect of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of wars (“POWs”) • Widespread and systemic use of rape and sexual violence • Use of rape as a weapon of war an act of extreme atrocity amounting to torture • Inadequate conditions of detention • Suffering of family members of those abducted or disappeared after 24 February 2022 in a context of mass arbitrary detentions and systematic abuse of detainees amounting to inhuman treatment Art 4 § 2 • Administrative practice of forced labour in occupied territory in Ukraine Art 5 • Administrative practice of unlawful and arbitrary detention of civilians, without any legal basis and without basic procedural safeguards, in occupied territory in Ukraine Art 8 • Administrative practice of unjustified transfer and displacement of civilians in occupied territory in Ukraine and unjustified application of filtration measures • Displacement of civilians by Russian occupying authorities did not qualify as lawful evacuation under IHL • Environment of coercion, fear, violence and terror in Ukraine on account of mass human rights violations by Russian Federation substantially responsible for civilians’ decision to flee • Displacement of such civilians amounted to forced displacement Art 9 • Administrative practice in occupied territory in Ukraine of intimidation, harassment, and persecution of religious groups, aside from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (“UOC-MP”) • Abduction, ill-treatment and killing of religious leaders • Obligation on religious groups to register • Application of extremism laws against religious communities other than UOC-MP to ban religious organisations, seize religious premises and material and prevent religious worship Art 10 • Administrative practice in occupied territory in Ukraine of unjustified interference with freedom to receive and impart information and ideas • Intimidation, detention, ill-treatment and killing of journalists • Registration and accreditation obligations on media outlets and journalists • Application of purported laws prohibiting and penalising dissemination of information in support of Ukraine including on social media • Application of terrorism and extremism laws • Excessive and arbitrary effects of measures blocking access to websites and broadcasters in occupied territory Art 11 • Administrative practice of unjustified interference with right to peaceful assembly • Forcible dispersal of peaceful protests in occupied territory in Ukraine in March and April 2022 Art 1 P1 • Art 8 • Administrative practice of destruction, looting and expropriation without compensation of the property of civilians and private enterprises and looting of homes and personal possessions, in occupied territory in Ukraine Art 2 P1 • Administrative practice in occupied territory in Ukraine of suppression of Ukrainian language in schools and of indoctrination in education • Failure to provide for teaching in Ukrainian language amounted to denial of substance of right to education • Views of parents in occupied territory on the history and status of Ukraine attained level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to be considered “convictions” • Arrangements made after 24 February 2022 for advancing narrative of occupying Power in schools pursued aim of indoctrination Art 3 (substantive) • Art 5 • Art 8 • Administrative practice of transfer to Russia, and in many cases the adoption there, of Ukrainian children • Overwhelming evidence from shortly before the 2022 invasion of systemic practice of transferring children to Russia and facilitating their adoption there • Continuous sequence of acts between 2014 and 2022 demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt • Russian authorities’ failure to take measures to secure the children’s return and excessive difficulties faced by caregivers seeking reunification • Transfers did not qualify as lawful evacuations under IHL • Automatic imposition of Russian nationality in breach of IHL facilitated adoption of children in Russia • Children’s treatment attained threshold of severity required to engage Art 3 • Children placed in care of hostile occupying State potentially indefinitely and in defiance of international law • Traumatising effect of military operations themselves and separation from caregivers particularly given uncertainty and fear of permanent and forcible separation • Evidence of ill-treatment of some children after their relocation • In exceptional circumstances of case children also deprived of their liberty and security Art 14 (+ Art 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11, and Art 1 and 2 P1) • Respondent State’s failure to secure Convention rights and freedoms in occupied territory in Ukraine without discrimination on the grounds of political opinion and national origin Art 13 (+ Art 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14, and Art 1 and 2 P1) • Failure to investigate credible allegations of administrative practices or to provide any redress Art 38 • Non-compliance with obligation to furnish all necessary facilities for examination of case • Deplorable failure of respondent State to abide by fundamental duty of cooperation with Court inevitably affected Court’s examination of case Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Individual measures to be taken without delay • Respondent State to release or safely return all persons deprived of their liberty on Ukrainian territory under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in breach of Art 5 before 16 September 2022 and still in the Russian authorities’ custody • Respondent State to cooperate in establishing an international and independent mechanism to secure, in the children’s best interests, the identification of all children transferred from Ukraine to Russia and Russian-controlled territory before 16 September 2022, the restoration of contact and the safe reunification of those children with their surviving family members or legal guardians Art 41 • Just satisfaction • Adjourned • Importance of having due regard to other international developments when making any future award for just satisfaction • Application no. 28525/20 disjoined from remainder of the case for purposes of further proceedings only   Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.   STRASBOURG 9 July 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. Table of Contents PROCEDURE I. INTRODUCTION II. APPLICATION NOS. 8019/16, 43800/14 AND 28525/20 III. THE LODGING OF APPLICATION NO. 11055/22 IV. PROCEEDINGS IN RESPECT OF ALL FOUR APPLICATIONS THE FACTS I. INTRODUCTION II. OVERVIEW A. Chronology of the conflict B. International developments following 24 February 2022 1. Council of Europe 2. United Nations (UN) 3. International Courts (a) International Court of Justice (b) International Criminal Court 4. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 5. European Union (EU) C. Investigations and proceedings concerning the downing of flight MH17 RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE THE LAW I. PARTICIPATION OF THE RESPONDENT STATE II. TERMINOLOGY III. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS A. The interveners B. The submissions of the intervening Governments IV. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS A. Introduction B. Historical context C. The present conflict D. Conclusions V. THE TEMPORAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government B. The Court’s assessment VI. APPROACH TO EVIDENCE A. Evidence in the case B. The burden of proof and the drawing of inferences C. The Court’s approach to new categories of evidence 1. Introduction 2. The findings of the Commission of Inquiry 3. The reports by the OSCE missions of experts 4. Other reports VII. ARTICLE 1 JURISDICTION AND ATTRIBUTION A. The complaints 1. Complaints in respect of which jurisdiction has been established 2. Complaints in respect of which jurisdiction now falls to be determined B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government 3. Third-party submissions (a) Governments (i) Introduction (ii) Submissions (α) Common pleading of all twenty-six Governments (β) Further submissions of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain, partially joined by Poland (γ) Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland (δ) France (ε) Latvia (στ) Poland (ζ) United Kingdom (iii) Responses to written and oral questions, received in writing after the hearing (α) Joint response of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (β) Belgium and the Czech Republic (γ) Croatia (δ) Estonia (ε) Germany and Portugal (στ) Latvia (ζ) The Netherlands (η) Poland (θ) Romania (ι) Spain (b) Geneva Academy (c) Human Rights Law Centre C. The Court’s assessment 1. Continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the basis of effective control 2. Jurisdiction in respect of the complaints in application no. 11055/22 (a) Events in the Russian Federation (b) Events in Ukraine 3. Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks (a) Introduction (b) The principles governing extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case of armed conflict and the Court’s recent approach (c) Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks in 2014-2022 in the present case 4. Attribution 5. Conclusion VIII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW A. Introduction B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The applicant Dutch Government 3. The respondent Government 4. Third-party submissions (a) Governments (i) Common pleading of all twenty-six Governments (ii) Further submissions of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain (iii) Further separate submissions (α) Croatia (β) France (γ) Poland (δ) United Kingdom (b) Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (c) The Human Rights Law Centre C. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the case IX. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17 A. Alleged substantive violation of Article 2 of the Convention 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Dutch Government (i) The obligation to protect life (ii) The prohibition of intentional deprivation of life (iii) International humanitarian law (b) The respondent Government (c) The third-party interveners 2. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case B. Alleged procedural violation of Article 2 of the Convention 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Dutch Government (i) The absence of an effective official investigation (ii) The failure to cooperate effectively (b) The respondent Government (c) The third-party interveners 2. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case (i) Obligation to conduct an effective investigation (ii) Obligation to cooperate effectively with the JIT (iii) Conclusion C. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention, taken together with Article 2 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Dutch Government (b) The respondent Government 2. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case X. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17 A. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Dutch Government (b) The respondent Government 2. The third-party interveners 3. The Court’s assessment (a) Relevant general principles and the Court’s approach in previous comparable cases (b) Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case B. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention XI. ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATION NO. 11055/22 A. The parties’ submissions B. The Court’s assessment 1. Identification of new complaints 2. Compliance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention 3. Evidential threshold 4. Conclusion XII. THE APPROACH TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES ALLEGED A. The identification of the administrative practices B. Evidence for an administrative practice 1. Repetition of acts 2. Official tolerance C. “Lawfulness” XIII. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF UNLAWFUL MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS A. The complaints B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the case XIV. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3, 4 § 2 AND 5 OF THE CONVENTION A. Summary of relevant evidence 1. The period from spring 2014 to January 2022 2. The period from 24 February 2022 (a) Reports of the Commission of Inquiry (i) Summary executions (ii) Attacks against civilians on the move (iii) Deprivation of liberty (iv) Ill-treatment in detention and conditions of detention (v) Ill-treatment outside detention facilities (vi) Forced labour (b) OHCHR reports (i) “The situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation, 24 February to 15 May 2022”, report of 29 June 2022 (ii) “Human rights situation in Ukraine between 1 February and 31 July 2022”, report of 27 September 2022 (iii) “Killings of civilians: summary executions and attacks on individual civilians in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions in the context of the Russian Federation’s armed attack against Ukraine between 24 February and 31 October 2022”, thematic report of 7 December 2022 (iv) “Human rights situation in Ukraine between 1 August 2022 and 31 January 2023”, report of 24 March 2023 (v) “Treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine: 24 February 2022 to 23 February 2023”, thematic report of 24 March 2023 (vi) “Detention of civilians in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine between 24 February 2022 – 23 May 2023”, thematic report of 27 June 2023 (vii) “Human rights situation in Ukraine between 1 February to 31 July 2023”, report of 4 October 2023 (viii) “Human rights situation during the Russian occupation of territory of Ukraine and its aftermath between 24 February 2022 – 31 December 2023”, report of 19 March 2024 (ix) “Treatment of prisoners of war and update on the human rights situation in Ukraine between 1 June 2024 and 31 August 2024”, report of 1 October 2024 (c) The OSCE Moscow Mechanism and ODIHR reports (d) Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (e) Other sources B. Article 2 of the Convention 1. The complaint 2. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Ukrainian Government (b) The respondent Government 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case C. Article 3 of the Convention 1. The complaint 2. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Ukrainian Government (b) The respondent Government 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case D. Article 4 § 2 of the Convention 1. The complaint 2. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Ukrainian Government (b) The respondent Government 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case E. Article 5 of the Convention 1. The complaint 2. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicant Ukrainian Government (b) The respondent Government 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles (b) Application of the general principles to the facts of the case XV. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence 1. Transfer and displacement of civilians 2. Filtration measures D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case (a) Transfer and displacement of civilians (i) Introduction (ii) Transfer of detainees in occupied territory (iii) Displacement of civilians at liberty in occupied territory (α) Has there been an interference? (β) Was the interference justified under Article 8 § 2 (iv) Conclusion in respect of the transfer and displacement of civilians (b) Filtration measures (c) Conclusion XVI. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case XVII. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the present case XVIII. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case XIX. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case XX. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the case XXI. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF ABDUCTION AND TRANSFER OF CHILDREN IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3, 5 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL NO. 4 TO THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. Summary of the relevant evidence 1. Evidence relating to the relocation of children 2. Evidence of the acknowledged activities of the respondent State in respect of the relocation of children D. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the case XXII. ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION A. The complaint B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. The Court’s assessment XXIII. OFFICIAL TOLERANCE AND ALLEGED ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION A. Introduction B. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The respondent Government C. The Court’s assessment 1. General principles 2. Application of the general principles to the facts of the present case (a) Official tolerance (b) Article 13 of the Convention XXIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS XXV. ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION A. The parties’ submissions 1. The applicant Ukrainian Government 2. The applicant Dutch Government B. The Court’s assessment XXVI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION A. Article 46 of the Convention B. Article 41 of the Convention OPERATIVE PROVISIONS   In the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:  Mattias Guyomar,  Síofra O’Leary,  Arnfinn Bårdsen,  Ioannis Ktistakis,  Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer,  Krzysztof Wojtyczek,  Faris Vehabović,  Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,  Georgios A. Serghides,  Tim Eicke,  Lətif Hüseynov,  Jovan Ilievski,  Jolien Schukking,  Erik Wennerström,  Anja Seibert-Fohr,  Diana Sârcu,  Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges, and Abel Campos, Deputy Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 12-13 June 2024 and 4 June 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the latter date: PROCEDURE I.        INTRODUCTION 1.  The present case originated in four separate applications (nos. 20958/14, 43800/14, 42410/15 and 11055/22) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 33 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the Government of Ukraine (“the applicant Ukrainian Government”) on 13 March and 13 June 2014, 26 August 2015 and 28 February 2022 respectively; and an application (no. 28525/20) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 33 of the Convention by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (“the applicant Dutch Government”) on 10 July 2020. The applicant Ukrainian Government alleged in the main that the Russian Federation had been responsible for administrative practices in breach of Articles 2, 3, 4 § 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 2 and 3 of Protocol No. 4 in the context of the conflict in Ukraine which began in 2014 and whose scale and territorial reach greatly increased after the 2022 invasion. The applicant Dutch Government alleged that the Russian Federation had been responsible for a violation of Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention on account of the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine on 17 July 2014. 2.  At the present stage of the proceedings, the applicant Ukrainian Government were represented by Ms M. Sokorenko, of the Ministry of Justice. The applicant Dutch Government were represented by their Agent, Ms B. Koopman, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The respondent Government did not take part in the proceedings (see paragraphs 21, 27 and 139-144 below). II.      APPLICATION NOS. 8019/16, 43800/14 AND 28525/20 3.  On 9 February and 29 November 2016, a Chamber of the Third Section, to which application nos. 20958/14 and 42410/15 had been allocated, divided the applications into four separate cases. Complaints concerning events in Crimea remained registered under the above case numbers, while the complaints concerning events in eastern Ukraine were given new application nos. 8019/16 and 70856/16 respectively. On 11 June 2018, the Grand Chamber decided to join the two applications and renamed the case Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), no. 8019/16. The complaints concerning events in Crimea were examined separately (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024). 4.  On 27 November 2020 the Grand Chamber decided to join to Ukraine v. Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), no. 8019/16, previously relinquished and pending before it, applications nos. 43800/14 and 28525/20, both pending before the First Section of the Court (see Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al, § 213, 12 October 2017) in accordance with Rules 42 § 1 and 71 § 1 of the Rules of Court and in the interests of the efficient administration of justice. The joined case was named Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia. 5.  A hearing on the admissibility of the applications was held on 26 January 2022. Representatives of all three Governments participated in the hearing and made oral submissions before the Court (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, § 33, 30 November 2022). 6.  Further details of the procedure in respect of the case up to the adoption of the Court’s admissibility decision on 30 November 2022 are set out in the Court’s admissibility decision (ibid., §§ 1-40). 7.  In its decision of 30 November 2022, delivered on 25 January 2023, the Grand Chamber (composed of judges Síofra O’Leary, President, Georges Ravarani, Marko Bošnjak, Pere Pastor Vilanova, Ganna Yudkivska, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Faris Vehabović, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, Yonko Grozev, Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, Tim Eicke, Lətif Hüseynov, Jovan Ilievski, Jolien Schukking, Erik Wennerström and Anja Seibert-Fohr, and also of Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar), declared the applications partly admissible (see the operative part of the Court’s decision). It joined to the merits the objection raised by the respondent Government regarding whether the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints of administrative practices of shelling in violation of Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, together with associated Article 14 complaints, fell within jurisdiction of the respondent State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. It also joined to the merits the question whether the suffering of the relatives of the victims of the downing of flight MH17 met the minimum threshold of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. III.    THE LODGING OF APPLICATION NO. 11055/22 8.  On 28 February 2022 the applicant Ukrainian Government asked the Court to indicate urgent interim measures to the Government of the Russian Federation, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to their allegation of “massive human rights violations being committed by the Russian troops in the course of the military aggression against the sovereign territory of Ukraine”. The request was registered under application no. 11055/22, Ukraine v. Russia (X). 9.  On 1 March 2022 the Court (the President of the Court) decided to apply Rule 39 calling on the respondent Government to refrain from military attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including residential premises, emergency vehicles and other specially protected civilian objects such as schools and hospitals; and to ensure immediately the safety of the medical establishments, personnel and emergency vehicles within the territory under attack or siege by Russian troops. The President further decided to give priority to the application under Rule 41. The respondent Government were requested to inform the Court as soon as possible of the measures taken to ensure that the Convention was fully complied with. 10.  On 4 March 2022, in the context of a number of individual requests for interim measures, the Court indicated to the respondent Government under Rule 39 that, in accordance with their engagements under the Convention, notably in respect of Articles 2, 3 and 8, they should ensure unimpeded access of the civilian population to safe evacuation routes, healthcare, food and other essential supplies, rapid and unconstrained passage of humanitarian aid and movement of humanitarian workers. 11.  On 5 March 2022 the respondent Government provided a response to the Court’s request for information of 1 March 2022 (see paragraph 9 above). The applicant Ukrainian Government commented on the response on 14 March 2022. 12.  On 16 March 2022 the applicant Ukrainian Government asked the Court to indicate to the respondent Government a number of interim measures in addition to those which the Court had indicated on 1 March 2022 (see paragraph 9 above). On 24 March 2022 the Court invited the respondent Government to provide their comments on the requests and to reply to a number of specific questions relating to the requests. No reply was received from the respondent Government. 13.  On 1 April 2022 the Court reiterated its previous Rule 39 indications (see paragraphs 9-10 above) and further indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39, that evacuation routes should allow civilians to seek refuge in safer regions of Ukraine. 14.  On 23 June 2022 the Court received a completed application form from the Ukrainian Government. The President of the Court assigned the application to the Fourth Section and notice of the application was given to the respondent State on 28 June 2022, in accordance with Rule 51 § 1. IV.   PROCEEDINGS IN RESPECT OF ALL FOUR APPLICATIONS 15.  As explained in the Court’s admissibility decision concerning application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20, the composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 13). When their terms of office expired, Georges Ravarani, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro and Yonko Grozev were replaced in the composition of the Grand Chamber by Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Arnfinn Bårdsen, Mattias Guyomar and Branko Lubarda, by virtue of Rule 24 §§ 2 (a) and 3. Ganna Yudkivska was replaced by Mykola Gnatovskyy in accordance with Rule 24 § 2 (b). The composition also included an ad hoc judge in respect of the Russian Federation appointed by the President from among its members, applying by analogy Rule 29 § 2 of the Rules of Court (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 40). 16.  On 17 February 2023 the Grand Chamber decided to join application no. 11055/22 to Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20), already pending before it, and notified the parties of this decision. The joinder decision was taken in accordance with Rules 42 § 1 and 71 § 1 and in the interests of the efficient administration of justice. The Grand Chamber also decided that the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22 would be examined jointly under Article 29 § 2 of the Convention and at the same time as the merits of the proceedings in the existing case. 17.  On 10 March 2023, leave was granted to the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (“the Geneva Academy”) and to twenty-six High Contracting Parties to the Convention (the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Iceland, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) to make written third-party submissions on application no. 11055/22 and on any aspects of the remainder of the joined case only in so far as they related to the issues raised in that application. The Governments of the twenty-six High Contracting Parties were further invited to coordinate their pleadings in so far as possible and submit to the Court, where possible, joint written submissions. The third parties granted leave to provide written submissions at the separate admissibility stage of the present case (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 25) were invited to make further written submissions to the Court in the context of the merits stage of the proceedings. 18.  In April 2023 the Court received third-party interventions from the Geneva Academy; the Human Rights Law Centre of the University of Nottingham (“the Human Rights Law Centre”); and, jointly, from the individual applicants in Ayley and Others v. Russia (no. 25714/16), Angline and Others v. Russia (no. 56328/18), Bakker and Others v. Russia (no. 22729/19) and Warta and Others v. Russia (no. 3568/20) (all of whom are relatives of those who lost their lives on flight MH17) and the MH17 Air Disaster Foundation in the Netherlands (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 21 and 25) (“the MH17 applicants”). In June 2023 the twenty-six intervening Governments provided the Court with their common and national written submissions (see further paragraph 151 below). 19.  Meanwhile, on 3 May 2023, after consulting the parties as to the written procedure in the case, the Court invited them to submit, by 2 October 2023, their memorials on the admissibility and merits of the issues raised in the case. In view of the lack of response from the respondent Government to the Court’s communications since March 2022 and in order to facilitate planning of the future procedure in the case, that Government were further invited to confirm by 14 June 2023 whether they intended to submit a memorial and supporting evidence by the deadline. The parties’ attention was drawn to their obligation under Article 38 of the Convention to assist the Court in the examination of the case and to Rules 44A-44C of the Rules of Court. 20.  The applicant Governments submitted their memorials together with supporting material on 2 October 2023. At the same time, the applicant Ukrainian Government requested leave to submit additional evidence to their memorial by 2 January 2024. They were granted until 2 January 2024 to provide further items of evidence relevant to the submissions in their memorial and informed that a decision on whether these items would be admitted to the file despite the expiry of the 2 October 2023 time-limit (Rule 38) would be taken after sight of the material. 21.  The respondent Government did not reply to the Court’s letter of 3 May 2023 (see paragraph 19 above) and did not submit a memorial. 22.  On 2 January 2024 the applicant Ukrainian Government submitted further items of evidence relating largely to criminal investigations pending at domestic level and which were relevant to the submissions in their memorial of 2 October 2023. The President of the Grand Chamber subsequently decided to include these items of evidence in the case file for the consideration of the Court. 23.  The Grand Chamber decided that it was necessary to hold an oral hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case (Rule 51 § 5 and Rule 58 § 2). On 26 February 2024, the parties were informed that the hearing had been scheduled for 29 May 2024. 24.  On 12 March 2024 the President of the Grand Chamber postponed the hearing to 12 June 2024. 25.  On 30 April 2024 the parties and the twenty-six intervening Governments were informed that it had been decided to grant the intervening Governments’ request to make a common oral presentation at the hearing. They were further informed that the Government of the United Kingdom had been granted leave to make separate oral submissions at the hearing. On 15 May 2024 the parties and the twenty-six intervening Governments were informed that the Government of Poland had also been granted leave to make separate oral submissions at the hearing. 26.  On 7 June 2024, in the light of the written submissions made by the parties and the intervening Governments before the Grand Chamber and in order to facilitate the oral proceedings, the President communicated to them questions concerning the alleged jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in respect of military attacks and invited them to address the questions at the hearing. 27.  On 12 June 2024 a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg. The respondent Government did not notify the Court of the names of their representatives in advance of the hearing and did not appear, although they had been formally notified of the date of the hearing. In the absence of sufficient cause for the failure of the respondent Government to appear, the Grand Chamber decided to proceed with the hearing, being satisfied that such a course was consistent with the proper administration of justice (Rule 65). 28.  There appeared before the Court: (a) for the Government of Ukraine Ms I. Mudra, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine; Ms M. Sokorenko, Agent, Mr  T. Otty, KC, Mr B. Emmerson, KC, Lord Verdirame, KC, Counsel, Mr A. Luksha, Ms O. Kolomiiets, Ms O. Soloviova,  Advisers; (b) for the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ms B. Koopman, Agent, Mr R. Lefeber, Ms S. Cemerikic, Ms M. Brilman, Ms R. Geraerts, Ms C. Coert, Advisers, Mr P. Ploeg, Chair of the MH17 Air Disaster Foundation. (c) for the third-party intervening Governments Common oral submission Ms H. Busch, Agent of the Government of Norway; Separate oral submissions for the Government of Poland Ms E. Suchożebrska, Agent; for the Government of the United Kingdom Ms S. Dickson, Ms S. Macrory, Agents, Sir James Eadie, KC, Counsel, Mr P. Luckhurst, Adviser.   29.  The Court heard addresses by Ms Mudra, Mr Otty, Mr Emmerson, Lord Verdirame, Ms Sokorenko, Ms Koopman, Mr Ploeg, Ms Busch, Ms Suchożebrska and Sir James Eadie. Mr Emmerson, Mr Otty, Ms Koopman, Mr Lefeber, Ms Suchożebrska and Sir James Eadie replied to judges’ questions. 30.  On 17 June 2024 the President of the Grand Chamber exceptionally granted the intervening Governments leave to reply in writing to the questions communicated by the Court on 7 June 2024 (see paragraph 26 above). The intervening Governments were requested to provide their collective or individual written replies to the Court by 3 July 2024. They were further requested to strictly confine their written submissions to answering the questions. 31.  Eighteen intervening Governments responded in writing. Two (the Governments of Austria and France) indicated that they had no further submissions. The remaining sixteen Governments (the Governments of Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden) provided submissions in response to the questions. 32.  Síofra O’Leary’s term of office came to an end. She was replaced as President in subsequent deliberations by Mattias Guyomar. Branko Lubarda, Marko Bošnjak and Pere Pastor Vilanova, prevented from sitting, were subsequently replaced by Diana Sârcu, Ioannis Ktistakis and Georgios A. Serghides, respectively, first, second and third substitute judges. THE FACTS I.        INTRODUCTION 33.  The present proceedings concern events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in the east of Ukraine, which began in the spring of 2014, and events throughout Ukraine from 24 February 2022, the start of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation (see paragraph 146 below). 34.  This section provides an overview of the relevant facts and the context. The facts described in this section are either uncontested or are not seriously contested, or are indisputably established on the evidence. For these reasons, there are no cross-references in this section to the evidence or submissions which may be relevant to the facts described here. More information on the individuals and armed groups identified in this section may be found in the admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above, §§ 98-166). II.      OVERVIEW A.   Chronology of the conflict 35.  In November 2013 the government of Ukraine announced that they would suspend the preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) and would renew the dialogue on trade and economic matters with the Russian Federation. This led to mass protests against the government across the country. These deteriorated into violent clashes between security forces and protesters. The protest movement became known as “Euromaidan” (after Independence Square (“Maidan Nezalezhnosti”) in Kyiv: see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 9-17, 21 January 2021). 36.  Violence escalated sharply on the evening of 18 February 2014. Hundreds of protestors, and some law enforcement officials, were killed or injured over the following days. On 21 February 2014, the then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and opposition leaders signed a compromise agreement which envisaged early elections by the end of the year. 37.  On 22 February 2014 President Yanukovych left Kyiv and went to the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Parliament voted to remove him from office on account of his failure to perform his constitutional duties. It elected a new speaker, who became acting President of Ukraine pending new elections on 25 May 2014. A new interim government was put in place. The interim government was not recognised by the government of the respondent State. 38.  In late February 2014 unidentified armed men in green military uniforms without insignia began taking over strategic infrastructure in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“Crimea”). On 27 February 2014 armed groups took over the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Later that day, at gunpoint, members of the Supreme Council dismissed the government of Crimea and appointed Sergey Aksyonov as “Prime Minister”. It was also decided to hold a “referendum” on the future status of Crimea (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 32-66 and 149-168, 16 December 2020). 39.  The “referendum” in Crimea took place on 16 March 2014 and according to the published results there was overwhelming support for Crimea joining the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2014 Crimea therefore purported to join the Russian Federation. 40.  Meanwhile, in early March 2014, pro-Russian protests began across eastern regions of Ukraine, including in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The protestors objected to what they claimed to have been an unconstitutional change of power in Ukraine. 41.  At the request of the government of Ukraine, the Office of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (“HRMMU”) to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. The HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014. 42.  The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (“SMM”) was deployed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 21 March 2014, following a request by Ukraine’s government and a consensus decision by all fifty-seven OSCE participating States, including the respondent State. The SMM’s main tasks were to observe and report on the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis. 43.  From early April 2014 there was a rapid escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine. Armed groups were formed and they started to take control by force of public buildings as well as of police and security facilities in cities and towns across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. They set up barricades and checkpoints to maintain control of the areas seized. 44.  On 6 April 2014 armed groups in Luhansk seized the regional office of the Security Service of Ukraine (“SBU”) and declared it to be the headquarters of the “South-East Army”. 45.  That night, armed groups occupied the Regional State Administration building in Donetsk and, on 7 April 2014, they declared the independence of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”). 46.  On 12 April 2014 a group of armed men led by Russian national Igor Girkin seized public buildings in Sloviansk, in the Donetsk region. Public administration buildings in a number of surrounding towns were also seized in the following days. 47.  On 14 April 2014 the government of Ukraine launched an “Anti‑Terrorist Operation” (“ATO”) to re-establish control over territory controlled by the separatist armed groups, deploying units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces supported by volunteer battalions. Meanwhile, an increasing number of troops of the armed forces of the Russian Federation were deployed in the border area near Ukraine. 48.  On 17 April 2014, following negotiations between the representatives of Ukraine, the EU, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine was published. The parties notably agreed that all sides should refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions; that all illegal armed groups should be disarmed; that all illegally seized buildings should be returned to legitimate owners; and that all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns should be vacated. 49.  On 27 April 2014 the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) was declared in Luhansk. On 29 April 2014, the Luhansk Regional State Administration building was stormed and occupied by separatist armed groups. 50.  In the following days and weeks, further buildings in towns and cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were taken over by separatist armed groups. 51.  On 11 May 2014, so-called “independence referendums” took place in the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions under separatist control. The “DPR” and the “LPR” announced that a majority had voted in favour of independence. They declared themselves to be sovereign states and formed new “governments”. 52.  On 6 June 2014 the “Normandy Format”, composed of Germany, France, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, was established. The diplomatic efforts of this group led to the establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group for the peaceful settlement of the situation in eastern Ukraine, composed of senior representatives from Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE. The Trilateral Contact Group held its first session on 8 June 2014. 53.  In the course of June and July 2014, the Ukrainian armed forces regained control over a number of towns and strategic positions in Donbas. On 5 July 2014 the separatist forces retreated to Donetsk from Sloviansk and surrounding towns. There was heavy fighting in the south-eastern part of the Donetsk region as the separatists sought to hold the territory they had occupied and to gain control over a passage of land which would link the “DPR” to the Russian border in the south. The Ukrainian forces used heavy artillery and air support to attack separatist positions. 54.  On 17 July 2014 Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was downed near Snizhne, in the Donetsk region. All 298 civilians aboard were killed. 196 of the victims were nationals of the Netherlands. According to the passenger manifest, the remaining victims were nationals of Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, the Philippines, Canada or New Zealand. Some of the deceased had dual nationality. The Netherlands, working closely with Ukraine and other affected States, coordinated the recovery and repatriation efforts. 55.  A new round of peace talks started on 31 July 2014 in Minsk, Belarus, in the context of the Trilateral Contact Group (see paragraph 52 above), with the informal participation of representatives of the “DPR” and the “LPR”. 56.  On 5 September 2014 senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the OSCE, the “DPR” and the “LPR” signed the Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (“Minsk Protocol”), which set out a 12‑point peace plan including an immediate ceasefire. Despite the ceasefire, fighting continued. A Memorandum was signed on 19 September 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol. A line of separation was created but fighting across the contact line persisted. 57.  In early 2015 active hostilities began to increase considerably. In February 2015 intense fighting began around Debaltseve. As a result of peace talks held on 11 and 12 February 2015 in Minsk, the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (“Minsk II”) was adopted. Minsk II provided for a ceasefire to enter into force from 15 February 2015, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the contact line, the establishment of a security zone and the withdrawal of foreign armed formations, mercenaries and weapons from the territory of Ukraine. 58.  Over the ensuing years, the conflict continued with regular attacks across the line of contact in eastern Ukraine. The intensity fluctuated, with a number of ceasefires being agreed which led to a reduction in hostilities in the immediate aftermath. However, these were followed in due course by escalations in hostilities. 59.  On 22 July 2020 the Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of “DPR” and “LPR” representatives, reached an agreement regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire. Following the enactment of the measures on 27 July 2020, the security situation in the conflict zone improved significantly. However, from March 2021 hostilities began to escalate once again. This coincided with a substantial build-up in April of Russian troops in areas bordering Ukraine, ostensibly for military exercises. Russia subsequently began to withdraw its troops and hostilities in the conflict zone decreased to levels similar to those seen in the second half of 2020. 60.  From October 2021 there was a significant increase in Russian military activity along the border with Ukraine and in Crimea. A large number of troops and substantial amounts of military equipment were deployed to the border areas. This coincided with an escalation in active hostilities in eastern Ukraine. In November 2021 armed engagement across the contact line decreased. However, the military build-up continued to increase through to February 2022. 61.  On 18 February 2022 the OSCE SMM reported a dramatic increase in activity along the contact line in eastern Ukraine over the preceding days. On the same date, the leaders of the “DPR” and the “LPR” announced a mass evacuation of residents of the two separatist entities to Russia. 62.  On 21 February 2022 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, adopted decrees on the recognition of the “DPR” and the “LPR” as “sovereign and independent states”. The decrees instructed the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation to carry out “functions on supporting peace” in the “DPR” and the “LPR”. That same evening, President Putin ordered the deployment of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine on a “peacekeeping mission”. 63.  On 22 February 2022 the State Duma ratified the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Lugansk People’s Republic”. 64.  By 23 February 2022 up to 190,000 Russian troops were estimated to be deployed in areas bordering Ukraine and in Crimea. 65.  On 24 February 2022 the Russian President announced that he had decided “in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the Charter of the United Nations ... to conduct a special military operation with the approval of the Federation Council of Russia and pursuant to the treaties on friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic”. He specified that the purpose of the “special operation’ was “to protect people who have been subjected to abuse and genocide by the Kiev regime for eight years”. He stated that the Russian Federation had to stop “a genocide” against millions of people and that it would seek the prosecution of those who had committed numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation. 66.  On the same day, Russian troops crossed various border points into Ukraine, including through Belarus, and launched attacks by land, air and sea. Airstrikes were reported across Ukraine. Fighting opened on four fronts. 67.  On the northern front, Russian armed forces advanced towards Kyiv from several directions, including from within Belarus, and conducted strikes on the capital, but fell short of capturing it. Russian troops took Hostomel airport and also took control of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. On the way to Kyiv, the Russian armed forces surrounded Chernihiv, which became the scene of heavy airstrikes and artillery fire. By the end of March 2022 the offensive towards Kyiv had stalled and the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant had been returned to Ukrainian personnel. After Ukrainian armed forces had regained control of areas north of Kyiv and Russian troops had withdrawn from localities they had temporarily occupied, evidence of grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations and large-scale destruction started to accumulate. 68.  On the north-eastern front, Kharkiv and Sumy cities quickly became the scenes of heavy urban warfare with heavy shelling of residential and other key buildings that led to large-scale destruction. Starting on 28 February 2022, Russian armed forces attempted to capture the city of Izium, in the Kharkiv region. On 24 March 2022 the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence declared that Izium was under the full control of its forces. By April 2022 the Russian armed forces had withdrawn from the area around Sumy city. However, fighting in and around Kharkiv continued. 69.  On the south-eastern front, as of 24 February 2022 Russian armed forces and “DPR” separatists launched attacks on the city of Mariupol from within Russian-controlled areas in the Donetsk region and from Crimea. By 1 March 2022 they had encircled the city. They gradually gained control of swathes of territory as attacks intensified, leading to large-scale destruction. Heavy fighting hampered evacuation efforts and curtailed access to basic necessities for civilians. On 10 March 2022 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that the humanitarian situation in Mariupol was becoming increasingly dire and desperate, and that hundreds of thousands of people had no food, water, heat, electricity, or medical care. The siege of Mariupol continued until 20 May 2022, when the Russian Federation declared that it had gained full control of the city. 70.  On the southern front, on 2 March 2022 the city of Kherson became the first major Ukrainian city to fall. Russian armed forces gradually occupied surrounding localities. In the neighbouring Zaporizhzhia region, they seized Melitopol, Berdiansk, and Enerhodar. They took control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe’s largest such facility. 71.  A second phase of the armed conflict was initiated in April 2022 with the launch of the “Battle for Donbas”, which, according to Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, was aimed at the “full liberation” of the “DPR” and the “LPR”. The offensive of the Russian armed forces concentrated on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and other eastern areas, with the support of separatist armed groups. 72.  On 25 May 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree simplifying the process for residents of Ukraine’s Russian-occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to acquire Russian citizenship. 73.  On 30 May 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree facilitating the acquisition of Russian nationality by orphaned children or children without parental care from the “DPR”, “LPR” and in the occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The decree authorised the heads of orphanages and other State institutions located in these areas to apply for Russian nationality for children under their care. 74.  From late August 2022 Ukrainian forces led counter‑offensive operations in the regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson which resulted in their retaking hundreds of settlements. Populations from recovered cities and settlements reported large-scale atrocities, such as unlawful killings, summary executions, torture, sexual violence and unlawful confinement during the period of occupation. 75.  From 23 to 27 September 2022, Russian authorities in the occupied territory of the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia purported to hold “referendums” on these regions becoming part of the Russian Federation. On 30 September 2022 the President of the Russian Federation signed so-called “Treaties on the Accession of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Lugansk People’s Republic, the Zaporozhye Region and the Kherson Region to the Russian Federation”. Part of the regions concerned was not in the hands of the Russian Federation at the time and Ukrainian control over further parts has since been restored. 76.  In October 2022 Ukrainian armed forces continued to recover control of cities and villages in eastern Ukraine. There was heavy fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 77.  On 10 October 2022, two days after an explosion caused damage to the “Crimean Bridge” connecting the Russian Federation with Crimea, the Russian Federation launched a wave of missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. During the subsequent weeks and months, further similarly intense and large-scale attacks with missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles were carried out. The attacks affected numerous regions of Ukraine, targeting energy-related infrastructure. As a consequence, millions were left without heating, electricity and water.  In the south, missile strikes hit the cities of Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia. Military activities and shelling repeatedly occurred at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. 78.  In November 2022 Ukrainian armed forces retook control of the Kherson city area, while Russian armed forces gradually withdrew. 79.  Over the subsequent years, control over territory in Ukraine has shifted in the face of Russian advances and Ukrainian counter-offensives. The conflict remains intense, with heavy fighting continuing on multiple fronts. Russian aerial strikes continue across Ukraine. B.   International developments following 24 February 2022 1.     Council of Europe 80.  On 24 February 2022 the Committee of Ministers condemned in the strongest terms the armed attack on Ukraine by the Russian Federation in violation of international law (CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426bis/2.3). It urged the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations in Ukraine. It further decided to examine without delay, and in close coordination with the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary General, what measures should be taken in response to the serious violation by the Russian Federation of its statutory obligations as a Council of Europe member State. 81.  On 25 February 2022, following an exchange of views with the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers decided to launch the procedure provided for by Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and agreed to suspend the Russian Federation from its rights of representation in the Council of Europe (CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3). 82.  On 10 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers published a decision expressing deep concern for the civilian victims of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, particularly vulnerable groups such as the elderly, disabled and children (CM/Del/Dec(2022)1428bis/2.3). The Committee of Ministers condemned as atrocious the bombing of a maternity and paediatric hospital in Mariupol on 9 March 2022, and strongly urged Russia to comply with the interim measures indicated by the Court on 1 and 4 March 2022 (see paragraphs 9-10 above). It decided to consult the Parliamentary Assembly on potential further use of Article 8 of the Statute. 83.  On 15 March 2022 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Opinion 300 (2022) on the Consequences of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. It noted: “1. In continuation of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine since 20 February 2014, as of 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation has escalated its military activities against Ukraine to unprecedented levels, causing thousands of civilian casualties, displacing millions of people and devastating the country. In launching this further military aggression, the Russian Federation has chosen recourse to force over dialogue and diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy objectives, in violation of the legal and moral norms that govern the peaceful coexistence of States. This conduct shows disregard for the very essence of the Council of Europe, as enshrined in its Statute (ETS No. 1), which is the conviction that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation.” 84.  The Parliamentary Assembly condemned, in the strongest terms, the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. It considered that the Russian Federation’s armed attack on Ukraine was a serious breach of Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and a violation of the obligations and commitments that the Russian Federation had accepted upon becoming a member of the Organisation, including the commitments to settle international and internal disputes by peaceful means and to denounce the concept of treating neighbouring States as a zone of special influence called the “near abroad”. The Parliamentary Assembly further deplored that the Russian leadership had “persisted in its aggression, escalating the violence in Ukraine and making threats should other States interfere”. It continued: “5. ... Through its attitude and actions, the leadership of the Russian Federation poses a blatant menace to security in Europe, following a path which also includes the act of military aggression against the Republic of Moldova and in particular the occupation of its Transnistrian region, the act of military aggression against Georgia and the subsequent occupation of two of its regions in 2008, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian Federation’s role in eastern Ukraine, which culminated in the illegal recognition of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as ‘independent States’.” 85.  The Parliamentary Assembly expressed itself to be deeply disturbed by evidence of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation, including attacks against civilian targets; indiscriminate use of artillery, missiles and bombs, including cluster bombs; attacks on humanitarian corridors intended to allow civilians to escape from besieged towns and cities; and hostage-taking. It noted “with shock the reckless attacks by Russian armed forces on nuclear facilities in Ukraine”. 86.  The Opinion included the following passages: “9.  The Assembly is deeply concerned about the situation of Ukrainians who have been forced to flee their country in fear of their lives, in the biggest refugee exodus seen in Europe since the Second World War. The Assembly applauds the generosity and solidarity shown by neighbouring countries that continue to take in hundreds of thousands of refugees, most of them women and children ... 10.  The Assembly notes that the unfolding Russian aggression in Ukraine has been very widely condemned by the international community, in particular by States and international organisations ... 11.  In the Russian Federation, however, anti-war protests are stifled. The Assembly condemns the measures taken by the Russian authorities to further curtail freedom of expression and freedom of assembly through the closure of almost all remaining independent news organisations, the intensifying crackdown on civil society, the harsh repression of peaceful protests and severe restrictions on access to social media. It deplores the fact that, as a result, the Russian population is deprived of information from independent sources and is exposed only to State-controlled media that amplify a distorted narrative of the war. 12.  These tragic events confirm the relevance of and continuing need for the Council of Europe as a value-based intergovernmental organisation working to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Through its numerous bodies and institutions, and in accordance with its remit and mission, the Council of Europe should be on the front line in providing assistance and expertise to support Ukraine and Ukrainians.” 87.  The Parliamentary Assembly accordingly called on the Russian Federation to cease hostilities against Ukraine and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and to comply strictly with its obligations under human rights and international humanitarian law. 88.  Taking into account all of the above and that the Russian Federation had committed serious violations of the Statute of the Council of Europe that were incompatible with the status of a Council of Europe member State, had not honoured its undertakings to the Council of Europe and had not complied with its commitments, the Parliamentary Assembly considered that the Russian Federation could no longer be a member State of the Organisation. It considered that the Committee of Ministers should request the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw from the Council of Europe. If the Russian Federation did not comply with the request, the Parliamentary Assembly suggested that the Committee of Ministers determine the immediate possible date from which the Russian Federation would cease to be a member of the Council of Europe. 89.  On 16 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution CM/Res(2022)2, by which it decided that the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe from 16 March 2022. 90.  On 22 March 2022 the Court, sitting in plenary session in accordance with Rule 20 § 1, adopted the “Resolution of the European Court of Human Rights on the consequences of the cessation of membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe in light of Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. It stated that the Russian Federation would cease to be a Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. 91.  On 16-17 May 2023 at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Europe established, through an Enlarged Partial Agreement, the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Forty-three States and the European Union have joined the Register. 92.  On 2 April 2024 the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine opened the claims submission process for compensation of damage, loss or injury caused by Russian aggression against Ukraine. 93.  Meanwhile, work was begun by a group of senior legal experts from around forty States working with the Ukrainian authorities, the EU Commission, the European External Action Service and the Council of Europe (the Core Group) on the preparation of draft legal instruments required to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine within the framework of the Council Europe, consisting of an agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, a Statute for the Special Tribunal and an Enlarged Partial Agreement governing the modalities of support to the Special Tribunal, its financing and other administrative aspects. On 14 May 2025 the Committee of Ministers welcomed the finalisation of these draft documents by the Core Group. Following receipt of a formal request from Ukraine for the establishment of the Special Tribunal, the Committee of Ministers invited the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to steer the process for the establishment of the Special Tribunal within the Council of Europe. 2.     United Nations (UN) 94.  On 25 February 2022 the UN Security Council rejected a draft resolution intended to end Russia’s military action. The draft, submitted by Albania and the United States, had garnered support from eleven members but was vetoed by the Russian Federation. Three States abstained. As a result, on 27 February 2022 the UN Security Council called an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the same matter (S/RES/2623 (2022)). 95.  On 2 March 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES‑11/1 with one hundred and forty-one votes in favour, five against and thirty-five abstentions. The resolution condemned the 24 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a “special military operation” in Ukraine, reaffirmed that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force would be recognised as legal and expressed grave concern at reports of attacks on civilian facilities such as residences, schools and hospitals, and of civilian casualties, including women, older persons, persons with disabilities and children. The preamble to the resolution continued: “Recognizing that the military operations of the Russian Federation inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine are on a scale that the international community has not seen in Europe in decades and that urgent action is needed to save this generation from the scourge of war, Endorsing the Secretary-General’s statement of 24 February 2022 in which he recalled that the use of force by one country against another is the repudiation of the principles that every country has committed to uphold and that the present military offensive of the Russian Federation is against the [UN] Charter, Condemning the decision of the Russian Federation to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces, Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine, with an increasing number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance ...” 96.  The General Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters, and “deplored in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter”. It demanded that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any Member State; and that it “immediately, completely and unconditionally” withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. The General Assembly further condemned all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and called upon all parties to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 97.  On 4 March 2022 the UN Human Rights Council (“HRC”) adopted resolution A/HRC/RES/49/1 condemning “in the strongest possible terms the human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law resulting from the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation”. It expressed grave concern at the documented harm to the enjoyment of many human rights, including the rights to life, to education, and to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, caused by Russian shelling and bombing in populated areas. It urgently established an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (“Commission of Inquiry”) comprised of three human rights experts to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, and to establish the facts, circumstances and root causes of any such violations and abuses (see also resolutions A/HRC/RES/52/32 and A/HRC/RES/55/23 extending the Commission of Inquiry’s mandate). 98.  On 24 March 2022 the UN General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/ES‑11/2 in which, among other things, it deplored the dire humanitarian consequences of the hostilities by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including the besiegement of and shelling and air strikes on densely populated cities of Ukraine as well as attacks striking civilians and civilian objects; and expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine, in particular at the high number of civilian casualties and the increasing number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance. It reiterated its demand for an immediate cessation of the hostilities by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular of any attacks against civilians and civilian objects; and called for an end to sieges of cities which further aggravated the humanitarian situation for the civilian population and hampered evacuation efforts. The General Assembly further condemned all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and called upon all parties to the armed conflict to strictly respect international humanitarian law. 99.  On 7 April 2022 the UN General Assembly passed resolution A/RES/ES-11/3 suspending Russia’s membership in the HRC. It expressed grave concern at the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, in particular at the reports of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation, including “gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights”. 100.  On 12 May 2022 the HRC adopted resolution A/HRC/RES/S-34/1 on the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression. It expressed deep concern at the alarming number of civilian casualties caused by the aggression against Ukraine and strongly condemned attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including attacks on residential areas, schools, kindergartens and medical facilities, and attacks carried out through the use of cluster munitions, air strikes and artillery, as well as the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary executions, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence, forced transfers of population, or violations and abuses committed against children. The HRC strongly condemned “the violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, confirmed by the High Commissioner [for Human Rights], that were committed in the areas of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions under the control of Russian armed forces in late February and in March 2022, including the very large number of reported cases of summary executions of men, women and children, of sexual and gender‑based violence, of the use of torture and other ill-treatment, and of other violations that may amount to war crimes and related crimes”. It expressed deep concern “at the grave human rights and humanitarian situation in the city of Mariupol, the near total destruction of its residential and civilian infrastructure caused by Russian bombing and shelling, reports of tens of thousands of civilian casualties and of mass graves near the city, and the limited progress in ensuring the safe and unhindered evacuation of civilians to safe areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine”. 101.  The HRC reiterated its demand for an immediate cessation of military hostilities against Ukraine, any attacks against civilians and civilian objects, and other violations of international humanitarian law and of any human rights violations and abuses in Ukraine, as well as of any disinformation, propaganda for war and national hatred related to the aggression against Ukraine. It requested the Commission of Inquiry to conduct an inquiry to address the events in the areas of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions in late February and March 2022 with a view to holding those responsible to account. 102.  From 24 February 2022 to 18 September 2022 the OHCHR recorded 14,532 civilian casualties in Ukraine: 5,916 killed and 8,616 injured. The OHCHR noted that the actual figures were considerably higher, as the receipt of information from some locations had been delayed and many reports were still pending corroboration at the time. 103.  On 12 October 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-11/4 on the “Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. It recalled States’ obligation under Article 2 of the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. It further reaffirmed the principle of customary international law, as restated in its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force would be recognised as legal. The General Assembly condemned the organisation by the Russian Federation of illegal “referendums” in regions within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine and the attempted illegal annexation of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine (see paragraph 75 above). It declared that these unlawful actions had no validity under international law and called upon all States not to recognise any alteration by the Russian Federation of the status of any or all of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk or Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine. 104.  On 14 November 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 on “Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine”. It recalled its previous resolutions and expressed grave concern at the “loss of life, civilian displacement, destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, loss of public and private property and economic calamity” caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. It recommended the creation of an international register of damage to serve as a record, in documentary form, of evidence and claims information on damage, loss or injury to all natural and legal persons concerned, as well as to the State of Ukraine, caused by internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine, and to promote and coordinate evidence-gathering. 105.  On 21 February 2023 the OHCHR reported that from 24 February 2022 to 15 February 2023, there had been 21,293 civilian casualties in 1,141 settlements of Ukraine, including 8,006 killed and 13,287 injured. 106.  On 23 February 2023 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-11/6 on “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. It underscored the need to reach, as soon as possible, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the principles of the UN Charter. It further reiterated its demand that the Russian Federation “immediately, completely and unconditionally” withdraw all its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and called for a cessation of hostilities. It called for full adherence by the parties to the armed conflict to their obligations under international humanitarian law to take constant care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects, to ensure safe and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need, and to refrain from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. It also called for an immediate cessation of the attacks on the critical infrastructure of Ukraine and any deliberate attacks on civilian objects, including residences, schools and hospitals. It emphasised the need to ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law committed on the territory of Ukraine through appropriate, fair and independent investigations and prosecutions at the national or international level and to ensure justice for all victims and the prevention of future crimes. 107.  On 15 February 2024 the OHCHR reported 30,457 civilian casualties, including 10,582 killed and 19,875 injured, since 24 February 2022. 108.  The Commission of Inquiry (see paragraph 97 above), whose mandate was extended in 2023, 2024 and 2025, has published a total of six reports (three to the UN General Assembly in October 2022, October 2023 and October 2024, and three to the UN HRC in March 2023, March 2024 and March 2025) and two conference room papers (August 2023 and May 2025) to date. According to these documents, the body of evidence collected showed that Russian authorities had committed a wide range of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in many regions of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation. Many of these amounted to war crimes and included wilful killings, attacks on civilians, unlawful confinement, torture, rape, and forced transfers and deportations of children. The Commission of Inquiry has concluded that Russian armed forces carried out attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas with an apparent disregard for civilian harm and suffering. It has documented indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, and a failure to take precautions, in violation of international humanitarian law. It has found sufficient evidence to enable it to determine that the Russian authorities had perpetrated torture and enforced disappearance as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population and pursuant to a coordinated State policy of torture. It has concluded that the Russian authorities committed enforced disappearances and torture as crimes against humanity. 3.     International Courts (a)   International Court of Justice 109.  On 26 February 2022 the applicant Ukrainian Government filed an application instituting proceedings against the Russian Federation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. They contended that the Russian Federation had falsely claimed that acts of genocide had occurred in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, and on that basis had recognised the “DPR” and the “LPR”, and had then declared and implemented a “special military operation” against Ukraine. 110.  On 16 March 2022 the ICJ indicated the following provisional measures in the case: “The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine; ... The Russian Federation shall ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control or direction, take no steps in furtherance of the military operations referred to in point 1 above; ... Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.” 111.  On 2 February 2024 the ICJ handed down its judgment on preliminary objections raised by the Russian Federation. The ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to examine Ukraine’s claim requesting it to “[a]djudge and declare that there is no credible evidence that Ukraine is responsible for committing genocide in violation of the Genocide Convention in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine”, and that the claim was admissible. (b)   International Criminal Court 112.  On 17 March 2023 a pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for President Putin, and Maria Lvova‑Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation. It considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that each suspect bore responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, to the prejudice of Ukrainian children, under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute. 113.  On 5 March 2024 a pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants for two individuals in the context of the situation in Ukraine: Sergei Kobylash, a Lieutenant General in the Russian Armed Forces who at the relevant time had been the Commander of the Long-Range Aviation of the Aerospace Force, and Viktor Sokolov, an Admiral in the Russian Navy, who at the relevant time had been the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. The chamber considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that each suspect bore responsibility for the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute), the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects (article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute) in respect of missile strikes carried out by the forces under their command against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023. The chamber found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that these strikes had been directed against civilian objects, and, where directed against installations that might have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time, the expected incidental civilian harm and damage “would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage”. It also determined that the alleged campaign of strikes constituted a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts against a civilian population, carried out pursuant to a State policy. 114.  On 24 June 2024 a pre-trial chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants for Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation at the time of the alleged conduct, and Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation at the time of the alleged conduct. It considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the two suspects bore responsibility for the missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023 (see paragraph 113 above). 4.     Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 115.  On 3 March 2022 the Moscow Mechanism of the human dimension of the OSCE, established in 1991 to provide participating States with the possibility of establishing ad hoc missions of independent experts to assist in the resolution of a specific human dimension problem, was invoked by Ukraine, supported by 45 participating States. 116.  On 7 March 2022 the SMM suspended its reporting activities in Ukraine (see paragraph 42 above). It discontinued its operations in Ukraine on 31 March 2022. 117.  Meanwhile, a Mission of three experts was appointed under the Moscow Mechanism on 14 March 2022. Its mandate was to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of OSCE commitments, and violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to establish the facts and circumstances of possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including due to deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure; and to collect, consolidate, and analyse this information with a view to presenting it to relevant accountability mechanisms, as well as national, regional, or international courts or tribunals that have, or may in future have, jurisdiction. The Moscow Mechanism was subsequently used on a further four occasions. 118.  A total of four mission reports have been prepared (13 April and 14 July 2022, 4 May 2023 and 24 April 2024), either with a general mandate to establish facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of OSCE commitments, violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, or with more targeted mandates concerning the forcible transfer of children or the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The missions found clear patterns of international humanitarian law violations by the Russian forces in their conduct of hostilities and concluded that international human rights law had been extensively violated in the conflict in Ukraine. Some of the most serious violations included targeted killing of civilians, including journalists, human rights defenders or local mayors; unlawful detentions, abductions and enforced disappearances of such persons; large-scale deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia; various forms of mistreatment, including torture, inflicted on detained civilians and prisoners of war (POWs); the failure to respect fair trial guarantees; and the imposition of the death penalty. 5.     European Union (EU) 119.  On 23 February 2022, in response to Russia’s recognition of the “DPR” and the “LPR” and the deployment of its armed forces in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (see paragraph 62 above), the EU adopted a first package of related sanctions against Russia. 120.  Following a special meeting on 24 February 2022, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. The European Council demanded that Russia immediately cease its military actions, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. 121.  On 1 March 2022 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2022/2564(RSP)), which condemned in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine. The European Parliament demanded that the Russian Federation immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all military and paramilitary forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. 122.  On 30 May 2022 the EU adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/838 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 as regards the preservation, analysis and storage at the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) of evidence relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related criminal offences. The Regulation referred to there being “a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been and are being committed in Ukraine in the context of the current hostilities”. Pursuant to the amended Regulation, Eurojust’s operational functions include supporting Member States’ action in combating genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and related criminal offences, including by preserving, analysing and storing evidence related to those crimes and related criminal offences and enabling the exchange of such evidence with, or otherwise making it directly available to, competent national authorities and international judicial authorities, in particular the ICC. The amendments permit the establishment of a new automated data management and storage facility for this purpose. They also authorise Eurojust to process and store satellite images, photographs, videos and audio recordings. 123.  On 23 November 2022 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on recognising the Russian Federation as a State sponsor of terrorism (2022/2896(RSP)). In the resolution, the European Parliament recognised Russia as a State sponsor of terrorism and as a State which used means of terrorism, in the light of the deliberate attacks and atrocities carried out by the Russian Federation against the civilian population of Ukraine, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which amounted to acts of terror against the Ukrainian population and constituted war crimes. The European Parliament expressed its unreserved outrage at, and condemnation of, these attacks and atrocities and the other acts that Russia had committed in pursuit of its destructive political aims in Ukraine and on the territory of other countries. 124.  On 19 January 2023 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2022/3017(RSP)). It underscored the urgent need for the EU and its Member States, in close cooperation with Ukraine and the international community, preferably through the UN, to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies and to find a legally sound, common way forward on this matter. 125.  By May 2025, 17 packages of sanctions had been adopted in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine from February 2022. They concern a total of over 2,400 individuals and entities considered to have undertaken actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. C.   Investigations and proceedings concerning the downing of flight MH17 126.  On 7 August 2014 authorities from the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium and Ukraine established a joint investigation team (“JIT”) to carry out a criminal investigation into the crash of flight MH17, with the participation of Malaysia and Eurojust. 127.  On 9 September 2014 the Dutch Safety Board (“DSB”), tasked with the technical investigation in accordance with Article 26 of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) into the cause of the crash of flight MH17, published its preliminary report. The report disclosed that no technical or operational issues had been found in respect of the aircraft or the crew and that the damage appeared to indicate that the aircraft had been penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects from outside. 128.  On 13 October 2015 the DSB published its final report in the context of the technical investigation into the cause of the crash of flight MH17. It concluded that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile fired from separatist-held territory. It said that further forensic research was required to determine the exact launch location. 129.  On 28 September 2016 the JIT presented its first partial findings from its criminal investigation into the downing of flight MH17. It said that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile from the 9M38-series, that the missile had been launched by a Buk-TELAR from a field south of Snizhne and west of Pervomaiskyi under the control of separatists, and that the Buk‑TELAR had been transported from the Russian Federation into Ukraine and had returned to Russia after the launch. 130.  On 24 May 2018 the JIT announced that the Buk-TELAR that had downed flight MH17 belonged to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (“AAMB”) of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. 131.  In a joint diplomatic note of 25 May 2018 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from their embassies, the Netherlands and Australia invoked the State responsibility of the Russian Federation for the downing of flight MH17. They invited the Russian Federation to enter into negotiations in relation to the legal consequences flowing from that responsibility. A number of meetings subsequently took place; the parties involved agreed to the confidentiality of the meetings. The Russian Federation withdrew from negotiations in October 2020. 132.  Meanwhile, on 19 June 2019 the JIT announced that the Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands (“OM”) was bringing charges against four men (three Russian nationals and one Ukrainian) for causing the crash of flight MH17, resulting in the death of all persons on board, and for the murder of the 298 persons on board that flight. The defendants were Mr Girkin, Sergey Dubinskiy, Oleg Pulatov and Leonid Kharchenko. 133.  The criminal trial started on 9 March 2020 before the first instance court in The Hague. Only Mr Pulatov instructed legal representation and entered an appearance in the proceedings. The other defendants were tried in absentia. 134.  In March 2022 Australia and the Netherlands initiated legal proceedings against the Russian Federation in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Council, under Article 84 of Chicago Convention, concerning the downing of flight MH17. They alleged that Russia had violated Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, which prohibits the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight. 135.  On 17 November 2022 the first instance court in The Hague delivered its verdict. It determined that flight MH17 had been downed by a Buk missile fired from an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi, resulting in the deaths of all 283 passengers and 15 crew members. It further found that the Russian Federation had had overall control over the “DPR” from mid-May 2014 until at least the crash of flight MH17 and that the conflict was thus an international armed conflict. It found Mr Girkin, Mr Dubinskiy and Mr Kharchenko guilty of both charges and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Mr Pulatov was acquitted. Neither the defendants nor the OM appealed the judgment, which accordingly became final under Dutch law. 136.  On 8 February 2023 the JIT held a further press conference on its investigation into the crew of the Buk TELAR that shot down MH17 and those responsible for supplying the weapon system. It announced that it had uncovered further information about the crew and about the decision-making process leading to the supply of the Buk TELAR. It underlined that any further evidence had to be sought in the Russian Federation. However, the Russian authorities continued to deny any involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine on and around 17 July 2014 and had, on multiple occasions, provided the JIT with falsified evidence exonerating the Russian Federation or had simply refused to provide any information. The information gathered by the JIT was not sufficiently conclusive and the JIT saw no further scope for investigation at that time without the cooperation of the Russian authorities. The investigation was therefore suspended. The JIT concluded that new information or a change in circumstances might lead to the resumption of the investigation or institution of new criminal proceedings. 137.  In March 2023 the ICAO Council found that it had jurisdiction to consider the case filed in March 2022 (see paragraph 134 above). On 17 June 2024 the Russian Federation announced that it would no longer participate in the proceedings before the ICAO Council on the basis that it did not acknowledge “the Council’s authority to entertain the allegations from Australia and the Netherlands, nor any decisions stemming from them” (B474). On 12 May 2025 the ICAO Council voted that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under international air law in the 2014 downing of flight MH17. The Council agreed that the claims brought by Australia and the Netherlands (see paragraph 134 above) were well founded in fact and in law (B475). RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 138.  Details of relevant domestic provisions and of international legal material relevant to the issues in the present case are set out in the Annex (“Annex A”) to the Court’s admissibility decision (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 41) and in Annex B to the present judgment. THE LAW I.         PARTICIPATION OF THE RESPONDENT STATE 139.  As explained above, in light of the 24 February 2022 invasion and upon the request of the applicant Ukrainian Government, on 1 March 2022 interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court were indicated to the respondent Government. The Government were asked to inform the Court of the measures taken to ensure full compliance with the Convention (see paragraph 9 above). 140.  In their two-page response of 5 March 2022 (see paragraph 11 above), the respondent Government described in three paragraphs alleged violations by Ukraine of the interim measure which had been in place in respect of both parties since March 2014 (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 2). The purpose of these passages appears to have been to present “the basis for conducting a special military operation in Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples’ Republics”. A further paragraph of the 5 March 2022 response was devoted to explaining the steps taken to evacuate to Russia civilians from the “DPR” and the “LPR” prior to 24 February 2022, and the provision made for them there. 141.  The response of the respondent Government to the Court’s request for information (see paragraph 9 above) was limited to a number of bare assertions not supported by any evidence. These assertions were that “the Russian forces are not attacking civilians or civilian objects, only military targets”; that “a lot of the so-called ‘evidence’ circulating online actually portrays the aftermath of attacks of Ukrainian armed formations”; that “the nationalist forces are hiding their military equipment in residential areas, near schools, hospitals and kindergartens”; and that “the Russian military forces provide humanitarian corridors and transport means in all the zones of armed conflict in Donbass in order to afford civilian population to move to a save place [sic]”. The respondent Government concluded by stating that the Russian Federation was taking “every measure to avoid civilian casualties and ensure full compliance with the Convention”. Under cover of a letter of 10 March 2022, the respondent Government subsequently provided a video file “in support of the legal stance of the Russian Federation”. 142.  This was the last correspondence received from the respondent Government in this case. No further correspondence whatsoever has been received since that date. In particular, there was no reply to the Court’s request for a further update and responses to the specific requests for information in the context of the Rule 39 indication (see paragraph 12 above). The respondent State has not participated at all in the proceedings on the merits in respect of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 or in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22 and, consequently, did not provide a memorial and did not attend the hearing on 12 June 2024 (see paragraphs 21 and 27 above). This is a matter that will be examined later by reference to Article 38 of the Convention (see paragraphs 1630 et seq. below). 143.  In order to respect the adversarial nature of and the need for equality of arms between the parties in the proceedings before it, the Court continues to engage in correspondence with the respondent Government in the normal manner. It has at all relevant times used, and continues to use, the electronic secured Government website as the means of communication with the authorities of the Russian Federation (see the Practice Direction on secured electronic filing by Governments, issued by the President of the Court in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court on 22 September 2008 and amended on 29 September 2014 and 5 July 2018). The site remains secure and accessible to the authorities of the respondent State (see the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 22). 144.  Finally, the Court underlines that pursuant to Rule 44C § 2 of the Rules of Court, failure or refusal by a respondent Contracting Party to participate effectively in the proceedings shall not, in itself, be a reason for it to discontinue the examination of an application. In the absence of sufficient cause for the failure of the respondent Government to submit a memorial or to participate in the hearing of 12 June 2024, the Grand Chamber decided to proceed with its examination of the case, being satisfied that such a course was consistent with the proper administration of justice (see, similarly, Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, §§ 10-12, ECHR 2001-IV, and Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 38263/08, §§ 25‑26, 28 April 2023). II.      TERMINOLOGY 145.  As regards the terminology employed in the present judgment, the Court observes that whether the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine amounted and amounts to an invasion, to an occupation and to an annexation is a matter of fact to be established on the evidence. 146.  According to the ordinary meaning of the word “invasion” in the context of an armed conflict, it broadly describes a situation where armed forces of one State enter the territory of another State with hostile intent. The Court is satisfied that the entry of Russian armed forces into Ukrainian territory from 24 February 2022 in the circumstances outlined above (see paragraphs 65 et seq. above) amounted to an invasion, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word (see also the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above § 197). 147.  The terms “occupation” and “annexation” have particular meanings in the context of international armed conflict. A situation will amount to occupation when an area is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army; a State occupies territory that is not its own when, and to the extent that, it exercises effective control over it (see, most recently, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 19 July 2024 (“Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory”), §§ 86 and 90-92 at B319-20, and also Article 42 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“the Hague Regulations”) at B131). The Court has already found that the Russian Federation exercised effective control over Ukrainian territory in the relevant parts of Donbas from 11 May 2014 (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 695-97). It will have to determine in the present judgment whether the Russian Federation exercised effective control over additional territory in Ukraine. To the extent that Ukrainian territory is found to be under the effective control of the Russian Federation for the purposes of that State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention, the Court considers it appropriate to refer to such territory as occupied territory. 148.  The ICJ has further explained in its Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory that, in that context, annexation was the forcible acquisition by the occupying Power of the territory that it occupied, namely its integration into the territory of the occupying Power. It presupposed the occupying Power’s intent to exercise permanent control over the occupied territory and was unlawful (ibid., §§ 158-60 and 175 at B322). Applying this definition to the facts of the present case, the Court considers that any Ukrainian sovereign territory under the effective control of the respondent State which the latter has purported formally to integrate into the Russian Federation, and to which it has, accordingly, applied its own laws in the place of the applicable Ukrainian law, may be described as annexed territory. The terms “annexed” and “annexation”, where used by the Court in the present judgment, do not imply any recognition of a transfer of sovereignty over the areas in question. 149.  Any description of the conduct of the Russian Federation in Ukraine as an invasion, an occupation and an annexation is not intended to do more than describe the situation as it presents itself as a matter of fact and is without prejudice to any different assessment of the facts made by any other tribunal in separate legal proceedings. It does not reflect any evaluation of, or judgment as to, the legality or otherwise as a matter of international law more generally of the acts in question. III.    THIRD-PARTY INTERVENERS A.   The interveners 150.  Thirty third-party interveners provided written submissions to the Court. 151.  Twenty-six High Contracting Parties (see paragraph 17 above) subscribed to a common pleading, comprised of an introduction, submissions on jurisdiction, submissions on the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law, and closing remarks. Eleven of those High Contracting Parties (Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom) submitted, in addition, national pleadings which contained varying degrees of shared content among those Parties. 152.  The Geneva Academy and the Human Rights Law Centre (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 25, and paragraphs 17-18 above) provided submissions on Article 1 jurisdiction and the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law. 153.  The MH17 applicants (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 25, and paragraphs 17-18 above) provided submissions on the complaints made by the applicant Dutch Government regarding the downing of flight MH17. 154.  The twenty-six High Contracting Parties also made a common oral submission at the hearing. The Government of Poland and the Government of the United Kingdom made additional national oral submissions. After the hearing, sixteen High Contracting Parties provided written answers to questions put by members of the Court prior to the hearing on 12 June 2024, having exceptionally been granted leave by the President to do so (see paragraph 31 above). 155.  The content of the relevant third-party submissions concerning jurisdiction, the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law, and the alleged violations of the Convention in respect of the downing of flight MH17 is summarised in the corresponding parts of this judgment. B.   The submissions of the intervening Governments 156.  It is unprecedented for twenty-six High Contracting Parties to intervene as third parties in a case before the Court. This reflects their perception of the importance of this case to the Convention system as a whole. It is therefore unsurprising that their common third-party submissions express not only their joint position on the specific legal issues arising in the case but also their shared view of the conduct of the respondent State in the light of the underlying aims and objectives of the Council of Europe. It is important to record their submissions in this respect. 157.  In their common pleading, they underlined their “support [for] accountability for all violations of international law by the Russian Federation”. They expressed support for efforts to hold the Russian Federation and its politicians and military personnel accountable, under applicable international legal frameworks, “for the aggression of the Russian Federation in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations ..., as deplored in the strongest terms by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/ES-11/1, and for the breaches of international humanitarian law ... perpetrated by Russian forces”. They continued: “3.  At the Reykjavík Summit of the Council of Europe held on 16-17 May 2023, the Heads of State and Government described Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as a flagrant violation of international law. They also reaffirmed the need for an unequivocal international legal response for all victims, as well as for the State of Ukraine. The Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine was established, and is intended to constitute the first component of a future international comprehensive compensation mechanism. In the Declaration in support of this Enlarged Partial Agreement adopted at the Reykjavík Summit, the Heads of State and Government condemned all violations of international law, including international human rights law and IHL, in particular attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including civilian infrastructure, cultural and religious heritage and the environment of Ukraine, and expressed their conviction of the exigent necessity to ensure comprehensive accountability in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Declaration of the Summit they also noted that only by respecting the right to truth, to justice, to reparation and to guarantees of non-repetition will it be possible to overcome the past and create solid foundations to build unity in the spirit of harmony and co-operation with respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 4.  The Council of Europe was founded in the wake of the Second World War, born out of the conviction that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation. It is a peace project, built on the promise of ‘never again’, a promise that has been fundamentally challenged by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Council of Europe Statute reaffirms the devotion of member States to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy. Article 3 of the Statute clearly requires: Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in Chapter I. ... 10.  The Russian Federation has failed to comply with [the] interim and provisional measures [of the Court and of the ICJ] and persists in its grave breach of the prohibition on the use of force, a fundamental principle of international law contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 11.  The intervening Governments are strongly committed to the protection and promotion of the international rule of law and recall that the system of the Convention is fundamental to the protection of human rights as well as peace and justice in Europe. They submit the present intervention bearing in mind their responsibility for the protection and collective enforcement of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention, as applicable in the Convention’s legal space. ... 46.  The intervening Governments reiterate their unwavering support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and their condemnation of the egregious violations of international law perpetrated by the Russian Federation.” 158.  In their common oral submissions, the twenty-six High Contracting Parties reiterated that: “The Council of Europe was founded on the sacrifice of millions of women, children and men. The horrors of war inspired the resolute will to strengthen the international order and the protection of democracy and human rights. The Council of Europe has remained committed to the promise of ‘never again’. The Convention and this Court remain a hallmark in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals. But the horrors of war are once again present in Europe. Women, children and men are once again facing what should be unthinkable and unbearable. All of the intervening Governments wish to reiterate their unequivocal support for Ukraine in its quest to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the continuing violations of international law, including human rights law, committed by Russia’s authorities and armed forces. We echo the declarations made by the 46 Heads of State and Government at the Reykjavík Summit of the Council of Europe a year ago. We reiterate the need to ensure comprehensive accountability for all violations of human rights, and more specifically the Convention, committed in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine. ...[T]he joined cases clearly show that aggression and systematic violations of human rights by the Russian Government and its agents was going on long before the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The intervening Governments therefore welcome the decision of the Court to join these cases and to consider the situation in Ukraine as it has developed. The events which have given rise to the three other applications will provide the necessary context for the consideration of case no. 11055/22 ... ... The failure of the Russian Federation to comply with interim and provisional measures of this Court and the failure to cooperate with the Court in general is further proof of the contempt that the present Government of the Russian Federation shows towards binding international law including the Convention. This is also evidenced by the absence of any representative from the Russian Government here today. Their silence speaks volumes. Instead of complying and cooperating with the Court, the Russian Federation persists in its ... ongoing breach of the prohibition on the use of force, a fundamental principle of international law contained in Article 2 § 4 of the Charter of the United Nations. The intervening Governments are strongly committed to the protection and the collective enforcement of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention, as applicable in the Convention’s legal space. This is why we have submitted common written observations and why we appear before you today. ... In the preamble to the Convention, the signatory Governments expressed their profound belief in the fundamental freedoms as the foundation of justice and peace in the world. This Court was established to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Parties to the Convention. It is in this spirit that the intervening Governments reiterate their unwavering support for Ukraine and reaffirm their condemnation of the egregious violations of international law perpetrated by the Russian Federation.” IV.   PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS A.   Introduction 159.  Under the terms of Article 32 of the Convention, the Court’s jurisdiction “[extends] to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47”. “In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction”, the decision is a matter for the Court (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 383). Its principal role, as defined by Article 19, is “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto” (see, in this respect, Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above § 78). 160.  Article 33 of the Convention empowers any High Contracting Party to “refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party” (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 384). 161.  The Court has repeatedly emphasised that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national interests but to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed in its Statute, and “to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” (see the Commission’s decision on the admissibility of application no. 788/60, Austria v. Italy, 11 January 1961, Yearbook, vol. 4, p. 116 at p. 138, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 385). It follows that when a High Contracting Party or Parties refer an alleged breach of the Convention to the Court under Article 33 of the Convention, they are not to be regarded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing their own rights, but rather as bringing before the Court “an alleged violation of the public order of Europe” (Austria v. Italy, cited above, p. 140. See also France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, nos. 9940/82, 9942/82, 9944/82, 9941/82 and 9943/82, Commission decision of 6 December 1983, Decisions and Reports 35, p. 143 at p. 169, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 385). 162.  It is important for the Court to acknowledge and set out the full context in which it is examining the present inter-State case. The Court will accordingly first review the historical context of the Council of Europe and the Convention, before turning to examine the present conflict. B.   Historical context 163.  On 5 May 1949 the Heads of State and Government of ten European States signed the Statute of the Council of Europe in London. This was a historic moment for the European continent, in a century that had already seen two world wars waged on its soil. As the High Contracting Parties recently underlined at the conclusion of the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe in Reykjavík in May 2023 and, again, in their submissions to the Court (see paragraph 157 above and B342): “The Council of Europe was founded in the wake of the Second World War, born out of the conviction that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation. It is a peace project, built on the promise of ‘never again’ ...” 164.  The Preamble to the Statute reflects this context, with the first recital referring to the High Contracting Parties’ conviction that the “pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation”. In creating the Council of Europe, the founding States were “[r]eaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy” (second recital at B63). 165.  The aim of the Council of Europe, set out in Article 1 of the Statute, is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, every member of the Council of Europe must “accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council” (B64‑65). 166.  In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, the High Contracting Parties expressly reaffirmed “their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend”. This underlines that their purpose in concluding the Convention on 4 November 1950 was to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law (see the Commission’s decision on the admissibility of application no. 788/60, Austria v. Italy, 11 January 1961, Yearbook, vol. 4, p. 116 at p. 138). The Convention is the cornerstone of the Council of Europe’s activities and its ratification is a prerequisite for joining the Organisation. 167.  The past seventy-five years have been largely characterised by peace in Europe and cooperation among Council of Europe member States. This does not mean that conflict has been entirely absent. In the early days of operation of the Convention system, the former Commission was confronted with large-scale human rights violations in the context of the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in July and August 1974 and the continuing division of the territory of Cyprus (see, for example, Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, D.R. 2, p. 125; Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 8007/77, Commission decision of 10 July 1978, DR 13, p. 85; and Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey, nos. 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89, 4 March 1991, D.R. 68, p. 216). Several cases arising out of that conflict later came before the Court (see, notably, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310; Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; and Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], cited above). In the 1990s, a number of regional conflicts erupted in what were at the time non-Contracting Parties, many linked to the fall of Communism and the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia. These States subsequently became members of the Council of Europe but in some cases were left with “frozen conflicts” that have continued to flare up from time to time and to generate a sizeable proportion of the Court’s case-load (see, for example, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, ECHR 2012 (extracts); Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, 23 February 2016; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, ECHR 2015; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, ECHR; 2015; and Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], no. 38263/08, 21 January 2021). C.   The present conflict 168.  The present case arises from events dating back to the spring of 2014 with the occupation and annexation by Russia of Crimea, part of Ukrainian sovereign territory, and the appearance of separatist armed groups in eastern Ukraine who subsequently took control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared independence from Ukraine. The Court concluded that the events in Crimea from February 2014 fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and subsequently found multiple violations of the Convention on account of acts attributable to Russia within that territory (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) and the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), both cited above). In its admissibility decision in respect of eastern Ukraine, the Court held that by 11 May 2014, the separatist operation as a whole in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was being managed and coordinated by the Russian Federation and that these areas were under the latter State’s effective control (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 693 and 695). 169.  Following the initial period of intense fighting in eastern Ukraine after hostilities first began in April 2014, the ensuing years of the conflict saw continuing skirmishes at the contact line, with repeated attempts to agree lasting ceasefires resulting in periods of reduced hostilities followed by periods of more intense and extensive hostilities as ceasefires broke down. This was the context of the conflict that was before the Court at the time of its admissibility hearing on 26 January 2022. The admissibility hearing took place against the backdrop of increasing tensions in the region. Widespread reports of a renewed massive build‑up of Russian troops at the border had been circulating since late 2021 (B380, 443, 2233 and 3353). The Minister of Justice of Ukraine appeared before the Court at the hearing in January 2022 and referred in his oral submissions to the fact that Russia had “recently ... amassed enormous forces along the border of Ukraine, threatening ... invasion and an all-out war”. He said, “Ukraine is facing a threat of invasion by [a] fully prepared Russian army of over one hundred thousand servicemen”. 170.  Since the admissibility hearing, the nature of the conflict has substantially changed. By February 2022 it was estimated that there were some 190,000 Russian troops deployed in Russian border areas near Ukraine (see paragraph 64 above and B444 and 3356-57). Less than one month after the admissibility hearing, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian armed forces entered Ukrainian sovereign territory at various border points from Russia and Belarus and from Crimea and launched attacks by land, air and sea. In the north of Ukraine, Russian troops crossed into Ukraine from Belarus advancing towards Kyiv and were involved in attacks on Chernihiv, Slavutych, Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel and Vorzel. Russian forces also attacked from the north-eastern part of Ukraine, targeting Kharkiv, Sumy, Okhtyrka, Brovary, Volnovakha and Izium. Russian troops in the east attacked from Donbas, extending “DPR” and “LPR” territory there. In the south of Ukraine, Russian forces moved from Crimea in the direction of Odesa and attacked Kherson, Mykolaiv, Melitopol and Mariupol. Ukrainian towns and cities in these areas and beyond were subjected to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire causing large‑scale death, injury and destruction. On 30 September 2022 the Russian Federation announced the “accession” to the Russian Federation of the partially-occupied Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine (B27-29). As the Court deliberated on the case before it, the hostilities continued on Ukrainian territory, with every month that passed bringing new deaths and extensive destruction. 171.  The actions of the Russian Federation have met with widespread condemnation from the international community. On 25 February 2022 the Russian Federation was suspended from its rights of representation in the Council of Europe (see paragraph 81 above). On the same day, a draft resolution demanding that the Russian Federation cease its use of force against Ukraine failed to pass in the United Nations Security Council owing to a veto by the Russian Federation (see paragraph 94 above). On 2 March 2022 the General Assembly of the United Nations demanded that the Russian Federation immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine (see paragraph 95 above). On 16 March 2022 the ICJ issued provisional measures ordering the Russian Federation inter alia immediately to suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 (see paragraph 110 above). 172.  Meanwhile, on 15 March 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe unanimously expressed the view that the military aggression of the Russian Federation had shown “disregard for the very essence of the Council of Europe, as enshrined in its Statute” and had seriously breached Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 165 above). The Parliamentary Assembly concluded that the Committee of Ministers should request the Russian Federation to withdraw immediately from the Council of Europe, or expel the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe (see paragraph 88 above). On 16 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers decided that as of that day the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 89 above).  On 22 March 2022 the Court declared that the Russian Federation would cease to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022 (see paragraph 90 above). 173.  At the Reykjavík Summit of the Council of Europe, the Heads of State and Government underlined that the “promise of ‘never again’” upon which the Council of Europe had been built (see paragraph 163 above) had been “fundamentally challenged by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine”. The declaration continued: “It underpins why we, the Leaders of Europe, have come together to state our resolve to unite around our values and against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a flagrant violation of international law and everything we stand for. We have a common responsibility to fight autocratic tendencies and growing threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Those core values are the bedrock of our continued freedom, peace, prosperity and security for Europe. As we approach the 75th anniversary of the Council of Europe, our vision for the Organisation remains the same. Our European democracies are not established once and for all. We need to strive to uphold them each and every day, continuously, in all parts of our continent. The Council of Europe remains the guiding light that assists us in fostering greater unity among us for the purpose of safeguarding and realising these ideals and principles which are our common heritage ... We reaffirm our deep and abiding commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as the ultimate guarantors of human rights across our continent, alongside our domestic democratic and judicial systems. We reaffirm our primary obligation under the Convention to secure to everyone within our jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention ...” 174.  Even before the sharp escalation of military operations on 24 February 2022, a narrative seeking to undermine Ukraine’s statehood which asserted Ukraine’s history as part of Russia and claimed that it was “entirely a product of the Soviet era” was being deliberately and strategically circulated in the Russia media (B1515-20). The transformation from covert to openly acknowledged operations in Ukraine has brought transparency to the objectives of the Russian Federation. These objectives appear to be no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State, through the forcible acquisition of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of any remaining Ukrainian nation to Russian influence and control. Through written articles, oral comments and posts on social media, the President of the respondent State and other senior Government figures have sought to portray the use of armed force and the forcible acquisition of territory in Ukraine as support for the right to self-determination of those residing in Russia’s “historical lands”, as the defence of ethnic Russians against “genocide” and as a matter of Russia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (for example, B1521-33, 1547-48, 1588-89 and 1592). 175.  It is noteworthy that in disseminating this narrative, the Russian Federation has not identified any clear limitations to its territorial ambitions, either in Ukraine or beyond. On the contrary, representatives of the respondent State have publicly alluded to the forcible acquisition of the entire territory of Ukraine all the way to the Polish border (B1588-89, 1591-92 and 1595). Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv and Odesa, have been referred to as “Russian cities” and reference has also been made to “temporarily occupied Poland and our Baltic provinces” (B1590 and 1593. See also B1591-92). The President of the respondent State referred in January 2024 to Russians being “pushed out of” Latvia and other Baltic countries, adding that these were “very serious matters that directly affect our country’s security” (B1557). Similar rhetoric has been employed in respect of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (B1575-76). 176.  The potential for further escalation has frequently been invoked by senior Russian political figures. When announcing the start of the February 2022 invasion the President of the Russian Federation warned that Russia would respond immediately to anyone who tried to stand in its way, with consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history” (B1532). He underlined that “all the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken”. He later warned that if Russia’s territorial integrity or its people were threatened “we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us”, adding “[t]his is not a bluff.” (B1542). While making the point that nuclear weapons could only be used in exceptional circumstances, he has nonetheless continuously repeated the grounds on which their use would be justified (B1548-49 and 1567-68), reiterating in February 2024 that “the strategic nuclear forces are on full combat alert and the ability to use them is assured (B1564). Other senior Russian political figures have been more explicit (B1596). As the Commission of Inquiry observed in its October 2022 report, “the threat by the Russian Federation of use of its nuclear capabilities became a major concern for the international community” (C.II.32). On 25 September 2024 the President of the respondent State announced that changes to the conditions for the use of nuclear force by the Russian Federation were under consideration. He outlined that under the new proposals Russia would consider an attack from a non-nuclear state but “involving or supported by” a nuclear state to be a “joint attack” and that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons if it received “reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons and their crossing our state border” (B1570). On 19 November 2024 the President of the respondent State signed an Executive Order implementing these changes. The amended State policy further permits the use of nuclear weapons in the event of “aggression” against the Russian Federation and/or Belarus with the use of conventional weapons, which creates a “critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity” (B22-23). D.   Conclusions 177.  As noted above, the Court has previously been required to examine applications arising out of situations of conflict in Europe (see paragraph 167 above). However, the events in Ukraine are unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The nature and scale of the violence as well as the ominous statements concerning Ukraine’s statehood, its independence and its very right to exist represent a threat to the peaceful co-existence that Europe has long taken for granted. As already explained, this dangerous rhetoric has also on occasion been extended to encompass other Council of Europe member States, including Poland, Moldova and the Baltic countries. These actions seek to undermine the very fabric of the democracy on which the Council of Europe and its member States are founded by their destruction of individual freedoms, their suppression of political liberties and their blatant disregard for the rule of law. In none of the conflicts previously before the Court has there been such near universal condemnation of the “flagrant” disregard by the respondent State for the foundations of the international legal order established after the Second World War and such clear measures taken by the Council of Europe to sanction the respondent State’s disrespect for the fundamental values of the Council of Europe: peace, as already underlined, but no less importantly human life, human dignity and the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention. 178.  The Court’s task under Article 19 is limited to ensuring the observance by the High Contracting Parties of the engagements undertaken in the Convention and its Protocols. The Court is not called upon to decide on the legality of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine in the abstract or the individual criminal responsibility of those implicated in the events, but rather to decide on the conformity of the actions of the respondent State with the fundamental guarantees contained in the Convention and its Protocols. 179.  Pursuant to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“the Vienna Convention”), the Court endeavours, in each case to come before it, to interpret the Convention in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The underlying objectives of the Convention – namely to realise the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe by promoting peace based on justice and international cooperation – are of critical importance for the Court today in its interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. V.      THE TEMPORAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A.   The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicant Ukrainian Government 180.  The applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that although Russia had ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022, this did not relieve it from its obligations under the Convention concerning any act performed by that State before 16 September 2022, the date on which it ceased to be a Party to the Convention (“the termination date”). Moreover, where the interference had occurred before the termination date but the failure to remedy it had occurred after the termination date, it was the date of the interference that had to be retained for determining the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (citing Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, § 53, 6 June 2023). Where an administrative practice was alleged, evidence might be admissible to corroborate the existence of such a practice even where the events said to make up the pattern continued after the State concerned had ceased to be a Contracting Party, provided that the administrative practice was also in existence during the time period under consideration by the Court. Thus, while the Court might decline to make a finding of an individual violation falling outside the temporal scope of the case declared admissible, evidence of events occurring outside the time frame could be admitted as relevant to the existence of an administrative practice during the relevant period. 181.  Moreover, the applicant Ukrainian Government contended that events occurring after 16 September 2022 remained within the jurisdiction of the Court in so far as they arose directly out of, and/or were connected to, incidents occurring prior to that date. They relied in particular in this respect on the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 266) (B293-95), and argued that the same approach should be followed in this case. 2.     The respondent Government 182.  The respondent Government did not take part in the present proceedings on the merits of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 and the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22 (see paragraph 142 above). As a result, no submissions were received from them as to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, either in general or in response to the specific arguments of the applicant Ukrainian Government. B.   The Court’s assessment 183.  In its admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 393), the Court noted: “Since the allegation is that the administrative practices are ongoing, in accordance with its usual practice the Court will consider the evidence available to it up to 26 January 2022, the date of the admissibility hearing, in order to determine the admissibility issues arising, including the question of jurisdiction. Evidence of events post-dating the admissibility hearing will be relevant to the Court’s determinations at any subsequent merits stage as to whether any Russian jurisdiction established continued after 26 January and up until 16 September 2022, the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention ...; and as to the period during which the administrative practice in question, if found established, took place.” 184.  In view of the arguments advanced by the applicant Ukrainian Government, the Court must now consider whether it may take into account incidents subsequent to 16 September 2022 and, if so, whether such events themselves fall within its temporal jurisdiction such that a violation of the Convention might be found in respect of them. 185.  In Pivkina and Others v. Russia (cited above), the Court had to determine its approach to acts spanning the termination date. In respect of allegations of ongoing violations, it explained that a “continuing situation” that spanned the termination date fell within its temporal jurisdiction only for the part occurring before that date. However, where it could be demonstrated that the specific allegation related to the “continuous” effect of an act that preceded the termination date, the entire period in which the effect of that act was felt fell within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. Thus a period of detention authorised before the termination date but extending beyond it fell within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction in its entirety on account of the “continuous” effect of the detention order. In contrast, a factual situation such as allegedly inhuman conditions of confinement, even if continuous, had no “overflowing” effects and jurisdiction therefore ended at the termination date (ibid., § 61). In Pivkina and Others, the Court accordingly found a complaint against Russia about pre-trial detention until 11 October 2022 to fall within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction on the basis that the decision authorising that period of detention had been taken before the termination date. This approach has since been confirmed and applied in the Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (cited above, §§ 892-97). 186.  In the present case, the allegations do not concern continuing situations in respect of alleged individual violations, but rather alleged ongoing administrative practices affecting a large number of individuals over a wide geographical area and a lengthy period of time. The Court has no jurisdiction to examine new occurrences of the alleged administrative practices which took place after the termination date. It notes, moreover, that the allegations advanced under Article 5 of the Convention in the present case do not concern the continuous effects of detention orders but rather an ongoing practice of arresting, abducting and detaining individuals, without any legal authority, which practice began before the termination date and continued after it. 187.  The case of Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (cited above) does not assist the applicant Ukrainian Government in this respect. In that case, the ICJ found that it was competent to examine events which had taken place after the denunciation of the treaty giving it jurisdiction to rule on a dispute concerning compliance with international customary law had taken place. However, it is noteworthy that the treaty concerned in that case merely regulated the question of the court’s jurisdiction: it had no impact on the continuing existence of the underlying obligations of the respondent State in that case, which arose from customary international law. This Court’s jurisdiction extends, under Article 32 of the Convention, to “all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in [Article] 33 ...”. Article 19 clarifies that the Court was established to “ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto”. The jurisdiction of the Court is thus explicitly linked to the existence of obligations under the Convention itself and it does not have the authority to ensure compliance with international treaties or obligations other than the Convention. The obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention ceased after 16 September 2022. It is, therefore, irrelevant in this respect that the same or similar obligations may continue to exist under other treaties or indeed under customary international law (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 454, 9 April 2024). 188.  In conclusion, having regard to the nature of the allegations it is called upon to examine in the present case, the Court finds that its temporal jurisdiction in this case extends no further than 16 September 2022 (cf. the judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 897). However, facts which fall outside the temporal jurisdiction of the Court as having occurred after the termination date may nonetheless be relevant to the overall context of the case (see, for example, paragraphs 330, 347, 1144, 1174, 1476‑1478 and 1556-1563 below). The Court may, therefore, have regard to facts which occurred following the termination date in so far as it considers appropriate in its assessment of whether there was a violation of the Convention in respect of acts which occurred prior to the termination date (see, mutatis mutandis, Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], no. 31443/96, § 74, ECHR 2002-X; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, §§ 240-41, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Savickis and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 49270/11, § 211, 9 June 2022. Regarding the relevance of the pre‑ratification case-law in this context, see Pivkina and Others, cited above, § 50). VI.    APPROACH TO EVIDENCE A.   Evidence in the case 189.  The evidential material before the Court is summarised in annexes to the Court’s admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) and to the present judgment. Annex A contains summaries of the evidence before the Court at the separate admissibility stage of the proceedings. Annex B contains summaries of the remaining evidence before the Court at this admissibility and merits stage of the proceedings. Annex C contains reports of the Commission of Inquiry (see paragraph 108 above). In view of the volume of the material submitted to the Court, the vast majority of the evidence is necessarily presented in the annexes in summary form. When reviewing the evidence in the context of the present judgment, the Court has, however, had regard to the source material. For this reason, the judgment may on occasion make reference to extracts of documents not summarised in the annexes. For reasons of readability, footnotes have been omitted in quotes from source material contained in the present judgment. 190.  In its separate admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, the Court explained that, aside from the parties’ submissions and the evidential material provided by them, it had had regard to material in the public domain (ibid., § 405). It has once again followed this approach in the context of its present examination of the merits of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 and the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22. 191.  As the Court indicated in its separate decision on admissibility, the present case concerns the extent of the responsibility of the respondent State for the Convention violations alleged (ibid., § 395). Potential violations of the Convention or international humanitarian law by Ukraine are not therefore the subject of the Court’s examination (see, in this respect, Russia v. Ukraine (dec), no. 36958/21, 4 July 2023; there are also approximately 4,000 applications pending against Ukraine related to the conflict). As a consequence, the summary of relevant evidence in the present judgment focuses on evidence concerning the conduct of Russia’s de jure and de facto armed forces. Material related to the actions of the Ukrainian armed forces or volunteer battalions, and the shelling of territory in the hands of the “DPR” and the “LPR” by the Ukrainian armed forces, is not included in the summaries. 192.  The evidence is vast and the factual material included in the present judgment is, necessarily, a summary of the most relevant reports and other material that have been submitted by the parties. Further relevant evidence to which the Court has had regard can be found in the annexes to the separate admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) and to the present judgment, and in the source material itself. B.   The burden of proof and the drawing of inferences 193.  The Court set out, in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, its general approach to evidence and to the burden and standard of proof and the drawing of inferences (ibid., §§ 396 and 434-53). It explained how it approached the particular allegations and the different categories of evidence in the case-file (ibid., §§ 454-81). These passages are equally relevant to the Court’s examination of the evidence now before it. The Court will accordingly apply the principles and approaches outlined in its decision with one exception: in light of the fact that the Court is now also examining the merits of the alleged violations, the applicable standard of proof to be satisfied is that of “beyond reasonable doubt” (see the judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 849-51; and compare § 454 in fine of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, concerning the lower standard of proof applicable at the admissibility stage of proceedings). C.   The Court’s approach to new categories of evidence 1.     Introduction 194.  There are two notable, new categories of evidence now before the Court: the reports and 2023 conference room paper of the Commission of Inquiry established by the UN HRC on 4 March 2022; and the reports of the missions of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism on 14 March 2022 (see paragraphs 97, 108 and 115-118 above). The Court considers it helpful to explain how it has approached this evidence. 2.     The findings of the Commission of Inquiry 195.  The findings of the Commission of Inquiry rely primarily on first-hand information, including numerous visits to Ukraine to collect and preserve evidence of violations and related crimes; hundreds of interviews conducted in person and remotely; inspection of sites of destruction, graves, places of detention and torture, and weapon remnants; and consultation of a large number of documents and reports. The Commission of Inquiry has met with government authorities, international organisations, civil society and other relevant stakeholders. According to its published methodology, it has included findings in its report when, based on a body of verified information, an objective and ordinary prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts had taken place as described. It has drawn legal conclusions when there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts met all the elements of a violation or abuse and, where possible, that an individual or entity was responsible. 196.  The Court will therefore give significant weight to the objective, factual reporting contained in the reports and the 2023 conference room paper of the Commission of Inquiry. The legal conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, which address questions of compliance with international law, may also be relevant to the Court’s examination of the issues arising. The Court will, however, approach these conclusions with some caution since the Commission of Inquiry has a fact-finding and evidence-gathering mandate (see paragraph 97 above and C.I.11) and its legal conclusions are made in the context of, and to the extent necessary for it to fulfil, this mandate. In any case, the Court’s task is to reach its own conclusions on the respondent State’s compliance with the Convention applying its own standard of proof. 3.     The reports by the OSCE missions of experts 197.  The reports prepared by the OSCE missions of experts each contain a section outlining the methodology followed in the preparation of the report. According to the reports, the first mission did not carry out an on-site visit but relied on a large variety of sources and reached out to a large number of contacts within international organisations with knowledge about the situation including, in particular, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Council of Europe. The mission held direct interviews with persons possessing particular knowledge on the matter and actively followed relevant media reports. The second mission included a visit to Ukraine which allowed the experts to collect essential direct information as well as to confirm information learned from other sources. 198.  The third and fourth missions relied on written materials, including submissions via a special email channel established for these purposes by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); and interviews with victims, witnesses, representatives of international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), human rights defenders, academics, members of the legal profession and journalists. The experts also undertook visits to Ukraine where they met representatives of Ukrainian State organs and of civil society, including legal professionals and journalists; and visited places where Ukrainian civilians had been detained during the period of Russian occupation in spring 2022 in the Kyiv region (mainly Bucha and Irpin). The third and fourth reports specify that the missions applied the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof in their assessment of factual and legal aspects. This standard was considered to be met when at least two credible primary sources independently confirmed the veracity of certain facts or information. The missions actively sought to verify and cross-check all data used in their report. The reports refrain from making any allegations related to criminal responsibility of concrete individuals. 199.  The reports by the OSCE mission of experts contain important factual information on the events in Ukraine after 24 February 2022, much of it from primary sources. The Court therefore considers it appropriate to place substantial weight on the objective factual reporting contained in these reports. The Court further observes that the experts appointed by the OSCE to undertake these missions were legal experts with backgrounds in international humanitarian law and international human rights law who were mandated to report on potential violations of international humanitarian law. The Court will accordingly have regard to the legal conclusions reached in the mission reports when examining relevant issues in the present case, although as already noted (see paragraph 196 above) it will reach its own legal conclusions on the legal matters arising in the case. 4.     Other reports 200.  The methodologies of other reports relied on by the Court are described in the relevant annexes. VII. ARTICLE 1 JURISDICTION AND ATTRIBUTION 201.  Article 1 of the Convention provides: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.” A.   The complaints 1.     Complaints in respect of which jurisdiction has been established 202.  In its admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above), the Court found that areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine were within the respondent State’s jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1, from 11 May 2014 up to the date of the admissibility hearing on 26 January 2022. It explained: “695. The vast body of evidence above demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that, as a result of Russia’s military presence in eastern Ukraine and the decisive degree of influence and control it enjoyed over the areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine as a result of its military, political and economic support to the separatist entities, these areas were, from 11 May 2014 and subsequently, under the effective control of the Russian Federation .... The threshold for establishing Russian jurisdiction in respect of allegations concerning events which took place within these areas after 11 May 2014 has therefore passed. Moreover, in response to the invitation in June 2020 to clarify the nature of the current relationship between Russia and the separatist entities ..., the respondent Government replied that “[t]here has been no change to the relationship outlined above”. In the absence of any evidence demonstrating that the dependence of the entities on Russia has decreased since 2014, the Court finds that the jurisdiction of the respondent State continued as at the date of the hearing on 26 January 2022. As noted above ..., it may be necessary for the Grand Chamber to assess, at the merits stage, whether the jurisdiction of the respondent Government continued beyond that date. ... 697. ... It will be for the respondent Government to demonstrate at the subsequent merits phase of these proceedings, should they wish to do so, that the separatists did not, in fact, control particular pockets of land or commit the particular acts which form the basis of the allegations by the applicant States; or that the specific acts of particular separatists cannot be attributed to them. 698. A finding of spatial jurisdiction brings within the jurisdiction of the respondent State all complaints which concern events occurring wholly within the relevant area ...” 203.  As regards the downing of flight MH17, the Court observed that it had been clearly established that both the firing of the Buk missile and the consequent downing of flight MH17 had occurred in territory which was in the hands of separatists and therefore within Russian jurisdiction. It was accordingly satisfied that the applicant Dutch Government’s complaints fell within the spatial jurisdiction of the respondent State (ibid., §§ 701-06). 2.     Complaints in respect of which jurisdiction now falls to be determined 204.  The first question to be addressed in the present case is whether the jurisdiction of the respondent Government already found to exist in respect of areas under separatist control from 11 May 2014 continued after 26 January 2022, the date of the admissibility hearing (see paragraph 5 above). 205.  Second, following the adoption of its admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above), the Court decided to join application no. 11055/22 to the existing case pending before the Grand Chamber (see paragraph 16 above). It is therefore necessary now for the Court to determine the extent to which the complaints made by the applicant Ukrainian Government in this application fall within the respondent State’s jurisdiction. 206. Finally, in its admissibility decision (ibid.), the Court joined to the merits the objection raised by the respondent Government as to whether the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints of administrative practices of bombing and shelling in violation of Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, together with associated Article 14 complaints, fell within the Article 1 jurisdiction of the respondent State (see paragraph 7 above). The Court must therefore also now resolve this matter. B.   The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicant Ukrainian Government 207.  Concerning the question of Russian jurisdiction for events in the “DPR” and the “LPR” post-dating the Court’s hearing on admissibility of 26 January 2022, the applicant Ukrainian Government submitted that there was no evidence that the complete dependence of the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the respondent State had decreased following that date. Indeed, the entities’ complete dependence on the respondent State had continued to increase rapidly, culminating in the illegal annexation by that State of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas alongside other Ukrainian territories occupied since 24 February 2022. The applicant Ukrainian Government invited the Court to apply its approach in cases concerning Transnistria and update its position as to the temporal scope of jurisdiction in the three applications concerned (nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) to include all events for the period from 11 May 2014 to at least 16 September 2022. 208.  The applicant Ukrainian Government made extensive submissions on jurisdiction in respect of their 2022 application in their memorial. Their primary submission was that Article 1 jurisdiction should be determined by reference to the legal space of the Council of Europe. If the Court did not accept the primary submission, then there was a sufficient jurisdictional link over all matters complained of on the basis of the Court’s existing case‑law. The applicant Ukrainian Government provided detailed arguments as to how the Court ought to approach the application of its judgment in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above). 209.  At the hearing (see paragraph 27 above), the applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that as a result of “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine” since 2014, almost 26% of Ukraine’s territory was “temporarily occupied”. The consistent and continuing long-term policy of Russia was aimed at conquering Ukraine. Russia’s ambitions were not just to unwind Ukraine’s position as an independent sovereign but to destroy Ukraine as a State and Ukrainians as a nation. It wanted to eliminate and assimilate Ukrainians, and in turn destroy the public order of Europe and the global order based on the rules of international law. 210.  The applicant Ukrainian Government advanced the following four key propositions to support their position concerning Article 1 jurisdiction. 211.  First, they invited the Court to conclude that Article 1 jurisdiction was established where, as here, one Convention State, acting entirely within the legal space of the Council of Europe, launched a war of aggression – recognised as such by the UN, the EU and the Council of Europe – against another Convention State. As the common pleading underlined, the core object and purpose of the Convention was to promote peace and security in Europe (see paragraph 157 above). While the scope of Article 1 jurisdiction was primarily territorial, it was not exclusively so. The Court had consistently acknowledged the particular importance of the Convention’s network of mutual undertakings and the concept of a Council of Europe legal space. The present context was focused entirely on the Council of Europe legal space and involved the most extraordinary and exceptional circumstances to come before the Court in its 65-year history. The Court was required to confront a large-scale inter-State conflict within the Council of Europe, of a kind that those drafting the Convention and founding the Council had been determined to prevent. The objective intent and effect of Russia’s war of aggression was to displace Ukraine’s ability to uphold the Convention, and its territorial control and jurisdiction. There had been open admissions as to Russia’s overall intent and motivation, including by President Putin. Recognising Article 1 jurisdiction was entirely consistent with fundamental aspects of the Court’s core case-law, namely that Article 1 should not be interpreted in such a way as to allow a State to perpetrate violations on the territory of another State which it could not perpetrate on its own territory; that the Convention is an instrument of European public order and collective security and should not be interpreted so as to create a vacuum within Council of Europe legal space; and that Article 1 could not be interpreted in a way that would undermine the effectiveness of the Convention both as a guardian of human rights and as a guarantor of peace, stability and the rule of law in Europe. 212.  Second, in the alternative, the concept of Convention legal space justified a generous interpretation of established concepts of State agent authority, effective control, and jurisdiction over procedural violations, such that Article 1 was satisfied on that basis. Regard was to be had to the exceptionally detailed evidence available and the complete failure of Russia to offer any argument or evidence in rebuttal. Satisfaction of the existing exceptions was particularly clear in all instances of territorial control, including all situations of complete or partial encirclement. There was, moreover, no reason not to find State agent authority to be established in all cases of attacks directed against civilians and civilian objects and indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, given the sophistication of weaponry available to Russia and the administrative practices alleged. There was, furthermore, every reason to find that the war crimes alleged constituted a special feature sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link in respect of all procedural violations complained of. 213.  Third, the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment (cited above) presented no obstacle to either Ukraine’s primary or its secondary case in favour of Article 1 jurisdiction. It expressly recognised the potential for cross-border use of force to establish jurisdiction. It was not to be treated as establishing any wider precedent capable of standing in the way of any part of the present case, for a number of reasons. First, it had not considered the primary argument raised in this case based on a war of aggression and Convention legal space, the destruction of statehood and territorial sovereignty and the foundational purposes of the Convention and the Council of Europe. As far as Russian intent was concerned, the Court had not previously had the same unequivocal evidence now before it. Second, the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment did not refer to the concepts of Convention legal space and legal vacuum. Third, the judgment had been significantly clarified and narrowed in its application in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia to the allegations of the Netherlands concerning the downing of flight MH17 ((dec.), cited above, §§ 576 and 703-04). The chaos that might exist in certain particularly dynamic phases in an active conflict combat zone did not automatically extend to the entire theatre of operations. Just as the Court had found in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (ibid., § 704) that it was possible in an active combat situation to distinguish the use of surface-to-air missiles as one defined by less “chaos”, the administrative practices of deliberate shelling and bombing of civilians, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian corridors and failing to discriminate between legitimate military targets and civilians were analytically distinct, even where they had taken place in a context where military positions were also being shelled. Fourth, there was no context of chaos in the present case: the allegations concerned targeted conduct with clear intent, an entirely sufficient legal proximity between perpetrators and victim, and an overwhelming body of detailed and uncontested evidence. The Court could easily pierce “the fog of war” (see ibid., § 705) in respect of these administrative practices because the information available was exceptionally vast, reliable and detailed. Fifth, the reasons set out in § 141 of the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment were incapable of justifying any wider application of the approach taken. 214.  The applicant Ukrainian Government further argued that the Court could not ignore the momentous significance of the return of inter-State conflict on such a large scale in Europe. Conditions had changed dramatically, and for the worse: the new reality in Europe involved war between the two largest State parties to the Convention – on a wider scale, and already of significantly longer duration, than the five-day conflict between Russia and Georgia – characterised by one State party’s attempt to invade and subjugate the sovereign territory of the other. The applicant Ukrainian Government underlined the unique circumstances of the present case, involving a full-scale war of aggression aimed at the destruction and subjugation of the State entirely. The “context of chaos” to which the Court had referred in Georgia v. Russia (II) was distinct from one High Contracting Party trying to destroy another High Contracting Party. The systematic targeted attacks in the present case had nothing to do with chaos and everything to do with intent. 215.  Finally, the present proceedings were distinct from Georgia v. Russia (II) because Ukraine had the support of twenty-six intervener States: the submissions of the intervening Governments provided strong support for Ukraine both as a matter of legal analysis and State practice. In particular, the common pleading identified the foundational purpose of the Council of Europe as being the pursuit of peace based on justice; recognised that Russia’s conduct was correctly characterised as a war of aggression that had shown disregard for the very essence of the Council of Europe; committed to the protection of the international rule of law and the recognition of the Convention’s fundamental role in protecting human rights, peace and justice in Europe; recognised that acts of Contracting States producing effects outside their territory may amount to the exercise of Article 1 jurisdiction; and gave weight to Convention legal space and the special character of cases addressing military action within the sovereign territory of Council of Europe member States, as well as the need for a generous approach to jurisdiction and the importance of avoiding a legal vacuum in that particular geographic context. 216.  Russia’s pursuit of its war against Ukraine through systematically illegal practices and methods strengthened Ukraine’s case based on the acquisition of territory from another Contracting Party and removal of that Party’s effective control. For example, had hostilities been conducted under an overarching policy of compliance, Russia’s control over Mariupol would have been very different: the nature of the attacks meant that Russian forces had been able to exert control over Mariupol and civilians there even before there were “boots on the ground”. If these attacks were not deemed sufficient to establish effective control even prior to physical presence in the territory, they were nonetheless sufficient to engage Russia’s jurisdiction under the “State agent authority and control” exception because, by their very nature, they created the proximity, power and control required for that exception to apply. The applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that they were not seeking a generalised “cause-and-effect” approach to Article 1 but rather a finding that the essential features of the administrative practices at the heart of Russia’s methods of war and the alleged violations entailed sufficient proximity, power and control for the purposes of the “State agent authority and control” exception. 217.  In response to questions put to them at the hearing (see paragraph 29 above), the applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that none of their complaints related to direct fighting between armed forces. All concerned civilian victims of Russian State conduct and war crimes arising from targeted acts of administrative practices involving the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force with known and foreseeable consequences. Engagement in military activity aimed at the destruction of a victim State’s sovereignty or the deprivation of its territorial control and ability to uphold the Convention was a principled basis for finding Article 1 jurisdiction. Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the Court’s case-law and was a paradigm example of an exceptional circumstance. The object and purpose of the Convention provided a compelling basis for interpreting Article 1 in this way. A distinction by reference to the Council of Europe legal space was fully justified by the expectations every citizen and resident of the Council had of Convention protection, by the network of mutual obligations owed to each other by Convention States and by the underlying origins and purpose of the Convention. The pre-eminent instrument of European public order designed to preserve peace in Europe had to be able to respond to the facts of the present case. A failure to find jurisdiction in the present case would contradict the approach taken by the UN Human Rights Committee and reflected in its General Comment No. 36, by the African Commission in its General Comment 3 and by the Inter-American Commission with its focus on causal effect for jurisdictional purposes (B92-96 and 115-24). 218.  Article 15 showed clearly that the Convention could apply to situations of international armed conflict, which was not surprising since it had been drafted after World War II with the object of preserving peace. The evidence did not support the existence of a practice by States of not derogating from the Convention in times of war: Ukraine had derogated from the Convention in the context of the present armed conflict and the United Kingdom had announced a “presumption to derogate” in future overseas military operations. In any event, lack of derogations could represent political strategic positions; could relate to the law applicable in a particular situation rather than any position on jurisdiction; could reflect an assumption that the Court would apply international humanitarian law as lex specialis, rendering derogation unnecessary; or could be the result of a concern that by derogating under Article 15 a State might be taken to have conceded the existence of Article 1 jurisdiction. The reference in Article 15 § 2 to “lawful acts of war” indicated that the Convention continued to apply to armed conflicts, otherwise such an exclusion would not be needed. The Contracting Parties had therefore expressed their clear wish that, given the paramount value of the right to life, derogation under Article 15 should be the only mechanism allowing the Court to expand the exceptions to Article 2 in the light of international humanitarian law. 219.  The applicant Ukrainian Government concluded that the Court had never held that there could be no extraterritorial jurisdiction in the absence of effective control over an area or State agent authority and control. It had held that exceptional circumstances had to be demonstrated, and those were two instances of such exceptional circumstances so far found by the Court. This case could not be more exceptional: there was no difficulty in recognising a war of aggression of this kind as justifying a finding of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 2.     The respondent Government 220.  The respondent Government did not take part in the present proceedings on the merits of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 and the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22 (see paragraph 142 above). Their general submissions concerning jurisdiction at the separate admissibility stage of the present case (see paragraphs 4-7 above) are summarised in the Court’s admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above), in so far as relevant, as follows: “ 508. The respondent Government opposed what it considered the Court’s expansion of the concept of jurisdiction to cover territory outside the geographical borders of a Contracting State on the basis of ‘effective control’. They argued that this development was not in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or the intentions of the drafters of the European Convention on Human Rights. ‘Jurisdiction’ ordinarily meant sovereign jurisdiction, since a State’s obligations could only be met using sovereign powers. The Convention had been developed to deal with the domestic affairs of States, in tandem with the separate development of the Geneva Conventions dealing with conflict. Without making reference to Articles 15 and 56 of the Convention, the respondent Government asserted that the Convention contained a provision for derogation in the context of conflict and allowed States to decide whether it should apply in foreign dependent territories that they controlled. This latter provision was totally inconsistent with the Court’s imposition of the Convention in relation to territory outside their national territory. 509. The concept of ‘living instrument’ should not be applied to extend the Convention’s reach into areas governed by international humanitarian law. The general position of States had been averse to such a development: they had resisted attempts to extend the Convention to such areas and had not lodged derogations under Article 15 in respect of areas outside their territories that might be under their control. Moreover, manuals for forces operating abroad were based on international humanitarian law. The Court’s expansion of jurisdiction beyond a State’s borders was illegitimate. 510. In any case, even on a most generous reading of the Court’s case‑law, the suggestion that the Russian Federation had effective control over relevant parts of eastern Ukraine was unsustainable. There was no plausible prima facie evidence of any Russian invasion during the relevant period, which if proved might have been sufficient to show effective control under the Court’s case-law. Although ten soldiers of the Russian 331st Guards Airborne Regiment had been captured in Ukraine, they had crossed the border by mistake. As regards alleged control via cross-border shelling by Russian Federation troops, such shelling was denied. In any case, Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others ((dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII) had clearly established that the firing of weapons did not establish control where they landed for the purposes of making that area subject to the jurisdiction of the firing State. ... 516. In their first-stage memorial, submitted after the delivery of the Court’s judgment in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above), the respondent Government argued that the findings in that judgment as regards jurisdiction during the active phase of hostilities applied to the present applications in respect of complaints about military attacks. The judgment excluded the ‘complaints concerning MH17 and all allegations of Ukraine concerning shelling’. 517. They argued that this was a civil war with defined sides and front lines that were moving all the time. The fluidity of the situation was such that no maps were authoritative. This fluidity was illustrated by the maps prepared in the context of Ukraine’s own ATO and a video of them over time and by BBC maps showing very considerable changes over a span of months ... The events in the active conflict – including the downing of flight MH17 – were ‘shrouded in the fog of war’. Generally in these circumstances fact-finding was virtually impossible. The confusion about what side controlled what territory was reflected in Ukraine’s own application: it had ‘repeatedly’ alleged abuses in areas that it claimed to have controlled, at the material times, in its ATO maps. 518. The respondent Government ... considered that using the personal, and not the spatial, conception of jurisdiction to say that the shooting down of flight MH17 was an exercise of physical power over the individuals onboard for the purpose of Article 1 jurisdiction was inconsistent with the Convention and ignored the result and reasoning in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above). The firing of weapons indicated an absence of control over those injured by the weapons and the space they occupied. Weapons were fired to gain control of space or to kill the enemy, not because control existed. To take any other view would be to bring all conflict within the purview of the Court if a civilian (or perhaps even a soldier) were hit. Applying the Convention to conflict would stretch it, irreconcilably, into the legal space governed by the very different rules of international humanitarian law, which were outside the substantive jurisdiction of the Court. It would compromise legal clarity in both spheres and introduce compulsory jurisdiction in relation to international humanitarian law where States had not agreed that any tribunal had compulsory jurisdiction. It would also take this Court into huge uncertainty on the facts. In any case, the applicant Ukrainian Government had completely failed to put forward any basis for considering all members of the ‘DPR’ and the ‘LPR’ to be State agents for the purposes of control. 519. ... [T]he respondent Government also contested the authenticity and reliability of the evidence relied upon by the applicant States to show jurisdiction.” 3.     Third-party submissions (a)   Governments (i)      Introduction 221.  The twenty-six intervening Contracting Parties coordinated their submissions in the following manner as far as Article 1 jurisdiction was concerned. 222.  First, the Governments of all twenty-six States submitted a common pleading (see paragraphs 224-233 below). 223.  The Governments of ten States (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom) submitted separate national pleadings. Of these: -  the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain submitted identical national pleadings (see paragraphs 234-239 below). The comments in their national pleadings were also submitted by the Government of Lithuania and, in large part, by the Government of Poland, both of which made additional comments in their national pleadings. -  the comments in the national pleadings of the Government of the Czech Republic were also submitted in largely identical terms by the Government of Lithuania (see paragraphs 240-243 below). They were also submitted by the Government of Poland, which made further additional comments in their national pleadings. -  the Governments of France (see paragraphs 244-247 below), Latvia (see paragraphs 248-250 below), Poland (see paragraphs 251-261) and the United Kingdom (see paragraphs 262-274) made separate comments in their national pleadings. (ii)    Submissions (α)     Common pleading of all twenty-six Governments 224.  The twenty-six Governments referred to the Court’s case-law to the effect that a State’s jurisdiction was primarily territorial and that acts of Contracting States outside their own territory or producing effects outside their territory “can only in exceptional circumstances amount to the exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1”. The exceptional nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction had been recently confirmed by the Grand Chamber in Duarte Agostinho and others v. Portugal and 32 others ((dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024). 225.  The Court had developed two main criteria for determining whether such exceptional circumstances existed. 226.  The first criterion – effective control over an area – could be fulfilled either because of direct control by the Contracting State over an area or because of indirect control through a subordinate local administration. This assessment was fact-based. The Court would primarily have reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the area. The existence of a military occupation for the purpose of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations would be a strong indication that there was also effective control over an area for the purposes of Article 1 jurisdiction. In other situations, other indicators could also be relevant, such as the extent to which military, economic and political support for the local subordinate administration provided the extraterritorial State with influence and control over the region. They highlighted the relevant findings in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above, §§ 561 and 564) and observed: “In sum, if it is established on the basis of the factual military presence, and/or on a State’s military, economic and political support for a local subordinate administration that it exercised effective control over an area, this constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. In such a situation, all acts by a local administration can be attributed to the State exercising jurisdiction, and for the purposes of Convention obligations, the area is treated as indistinguishable from the State’s own territory.” 227.  The intervening Governments believed that this first criterion was satisfied in relation to events that took place in all areas under effective control by Russian forces, including those areas which were subsequently recovered by Ukrainian forces, such as Bucha or Kherson. 228.  Jurisdiction based on the second criterion – State agent authority and control over individuals – was also necessarily fact-based. The exercise of jurisdiction through State agent authority and control could be established on the basis of three grounds: the activities of diplomatic and consular agents when they exerted authority and control over others; exercising public powers through the consent, invitation, or acquiescence of the government of a territory; and, in certain circumstances, the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory. As to the third ground, the decisive criterion, as set out in Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011), remained the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question. Even in an international armed conflict, if an individual was taken into the custody of State agents this could give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction. Similarly, “extraterritorial jurisdiction has been recognised as a result of situations in which the officials of a State operating outside its territory, through control over buildings, aircraft or ships in which individuals were held, [officials of a State] exercised power and physical control over those persons” (citing M.N. and others v. Belgium [GC], no. 3599/18, § 105, 5 May 2020). It could not be excluded that some other situations described in application no. 11055/22 might also come under this heading, including where individuals were abused or summarily executed by soldiers in circumstances of close proximity. The intervening Governments noted that jurisdiction had been found by the Court in respect of isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity. Thus, jurisdiction has been found in respect of the beating or shooting by State agents of individuals outside that State’s territory and the extrajudicial targeted killing of an individual by State agents in the territory of another Contracting State, outside the context of military operations. The Court had explained that accountability in these situations stemmed from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention could not be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State which it could not perpetrate on its own territory. Likewise, targeted violations of the human rights of an individual by one Contracting State in the territory of another Contracting State undermined the effectiveness of the Convention. The common pleading referred to and quoted Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above, §§ 568-72) in this respect. 229.  The twenty-six Governments noted that in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above), the Court referred to “the very reality of armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos” as excluding effective control over an area and State agent authority and control. However, this conclusion had been qualified by the admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above), where the Court had clarified that this did not generally exclude jurisdiction in an international armed conflict. The twenty‑six Governments further noted the Court’s finding in the admissibility decision that jurisdiction arose under Article 1 of the Convention in relation to the military operation of the downing of flight MH17 (ibid., §§ 695‑703). This finding had been based on two reasons. First, the Court had noted that the respondent Government exercised “effective control” over the territory under separatist control, which included “effective control” over the airspace above that territory. The downing of flight MH17 within that airspace was therefore an act within the spatial jurisdiction of the respondent Government. Second, the Court had found, in respect of the particular factual circumstances of the downing of flight MH17, that, while it had taken place “in the context of active fighting between the two opposing forces, it would be wholly inaccurate to invoke any ‘context of chaos’ preventing jurisdiction on the basis of effective control over an area from being established”. The Court had therefore concluded that jurisdiction could not be excluded on the basis that it concerned “military operations in the active phase of hostilities”. The twenty-six Governments noted that finding and observed: “If a Government has sufficient control over territory for jurisdiction to arise under the ‘effective control over an area’ principle, this distinguishes the situation from the circumstances addressed by the Court in Georgia v. Russia (II), namely ‘fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area’.” 230.  The twenty-six Governments highlighted two “further notable findings” of the Court as regards jurisdiction on the basis of “effective control over an area” in its admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above). 231.  First, the Court had clarified that the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment could not be seen as authority for excluding entirely from a State’s Article 1 jurisdiction a specific temporal phase of an international armed conflict (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 558). The twenty-six Governments endorsed this clarification. The relevant question was whether there was spatial or personal jurisdiction having regard to the factual circumstances of the acts which were alleged to engage the jurisdiction of a Contracting State under Article 1. 232.  Second, the twenty-six Governments referred to the Court’s observation that it had not, to date, found there to be extraterritorial jurisdiction on account of ratione loci jurisdiction over an area outside the Convention legal space (ibid., § 563). The twenty-six Governments submitted that it was correct to draw attention to the special character of cases addressing military action within the sovereign territory of the member States of the Council of Europe. Moreover, they submitted, “the ‘effective control over an area’ principle should be applied generously within that territory’”. They relied upon the Court’s reasoning in Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], cited above, § 78), where it had referred to the special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order for the protection of individual human beings and the need to avoid a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection which would occur if the benefit of the Convention’s fundamental safeguards were removed from individuals within Convention territory. 233.  Finally, as regards the application of the “State agent authority and control” principle to the facts in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, the Court had not said at the admissibility stage that any form of such authority and control over individuals was excluded in the context of military operations, but had held that “[t]he question whether there was State agent authority and control in respect of acts of shelling in the present case, such as to give rise to the respondent State’s jurisdiction in respect of them, requires a careful examination of whether these incidents fell within the exception identified in Georgia v. Russia (II) by reference to the specific facts of the incidents alleged” ((dec.), cited above, § 700). The twenty-six Governments submitted that the approach of the Court in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) reflected the application of the “effective control over an area” principle and the “State agent authority and control” principle to the specific factual circumstances of the international armed conflict before it. Use of force resulting in loss of life or damage to persons or property did not automatically give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction. On the other hand it would be incorrect to conclude that jurisdiction on the basis of State agent authority and control could never arise in the context of an international armed conflict. (β)      Further submissions of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain, partially joined by Poland 234.  In their national submissions, the five interveners (Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain) distinguished two, partly overlapping categories of cases in the Court’s case-law where extraterritorial jurisdiction might arise on a personal basis: the “exercise by State agents of physical power and control over the victim or the property in question” (most clearly at issue in situations where State agents had custody over an individual); and the use of force against individuals in certain circumstances, referred to by the Court as “specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity” (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 569-70). What this second category of cases entailed precisely had not yet been clearly circumscribed in the Court’s case-law. At the admissibility stage, the Court had not excluded that artillery shelling could give rise to jurisdiction over victims of such attacks. 235.  The five interveners and Poland noted that in cases relating to the procedural obligation to investigate, the Court had relied on the criterion whether a “jurisdictional link” existed between a respondent State and the victim’s relatives in the circumstances of the case. The procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation under Article 2 had evolved into a separate and autonomous obligation that could be considered to be a detachable obligation capable of binding the State even when the death occurred outside its jurisdiction (Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], no. 36925/07, § 189, 29 January 2019). 236.  The five interveners, joined by Poland, observed that the Court had an extensive and established case-law applying the Convention during the active phase of hostilities of an international armed conflict, and to States’ use of military force during armed conflicts extraterritorially. It had found the Convention to be applicable to the extraterritorial use of force in the armed conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, even during “conduct of military operations ... accompanied by arrests and killings on a large scale” (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], cited above, § 133; and Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 186, ECHR 2009). In that context, the Court had also found that “in a zone of international conflict Contracting States are under [the] obligation to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in hostilities” (ibid., § 185). Similarly, with respect to the armed conflict in Iraq, the Court had found that the Convention applied despite the prevalence of “violent attacks” which involved high-intensity armed violence. The armed clashes had involved heavy weaponry such as anti-aircraft attacks and hundreds of grenade, mortar, and rocket-propelled grenade attacks even after the close of “major combat operations” (Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 23). In Issa and Others v. Turkey (no. 31821/96, 16 November 2004), the Court had indicated that it was prepared to accept jurisdiction on the basis of the use of weapons by agents of a Contracting State against individuals on the territory of another State. The context was: “45. The Turkish security forces carried out fourteen major cross-border operations ... The largest operation, called ‘Çelik (steel) operation’ and carried out with the participation of seventy to eighty thousand troops accompanied by tanks, armoured vehicles, aircraft and helicopters, lasted almost six weeks ... The Turkish troops penetrated 40-50 kilometres southwards into Iraq and 385 kilometres to the east.” 237.  It was clear that extraterritorial jurisdiction was not excluded in situations of international armed conflict and that the Court’s case-law was replete with examples of States being held responsible for acts which had occurred in the context of an international armed conflict taking place outside their own sovereign borders (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 556). 238.  The five interveners noted that even where the applicability of the spatial or personal concept of jurisdiction had been established, it had to be considered whether the Georgia v. Russia (II) exception might play a role. This meant that “military operations carried out during the active phase of hostilities”, in the sense of “armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos”, might be excluded from jurisdiction. The five interveners, joined by Poland, considered that it followed from the Court’s application of this exception in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) that this was a factual test, which hinged on the circumstances of the case. There, the Court had found that the military operations carried out had not affected the spatial jurisdiction exercised by the respondent State, through separatists, over areas in eastern Ukraine as regards the downing of flight MH17. The Court had noted in particular that no “context of chaos” existed. It could therefore be concluded that the existence of an international armed conflict, and the conduct of military operations therein, did not as such give rise to a “context of chaos” which excluded the level of control required to establish jurisdiction. This flowed from the Court’s well-established application of the Convention to situations of armed conflict, as well as from its more recent findings in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above). Any existence of a “context of chaos” depended on the facts of the case, and it was for a respondent State to show that it existed. 239.  Finally, the five interveners emphasised that the Georgia v. Russia (II) exception did not apply to situations where a State had taken individuals into custody and to the procedural obligation to investigate. (γ)      Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland 240.  In their national pleadings, the Governments of the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland referred to the Court’s approach to examining jurisdiction in respect of the downing of flight MH17 and its finding that there was no “context of chaos”. They submitted that the same approach should be applied to other military operations conducted with similar or analogous modus operandi, such as those conducted against civilian objects using missile guidance or other target-pointing technologies or in case of attacks conducted far from the frontline. The concept of “context of chaos” was to be understood as relevant primarily in the specific situation of Georgia v. Russia (II). However, were the Court to decide otherwise, there were a variety of circumstances that excluded the application of the concept. This would include attacks against civilians and civilian objects which, assessed as a whole, indicated “deliberate action out of calculation conducted unilaterally”. This could concern, for example, the systematic targeting of residential areas, including with weapons prohibited by international law, those with wide-area effects or those which were by their nature inaccurate; or persistent actions aimed at the complete destruction of residential areas, which could not be considered as usual collateral and unavoidable consequences of the military necessity realised in conditions of chaos. The concept of chaos was likewise not appropriate with respect to situations where clearly visible and marked civilian objects such as kindergartens were attacked or where identified civilians or civilian groups were targeted. In short, attacks against places not linked with any direct military confrontation, and especially places with no military objects, could not be covered by the exception in Georgia v. Russia (II) concerning armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces. 241.  The three intervening Governments further referred to the great number of investigations being conducted into events in Ukraine. These were capable of “piercing the fog of war”. The scale of evidence gathered was enormous. In the same way as the establishment of spatial jurisdiction was based on a global assessment of the criterion of “effective control”, for the establishment of personal jurisdiction in the context of a war of aggression it ought to be sufficient to take into account the prevailing pattern of conduct of the aggressor State acting extraterritorially, unless it was convincingly proven that it lacked control in a particular incident. The Governments of Lithuania and Poland added that if State officials of the aggressor State acted and exerted influence on individuals to the extent that they caused their death and chose to cause the total or major destruction of civilian objects together with civilians, it was for the State to show that it did not exercise control in the particular circumstances. It would be difficult to reconcile the argument of lack of control with situations of besieged or encircled areas where support and supplies of essential goods had been cut off or destroyed in the knowledge that it would endanger the right to life of the population. 242.  All three intervening Governments submitted that the “full-scale war of aggression and in particular the manner of its conduct that aims at exerting extremely wide and profound impact on the rights and freedoms of affected inhabitants should also be treated as a very heavy argument speaking in favour of jurisdiction of the State conducting these actions, based on the criterion of control over individuals”. Any other finding would result in a vacuum in the system of human-rights protection within the legal space of the Convention (citing Güzelyurtlu and Others, cited above, § 195). It would be paradoxical if the Court were able to find jurisdiction in respect of the actions of a State’s agents on the territory of another State Party which cost the life of one person, but was prevented from attributing such jurisdiction over the actions of the entire armed forces on the territory of another State Party, which had cost the lives of thousands. In the particular circumstances of the present case, a finding of no Article 1 jurisdiction would significantly weaken the very raison d’être of the Convention and the Court, with its role as a guardian of human rights protection and guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. It would also lead to the creation of black holes and a legal vacuum in the system of human rights protection in the legal space of the Convention, which went against the very intention of those who had initiated and drafted it. 243.  Finally, the Governments of Lithuania and Poland submitted that a war of aggression made it difficult for, or significantly impeded, the State on whose territory it took place to ensure the implementation of its obligation to secure all the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention to all persons within its territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court required the State affected to take “diplomatic, economic, judicial and other measures” in its power and in accordance with international law in order to fulfil the positive obligations imposed on it by Article 1 (Sandu and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 21034/05, § 34, 17 July 2018). The inter‑State application was exactly one such measure. Having regard to the objectives behind the adoption of the Convention, it ought to be considered that a State affected by aggression was fully entitled to seek protection of the human rights of its citizens against the aggression, including by means of an inter-State application. Both Governments concluded that finding a lack of jurisdiction of the aggressor State in such case would have the effect of excluding the application of the main European human rights treaty in respect of particularly drastic human rights violations and would lead to the denial of rights and remedies for millions of citizens and inhabitants of the State affected by the aggression. (δ)      France 244.  As regards spatial jurisdiction, the Government of France observed that in Issa and Others the Court had not excluded the possibility that, as a consequence of military action, a respondent State could be considered to have exercised, temporarily, effective overall control of a particular portion of territory (cited above, § 74). 245.  The Government noted the Court’s finding of jurisdiction in respect of the downing of flight MH17 and the reasons given. They observed that the Court had not excluded that, in other circumstances, a “context of chaos” could exist in the air as on the ground, in particular in the case of ground or aerial confrontations between enemy military forces seeking control over an area or seeking to impose a no-fly zone. It was difficult to define “active phase of hostilities” in a manner that took into account the complexities and methods of contemporary armed conflict. 246.  As regards jurisdiction via State agent authority and control, the Court had not clearly defined the acts of violence that could be included in the criterion of “isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity” (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 570). However, the cases in which the criterion had been found to exist concerned situations in which people had been beaten or killed at point‑blank range by State agents, outside the context of armed conflict. It had never been used by the Court in the framework of military operations in international armed conflict, which did not constitute “isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity”. In such a context, extraterritorial jurisdiction could exist where State agents exercised physical power and control over the victim or the property in question, such as in the case of detention or searches of homes. This was a matter for factual assessment in the circumstances of each case. Moreover, in each situation, the impact, if any, of the exclusion from jurisdiction of “military operations carried out during the active phase of hostilities”, in the sense of “armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos”, identified in Georgia v. Russia (II), had also to be considered (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 698). This required a careful examination by reference to the specific facts. While the existence of State agent authority and control had to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the context of an international armed conflict, shelling and bombing were characteristic of “armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area”. It was therefore not possible to find jurisdiction in such a situation, without prejudice to the findings of the Court in the very particular case of the downing of flight MH17. 247.  The French Government also noted that in its case-law on jurisdiction in respect of the procedural obligation under Article 2, the Court had found a “jurisdictional link” to exist where the investigative or judicial authorities of a Contracting State had instituted their own criminal investigation or proceedings concerning a death which had occurred outside the jurisdiction of that State, by virtue of their domestic law; and where there were other “special features”. (ε)      Latvia 248.  The Government of Latvia emphasised that extraterritorial jurisdiction could not be presumed: it depended on the existence of case‑specific exceptional circumstances capable of rebutting the presumption that the State did not exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 553). The relevant principles concerning the interpretation and application of Article 1 had evolved “with a view to the effective protection of human rights in a largely regional context” (ibid., § 547). The notion of “context of chaos” in itself was not capable of preventing the rebuttal of the presumption that the State did not exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory (ibid., § 703). 249.  The Government reiterated the common pleading of the intervening Governments that cases addressing military actions within the sovereign territory of the member States of the Council of Europe deserved special attention and that the concept of “effective control over an area” was to be applied generously within that territory (see paragraph 232 above). 250.  In conclusion, the Latvian Government strongly reiterated their unwavering support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and their condemnation of the egregious violations of international law perpetrated by the Russian Federation. (στ)   Poland 251.  The Government of Poland underlined that eighty years ago, Europe had been “desolated by the ravages of war”, while millions of Europeans had suffered death, loss and trauma. Amid these atrocities, the conviction had emerged that human rights violations should be opposed decisively through effective State accountability and an international judicial mechanism to adjudicate thereon. From the ashes of war and the strong call from Europeans for no more war, the Council of Europe had been born together with its most important response: the Convention and its Court. 252.  Today, the ravages caused by war covered parts of Europe yet again. Millions of people were suffering from the atrocities of war inflicted in the name of an “utterly inexplicable aggression”. The question of effective mechanisms to counter violations of individual rights had come to the fore once more. The key question was whether Article 1 of the Convention required “an aggressor state to ensure the protection of human rights to persons affected by its military actions conducted on the territory of another [Council of Europe] member state”. The answer to this question was “yes”. Nothing in the text of the Convention authorised the State to be exempt from responsibility to ensure the protection of the right to life. 253.  First, Article 1 of the Convention had to be interpreted in line with the values and objectives of the Council of Europe as an organisation established in response to the atrocities of war. The Convention was not “the fruit of a long peaceful evolution of legal and philosophical thought, cultivated in the privacy of universities or government offices”. It was the specific wartime context that had led to the creation of an international court to uphold human rights. Bearing in mind the regional political, historical and legal context of the Convention, Article 1 ought to be interpreted in line with the principle that no war of aggression was legally admissible in the Council of Europe space. The legal qualifications made by the Committee of Ministers under the Statute in its decisions to exclude a member State for the breach of membership obligations were pertinent here. 254.  Second, the interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention had to take into account the principles and values expressed in public international law, starting with the UN Charter which prohibited wars of aggression in absolute terms. The value of peace was an integral and constitutive element of the entire concept of human rights protection. It was expressed in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Convention referred and had to find concrete expression in the interpretation of legal norms such as Article 1, so that the Convention could serve the fundamental values of international order in a coherent and genuine manner. 255.  Third, the existence of a comprehensive and consistent approach by other international courts and treaty bodies, notably the ICJ and the UN Human Rights Committee, also spoke in favour of the application of Articles 1 and 2 to hostilities conducted outside a State’s territory. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also referred to “jurisdiction” but nothing in the case-law of the ICJ indicated the possibility of systematically excluding State accountability on account of the lack of jurisdiction during exterritorial hostilities. On the contrary, it was possible to attribute to States responsibility for violations of the right to life under the ICCPR in connection with hostilities abroad (citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, summarised at B109-12). The UN Human Rights Committee also considered jurisdiction to include persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State but whose right to life was nonetheless affected by that State’s military activities in a direct and foreseeable manner (B83). Article 1 ought also to be interpreted to cover hostilities abroad both for the sake of coherence of the entire system of international law, of which the Convention was an essential part, and – above all – in view of the leading role of the Court’s case-law in defining the highest standards of respect for human rights. 256.  Fourth and finally, the text of the Convention did not provide grounds to exclude State jurisdiction in respect of acts of war. The relationship between Article 2 and acts of war was addressed by Article 15 § 2, which provided for the possibility of derogation in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. If the wording of Article 1 excluded State accountability for deprivation of life as a result of acts of war, the provision of Article 15 § 2 would be redundant. The logical conclusion was that it was the concept of derogation, not jurisdiction, that was intended to exclude the Court’s competence over hostilities. Article 15 § 2 clearly suggested that the drafters of the Convention did not wish to exclude the Court’s scrutiny over deaths caused by unlawful acts of war. The view that jurisdiction over military actions, such as bombing and shelling, should be excluded on the grounds that the matter was governed by international humanitarian law was untenable. No provision of international humanitarian law required that. Moreover, humanitarian law did not create any complaint mechanism that would be similar or comparable to that provided by the Convention. International humanitarian law could and should influence the Court’s assessment of States’ substantive obligations; however, there was no reason for international humanitarian law to determine also the Court’s competence to investigate human rights violations. 257.  The scarce practice of States’ reliance on derogation from Article 2 in the context of war could not be treated as an argument against the clear wording of the Convention. First, the number of cases in which derogation could have applied to acts of war had, fortunately, been low. It was not possible to say that the non-reliance on derogation was a common approach of all, or even the majority, of State parties: there was simply no proof. Second, the decision not to derogate might be based on many other reasons, including a State’s commitment to the right of individual application despite the risk of an adverse judgment. Third, States might fail to derogate because they forget that the possibility exists under Article 15; this was an opportunity to remind them that derogation was the legitimate way of limiting Convention obligations. 258.  The lack of a judicial mechanism open to individuals would leave a serious gap in victim protection and state accountability for large-scale and most serious human rights violations. This would be against the very logic of the post-war development of international law at large, which had steered towards enhancing rather than weakening States’ accountability for the unlawful use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other States. Such a gap would also be contrary to the entire axiology of the Convention, reaffirmed by the Court on many occasions, based on the effective and real protection of human rights via a system of human rights protection to which States Parties, including the respondent State, had voluntarily committed themselves. 259.  Article 1 should not be interpreted in a way that would make the Convention and the objectives of the Council of Europe ineffective in the face of unlawful aggression. Now was precisely the moment for the values on which the Court had based the Convention system over the years to resonate sonorously, echoing the prevention of impunity and the victims’ right to an effective remedy and just satisfaction. In the face of an aggressor State evidently manifesting a desire to take control of the territory of another State party, contrary to all rules of international law, the Convention could not prove powerless. There was a need to further develop the Court’s case-law in response to a glaring example of aggression in the Convention legal space. Important clarifications had already been made to the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment in the Court’s admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) (both cited above). However, further clarification would be useful. 260.  The present case was of an unprecedented nature. The Court’s approach developed in a different factual context did not seem fully adequate to assess the present case relating to full-scale armed aggression and invasion. A new and more in-depth test was called for, at least with regard to the personal aspect of jurisdiction. In a new test the Court might consider taking into account the scale of the military action and its impact on the civilian population, with the existence of a full-scale invasion potentially demonstrating the exercise of effective control over victims; whether hostilities were conducted within the Convention area; and whether there was an intention on the part of the belligerent State to acquire and exercise effective and ultimate control over the territory of another State. Notably, the State’s intention to unlawfully conquer the territory and overthrow the legitimate authority of another nation in order to establish its own authority or install subordinate or effectively controlled entities, not recognised by international community, should be an important consideration. Such approach would usefully complement the criteria already developed by the Court with regard to the spatial aspect of jurisdiction. 261.  Without accountability, there could be no lasting peace, as the Heads of State and Government had recalled at the Reykjavík Summit. The answer to the question whether the Convention could effectively protect human rights in the face of war was critical to upholding confidence in, and the relevance of, the Convention system as a living instrument capable of responding to the most significant of challenges. The point at issue before the Court was whether, in its response, Europe would be faithful to its repeated declarations that war and human rights violations had no right to exist on its territory. Uncompromised courage and faith in the ideals that characterised the founders of the Convention was needed again today. But what was needed above all was “fidelity to the anti-war legacy they left for us, and for the Court, in the European Convention on Human Rights”. (ζ)      United Kingdom 262.  The United Kingdom Government reiterated their unwavering support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. They also strongly supported findings by the Court that Russia had perpetrated the most serious violations of the Convention in Ukraine. However, the analytical route to such findings was important. Contracting States might in future participate in legitimate armed conflict, for example collective self-defence under the auspices of NATO, or peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. There were circumstances in which moving to a conception of jurisdiction whereby everything within Convention legal space was held to be within Article 1 jurisdiction would cause, or risk causing, significant issues in relation to lawful and realistic scenarios which the Contracting States should be concerned about. Collective self-defence under NATO, for example, “might assume an invasion of the territory of a Council of Europe State and would cover that [sic] because jurisdiction might apply both to the aggressor and to the defending State itself”. There were also potential difficulties in relation to State agencies more generally which might well act so as to affect people outside the territory. 263.  There was no need in this case for the principled approach of the Court to be expanded in order to reach the findings of serious violation of the Convention that all the intervening States invited the Court to reach. The Court should apply its existing case-law on Article 1, as expressed in Georgia v Russia (II) (cited above) and set out in some detail in the written submissions of the United Kingdom Government. As regards situations of international armed conflict, the United Kingdom Government endorsed the Court’s finding in its admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) that if a Government had sufficient control over territory for spatial jurisdiction to arise, this distinguished the situation from the circumstances addressed by the Court in Georgia v Russia (II), namely “fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area” (ibid., § 137). The relevant question in cases involving international armed conflict was whether spatial or personal jurisdiction arose having regard to the factual circumstances. For example, Article 1 jurisdiction plainly arose in respect of persons detained by military forces, or in respect of territory controlled by an occupying Power, irrespective of the temporal phase of the conflict. Subject to these clarifications, the Grand Chamber had been correct to find in Georgia v. Russia (II) that Article 1 personal jurisdiction ordinarily did not arise during the active phase of an international armed conflict save in respect of: (i) detained combatants or civilians; (ii) persons in buildings or premises controlled by soldiers; and (iii) persons who were abused or summarily executed by soldiers in circumstances of close proximity. This was consistent with the Court’s established case-law. 264.  The application of these principles would lead to the conclusion that Article 1 jurisdiction arose in respect of most categories of violation committed by Russia and described in the present case, namely: -  Article 1 jurisdiction arose under the “effective control of an area” principle in respect of violations that occurred within territory occupied by Russia within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations. The atrocities perpetrated in Kherson, Bucha and Melitopol, for example, appeared to have occurred during a period of Russian occupation. The forced removal of Ukrainian nationals (including children) to Russia and the theft and destruction of property in occupied territory were further clear examples. -  Jurisdiction arose under the “State agent authority and control” principle in respect of: (i) detained combatants or civilians; (ii) persons in buildings or premises controlled by Russian troops; and (iii) persons who were abused or summarily executed by Russian soldiers in circumstances of close proximity. The application detailed extensive violations in these categories including murder/summary execution, torture, rape, forced labour, and arbitrary detention. 265.  The Government summarised the Court’s case-law on jurisdiction, observing that the Court had been careful to define limited categories of extraterritorial Article 1 jurisdiction under two headings: “effective control of an area” and “State agent authority and control”. They asserted that the latter principle had been further sub-divided by the Court (notably in Al‑Skeini and Others, cited above, §§ 134-36) into three categories: (1) the activities of diplomatic and consular agents when they exerted authority and control over others; (2) the exercise of public powers through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of a territory; and (3) the use of force by State agents. 266.  However, Article 1 jurisdiction ordinarily did not arise in respect of death, injury and damage to property arising from use of military force in the course of active conflict, even if an attack was directed at an unlawful target, the expected incidental civilian loss of life, injury or damage was excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, or the use of force was otherwise alleged to be in breach of international humanitarian law. Military action seeking to conquer territory was not the exercise of public power within the meaning of the Court’s case-law on the State agent authority and control principle. Active military combat against the government of another territory was not action undertaken through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of that government. The reference in Al-Skeini and Others (cited above, § 135) to “public powers” was evidently (and correctly) a reference to (a) public powers consequent on the consent of the other government and (b) the public powers of that other government. It had no application to the present context or, more generally, to hostile military action.  Furthermore, the fact that at the conclusion of an international armed conflict an invading State became an occupying Power and the de facto authority in an area of territory with Article 1 jurisdiction, including spatial jurisdiction, did not mean that Article 1 jurisdiction arose during the prior phase of active armed conflict (citing Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, §§ 143-49). 267.  The United Kingdom Government advanced five arguments in support of their position. 268.  First, Article 1 jurisdiction was a “threshold criterion”, namely “a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention” (Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 130). An allegation of unlawful action contrary to international humanitarian law could not be conflated with the prior “threshold” question of whether Article 1 jurisdiction arose. 269.  Second, Article 1 jurisdiction was circumscribed by clear criteria. Otherwise, the Court would inevitably be drawn into adjudicating on substantive complaints about the conduct of the active phase of an international armed conflict merely to answer the prior jurisdictional question. That would cause difficulty, as the Court had recognised in Georgia v Russia (II) (cited above, § 141), since the “context of chaos” which existed during active combat between opposing military forces in an armed conflict would make it difficult or impossible for the Court to judge whether a substantive breach of international humanitarian law had occurred. If Article 1 jurisdiction depended on establishing the existence of such a breach, the jurisdictional “threshold” would be subject to unacceptable uncertainty. 270.  Third, the Grand Chamber had already made clear in Medvedyev and Others v. France ([GC], no. 3394/03, § 64, ECHR 2010) that Article 1 jurisdiction did not ordinarily arise from “an instantaneous extraterritorial act” because the terms of Article 1 did “not admit of a ‘cause and effect’ notion of ‘jurisdiction’”. 271.  Fourth, as the Grand Chamber had explained in Georgia v Russia (II) (cited above, §§ 132 and 136-137), Article 1 jurisdiction was closely linked to the notion of control. The Court’s previous case law had found Article 1 jurisdiction only in relation to isolated and specific acts involving an element of proximity. These cases had involved individuals being beaten to death or shot at close range, and did not concern an active international armed conflict. By contrast the reality of armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces generally involved a context of chaos, or actions without the necessary proximity, which meant that the required element of control over victims was not present. 272.  Fifth, it was plain that the drafters of the Convention had never intended for the substantive Articles of the Convention, including its Article 2, to regulate the conduct of military hostilities in international armed conflicts. This proposition was self-evident: there was nothing in the terms of Article 2 to indicate any regulation of the conduct of military operations; the Article was entirely silent on the point, unlike international humanitarian law. Moreover, the practice of Contracting States was not to derogate under Article 15 of the Convention where they engaged in an international armed conflict outside their territory. As the Grand Chamber had found in Banković and Others (cited above, § 62) and in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above, § 139), this indicated that Contracting States did not consider themselves to be exercising Article 1 jurisdiction when deploying military force in an international armed conflict. This did not mean that the Convention could never enter the sphere of war or international armed conflict; such a suggestion would be untenable in light of consistent case-law going back a number of years. However, the drafters’ intention together with the State practice of non-derogation supported “careful and limited exceptions” to the usual principle that jurisdiction was territorial. 273.  According to the United Kingdom Government, none of this indicated that there was a legal lacuna. On the contrary, the conduct of active military operations was regulated by international humanitarian law. Breaches of that body of law could be considered by the ICC or another international tribunal convened for such a purpose. In this context, the United Kingdom strongly supported the investigation by the ICC Prosecutor into crimes committed in Ukraine since 21 November 2013. 274.  In conclusion, the Government of the United Kingdom expressed their support for the application in this case of the Court’s existing principles as established in its existing case-law. There was no need to expand or to reinvent those principles for the purpose either of doing justice in this case or giving effect to the object and purpose of the Convention. (iii)   Responses to written and oral questions, received in writing after the hearing 275.  Following the hearing, the Court received correspondence from eighteen intervening Governments concerning the questions posed prior to the hearing (see paragraphs 26 and 30-31 above). The Governments of Austria and France confirmed that they would not submit written responses and referred the Court to their previous written pleadings and the common oral submissions. The responses of the remaining sixteen Governments, in so far as relevant, are summarised below. (α)     Joint response of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 276.  The five Governments reiterated that Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above) could not be seen as authority for excluding entirely from a State’s Article 1 jurisdiction a specific temporal phase of an international armed conflict. The specific situations described in §§ 132 and 137 of Georgia v. Russia (II) could not, therefore be seen as excluding the possibility for other situations to fall within a State’s jurisdiction. Article 1 jurisdiction was closely linked to the notion of “control”. Whether “exceptional circumstances” existed requiring and justifying a finding that a State had exercised jurisdiction extraterritorially was to be determined by a concrete assessment of the facts of each case. 277.  The five Governments indicated that, to their knowledge, the use of force abroad by State agents had not as such, without further qualifications, been found sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. Use of force by State agents resulting in loss of life or damage to property did not automatically give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction (see paragraph 233 above). In considering novel interpretations of Article 1 of the Convention in cases of armed conflict within Council of Europe territory, or military activity by one High Contracting Party to acquire territory from another, it was important to distinguish the question of jurisdiction under Article 1 from that of compatibility of State actions with international law. 278.  Article 1 was to be interpreted in accordance with the general rules of interpretation of treaties. This meant that Article 1 had to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose” (citing Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention at B74). The Convention was, moreover, to be as far as possible interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law. These rules, including the Vienna Convention, were relevant sources of law when interpreting the Convention (B74). Whether the practice of other comparable international dispute settlement mechanisms as regards extraterritorial jurisdiction was a relevant source of law depended on whether it fell within Article 31 § 3 of the Vienna Convention. The ICJ had recently dealt with the relevance of such practice in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 71) (see B289-92). Their relevance would also depend on the similarity of the wording of the jurisdictional provision of the comparable international instrument. (β)      Belgium and the Czech Republic 279.  The Belgian and Czech Governments noted that the facts of the present case had taken place in the Convention legal space. The Court could therefore limit its consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction to this situation. 280.  In assessing the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the present case, the guiding principle should be that, within the Convention legal space, the use of armed force by a High Contracting Party, including bombing and shelling with the aim of removing the effective control of another High Contracting Party over its own territory, should not result in a situation where individuals whose human rights had been violated as a direct result of such use of armed force were deprived of the protection of the Convention. Such a situation would be difficult to reconcile with the very foundations of the Council of Europe and the object and purpose of the Convention. (γ)      Croatia 281.  The Government of Croatia noted that Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe in Reykjavík had recognised the urgent need “to ensure comprehensive accountability for all violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”. The Court, as the ultimate guarantor of human rights guaranteed by the Convention and the “Conscience of Europe”, was well placed to perform this task. 282.  Regarding the question of Article 1 jurisdiction in situations of bombing and shelling, the primary obligation under the Convention was to secure to everyone within the jurisdiction of the member States the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. In exceptional cases, the Court had accepted that acts of the Contracting States performed, or producing effects, outside their territories could constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. In Pad and Others v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 60167/00, § 54, 28 June 2007), Issa and Others (cited above), Andreou v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 45653/99, 3 June 2008) and Solomou and Others v. Turkey (no. 36832/97, § 51, 24 June 2008), the Court had concluded that a State may be held accountable for violations of the Convention rights of persons in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating (lawfully or unlawfully) in the latter State. Accountability in such situations stemmed from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention could not be interpreted so as to allow a member State to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory. In addition, the responsibility of a Contracting Party might also arise when as a consequence of military action (lawful or unlawful) it exercised effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derived from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. 283.  Member States had a duty to respect, protect and fulfil the rights affirmed in the Convention. They were obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention committed within or beyond the Convention legal space. Furthermore, the Convention did not provide grounds to exclude member States’ jurisdiction in respect of acts of war. Any other finding would undermine the fight against impunity for serious human rights violations and would leave a serious gap in victim protection and State accountability for those violations. 284.  In conclusion, the assessment of the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the present case ought to be guided by the principle that within the Convention legal space, the use of armed force, including bombing and shelling, by a member State with the aim of removing the effective control of another member State over its own territory, could not result in a situation where individuals whose human rights had been violated as a direct result of such use of armed force were deprived of the protection of the Convention. Such a situation would be hard to reconcile with the very foundations of the Council of Europe and the object and purpose of the Convention. (δ)      Estonia 285.  The Estonian Government underlined that the application of exceptions to the Article 1 principle of territorial jurisdiction was necessarily fact-based. It was thus a question of fact whether a Contracting Party exercised effective control over an area outside its own territory or whether a State agent had authority and control. Based on specific evidence and facts, there could therefore be, during an active phase of hostilities, areas over which a Contracting Party had effective control or situations in which there was personal control through “an element of proximity” different from situations that had been assessed in earlier case-law. These exceptional circumstances fell to be, and could be, examined under the existing approach that the Court had taken to Article 1. 286.  The use of force (whether resulting in loss of life, injury to a person or damage to property) did not automatically give rise to jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. The case-law did not support a general “cause‑and-effect” approach to Article 1 jurisdiction. 287.  Any expansion of the exemptions to the essentially territorial nature of jurisdiction under Article 1 had to take into account the need for Article 1 jurisdiction to remain an easily applicable threshold criterion that would among other aspects allow the Contracting Parties to ascertain the extent of their obligations under the Convention in situations of legitimate armed conflict (e.g. collective self-defence and peacekeeping operations). (ε)      Germany and Portugal 288.  The German and Portuguese Governments observed that it was likely that there would be other situations involving the use of armed force which would fall into a zone between the definitions set out in §§ 132 and 137 of Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above). 289.  The use of armed force abroad by State agents had not, without further qualifications, been found sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. Use of force by State agents resulting in loss of life or damage to property did not automatically give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction (see paragraph 233 above). If a new exemption to the principle that jurisdiction was territorial, based on military activity by one High Contracting Party to acquire territory from another, were to be contemplated by the Court, it was important to bear in mind that the Court should not be drawn into adjudicating the international legality of State actions in order to resolve jurisdictional questions. The criteria used to determine the existence of an exemption had to be clearly formulated and readily ascertainable in the proceedings before the Court. The paramount consideration ought to be whether the military activity aimed at permanently removing another High Contracting Party’s effective control over its own territory. 290.  Finding Article 1 jurisdiction solely on the basis of armed conflict on Council of Europe territory would be a very broad basis for an exemption to the principle of territorial jurisdiction. This would make it difficult for High Contracting Parties to evaluate the extent of their obligations in cases of legitimate use of armed force abroad, which might have occurred precisely to preserve the objects and purposes of the Convention. 291.  Finally, the Portuguese Government submitted that it was essential to ensure that that the use of armed force, within the Convention legal space, including bombing and shelling by a High Contracting Party with the aim of removing the effective control of another High Contracting Party over its own territory, never resulted in a situation where individuals were deprived of the protection of the Convention. Such a prospect would be incompatible with the very foundations of the Council of Europe and the object and purpose of the Convention, particularly when dealing with cases where human rights had been violated as a direct result of such use of armed force. (στ)   Latvia 292.  The Latvian Government were of the “strong opinion” that the Court’s findings in Georgia v. Russia (II) allowed the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a High Contracting Party to be established “in a zone between ‘isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity’ and ‘armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos’” where it engaged in military activities with a view to acquiring territory from the territorial High Contracting Party or removing the latter’s effective control over the latter’s territory. This was especially so in the light of the need to ensure the effective protection of human rights in a largely regional context and in line with the Court’s finding in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) that a “context of chaos” was not in itself capable of excluding the jurisdiction of a High Contracting Party in the active phase of hostilities. 293.  A High Contracting Party’s jurisdiction could not be established in all cases where State agents used armed force abroad and this could not be considered as a standalone ground to establish jurisdiction. 294.  Similarly, a general finding that a High Contracting Party exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in all cases where military activities were undertaken in the territory of the Council of Europe could create serious challenges for the High Contracting Parties to assess and evaluate their obligations in cases of use of armed force abroad when it was legitimate and permitted under international law, for example, in self-defence. The test for armed attacks to fall within the zone between “isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity” and “armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos” was inextricably linked to the facts of each particular case and to the underlying reasons for and aims of the military activities in question. In its assessment, the Court could take into account the conclusions reached by other international organisations and their organs when characterising the activities of the High Contracting Party in question. 295.  The Council of Europe was the oldest peace organisation in Europe, established in pursuit of peace based upon justice with the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention being the foundation of peace and justice. A war of aggression leading to massive civilian casualties required special diligence from the Council of Europe organs to review compliance with the Convention and to ensure accountability for any violations thereof. It would be manifestly counter to the values of the organisation and the spirit of the Convention to rule that a violation of international law determined by the UN General Assembly to constitute an act of aggression entailed as a consequence the loss of the protection offered by the Convention in the territory prior to the act of aggression. Article 19 of the Convention should encourage the Court to prevent a vacuum in human rights protection over significant parts of the European legal space where one High Contracting Party was engaged in military activity with a view to acquiring territory from another High Contracting Party or removing the latter’s effective control over its own territory. (ζ)      The Netherlands 296.  The Dutch Government, in their capacity as a third-party intervener, observed that the question whether there was jurisdiction in respect of military attacks from an area under one Contracting State’s effective control and directed at the territory of another Contracting State was necessarily dependent on the relevant facts and the circumstances of each case. The use of force in an armed conflict resulting in loss of life or damage to persons or property outside the own sovereign border of a Contracting State did not automatically give rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that jurisdiction could never arise in the context of an armed conflict (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 703). 297.  The Court had established in Pad and Others, Issa and Others, Andreou v. Turkey and Solomou and Others v. Turkey (all cited above), that the exercise of physical power and control through the use of a weapon by agents of a Contracting State against individuals of another Contracting State – even where the latter exercised no control over the former’s territory – could result in jurisdiction being found. The Court had held on numerous occasions that Contracting States could not profit from impunity by violating rights of individuals outside their territory, where such impunity would not exist had such acts been committed in their own territory. The Dutch Government supported the Court’s approach as set out in the case-law cited, and did not support a “cause and effect” approach to Article 1 jurisdiction. 298.  If a State deliberately deployed force that might cause (possibly deadly) harm, this could – depending on the circumstances and facts of the case – lead to a finding of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention and result in accountability for violations of the Convention rights and freedoms of the victims of such force. Moreover, in the event of acts of aggression by a Contracting State, as defined in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly (B196) and confirmed as such by, as appropriate, the Security Council, the General Assembly or the ICJ, Article 1 jurisdiction could be found depending on the circumstances of the case. 299.  All Contracting Parties had to abide by their Convention obligations, regardless of whether actions were exercised within or beyond Convention legal space. The preamble of the Convention referred to “universal and effective recognition and observance” of fundamental rights; there could be no discrimination with regard to the protection of Convention rights. The Court had already found jurisdiction in cases of Contracting States exercising effective control or authority outside the Convention legal space (for example, Issa and Others, cited above; Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, ECHR 2005-IV; Pad and Others, cited above; and Isaak v. Turkey (dec.), no. 44587/98, 28 September 2006). Any limitation of jurisdiction by reference to Convention legal space would therefore not be appropriate. (η)     Poland 300.  The Polish Government fully agreed that apart from “isolated and specific acts of violence involving an element of proximity” there could be also other situations where jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention might arise in connection with States’ use of force abroad, including hostilities. The Court’s approach to the downing of flight MH17 in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) demonstrated how this might be done, and deserved “full support”. It might be difficult to define the situations strictly, bearing in mind the great variety of the possible factual situations, nor did it seem possible or necessary to delineate between all possible situations. 301.  The existence of chaos should neither be presumed nor applied ex officio by the Court if not raised by the respondent State itself. The “burden of proof should be on the aggressor State”, which was therefore required to appropriately substantiate the existence of chaos in respect of the incidents complained of and the resulting lack of control over the lives of persons affected (see paragraph 241 above). The application of the concept of the “context of chaos” in itself would be highly questionable where in the context of the war of aggression the State sought to impose its control over the territory of another State, as it would mean no responsibility for human rights violations on the basis of reasons which were themselves unlawful. 302.  The Polish Government further supported the idea that Article 1 jurisdiction could arise where State agents used armed force abroad and a High Contracting Party was engaged in military activity with a view to acquiring territory from the other High Contracting Party, and thereby removing the latter’s effective control over its own territory, where the armed conflict was conducted in the Council of Europe State’s territory. The aggressor State’s aim to acquire and exercise effective and ultimate control over the territory of another State, and in particular to conquer that territory and overthrow the legitimate authority of another nation in order to establish its own authority or install subordinate or effectively controlled entities, not recognised internationally, ought to be important considerations. The inclusion of a criterion reflecting the reality of aggression would be in line with the spirit of Article 15 of the Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (B339), since it would prevent a situation in which an aggressor State could benefit from its act of aggression to evade accountability under the Convention. The main question should be whether the situation, assessed as a whole, allowed the Court to conclude that the State exercised effective control over the enjoyment of the right to life of persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State who were affected by that State’s military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner (citing the UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 36 at B94). Other criteria could also be helpful in this regard, for instance the scale of the military action and its impact on the civilian population. The existence of a full-scale invasion might further demonstrate the exercise of effective control over victims. The fact that the present case took place in the Convention legal space also had a bearing on the scope of the State’s obligations under the Convention. 303.  The Polish Government were not aware of any judgments of other international courts or of positions of other relevant dispute settlement mechanisms or treaty bodies that would speak against the finding of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the criteria outlined above (see paragraph 302 above). On the contrary, the practice of the ICJ and of the UN Human Rights Committee (B92-96 and 101-12) would seem to be in favour of finding extraterritorial jurisdiction in such situations. In contrast, the failure to find extraterritorial jurisdiction in the circumstances outlined could raise serious doubts from the point of view of coherence of international law, of which the Convention was an essential part (see paragraphs 254-255 above). Such a position could not be reconciled with the general intention and effort of the international community to preserve an international order based on respect of each other’s territorial sovereignty. 304.  To consider that no extraterritorial jurisdiction arose in the case of aggression within the European legal space could also not be reconciled with the Court’s responsibility under Article 19 of the Convention, and would be against the Convention’s object and purpose. The main objective of the codification of international humanitarian law had been precisely to strengthen the protection of human rights during armed conflicts. It would therefore be illogical to understand international humanitarian law as limiting the application of other provisions protecting human rights during hostilities and, in effect, as lowering standards of human rights protection. The Court should not self-limit its competence on the basis of a restrictive interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention, leading to an unacceptable vacuum and a de facto non-applicability of the Convention in times of war, when its protection was needed most. Interpreting Article 1 of the Convention in the spirit of the values and objectives of the Convention itself and of the Council of Europe in general required recognising that the aggressor State should ensure protection of the human rights of those subjected to its military actions, and should bear responsibility for the loss of life of persons resulting from the bombing and shelling of civilians and civilian objects to the extent that it violated rules of international law. (θ)      Romania 305.  The Romanian Government noted that extraterritorial jurisdiction was applicable in international armed conflicts. Thus States had been held accountable for military activities committed outside their borders (citing Cyprus v. Turkey, Loizidou and Al-Skeini and Others, all cited above). In Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above), the Court had “found no territorial or personal jurisdiction in the middle of fighting for control which takes place in a ‘context of chaos’”. However, according to the Romanian Government, “the exception provided by the ‘context of chaos’ should not be so dominant as to automatically eliminate the investigation of the facts and circumstances in which the violations occurred”. The key to solving the issue of jurisdiction lay in the comprehensive analysis of each incident on a case-by-case basis. The active hostilities had a probative, and not a normative, value and it was for the respondent State to prove that a context of chaos existed at the moment of the violation. This concept was not to be understood as a presumption for the total exclusion of State jurisdiction. 306.  The Romanian Government underlined the aims of the Council of Europe and concluded that Article 1 ought to be interpreted in such a way as to bring within the scope of the Convention human rights violations that had been committed outside the territory of the State, whether within the territory of the High Contracting Parties or outside it, but committed under its effective control or by its agents. The jurisdictional link “must always be comprehensively verified”; there was no jurisdiction of the Court in the absence of such a link. (ι)       Spain 307.  The Spanish Government observed that it was likely that there would be other situations involving the use of armed force which would fall into a zone between the definitions set out in §§ 132 and 137 of Georgia v. Russia (II). 308.  The use of force by State agents resulting in loss of life or damage to property did not automatically give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction (see paragraph 233 above). On the other hand, it would be incorrect to conclude that jurisdiction on the basis of State agent authority and control could never arise in the context of an international armed conflict. If a new exemption to the principle that jurisdiction was territorial, based on military activity by one High Contracting Party to acquire territory from another, were to be contemplated by the Court, the criteria used to determine the existence of such an exemption had to be clearly formulated. The paramount consideration ought to be whether the military activity aimed at permanently removing another High Contracting Party’s effective control over its own territory. 309.  Finding Article 1 jurisdiction solely on the basis of armed conflict on Council of Europe territory would be a very broad basis for an exemption to the principle of territorial jurisdiction. This would make it difficult for High Contracting Parties to evaluate the extent of their obligations in cases of legitimate use of armed force abroad, which might have occurred precisely to preserve the objects and purposes of the Convention. (b)   Geneva Academy 310.  The Geneva Academy interpreted the admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) as applying a “kind of presumption” that extraterritorial jurisdiction was excluded in the case of “military operations carried out during an active phase of hostilities”, except as regards the duty to investigate deaths. The factual meaning and legal consequences (if any) of the notion “military operations carried out during an active phase of hostilities” remained to be clarified. 311.  As regards the factual meaning, first, the notion was limited to “military operations” such as bombing, shelling and artillery fire. In Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above) the Court had excluded extraterritorial jurisdiction, notably on the ground that the conduct was part of a large-scale campaign rather than “isolated and specific” and did not involve an element of “proximity”. However, even bombing, shelling and artillery fire could be “isolated and specific” – temporally, geographically or regarding their actual target. Moreover, nothing precluded a large-scale campaign expanding over months from being broken into separate conducts capable of constituting a form of control establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction. The intensive pre-planning of such military operations also comported important elements of control that had to be taken into account. If procedural obligations under the right to life could be detached for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction, a similar approach could be adopted regarding ex ante obligations of planning and control of military operations. Regarding “proximity”, jurisdiction was not a matter of physical distance but of exercise of control in the sense of control over the life of the victim (citing Carter v. Russia, no. 20914/07, 21 September 2021). Force could be discharged with equally lethal results from near and far. In Pad and Others (cited above), jurisdiction had been established in respect of helicopter fire; the same ought to be true of a drone strike or targeted killing which could be described as “isolated and specific”. Similarly, a situation of siege or encirclement involved State agent authority and control over the lives of those confined to an area with very limited freedom of movement or action (Ukraine and the Netherlands, § 569, and Medvedyev, § 76, both cited above). In Jaloud v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 47708/08, § 152, ECHR 2014), the Court had found jurisdiction established in a checkpoint scenario, which was not materially different except for the scope of the use of kinetic force. Sieges and checkpoint scenarios could additionally be seen as involving control over an area. This did not necessarily mean that the “entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention” had to be secured: here too, Convention rights ought to be capable of being “divided and tailored”. 312.  Second, the notion of “military operations carried out during an active phase of hostilities” only included the “active phase of hostilities” involving situations of “armed confrontation and fighting”. What was material was that there was not simply a unilateral use of force but a proper confrontation and a “context of chaos” whereby it became factually near impossible to determine the exact set of circumstances that would allow making determinations regarding attribution and consequently jurisdiction. In other words, control over an area was at stake; the lives of enemy soldiers were at risk; and confusion reigned. The “context of chaos” was a context against which the exercise of control had to be assessed; it was not a legal exception to jurisdiction. 313.  In terms of legal consequences (see paragraph 310 above), the phrases “military operations carried out during an active phase of hostilities” and “context of chaos” should not be seen as creating a legal presumption for either the attacking or territorial State. Not even a hard reading of Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above) warranted such a conclusion. In Bekoyeva and Others v. Georgia ((dec.), no. 43733/08, §§ 32-40, 5 October 2021), the Court had complemented a careful application of Georgia v. Russia (II) with a detailed analysis of the factual evidence excluding territorial jurisdiction in that case. 314.  In conclusion, not every kinetic use of force in an international armed conflict could be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of a belligerent State, otherwise the jurisdictional limitation on the Convention would have no effet utile. However, to consider all (or most) acts of hostilities to fall outside the jurisdiction of all the belligerent parties would be extremely problematic from a victim and legal/technical perspective. If applied in the Ukraine context, it would lead to thousands of civilians being deprived of Article 2 – and more broadly, Convention – protection for potentially years. Such an interpretation would, moreover, not take into account the complexity of contemporary military operations and the diversity of situations involving kinetic use of force, which could entail a vast amount of control over areas or individuals and/or their right to life. Finally, interpretations of the notion of jurisdiction by the Court ought not to have the unintended effect of incentivising resort to large-scale combat operations by States: Article 1 could not be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate on the territory of another State Convention violations that it could not perpetrate on its own territory. 315.  The preceding submissions concerned the interpretation of the Court’s existing criteria. However, the Geneva Academy questioned whether these should be the governing standards. First, there had been calls for a more principled and systematic approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction, grounded in a functional understanding of jurisdiction. This was based on the position that States particularly well-situated to incur international human rights law obligations should do so. Commentators had also noted that the Court’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction was becoming increasingly distant from that propounded by other human rights bodies. The UN Human Rights Committee’s test of “direct and reasonably foreseeable impact” (B94) was reflected in different forms by a number of other international and regional bodies. Some had applied an even more expansive model based on the simple capacity to influence a situation (the UN Special Rapporteurs on Counter‑Terrorism and on Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the Committee on the Rights of the Child – see B113 and 130). The requirement for effective control over an area under the Court’s case-law had been diluted by the “decisive influence” test as well as indirect control through a subordinate local administration. Similarly, the test applied by the Court in Carter (cited above) recalled the functional reading of jurisdiction as “control over rights”. Such openings could result in the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction for several kinds of conduct in international armed conflict. The Convention could thus apply to allegations of human rights violations committed in the context of sieges and blockades. By considering the direct and foreseeable consequences flowing from the State’s conduct, irrespective of the geographical location, the context of war and peace, or the rights affected, the victim’s perspective would be placed at the centre of the Court’s activity. This would also ensure that legal criteria were not being interpreted and applied in ways that excluded massive killings and destructions for a long period of time in Europe from Article 1 jurisdiction and diluted to a considerable extent the protections offered by the Convention in times of armed conflict. 316.  The best approach, therefore, would be to further refine the meanings of control, taking into account the practice of other human rights bodies around functionality and the need to avoid creating legal gaps. Complexities around the interplay between the Convention and international humanitarian law – which were relevant to the merits – ought not to have a bearing on jurisdiction, which was an admissibility issue. Similarly, evidential difficulties should not have a bearing on jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Court could draw inferences based on the absence of cooperation of one of the parties. (c)   Human Rights Law Centre 317.  The Human Rights Law Centre submitted that the “context of chaos” exception to establishing Article 1 jurisdiction lacked internal coherence with other principles the Court had expounded. However, when it came to spatial jurisdiction, there would be some situations in which control over a discrete area was contested to such a degree that it was impossible to determine whether any State exercised control over that particular area. This would especially be the case for areas on the front line of intense hostilities between two States engaged in an international armed conflict. It was reasonable to say that in a situation of intense hostilities and street-to-street fighting in a specific area, neither Ukraine nor Russia exercised effective overall control over that area while such hostilities lasted. But such control easily existed in the immediately adjacent areas behind the front lines, especially when such lines remained relatively stable over time. Both prior to and after the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine and Russia controlled discrete areas of territory. This control fluctuated over time due to the ebb and flow of military operations. There was no bar to applying the Convention fully in such areas: a “context of chaos” could not justify failing to apply the Convention to a town or village under the control of one of the parties to the conflict in which civilians or POWs were unlawfully killed or mistreated. It was for the parties to provide evidence on how control over specific areas had changed over time or was affected by intense fighting. 318.  In the absence of spatial jurisdiction, allegations of violations of the right to life by kinetic means, such as artillery shelling, missile strikes or aerial bombardment, had to be considered under the personal model of jurisdiction. This included situations when kinetic uses of force emanated from Russian-controlled territory and caused death, injury and damage in Ukrainian-controlled territory, and situations that were wholly confined to a contested area. 319.  In order to assess whether personal jurisdiction existed, the Court was required to establish whether these killings and destruction of property were an exercise of authority and control by the Russian Federation over the victims and their property. The Court’s approach to kinetic uses of force absent territorial control had tended to be rather conservative. If the Court applied the restrictive approach taken in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above), the vast majority of individual acts of hostilities committed in Ukraine would be excluded from the purview of the Convention. This was not a normatively justifiable result. The Court should therefore take this opportunity to overrule the “arbitrary approach” adopted in Georgia v. Russia (II), rather than “somehow try to fit the individual acts of hostilities at issue in this case within any supposed ‘exceptions’”. The restrictive approach taken in that case was unprincipled and unworkable and ought to be discarded. This would be the right thing to do for at least three reasons. 320.  First, the whole notion of a “context of chaos” precluding the existence of personal jurisdiction was simply unfounded. The Court had already said in Issa and Others (cited above, § 71) that “Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory”. It was true that the chaos or fog of war could hamper the Court’s ability to reliably establish what had actually happened and obscure whether there had been “control” for the purposes of Article 1. However, in the present case there was a wealth of information from official intergovernmental and governmental sources, as well as open‑source journalism, that could provide factual clarity. The Court had taken into account this material at the admissibility stage, had requested clarifications from the respondent State and had drawn inferences whenever appropriate. It should adopt the same approach on the merits, and no “context of chaos” could or should prevent it from doing so. 321.  Second, there was no good reason of principle to distinguish between “isolated” or “proximate” incidents of lethal force and more “distant” takings of life, such as through shelling or aerial bombardment. If the former involved the exertion of authority and control over the victim, then the same had to be said of the latter. In the same way as it made no sense to argue that the Convention applied to a killing only if a person was first arrested, no principled system of human rights law could draw a distinction between killing an individual “proximately” by poisoning or stabbing them and killing them more “distantly” by a missile strike or an artillery shell. Furthermore, if killing one person was an exercise of personal jurisdiction by the State over that individual, then the same had to be true if the victims numbered in the hundreds or the thousands. 322.  Third, in Georgia v. Russia (II), the Court had justified its restrictive approach partly by saying that if “the Court is to be entrusted with the task of assessing acts of war and active hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict outside the territory of a respondent State, it must be for the Contracting Parties to provide the necessary legal basis for such a task”. However, there was nothing in the text of the Convention indicating that it did not apply to active hostilities in an armed conflict outside the territory of a Contracting State. On the contrary, Article 15 § 2 expressly provided for the possibility of a derogation from Article 2 “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”. The Court’s approach in Georgia v. Russia (II) rendered this express language of the Convention entirely nugatory. Moreover, it was for Contracting States to provide the Court with the resources that it needed to adequately address the indisputably difficult task of assessing the legality of deprivations of life in armed conflict. The Court had the legal basis to do so and needed simply to apply Article 2 as interpreted in light of the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. 323.  The Court should adopt a very simple approach to personal jurisdiction in the context of Article 2, namely that whenever a State party, acting through one of its agents, had deprived an individual of life, that State party had exercised authority and control and thus jurisdiction over that individual. This was equally the case within armed conflict or outside it, regardless of whether the killing was “proximate” or distant, “isolated” or part of a pattern. The same approach could also be applied mutatis mutandis to other Convention rights. This approach would accord with that taken by other international human rights bodies (B92-96). 324.  Where Article 1 jurisdiction was found, it would be for the Court to then decide on whether any deprivation of life would give rise to responsibility under the Convention. In doing so, it would be for the Court to determine whether the context of armed conflict impacted the scope of protection of individual Convention rights, including the right to life. 325.  Whether the Russian Federation was responsible for the violations alleged required the Court to find that the relevant acts or omissions were actually attributable (imputable) to the Russian Federation. In its admissibility decision (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above), the Court had held that all acts and omissions conducted by the separatist forces were attributable to the Russian Federation by virtue of its control over these entities, but had left the door open for the Russian Federation to argue that certain alleged violations were not attributable to it. Should the Court be required to consider attribution at this stage in the proceedings, its assessment should be conducted according to the relevant tests in general international law developed by the International Law Commission, specifically in its Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), and in the case-law of the ICJ (A85-87; and B283 and 285-88). The Court had regularly referred to the ARSIWA and had relied on the attribution rules contained therein. 326.  Given the Court’s holding that “the acts and omissions of the separatists are attributable to the Russian Federation in the same way as the acts and omissions of any subordinate administration engage the responsibility of the territorial State”, it would be appropriate for the Court to clarify that it has made this decision on the basis that the separatists were de facto organs of the State pursuant to Article 4 ARSIWA. After the annexation of the separatist entities by the Russian Federation, organ status would exist even de jure because separatist authorities would be regarded as State organs under Russian law, regardless of the manifest illegality of the annexation as a matter of international law. C.   The Court’s assessment 327.  The Court must assess the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under Article 1 of the Convention in three respects, namely: whether it had continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” following the date of the admissibility hearing, whether it had jurisdiction in respect of the complaints made in application no. 11055/22, and whether it had jurisdiction in respect of military attacks (see paragraphs 204-206 above). 1.     Continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the basis of effective control 328.  As noted above (see paragraph 202), in its admissibility decision the Court concluded that the areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine were, from 11 May 2014 until at least 26 January 2022, under the effective control of the Russian Federation (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 695). 329.  On 21 February 2022 the President of the respondent State adopted decrees recognising the “independence” of the “DPR” and the “LPR” (see paragraph 62 above and B12). On 30 September 2022 he signed “treaties” with the “DPR” and the “LPR” on their “accession” to the Russian Federation and, on 4 October 2022, the respondent State purported to adopt laws providing for such “accession” (see paragraph 75 above and B4-6). 330.  On 31 July 2023 the Russian authorities adopted federal law No. 395 proclaiming the retroactive extension of Russian criminal jurisdiction over the territories of the “DPR” and the “LPR” in respect of all crimes committed there before 30 September 2022 (B11). According to the law, criminal offences committed before 30 September 2022 against the interests of the “DPR” and “LPR” were to be considered as having been committed against the interests of Russia. The law also provided for the acknowledgment by the Russian Federation of the legal force of all judicial decisions delivered in the “DPR” and the “LPR” which had entered into force before 30 September 2022. 331.  Given the absence of any information to suggest a decrease in the level of control exercised by the respondent State over the “DPR” and the “LPR”, and the formalisation of the control already exercised by that State through the purported “accession” of the two territories to the Russian Federation and the retroactive application of Russian criminal law to the territories and assimilation of “DPR” and “LPR” interests to those of the Russian Federation itself, the Court finds that these areas continued to be under the effective control of the respondent State throughout the period falling within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, namely up until 16 September 2022. 2.     Jurisdiction in respect of the complaints in application no. 11055/22 (a)   Events in the Russian Federation 332.  In application no. 11055/22, the applicant Ukrainian Government also complained about actions of the Russian authorities that took place on Russian sovereign territory, in respect of filtration processes (see paragraph 1125 below) and the transfer and adoption of children (see paragraph 1498 below). Such complaints clearly fall within Russia’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. (b)   Events in Ukraine 333. The Court has found that the areas under “DPR” and “LPR” control fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation up until 16 September 2022 (see paragraph 331 above). In their application no. 11055/22, the applicant Ukrainian Government also complained about a number of alleged administrative practices by the respondent State throughout Ukrainian territory following the invasion on 24 February 2022. The Court must therefore determine, in respect of these allegations, whether the respondent State exercised jurisdiction. 334.  As far as the allegations of Convention violations on account of military attacks producing effects outside territory under the effective control of the respondent State are concerned, the jurisdictional issues that arise in the context of the complaints made in application no. 11055/22 are identical to those arising in respect of the complaints of bombing and shelling in the 2014 application (no. 8019/16). The Court will therefore examine the complaints concerning military attacks in the 2014 and 2022 applications together (see paragraphs 340 et seq. below). 335. The remaining allegations concern acts which are said to have occurred in areas in the hands of the Russian armed forces. As the respondent State has not participated at all in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22, it is not clear whether it disputes that the areas of Ukraine which were in the hands of its armed forces at the material times fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. In the absence of any arguments in this respect, the Court will determine the jurisdiction of the respondent State in respect of these areas in accordance with its usual approach (see the general principles set out in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 560). This means that, in view of the factual background to the allegations in question, it will first assess whether the respondent State enjoyed effective control over the relevant areas of Ukraine on account of its military presence in those areas. 336.  As noted above, since 24 February 2022, large numbers of Russian troops have entered sovereign Ukrainian territory and have taken direct control over territory in Ukraine (see paragraph 170 above). Although none of the parties to the proceedings has provided figures as to how many Russian soldiers were present on Ukrainian territory, it has been widely reported that some 190,000 Russian troops were stationed at the borders with Ukraine immediately prior to 24 February (see paragraph 64 above). Once the full‑scale invasion began, on the northern front, Russian armed forces captured key areas to the north and west of Kyiv and surrounded Chernihiv. In north-eastern Ukraine, they advanced on the cities of Kharkiv and Sumy. In southern Ukraine, they captured several cities and localities in the Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia regions. They subsequently extended the territory held by the separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. These events have been widely reported, with the consequence that the evidence of Russia’s military presence in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 is plentiful and overwhelming. The acquisition by Russian armed forces of control over Ukrainian territory has, moreover, been openly acknowledged by the respondent State in the course of briefings issued by that State’s Ministry of Defence as well as in comments by its President and other senior politicians and officials (for example, B1540, 1547, 1568, 1929, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1982 and 2012). 337.  The Court has no difficulty concluding from the evidence and from the speed and scale of the Russian advance that the military presence of the respondent State in Ukraine was substantial. There is also no doubt that as a result of this substantial military presence, Russian armed forces took control of areas of Ukraine. This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that some of the territory in question was later recovered by Ukraine in the course of successful counter-offensives. 338.  In conclusion, by virtue of the control exercised over the territory concerned by the Russian armed forces, Russia exercised effective control over such territory and thus had jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention for any period during which such areas remained under the control of its armed forces, up until 16 September 2022 (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 694 and 696. See also the Commission’s decision in Cyprus v. Turkey (1975), cited above, at p. 137). 339.  In the context of its examination of each alleged administrative practice below, the Court will take into accounts acts of Russian agents which took place in territory which was, at the relevant time, under Russian jurisdiction. 3.     Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks (a)   Introduction 340.  As noted above, in its admissibility decision the Court joined to the merits the objection raised by the respondent Government in respect of the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints concerning an administrative practice of bombing and shelling (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 700). In doing so, it acknowledged the need for careful consideration of how its findings in its Georgia v. Russia (II) judgment (cited above) might apply to the allegations then before it in the context of application no. 8019/16. With the joinder of application no. 11055/22 to the existing case, its consideration of this issue now also encompasses the military attacks to which this latter application refers (see paragraph 334 above). The question for the Court is, therefore, whether the alleged administrative practice of military attacks in breach of the Convention from 2014 to 2022 falls within the jurisdiction of the respondent State. 341.  The background to the Court’s examination of this complaint at the separate admissibility stage of the proceedings is important. On 21 January 2021 the Court delivered its judgment in Georgia v. Russia (II) in which it was required to examine whether the conditions for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State under the Court’s case-law could be regarded as fulfilled in the context of military operations carried out during the “five-day war” in Georgia on 8-12 August 2008. It found that Russia did not have Article 1 jurisdiction in respect of the military operations which it had conducted during this five-day period. It explained: “126. ... [I]t can be considered from the outset that in the event of military operations – including, for example, armed attacks, bombing or shelling – carried out during an international armed conflict, one cannot generally speak of ‘effective control’ over an area. The very reality of armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos means that there is no control over an area. This is also true in the present case, given that the majority of the fighting took place in areas which were previously under Georgian control ... ... 136. ... The obligation which Article 1 imposes on the Contracting States to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention is, as indicated above, closely linked to the notion of ‘control’, whether it be ‘State agent authority and control’ over individuals or ‘effective control’ by a State over a territory. 137. In this connection, the Court attaches decisive weight to the fact that the very reality of armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of chaos not only means that there is no ‘effective control’ over an area as indicated above (see paragraph 126), but also excludes any form of ‘State agent authority and control’ over individuals.” 342.  The admissibility hearing in the present case took place on 26 January 2022. The parties’ submissions to the Court during the hearing were situated within the Georgia v. Russia (II) paradigm. 343.  However, as explained above, less than one month after the admissibility hearing in the present case, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine (see paragraph 66 above). As a consequence, tens of thousands of civilians have been killed and injured. In its report of March 2024, the Commission of Inquiry recorded that there had been over 10,000 civilian deaths and around 20,000 injured in the context of the hostilities in Ukraine since February 2022, although it noted that the numbers were likely to be higher. The vast majority of these deaths and injuries were the result of attacks with explosive weapons (C.VI.9 and 26). 344.  The March 2023 Commission of Inquiry report noted that the armed conflict “has caused a population displacement not seen in Europe since the Second World War” (C.III.20; see also C.IV.95 and 776). The Commission of Inquiry reports refer to eight million refugees from Ukraine in other European countries, and a further five million internally displaced persons (C.III.20 and IV.95 and 776). The reports describe the extensive damage and destruction to cities and villages – including homes, hospitals and schools – caused by the widespread military attacks, which has resulted in a lack of access to basic necessities. Two of the most prominent examples identified by the Commission of Inquiry were the 9 March 2022 attack on Maternity Ward No. 3 in Mariupol and the shelling of the Mariupol drama theatre on 16 March 2022 (C.IV.127 and 142). The Commission of Inquiry referred to nearly 18 million people in Ukraine in need of humanitarian assistance (C.III.20 and IV.96). 345.  The March 2024 Commission of Inquiry report examined the events surrounding the siege of Mariupol (C.VI.13-24). The report recorded that residents had seen buildings and houses collapsing under the shelling, in some instances killing and injuring loved ones, and whole areas of the city in ruins (C.VI.14). Witnesses had seen the Russian armed forces fire at a hospital, leading to civilian casualties and damage to the building, in an attack assessed by the Commission of Inquiry as “indiscriminate and constitut[ing] the war crime of excessive incidental death, injury or damage” (C.VI.17). The report explained: “20. As the fighting intensified, energy facilities and supply lines were damaged. Satellite imagery shows damage to 11 power stations. According to residents from Mariupol, water, power and heating went off on 2 March 2022, one day after the siege started. A few days later, gas was no longer available. Around mid-March 2022, water and food also became scarce. Shops that could open had limited products. Despite the ongoing shelling, residents had no choice but to go outdoors to look for food and to cook. Some were killed and injured as a result. Residents stated that they were forced to melt snow or to drink water from radiators and boilers. Witnesses described suffering intensely from the cold. Living conditions were particularly harsh in crowded shelters in the basements of hospitals and cultural or administrative buildings, where dozens of people sought refuge, often without basic necessities.” 346.  The March 2024 Commission of Inquiry report noted (C.VI.9): “Civilians have been forced to cope with the loss of loved ones, homes and other irreplaceable possessions, massive displacement, constant fear and critical shortages, all of which have had a deep impact on their enjoyment of basic human rights.” 347.  As explained above, on 5 March and 24 June 2024 a pre‑trial chamber of the ICC issued warrants of arrest for four individuals (then Defence Minister Mr Shoigu and three other senior figures in the Russian armed forces) suspected of bearing responsibility for the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects, the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects, and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts caused by missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023 (see paragraphs 113‑114 above). The pre-trial chamber also determined that the alleged campaign of strikes constituted a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts against a civilian population carried out pursuant to a State policy. There were, therefore, reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects had intentionally caused great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, thus bearing criminal responsibility for the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts (see paragraph 114 above). 348.  The Court is ever mindful of its responsibility, pursuant to Article 19 of the Convention, to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and its Protocols. The Convention is not merely a declaration of rights. It establishes a European system for the collective enforcement of the rights it contains with the aim, as attested to by both the Preamble to the Convention and the travaux préparatoires, of securing justice and peace on a continent twice ravaged by war in the twentieth century. It is clear from the evidence available that the military attacks by Russia on Ukrainian territory resulted in some of the most egregious and extensive alleged human rights violations arising in this armed conflict. In its preliminary observations, the Court has drawn attention to the threat posed to peaceful co-existence within Europe by the acts and intentions of the Russian Federation (see paragraph 177 above). It emphasised the critical importance of the underlying objectives of the Convention to the Court’s interpretation of its provisions (see paragraph 179 above). 349.  The full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a High Contracting Party, by Russia, another High Contracting Party, which commenced on 24 February 2022 therefore marked a clear watershed moment in the history of the Council of Europe and the Convention. The Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers reacted decisively to these events, swiftly excluding the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe as a consequence of its serious violation of its obligations under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe through its aggression against Ukraine (see paragraphs 80‑89 above). In the face of such an unprecedented and flagrant attack on the fundamental values of the Council of Europe and the object and purpose of the Convention, the Court must reflect anew on the exercise of its own jurisdiction under Article 32 to interpret and apply the Convention and its Protocols with a view to contributing to the preservation of peace and security in Europe through the effective protection and enforcement of the human rights of those whom the Convention is intended to protect. It is significant in this respect that the majority of High Contracting Parties have referred expressly, in their submissions as third parties in this case, to their support for accountability for all violations of international law by the Russian Federation and for efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable under applicable international legal frameworks (see paragraph 157 above). They also acknowledged that the Court’s careful examination of the facts surrounding the downing of flight MH17 in order to determine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction arose (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 701-06) reflected the application of the principles in its case-law to the specific facts of that incident (see paragraph 233 above). (b)   The principles governing extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case of armed conflict and the Court’s recent approach 350.  The general principles concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction were set out at some length in the Court’s admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above, §§ 552-75). These principles were formulated and subsequently developed over a number of years in the context of the examination of specific cases by the former Commission and, later, the Court. It is important to note that these cases frequently arose against a backdrop of armed conflict. Indeed, some of the earliest developments in the case-law in this area occurred in cases concerning alleged violations arising from the Turkish invasion of 1974 and its subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus; and further refinement of the principles in later years also took place in this context (see the case-law cited in paragraph 167 above). 351.  It can be seen from an analysis of that line of cases that the spatial model of jurisdiction emerged where, by the actions of its armed forces or the armed forces of a local administration subordinate to it, a High Contracting Party exercised effective control over an area outside its national territory. The nature of the controlling State’s jurisdiction in such cases is territorial, in the sense that it has power and authority over the territory as a whole. This spatial approach to jurisdiction has been applied by the Court in a number of cases where an area within the sovereign territory of one High Contracting Party has been removed from its effective control by the direct or indirect (via a local subordinate administration) military action of another High Contracting Party, which has thus acquired effective control over the territory in the place of the sovereign State (see notably Ilaşcu and Others; Catan and Others; Mozer and Others; Chiragov and Others; Georgia v. Russia (II); and Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea); all cited above). As a consequence of the controlling State’s domination over the territory as a whole, that State has the responsibility under Article 1 to secure, within the area under its control, the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention and those additional Protocols which it has ratified (see Al‑Skeini and Others, cited above, § 138). 352.  However, the Court has not only considered jurisdictional issues in the context of acquisition by one High Contracting Party of control over the territory of another High Contracting Party. It has also examined cases concerning military action by High Contracting Parties, outside any such context. In its decision in Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others ((dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, §§ 59-61, ECHR 2001-XII), involving an alleged violation of Article 2 on account of a single NATO airstrike in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Court underlined that “the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial” and that extraterritorial jurisdiction was exceptional. It concluded that no such jurisdiction arose in that case. The Court later explained that Banković and Others had excluded jurisdiction in respect of “an instantaneous extraterritorial act, as the provisions of Article 1 did not admit of a ‘cause and effect’ notion of ‘jurisdiction’” (see Medvedyev and Others, cited above, § 64). 353.  The Court has subsequently clarified that the use of force by State agents operating abroad, including in situations of armed conflict, might bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities within the jurisdiction of that State in certain circumstances (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 136). This is the case where State agents have taken the victim into their custody (see, for example, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 61498/08, §§ 86-89, 30 June 2009; Al‑Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, § 86, ECHR 2011; and Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, §§ 76-80, ECHR 2014). There may also be Article 1 jurisdiction even in the absence of detention in cases concerning isolated and specific acts involving an element of proximity (see the cases cited in Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, §§ 120-23 and 131‑32) or the exercise of physical power and control over the victim’s life in a situation of proximate targeting (see Carter, cited above, §§ 150 and 158‑161). The nature of the State’s jurisdiction in these cases is personal, in that it involves power and authority over the individual victims themselves. Reflecting the nature of its jurisdiction in such cases, the respondent State is under an obligation pursuant to Article 1 to secure to the individual the Convention rights and freedoms that are relevant to the situation of that individual (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 137). 354.  The Court has also recognised extraterritorial jurisdiction to exist on a personal basis in cases involving the use of force by State agents in a context where the High Contracting Party to which the actions of those agents are attributable has assumed responsibility for security in an area outside its own sovereign territory (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, §§ 143-50, and Jaloud, cited above, §§ 149-52). In Al-Skeini and Others, the Court noted that the United Kingdom, which held the status of occupying Power in Iraq, had assumed there the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government and had, in particular, assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of security in south-east Iraq (cited above, § 149). In these exceptional circumstances, the Court considered that, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basra during the period in question, the United Kingdom had exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, giving rise to Article 1 jurisdiction (ibid.). In Jaloud, the Court found on the facts of the case that the Netherlands, which unlike the United Kingdom did not have the status of occupying Power in Iraq, had nonetheless assumed responsibility for providing security in a particular area in south-eastern Iraq in the context of its role in the multinational force established to restore stability and security (cited above, § 149). In these circumstances, it had exercised its jurisdiction within the limits of its mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing through a checkpoint manned by personnel under its command and direct supervision (ibid., § 152). In these cases, the authority and control over the victim necessary to establish Article 1 jurisdiction resulted from the use of force within the broader context of an assumption of authority and responsibility across territory falling short of the “effective control” necessary to give rise to Article 1 jurisdiction on a spatial basis. 355.  Applying these principles to the facts in Georgia v. Russia (II), the Court attached decisive weight to the reality of the armed confrontation and fighting between enemy military forces seeking to establish control in a context of chaos over the areas concerned in that case, and found that Russia did not have jurisdiction in respect of the military operations in Georgia during the five-day active phase of hostilities (cited above, §§ 137-38). (c)   Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks in 2014-2022 in the present case 356.  The Court has already found that by 11 May 2014, the separatist operation as a whole was being managed and coordinated by the Russian Federation (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 693). It broadly accepted the allegations of the applicant Ukrainian Government as to the high number of Russian troops deployed in the border regions of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2014, in preparation for further deployment to eastern Ukraine (ibid., § 662). It found that the Russian Federation had provided training in camps near the border to Russian soldiers prior to their deployment in eastern Ukraine (ibid., § 644). It further found it established that senior members of the Russian military had been present in command positions in the separatist armed groups and entities from the outset (ibid., § 611). Mr Girkin, in particular, had played a central role in planning military strategy and coordinating the separatist armed forces, including between the “DPR” and the “LPR” (ibid., § 618). The Court was further persuaded that the political hierarchy within the Russian Federation had exercised “significant influence over the separatists’ military strategy” (ibid., § 619). The evidence before the Court enabled it to conclude that orders and instructions had been received from the Russian Federation on a range of strategic issues (ibid., § 621). The evidence also supported the Court’s conclusion that from the earliest days of the separatist administrations in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Federation had provided weapons and other military equipment on a significant scale, including the Buk-TELAR used to shoot down flight MH17 (ibid., §§ 632 and 639). 357.  The evidence summarised above, to which the Court referred in detail at the separate admissibility stage of the present proceedings, clearly demonstrates the coordination of the different aspects of the Russian operations which started in spring 2014 in eastern Ukraine by the Russian authorities. None of the evidence subsequently provided to the Court or obtained of its own motion provides any basis on which this conclusion could be questioned. No explanation or account of its military decisions and actions during this period has been provided by the respondent State. The Court concludes that the Russian operations in eastern Ukraine which began in spring 2014 were carefully planned and orchestrated from Russia and were executed under Russian instructions by Russian troops in border regions and by armed separatists in the “DPR” and “LPR” acting under Russian authority and control. 358.  The immediate purpose of the military attacks was to enable the respondent State to acquire and to retain effective control over Ukrainian territory and to remove the power and authority of the Ukrainian Government over the areas concerned. As the Court observed in its admissibility decision, the separatists had acquired control over vast swathes of land in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in April and early May 2014. However, that control was gradually being lost over the course of the summer of 2014 in the face of an increasingly professional and organised Ukrainian military response (ibid., § 605). The provision of artillery equipment to the separatists was in direct response to requests from them to avoid defeat or the substantial reduction of separatist strongholds in eastern Ukraine (ibid., § 632). It can be inferred from their timing and the critical situation on the ground that the direct artillery support provided by Russian troops was aimed at securing this same objective (see in particular § 651 of the Court’s admissibility decision and the evidence to which it refers). 359.  Throughout the ensuing years, while the contact lines were largely stable, military attacks continued. Aside from regular exchanges of fire across the line of hostilities, there were also periods of intense fighting in which military attacks were launched in support of the separatists’ attempts to retain or acquire control over Ukrainian territory. For example, in early 2015 increased hostilities began around Debaltseve, in the course of which the separatists acquired control of the city (ibid., § 78). In January and February 2017 there was an increase in the intensity of hostilities around Avdiivka and Makiivka (ibid., § 83). This remained the state of affairs until 2021, when the Russian Federation began deploying significant numbers of troops and military equipment near the border with Ukraine, ostensibly for the purpose of conducting large-scale military exercises (see paragraphs 59-60 above). 360.  The start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 represented the continuation and escalation of the strategy pursued by Russia since 2014. The lengthy preparation phase, involving the prior deployment of troops and military material, and the scale of the invasion are clearly indicative of the degree of planning on the part of the Russian Federation. The move from covert to overt operations brought transparency and clarity as to the views and intentions of the Russian leadership and, in consequence, the underlying, long-term objectives of the Russian operations in Ukraine. These objectives were no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State through the annexation of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of the rest of Ukraine to Russian influence and control (see paragraph 174 above). These objectives, as already explained above, are wholly at odds with the Council of Europe peace project based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law (see paragraph 177 above). 361.  The reality of the extensive, strategically planned military attacks perpetrated by Russian forces across Ukrainian sovereign territory between 2014 and 2022, carried out with the deliberate intention and indisputable effect of assuming authority and control, falling short of effective control, over areas, infrastructure and people in Ukraine, is wholly at odds with any notion of chaos (compare Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, §§ 137‑38, summarised at paragraph 355 above). The Court concludes that in planning and in executing, directly or via the armed forces of the “DPR” and “LPR”, its military attacks across Ukrainian territory with a view to acquiring and retaining effective control over areas of sovereign Ukrainian territory and thereby removing those areas from the effective control of Ukraine, the Russian Federation assumed a degree of responsibility over those individuals affected by its attacks (see paragraph 354 above). In these circumstances, the Russian Federation exercised, through its de jure and de facto armed forces, authority and control over individuals affected by its military attacks up until 16 September 2022. Such individuals therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. It follows that the Russian Federation was under an obligation pursuant to Article 1 to secure to individuals affected by its military attacks the Convention rights and freedoms relevant to their situation (see, mutatis mutandis, Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 137). 4.     Attribution 362.  Acts and omissions of the Russian military are acts of Russian State organs and are plainly attributable to the respondent State. 363.  In its admissibility decision, the Court has already explained that the acts and omissions of separatists in the areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation were attributable to that State (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 697). In this respect, the Court underlines that, having regard to the wealth of evidence before it, it is satisfied that all the armed hostilities undertaken by the separatists reflected an overall strategy and tactics wholly devised by the Russian Federation. There can, moreover, be no doubt that direct and critical combat support was provided by the respondent State from the very earliest stages of the armed conflict (see paragraphs 356 and 358 above). The reality of the relationship between the separatists on the one hand and the respondent State on the other was such that, whatever their legal status, the separatists were completely dependent on military, political and economic support from the respondent State to carry out their activities and were, ultimately, a mere instrument of that State. It is for these reasons that the Court was persuaded that, from 11 May 2014, the relationship of the separatists to the Russian Federation was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the separatists in the “DPR” and the “LPR” with de facto organs of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of Article 4 ARSIWA. Any other solution would allow States to avoid their Convention obligations by choosing to act through entities whose supposed independence is purely fictitious. 364.  The applicant Ukrainian Government have alleged that the overall command of Russia’s “hybrid forces” in eastern Ukraine was under the direct control of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 586). The Court observes that once the armed separatists were formally integrated into the military hierarchy of the Russian armed forces, they had the legal status of State organs and were, accordingly, from that date de jure organs of the respondent State within the meaning of Article 4 ARSIWA. In view of its finding that prior to that date the separatists were de facto organs of the Russian Federation, it is not necessary for the Court to make any finding as to the date on which this transition occurred. 5.     Conclusion 365.  The Court already found in its admissibility decision that the respondent State exercised Article 1 jurisdiction over areas under separatist control in eastern Ukraine from 11 May 2014 until at least 26 January 2022 (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 695-96). 366.  The Court now further concludes that the Article 1 jurisdiction of the respondent State has also been established in the present case, up until 16 September 2022, in respect of the complaints of administrative practices in areas under separatist control after 26 January 2022, the complaints of administrative practices in the Russian Federation and in areas in the hands of the Russian armed forces from 24 February 2022, and the complaints of an administrative practice of military attacks in violation of the Convention from 2014 to 2022. It accordingly dismisses the preliminary objection raised by the respondent Government in this regard (see paragraph 340 above). All acts and omissions of the Russian armed forces and the armed separatists of the “DPR” and the “LPR” are attributable to the Russian Federation. VIII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW A.   Introduction 367.  At the separate admissibility stage of the present proceedings, the Court was asked to consider the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law in the context of an objection by the respondent Government that it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae to deal with the complaints made. The objection was based on the contention that some of the complaints in particular were governed by international humanitarian law to the exclusion of the Convention (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, §§ 707-11). The arguments focussed on the incompatibility of the Convention with international humanitarian law in respect of the relevant complaints. It is for this reason that the Court, when dismissing the objection, commented on the existence or otherwise of any apparent conflict between the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law and the Convention provisions (ibid., § 720). 368.  In their written submissions to the Grand Chamber at the present stage of the proceedings, the applicant Governments and third-party interveners invited the Court to clarify its approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in situations of armed conflict and the relevance in this respect of provisions of international humanitarian law, particularly in circumstances like those arising in the present case where no derogation under Article 15 of the Convention has been lodged. B.   The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicant Ukrainian Government 369.  The applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that the Court had consistently applied the Convention to alleged violations which had occurred in the context of armed conflict. The only limited exception to this rule arose when a State exercised the specific power under Article 15 of the Convention to derogate from obligations to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of “war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. Russia had not purported to derogate under Article 15 in the present case. 370.  Where the alleged violations of the Convention occurred in the context of an armed conflict, the Court could draw on international humanitarian law as authoritative guidance for both contextualising and interpreting the obligations under the Convention. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (“GC I”), the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“GC III”) and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“GC IV”), of 12 August 1949, as well as the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (“AP I”), all of which reflected or codified customary international law and to which both Ukraine and Russia were parties, were applicable in this case. 371.  Referring to the Court’s case-law, the applicant Ukrainian Government submitted that the starting point was the Court’s consistent practice of interpreting the Convention in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention, notably its Article 31 § 3 (B74). Second, where there was no subsequent agreement between the parties (Article 31 § 3 (a) of the Vienna Convention), the Court would look to subsequent practice (Article 31 § 3 (b) of the Vienna Convention). Consistent practice subsequent to the parties’ ratification of the Convention could be taken as establishing their agreement not only as regards its interpretation but even to modify the text of the Convention. Third, in line with Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention, the Convention had to be interpreted, so far as possible, in harmony with international humanitarian law. This exercise had to be undertaken separately for each aspect of the case and each Convention Article alleged to have been breached. Fourth, the ICJ had consistently held that the protection afforded by human rights conventions and that offered by international humanitarian law co-existed in situations of armed conflict (citing the case-law summarised at B101, 104 and 111 and General Comment nos. 31 and 36 of the UN Human Rights Committee at B83-84 and 92-96). 372.  The applicant Ukrainian Government invited the Court to use the rules and standards of international humanitarian law as a tool for interpreting the alleged violations of the Convention that they invoked. They underlined that this position was supported by the twenty-six intervening Governments (see paragraphs 376-381 below). The common pleading of the intervening Governments had also emphasised that if certain conduct which was incompatible with the Convention was also in breach of international humanitarian law, such conduct obviously fell beyond the scope of what was allowed by international humanitarian law. It logically followed that no norm of international humanitarian law would prevent a finding of a violation of the Convention in such a case. As regards the submissions of the United Kingdom concerning the correct analysis in cases of conflict between international humanitarian law and international human rights law (see paragraph 397 below), the applicant Ukrainian Government underlined that the Court was not required to address this scenario in the present case. They drew attention to the United Kingdom’s position that it was plain that Russia had conducted its military operations in Ukraine in flagrant breach of the basic standards imposed by international humanitarian law (see paragraph 394 below). 2.     The applicant Dutch Government 373.  The applicant Dutch Government referred to the methodology developed by the Court for deciding cases involving the simultaneous applicability of international humanitarian law and the Convention. Pursuant to this methodology, the Court was required to examine the interrelation between the two regimes with regard to each aspect of the case and each Convention Article alleged to have been breached. 374.  The question here was whether Article 2 came into conflict with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law. The applicant Dutch Government argued that in the present case, the rules of international humanitarian law and the Convention pointed in the same direction: the attack on flight MH17 was unequivocally unlawful as it was prohibited by both the Convention and international humanitarian law. Both the Convention and international humanitarian law required that precautionary or preventive measures be taken. International humanitarian law required that States comply with rules regarding distinction, precaution and proportionality when engaging in military action. The downing of flight MH17 had clearly violated these rules. There was therefore no conflict between the two bodies of law in respect of this complaint. 3.     The respondent Government 375.  The respondent Government did not take part in the present proceedings on the merits of application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20 and the admissibility and merits of application no. 11055/22 (see paragraph 142 above). Although they argued at the separate admissibility stage that some of the complaints in particular were governed by international humanitarian law to the exclusion of the Convention (see paragraph 367 above), they made no submissions as to how the Court should approach its interpretative task in the event that the complaints identified fell within the scope of the Court’s review. 4.     Third-party submissions (a)   Governments (i)      Common pleading of all twenty-six Governments 376.  In their common pleading and common oral submission, the twenty‑six intervening Governments submitted that in cases that took place in the context of an armed conflict, the Court had to consider international humanitarian law in the interpretation and application of the Convention. They referred to the case-law of the ICJ (B101-08) concerning the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The ICJ had described international humanitarian law as the lex specialis in armed conflict. 377.  The Court’s task, however, was to rule whether States had violated the Convention. It had previously explained that “the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part”, including international humanitarian law. This was consistent with the principle of systemic integration codified by Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention (B74). In cases that took place in the context of an international armed conflict, international humanitarian law had to be taken into account. This followed from the very nature of international humanitarian law as the common and widely shared understanding as to the rules and principles that governed the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. 378.  The twenty-six interveners referred to the Court’s approach in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above, § 95), where it had examined “the interrelation between the two legal regimes with regard to each aspect of the case and each Convention Article alleged to have been breached” and ascertained whether there was a conflict between the provisions of the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law. This approach had been confirmed in Hanan v. Germany ([GC], no. 4871/16, §§ 211‑29 and in particular at § 224, 16 February 2021) where the Court had assessed whether the obligation to investigate under Article 2 of the Convention came into conflict with international humanitarian law. In cases where no conflict existed between the Convention and international humanitarian law, the Convention standards had to be interpreted in the light of the relevant applicable rules of international humanitarian law. Thus, international humanitarian law was central in determining what the Convention required in a situation of armed conflict, to which international humanitarian law applied. In cases in which there might be considered to be a real difference between the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law, the Court had provided guidance in Hassan (cited above, notably at § 104). 379.  The intervening Governments submitted that the approach described in the above paragraphs was consistent with international law. The principle lex specialis derogat legi generali could assist in resolving a normative conflict between two sources of international law and, according to the ICJ case-law, regulated the relationship between rules of international humanitarian law and of international human rights law. The International Law Commission had explained that in the case of a normative conflict between two primary rules of international law – in casu, the rules of international humanitarian law and the Convention – the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali provided that the more specific rule (lex specialis) took precedence over the more general rule (lex generalis) (B332‑34). Such analysis was to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 380.  In any event, if certain conduct which was incompatible with the Convention also amounted to a breach of international humanitarian law, including war crimes, such conduct obviously fell beyond the scope of what was allowed by international humanitarian law. Consequently, no norm of international humanitarian law prevented a finding of a Convention violation in such a case. 381.  Finally, the common pleading emphasised that the respondent State could not merely assert compliance with international humanitarian law to resist a finding of breach of the Convention in respect of conduct that was incompatible with the Convention. It would need to be established that its conduct in the specific situation had complied with the relevant rules of international humanitarian law applicable in the case at hand, in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality, that the necessary precautions had been taken in relation to the use of force, and that protected persons had been treated in accordance with international humanitarian law standards. (ii)    Further submissions of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain 382.  The Governments of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain underlined that even in situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under the Convention continued to apply. The Court had developed a methodology for deciding cases involving the simultaneous applicability of international humanitarian law and the Convention. This methodology hinged on the question whether a provision of the Convention, in the circumstances of a specific case, came into conflict with a rule of international humanitarian law. 383.  The six Governments further urged the Court, when applying the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, to take account of the different functions of this generally accepted technique: as a norm for conflict resolution; and as an interpretative tool (i.e. as a supplementary means of interpretation in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention – see B75). As a norm for conflict resolution, lex specialis provided for the precedence of one norm over another. As an interpretative tool, it applied on a norm-by-norm basis, meaning it did not displace a legal regime as such: it had to be applied contextually, so that even during armed conflict, the precise factual and legal context determined whether international humanitarian law or the Convention was lex specialis; and it had to be applied in a nuanced manner, meaning that one regime did not displace the other, nor did a norm fully displace another if it was found to be specialis. It merely provided for the precedence of one norm over the other in that specific situation and for that specific incident. In order to decide which norm functioned as lex specialis, regard had to be had to a contextual element (the relevance or appropriateness of a rule to regulate the specific situation) and a purely legal element (the wording of the norm itself, particularly how explicit, direct and precise the provision was). The contextual element of the specialis determination indicated whether rules were designed to govern a situation. This depended on: (1) whether the situation concerned one of international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict or occupation; (2) whether there was active fighting ongoing; (3) the status of individuals concerned and their activities; and (4) the level of control the State had over the situation. Once it had been decided, based on these factors, whether international humanitarian law or international human rights law provided the more specific norm, the lex specialis then took precedence over the conflicting lex generalis. 384.  Five Governments (Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain) gave the following examples to illustrate when a normative conflict between a rule of international humanitarian law and a Convention provision could emerge. First, this could occur in the context of the strict rules under Article 2 of the Convention, safeguarding the right to life, and the more permissive rules of international humanitarian law (killing of combatants and fighters, incidental loss of civilian life resulting from attacks directed against lawful military objectives, and the international humanitarian law obligation to investigate alleged violations). Second, it could arise in the context of Article 3 of the Convention, as the Third Geneva Convention required the repatriation of POWs after hostilities ended, where such individuals when repatriated would run a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. Third, it could occur in the context of detention, as the Court had recognised in Hassan (cited above). Fourth, it could arise in the context of occupation, where international humanitarian law required occupying States to respect, “unless absolutely prevented”, the laws in force in the country, and to leave in place “penal laws ... with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of [Geneva Convention IV]”. A conflict could arise if such local legislation was in conflict with the Convention. (iii)   Further separate submissions (α)     Croatia 385.  The Government of Croatia provided extensive details of case-law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) relevant to the application of international humanitarian law (see B143-44, 146 and 159‑60).  They submitted that the judgments of the ICTY and ICTR illustrated the need for full respect by those engaged in armed conflict for the fundamental norms of international humanitarian law. Foremost among those norms was that which required the protection of people not taking an active part in hostilities. The norms were based on values that were fundamental for every human being, namely the integrity of the individual, the right to life and the right to be protected from fear, pain and violence. As such, they were applicable without distinction on any ground including ethnicity, nationality and religion. (β)      France 386.  The Government of France underlined that international humanitarian law and international human rights law were not mutually exclusive collections of law. They referred to the content of the common pleading as regards the interpretation of the Convention in times of conflict in the absence of a conflict of norms with international humanitarian law (see paragraph 378 above). Where such a conflict arose, the Court applied the rule lex specialis derogat legi generali, in accordance with the principles outlined in the common pleading (see paragraph 379 above). Priority had therefore to be given to the law more specific to the situation concerned. 387.  The identification of the lex specialis depended on the situation in question and the general context. In Hassan (cited above, §§ 103-04) the Court had confirmed the role of international humanitarian law as lex specialis in respect of facts arising in armed conflicts. This was the correct approach, and was consistent with the Court’s approach of interpreting Convention provisions in times of armed conflict taking into account the practical reality of military deployments (citing Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, §§ 326-27). 388.  The Court had accepted that, in accordance with State practice, the absence of a formal derogation under Article 15 did not prevent it from taking into account the context and the rules of international humanitarian law (citing Hassan, § 103 and Varnava and Others, § 185, both cited above). This coherent relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law guaranteed a certain judicial security to States when conducting military operations and strengthened the application of international humanitarian law and the principles that it had in common with the Convention in the very difficult situation of armed conflict. Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention (B74) was also relevant in this respect. In this way, a relationship of mutual enlightenment could exist between international humanitarian law and human rights. 389.  The French Government further referred to the “Martens clause”, which was to the effect that military operations linked to an armed conflict which did not fall under one of the conventional provisions of international humanitarian law remained subject to customary rules and fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. 390.  A detailed analysis was necessary to determine the existence of any conflict of norms between international humanitarian law and the Convention provisions. The question of a conflict of norms was susceptible to be raised in respect of several rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. As regards Article 2, the taking into account of international humanitarian law even in the absence of a formal derogation under Article 15 implied that a violation of the right to life could not be found if the death resulted from a lawful act of war. However, deliberate targeting of those protected by international humanitarian law or attacks expected to cause excessive damage compared to the concrete and direct military advantage constituted unlawful acts of war which could lead to a finding of a violation of Article 2. 391.  The French Government concluded that having regard to the seriousness of the facts complained of by Ukraine and the application of the principles outlined above, a large number of the provisions invoked were likely to have been violated. They reaffirmed their attachment to the rights and freedom guaranteed by the Convention as well as the fight against any impunity. (γ)      Poland 392.  The Government of Poland submitted that despite being separate legal regimes, international humanitarian law and the Convention could apply to the same persons, on the same territory and at the same time, as confirmed by the ICJ. International humanitarian law could and should influence the Court’s assessment of States’ substantive obligations. This Court was fully qualified to adjudicate in complex factual circumstances in the context of the relationship between international humanitarian law and the Convention. 393.  A detailed analysis was necessary when determining whether there was a normative conflict between a rule of international humanitarian law and a Convention provision. The Government of Poland provided extensive descriptions of and references to the applicable international humanitarian law provisions, which have been summarised in Annex B (B131-85). (δ)      United Kingdom 394.  The Government of the United Kingdom emphasised, and invited the Court to find, that Russia had conducted its military operation in Ukraine in flagrant breach of the basic standards imposed by international humanitarian law. Interpreting the Convention with reference to international humanitarian law would not, therefore, lead to the conclusion that the respondent State had acted compatibly with the Convention. It was, however, important to follow the correct legal analysis as a matter of practice because Contracting States might in future participate in legitimate armed conflict such as humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN or NATO. It was also important as a matter of principle because it properly located the analysis squarely within the international body of law specifically designed and agreed by a wide range of States (including the Contracting States) to regulate this context. 395.  The United Kingdom Government’s first and foundational submission was that, insofar as Article 1 jurisdiction arose in an international armed conflict, the Convention should be interpreted and applied in accordance with international humanitarian law, which was the lex specialis. They referred to the approach of the ICJ in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (B101-02), where the court had had recourse to international humanitarian law in determining whether a deprivation of life was “arbitrary”, within the meaning of Article 6 of the ICCPR. They further referred to the approach of the UN Human Rights Committee, as reflected in their General Comment nos. 31, 35 and 36 (B83‑84, 92-96 and 98-100). The recognition of international humanitarian law as the lex specialis was soundly based. Moreover, the key rules and principles of international humanitarian law represented a common and widely shared understanding among nations. 396.  The Court had also recognised international humanitarian law as the lex specialis in international armed conflicts. It had explained that the Convention was to be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed part, pursuant to Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention (B74). This included the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations. The United Kingdom Government further pointed to the practice of Contracting States not to make derogations under Article 15 of the Convention in respect of extraterritorial military missions. This was mirrored by State practice in respect of the ICCPR. The Court was entitled to take this into account, pursuant to Article 31 § 3 (b) of the Vienna Convention (B74). Accordingly, the lack of a formal derogation did not prevent the Court from taking account of the context and provisions of international law when interpreting and applying the Convention to an international armed conflict (citing Hassan, cited above, § 103). 397.  The interrelationship between international humanitarian law and the Convention had to be examined in respect of each aspect of any application and each Convention Article alleged to have been breached (citing Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 95). When conducting that examination, it had to be clearly recognised that international humanitarian law was the primary source of rights and obligations in an international armed conflict. The idea of primacy, and indeed the concept of lex specialis, had important practical, analytical effects. They meant that international humanitarian law was the first, and in many instances the only appropriate, port of call in seeking to identify the nature of the substantive Convention right in question. Where there was a direct conflict between international humanitarian law and the principles under the Convention, then the former had to take precedence. 398.  Approaching the analysis in this way shaped the Convention right. Thus, for example, the actual terms of Article 2 were designed and formulated to regulate the taking of life by the State outside the context of military operations. In order to apply Article 2 in an international armed conflict, there had to be standards implied into Article 2. International humanitarian law provided those standards. Likewise Article 5 had to accommodate the inevitable situations of detention that arose in an international armed conflict (referring to Hassan, cited above, §§ 104-06). The strength of the interpretive obligation to apply international humanitarian law as the lex specialis meant that the express wording of Article 5 § 1 was to be interpreted to include a new ground of detention pursuant to the Geneva Conventions. Hassan had not been wrongly decided, and was in line with the approach of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its ruling in Coard et al. v. United States (Report No. 109/99 Case 10.951 September 29, 1999, at B120-21). Indeed, if Article 1 jurisdiction covered extraterritorial military action, it was vital that armed forces could detain opposing combatants, consistently with the Geneva Conventions. It was plainly more humane, and consistent with the purposes of the Convention, for a State to be able to detain combatants where operationally possible, rather than kill them. 399.  The United Kingdom Government urged very considerable caution before importing approaches and principles from the Convention jurisprudence into an area covered by international humanitarian law. It would rarely be appropriate to add to the rules or principles of international humanitarian law by using the Convention to layer additional rights and obligations on the States party to an armed conflict. First, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 enjoyed – as recognised by the Court in Hassan (cited above, § 102) – “universal ratification”. They reflected the common and widely-shared understanding of States as to the rules and principles that governed the conduct of parties to an international armed conflict. Second, the importation of obligations derived from the Convention would undercut the lex specialis approach, which was founded on international humanitarian law representing the bespoke set of rules to which States operated in an international armed conflict. Third, Convention obligations might well have been developed in the very different context of the “domestic” application of the Convention. They might be inherently unsuitable for the different context of an international armed conflict. The correct approach was not simply to apply Convention principles in an international armed conflict provided only that there was no obvious conflict with international humanitarian law; such an approach was wrong in principle. Fourth, there was no proper basis for importing Convention rules or principles that would materially and directly alter the rules or principles of international humanitarian law. Fifth, adding to the rules or principles of international humanitarian law in such a context was or might well be tantamount to an alteration of those rules and principles. It was therefore inappropriate for that reason. Convention rights were most likely to be relevant in relation to issues where international humanitarian law was silent and regarding the administration of civilian life in occupied territory. 400.  The United Kingdom Government went on to identify what they considered to be the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law in the present case. They explained that in respect of most of the violations alleged in application no. 11055/22, these international humanitarian law rules provided more than was sufficient, without the transposition of any other Convention principles, to conclude that there had been serious violations of the Convention. In particular, each of the methods of the war adopted by the respondent State – targeting civilians, targeting civilian infrastructure and violating humanitarian corridors – would constitute on any view the most flagrant violation of the core principles of international humanitarian law. The Court was invited therefore, “not simply to jump to an analysis based on the principles in the Convention Articles; but rather to work through the applicable and relevant IHL provisions to that end”. (b)   Geneva Academy 401.  The Geneva Academy addressed first the interaction between the jus ad bellum and international human rights law. They argued that an act of aggression could have a bearing on the determination of compliance with substantive Convention rights. While it would be open to the Court to derive Convention violations from non-compliance with the jus ad bellum, two issues would arise. First, the Court would have to determine whether it was competent to decide on issues of compliance with jus ad bellum. This was debatable, given the terms of Article 32 of the Convention, but could be argued to fall within the scope of its interpretation of Article 15. Second, the Court would have to weigh the feasibility and longer-term implications of this approach, since relying on the jus ad bellum determinations by political organs might not always be an option and could in any case result in double standards that would ultimately weaken the value of judicial determinations. The risk of politicisation was high, and clear-cut aggressions like the one committed by Russia on Ukraine remained the exception rather than the rule. 402.  As regards the Court’s existing approach, the Geneva Academy considered that the approach outlined by the Court in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above, §§ 236-37) and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above, § 720) did not reflect the full implications of harmonisation to which the Court had earlier subscribed. They argued that the Court should revert to its previous case-law on the interplay between the Convention and international humanitarian law as outlined in Varnava and Others (cited above, § 185) and Hassan (cited above, §§ 102-104) and “embrace a more nuanced approach to the complementarity of the two regimes”. The ICJ had moved away from reliance on the terminology of lex specialis, stressing instead the need to take into consideration both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Court’s case-law also showed that international humanitarian law had a bearing on the interpretation and application of Convention rights beyond cases of conflict of law (referring to Loizidou (merits), § 43, Varnava and Others, § 185, and Hassan, §§ 102 and 104, all cited above; and Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention – B74). International humanitarian law had to intervene in the interpretation of Convention rules not only when a conflict of norms arose but much more pervasively as a background against which Convention safeguards had to be construed. 403.  For several substantive rights protected by the Convention, interplay with international humanitarian law offered a necessary tool of interpretation even in the absence of conflict stricto sensu. This was the case, for example, in respect of allegations of forcible transfers and deportation from occupied territory under Article 8, of pillage and destruction of real or personal property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and of allegations made under Article 3. Cross-fertilisation could also be useful in the area of procedural rights, including the obligation to investigate. In the vast majority of cases international humanitarian law would not conflict with the Convention but would nevertheless serve as an essential tool of interpretation that would enrich the reasoning of the Court and ensure the relevance, coherence and acceptability of the Court’s decisions. 404.  The lack of a formal derogation under Article 15 of the Convention did not prevent the Court from taking account of the context and the provisions of international humanitarian law when applying and interpreting Convention safeguards. However, the dawning practice of making derogations (for example, Ukraine’s derogations in 2015 and 2022) should not be overlooked. The Geneva Academy proposed that a State that had de facto derogated from the Convention should be held responsible under Article 15 § 3 for failing to comply with its obligation to give notice of the derogation. 405.  As regards the use of potentially lethal force, the legitimate aims listed in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention were devised for peacetime policing situations. They therefore did not fit when analysing conduct of hostilities scenarios. The Court would therefore be required to “harmonise” Article 2 with international humanitarian law in the context of an international armed conflict. The crucial question was to define what was a “lawful act of war” from an international humanitarian law perspective. International humanitarian law underlay the “conduct of hostilities paradigm”, which was based on the assumption that the use of force was inherent to waging war because the ultimate aim of military operations was to prevail over the enemy’s armed forces. International human rights law, for its part, contributed to shaping the “law enforcement paradigm”, whereby lethal force could only be used as a last resort in order to protect life, when other available means remained ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. The principles governing the two paradigms – necessity, proportionality and precaution – were essentially the same but had distinct meanings and operated differently. 406.  As regards the complaints before the Court, three situations involving the interplay between international humanitarian law and Article 2 of the Convention were of particular relevance. 407.  The first situation was intentional, disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians or attacks on persons hors de combat that would violate international humanitarian law. This was governed by the conduct of hostilities rules under international humanitarian law and would also entail a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. As regards this conduct, the protections and safeguards offered by international humanitarian law and international human rights law not only co-existed but overlapped. Defining a disproportionate attack in the context of the conduct of hostilities required interpreting Article 2 in the light of international humanitarian law. In the same vein, the definition of persons hors de combat had to be found in international humanitarian law and had to inform interpretation of Article 2. The legality of weapons used also had to be considered to determine whether Article 2 had been violated in this context. 408.  The second situation concerned incidental killings of civilians that did not violate international humanitarian law. Such attacks were also to be governed by the conduct of hostilities paradigm, which tolerated more incidental loss of life than the law enforcement paradigm. In such a case, the Court was required to “accommodate” the substantive limb of Article 2 with the relevant principles on proportionality and distinction under international humanitarian law, as it had done in Hassan (cited above) concerning detention. An attack that respected the international humanitarian law principles on the conduct of hostilities had to be deemed lawful prima facie under Article 2 of the Convention when applied in the context of an acknowledged armed conflict situation, especially an international one like the conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, the principle of precautions in international humanitarian law provided for ex ante obligations in a comparable way to the planning and control obligations identified by the Court in McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1995, §§ 202-214, Series A no. 324), Ergi v. Turkey (28 July 1998, §§ 79-81, Reports 1998-IV) and Isayeva and Others v. Russia (nos. 57947/00 and 2 others, §§ 188-201, 24 February 2005). 409.  More generally, the interpretation and application of Article 2 of the Convention could evolve in such a way as to provide better and more adequate protections than those foreseen under international humanitarian law. A relevant example concerned sieges: these were not explicitly prohibited by international humanitarian law, but allowing the incidental starvation of civilians together with the purposeful starvation of encircled combatants was at odds with the core value of protecting the right to life. Practice showed that this method of warfare was often accompanied by an overly broad understanding of what constituted a military objective, which led in reality to indiscriminate attacks. Human rights law could outlaw this method of warfare. 410.  The third situation (see paragraph 406 above) concerned cases arising in armed conflict governed by the law enforcement paradigm, for example the use of force in detention settings or situations where there was doubt as to the status, function or conduct of the person against whom force was to be used. Here, specific international humanitarian law rules were integral to the law enforcement paradigm. 411.  In conclusion, the interplay between international humanitarian law and the Convention regarding the use of force had to be approached in a granular fashion. When the use of force pertained to the conduct of hostilities, Article 2 had to be interpreted in light of international humanitarian law and its principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions. Where it pertained to law enforcement, use of force had to be the last resort and the applicable standards were those prevailing in peacetime law enforcement, albeit interpreted against a different context. (c)   The Human Rights Law Centre 412.  The Human Rights Law Centre submitted that when assessing whether there had been violations of the right to life – either by the downing of flight MH17 or with regard to some of the other uses of kinetic force at issue in this case – the Court would need to take into account relevant rules of international law, including international humanitarian law. 413.  The Court’s justification analysis under Article 2 normally required an assessment of whether force was “absolutely necessary” for one of the purposes set out in Article 2 § 2. That approach could not work as such in the context of deprivations of life in international armed conflict: none of the purposes in Article 2 § 2 could accommodate status-based targeting rules of international humanitarian law in international armed conflict. Moreover, the international humanitarian law principle of proportionality, which was solely about incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, was different from a human rights approach to proportionality. Furthermore, the targeting rules of international humanitarian law did not employ the “absolute necessity” standard for the taking of human life. Interpreting Article 2 in light of applicable international humanitarian law therefore required “a significant departure” from the text of Article 2. 414.  Any such interpretation had to take into account the text of Article 15 § 2 of the Convention. This possibility of wartime derogation from Article 2 had been put in place by the drafters of the Convention precisely because the rules of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities could not easily be accommodated by the categorical framing of the text of Article 2. This was in contrast to the much more flexible text of Article 6 ICCPR, which simply prohibited arbitrary deprivations of life, thus providing an interpretive window through which international humanitarian law could enter, while not allowing for any derogations whatsoever from the right to life. 415.  This raised three preliminary issues. First, whether the Article 15 § 2 “lawful acts of war” derogation from the right to life could operate automatically, or whether, as was generally the case with derogations, it required a formal statement by the derogating State. Second, whether derogations could operate extraterritorially. Third, whether the reference to “lawful” acts of war encompassed not just international humanitarian law but also the UN Charter-based law on the use of force (jus ad bellum). 416.  The first point was of the greatest relevance in this case. It could be argued that the text of Article 15 was clear and did not allow for automatic derogation. But it was also undeniable that no State had ever derogated from Article 2 by relying on the lawful acts of war exception. It could therefore be argued that the Court should, in line with State practice, read into Article 2 a “lawful acts of war” exception or justification, in the same way as it had, in Hassan (cited above), already read into the (equally categorical) language of Article 5 a further exception for international humanitarian law-authorised deprivation of liberty. On this approach, the application of Article 2 during armed conflict would be essentially the same as that of Article 6 ICCPR, despite their different wording. If the Court were to adopt this approach, both Russia and Ukraine would in principle be able to argue that deprivations of life committed by their armed forces during hostilities did not violate Article 2 of the Convention so long as they were compliant with all relevant rules of international humanitarian law. 417.  The second question was whether derogations could be made with regard to emergencies that arose extraterritorially. No State had ever derogated on such grounds, but this did not entail that such derogations could not be made. Were the Court to adopt the automaticity approach advocated above (see paragraph 416 above), this point would be moot. 418.  The third point concerned whether, to be “lawful”, an act of war had to comply with the jus ad bellum. On this view, a State waging a war of aggression was committing only “unlawful” acts of war, even if its forces were fighting in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law. Every deprivation of life by an aggressor would be arbitrary and a violation of the right to life, even the deaths of the defending State’s combatants killed in combat. The Human Rights Law Centre argued against such an approach on pragmatic grounds, since it would require the Court to make determinations on whether a State had committed aggression. This might be straightforward in some cases but not in others, and might therefore open the door to political controversy. 419.  The Human Rights Law Centre identified two basic types of situation in which individuals were deprived of their life during armed conflict. First, individuals could be killed while in captivity. Such cases might be numerous and hard to document, but were legally straightforward. Second, individuals might be killed in the course of hostilities. In these cases, Article 2 would be violated whenever the death resulted from an attack that was unlawful under international humanitarian law. 420.  There were four basic sets of international humanitarian law rules governing the conduct of hostilities: the principle of distinction, the principle of proportionality, the rules governing precautions in attacks, and the rules governing means and methods of warfare. In summary, the Human Rights Law Centre suggested that in the context of armed conflict there would be a violation of Article 2 where death resulted from: (1)  attacks directed against combatants who were hors de combat; (2)  attacks directed against combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities (both otherwise lawful military objectives) by using unlawful means or methods of warfare; (3)  attacks directed against civilians; (4)  indiscriminate attacks that resulted in any civilian deaths; (5)  attacks directed against civilian objects that resulted in any civilian deaths; (6)  attacks directed against military objectives that caused disproportionate loss of civilian life; (7)  attacks compliant with the principles of distinction and proportionality that nonetheless resulted in the loss of civilian life, if the party concerned used unlawful means or methods of warfare; and (8)  attacks compliant with the principles of distinction and proportionality that nonetheless resulted in the loss of civilian life, so long as that loss of life could have been avoided through feasible precautions that the attacking party failed to take. 421.  There would, in principle, be no violation of Article 2 where death was the result of: (1)  killings of combatants; (2)  killings of civilians directly participating in hostilities, if they were attacked whilst they participated in hostilities; and (3)  incidental killings of civilians compliant with the principle of proportionality, if the party concerned used only lawful means and methods of warfare and if all feasible precautions had been taken. 422.  The Human Rights Law Centre acknowledged the difficult issues of proof that arose when determining why particular objects or people had been targeted and what precautions had been taken. These difficulties were not insurmountable. The Court could rely on evidence from the parties and from the work of independent fact-finding institutions like the UN Commission of Inquiry (see paragraphs 97 and 195 above). It could also request the respondent State to provide evidence that the principles of international humanitarian law had been adhered to. This could be done through the provision of information on targeting decisions and instructions, strategic and tactical decisions regarding the use of particular weapons, any decisions regarding precautions and any documentary evidence concerning investigations and obtaining of evidence about specific incidents. Appropriate adverse inferences could be drawn from any refusal to cooperate adequately. 423.  Mistake of fact scenarios, in which civilians were not harmed intentionally but because of a material error in the targeting process, were very common in armed conflict. Such errors related to the international humanitarian law rule on distinction. McCann and Others (cited above) concerned such a mistake of fact outside the context of armed conflict. The Court accepted that the use of force based on an honest belief which turned out later to be mistaken could be justified (ibid., § 200). However, even where there was an honest, but mistaken, belief, a violation of Article 2 could arise as a result of errors in planning and conduct of the operation that resulted in the use of force (ibid., § 211, and Ergi, cited above, § 79). In the international humanitarian law context, Article 2 could be read as imposing a duty on States to take all feasible precautions to avoid basing operational decisions on unverified – and possibly incorrect – information as to the identity or nature of any targets. 424.  The rules of treaty and customary international humanitarian law were not explicit as to how a mistake of fact regarding distinction was to be treated. The majority view in international humanitarian law scholarship was that the concept of directing attacks implied some level of intent, and that an honest and reasonable mistake of fact could negate that element of intent. Thus if the armed forces of a party to a conflict did take all feasible precautions in attack and all feasible measures to verify that a target was a military objective, but it later transpired that the target was in fact a civilian object, there would be no violation of international humanitarian law. In such circumstances there should be no violation of Article 2 either, even if civilians died as a result of such a mistake. The question for the Court was therefore whether the persons in charge of the targeting process took all objectively feasible measures to verify the identity of the target and any other relevant measures that could minimise the risk of loss of life. C.   The Court’s assessment 1.     General principles 425.  Within the structure of the Convention, only Article 15 explicitly addresses armed conflict. It provides: “1.  In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 2.  No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. 3.  Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.” 426.  The respondent Government have not availed themselves of their right to derogate under Article 15. However, even where the Court is not required to assess the validity of a purported derogation from provisions of the Convention, it must still approach its general interpretative task under Article 32 of the Convention in accordance with the principles clearly laid out in its previous case-law. 427.  The starting point for the Court’s examination must be its constant practice of interpreting the Convention in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention (see B74-75, and Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, §§ 29-35; Hassan, cited above, § 100; and the judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 913). The “general rule of interpretation” set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides in paragraph 3 that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; and (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties (B75). It follows from Article 31 § 3 (c) in particular that the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum: it should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part (see, notably, Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 55, ECHR 2001-XI; and Hassan, cited above, § 77). This includes international humanitarian law (see Varnava and Others, § 185; Hassan, §§ 77 and 102; Georgia v. Russia (II), § 94; and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), § 719; all cited above). 428. The ICJ has clarified that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict. It has explained that as regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. It has in the past referred to international humanitarian law as being lex specialis in this context (B101 and 103-08). However, in its more recent 2005 judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), it did not invoke the concept of lex specialis and instead explained that in its previous case-law it had concluded that “both branches of international law, namely international human rights law and international humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration” (B109-12). The Court, for its part, has not described the relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law as one of lex generalis and lex specialis. In particular, the Court’s case-law demonstrates that the specific provisions of international humanitarian law do not displace Convention guarantees in situations of armed conflict. Rather, they are used as an interpretative tool when determining the scope of human rights guarantees in such situations. In the context of the Convention, there is no circumstance in which international humanitarian law will apply to the complete exclusion of the Convention’s human rights guarantees. This follows logically from the Court’s consistent position that even in situations of international armed conflict, the safeguards under the Convention continue to apply (see, recently, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 718). 2.     Application of the general principles to the facts of the case 429. As it has already underlined, in the present case the Court is asked to interpret and apply the Convention against the backdrop of international armed conflict. The Court will take into account relevant provisions of international humanitarian law where relevant when determining the scope of human rights guarantees under the Convention Articles invoked by the applicant Governments. This is not only rendered necessary by its general interpretative obligation as described above, or by the arguments from the applicant, respondent and third-party Governments concerning the relevance of international humanitarian law in this case (see paragraphs 369‑400 above). It also follows as a consequence of the special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order for the protection of individual human beings and its mission, as set out in Article 19 of the Convention, to “ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties” (see paragraphs 159 and 161 above). In these circumstances, the Court cannot avoid interpreting international humanitarian law and, where necessary for it to carry out its role, will assess compliance with international humanitarian law provisions (see, notably, Hassan, cited above, § 109-10. See also Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, §§ 200‑27, ECHR 2010, and, similarly, the Court’s analysis of State immunity rules in Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, §§ 201-15, ECHR 2014). 430.  The Court observes that its duty is to interpret the Convention in harmony with international law “so far as possible” (see paragraph 427 above). There may be situations where a harmonious interpretation of provisions of the Convention with relevant provisions of international humanitarian law is not possible in the absence of a derogation under Article 15 of the Convention (see paragraph 425 above), since the provisions are in conflict with one another. In its admissibility decision, the Court acknowledged that this might be the case as regards the Article 2 complaints advanced by the applicant Governments (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above, § 720). Whether such conflict does, in fact, arise on the facts of the present case will be addressed in the context of the Court’s examination of the respective Article 2 complaints of the applicant Governments, below. 431.  Neither applicant Government invited the Court to take account of jus ad bellum when determining the compliance of the respondent State with substantive Convention rights. In the absence of submissions from them on this question, the Court does not consider it appropriate to address it. IX.   ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE DOWNING OF FLIGHT MH17 A.   Alleged substantive violation of Article 2 of the Convention 432.  The applicant Dutch Government complained that the respondent State had violated the right to life within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention through its role in the downing of flight MH17. Article 2 provides: “1.  Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a)  in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c)  in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)   The applicant Dutch Government (i)      The obligation to protect life 433.  The applicant Dutch Government argued that the use of force that had led to the deprivation of life of all persons on board flight MH17 was in breach of the respondent State’s obligation under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention to protect the right to life of persons within its jurisdiction. In particular, the respondent State had failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard the passengers’ lives in light of the real and immediate threat posed by the Buk-TELAR and it had failed to take adequate preventive measures to protect the right to life. 434.  The deployment and use of the Buk-TELAR without taking any additional preventive measures, in an area over which civilian aircraft continued to fly, had presented a real and immediate threat to the lives of those on board flight MH17 and other civilian aircraft which the respondent State had, or ought to have, known to be flying over the east of Ukraine on 17 July 2014. In Tagayeva and Others v. Russia (nos. 26562/07 and 6 others, § 482, 13 April 2017), the Court had underlined that the positive obligation to protect life “may apply not only to situations concerning the requirement of personal protection of one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act, but also in cases raising the obligation to afford general protection to society”. The real and immediate risk to civilian aircraft arising from the deployment and use of a Buk-TELAR, in the circumstances of this case, was undeniable. This knowledge engaged the Russian Federation’s obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention. 435.  In the weeks prior to the downing of flight MH17, the conflict in eastern Ukraine had extended into the airspace. The separatists had had access to and had deployed MANPADS that could reach targets of up to six kilometres. In light of this, the airspace above the conflict area had been closed below flight level 320, which corresponded to approximately ten kilometres. Above that level, commercial flights had continued to fly, on the basis that the weapons being used in eastern Ukraine did not represent a danger to these flights. However, this had changed dramatically with the supply by the Russian Federation of a Buk-TELAR, which could reach targets up to an altitude of twenty-four kilometres. 436.  The applicant Dutch Government explained that an anti-aircraft weapon such as a Buk-TELAR was an advanced military system in many respects, but it was heavily limited when it came to the identification of aircraft. Normally, a Buk-TELAR operated within a Buk system, comprising eleven vehicles: a command post, a target acquisition radar (known as a Buk‑TAR), three transporter erector launcher and loaders (Buk-TEL) and six transporter erector launcher and radars (Buk-TELAR). Since a Buk-TELAR had its own radar, it could operate on its own without the rest of the Buk system. However, used in this manner, there were severe limitations. Notably, the radar of a Buk-TELAR could only positively identify one of its own military aircraft as a “friend”. All other aircraft – whether enemy aircraft or civilian aircraft – would necessarily be identified as a “foe”. Flight MH17 was therefore identified as a “foe”. 437.  Despite this known risk to civilian aircraft, the respondent State had not taken any preventive measures. Measures which could have been taken included, first, closing its own airspace near the border with Ukraine. This would, together with the closed airspace over Crimea, have resulted in a situation in which civilian aircraft bound for Russian airspace would no longer have flown in the area where flight MH17 was downed. Second, the respondent State could have ensured the involvement of the civil air traffic controllers (“CATC”) and/or military air traffic controllers (“MATC”) in the operation of the Buk-TELAR. The CATC and MATC are, through the use of radars, aware of the presence and specific location of civil aircraft in certain areas of the airspace. Based upon this information, the precise location of the Buk-TELAR and information regarding the range of the Buk-TELAR, the CATC or MATC could have informed the crew of the Buk-TELAR whether there were, at a specific moment in time, civilian aircraft in the vicinity. Third, the respondent State could have notified the Ukrainian authorities about the presence of a Buk-TELAR in the east of Ukraine, thereby allowing the Ukrainian authorities to take preventive measures. Finally, it could have issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) so that all airlines planning to fly over the conflict zone would have been warned of threats to the safety of civil aviation in the part of the airspace that had not been closed by Ukraine. 438.  Had the Russian Federation not supplied the Buk-TELAR, or had it taken the preventive measures outlined, 298 civilians would not have lost their lives. Russia had therefore violated their right to life. (ii)    The prohibition of intentional deprivation of life 439.  The applicant Dutch Government contended that the use of force also constituted an unlawful deprivation of life, in breach of Article 2 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention. 440.  The applicant Dutch Government referred to the Court’s findings in its admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia ((dec.), cited above) that the firing of the missile and the downing of flight MH17 had occurred in territory in the hands of the separatists; that Russia had supplied and transported the Buk-TELAR; and that the acts and omissions of local administrations in areas under Russian spatial jurisdiction were attributable to Russia. On this basis alone, the downing of the flight was to be attributed to Russia. However, the applicant Dutch Government submitted that the Buk‑TELAR had in fact been manned by members of the Russian armed forces and that the missile itself had been fired by members of the Russian armed forces, or at the very least, with their assistance. They underlined that the separatists did not have trained specialists able to operate a Buk‑TELAR, and that the training would take several years. The only logical conclusion was that members of the Russian armed forces had operated the Buk‑TELAR that launched the missile. 441.  It was therefore clear that the respondent State’s obligations under Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the