THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 32657/24
KMETIJSKO GOSPODARSTVO LENDAVA D.D.
against Slovenia
 
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 12 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
 Lətif Hüseynov, President,
 Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,
 Vasilka Sancin, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 32657/24) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 October 2024 by a Slovenian company, Kmetijsko gospodarstvo Lendava d.d. (“the applicant company”), which was established in 1991, is registered in Lendava, and was represented by Mr G. Balažic, a lawyer practising in Murska Sobota;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.  The application concerns the decision not to appoint an expert witness in civil proceedings against the applicant company.
2.  On 28 May 2015 the Maribor Higher Court convicted A.Z., an employee of the applicant company, for endangering safety at work. In the operative part of the judgment, the court held that A.Z. – as the person in charge at the applicant company at the relevant time – had not acted in accordance with the applicable regulations, thus endangering human lives, and that such conduct had resulted in F.M. sustaining a very serious physical injury.
3.  After the criminal judgment became final, F.M. initiated civil proceedings against the applicant company, in which he claimed compensation for the work-related accident. During the proceedings, the applicant company proposed that an expert witness specialised in occupational safety be appointed to determine whether it had acted lawfully. Its proposal was refused by the first-instance court, which explained that the appointment of an expert witness would only unnecessarily prolong the proceedings as all the relevant facts had already been established in the criminal judgment against A.Z. (see paragraph 2 above). On 12 November 2019 the Maribor Labour Court found the applicant company liable for the work-related accident and ordered it to pay F.M. salary compensation and a monthly annuity.
4.  In a subsequent appeal, the applicant company argued, inter alia, that an expert witness should have been appointed. On 5 June 2020 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal, holding that the unlawfulness of the applicant company’s conduct stemmed from the findings in the criminal proceedings against A.Z. (see paragraph 2 above).
5.  On 10 November 2020 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company, without examining it on the merits.
6.  On 13 June 2024 the Constitutional Court held that while it was true that the applicant company had not participated in the criminal proceedings, there had been both sufficient procedural safeguards in the particular circumstances of the present case and other factors justifying the decision not to appoint the requested expert in the civil proceedings. Firstly, all of the relevant facts had been established in the criminal proceedings, and the appointment of an expert would have only unnecessarily prolonged the civil proceedings. Secondly, in the criminal proceedings, after conducting an adversarial trial and admitting evidence, the court had established beyond reasonable doubt that A.Z. had been responsible for the accident. Moreover, A.Z. had not admitted his guilt and had actively participated in the criminal proceedings while being represented by the same attorney as the applicant company in the subsequent civil proceedings. Thirdly, in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law, the civil courts had been bound by the criminal court’s findings regarding the unlawfulness of A.Z.’s conduct. They however, had to decide on the amount of damages to be awarded and F.M.’s level of contribution to the work‑related accident. Furthermore, the standard of proof required for a criminal conviction was higher than that in civil proceedings. Lastly, in accordance with Article 147 of the Civil Code, the legal or natural person for whom an employee had been working at the time the damage had been inflicted was strictly liable for any damage inflicted on a third party by the employee during or in connection with their work.
7.  The applicant company complained under Article 6 of the Convention, asserting that the domestic courts’ decision not to appoint an expert witness in the civil proceedings had been arbitrary. Furthermore, the applicant company complained under Article 13 of the Convention regarding the lack of reasoning provided for that decision. Lastly, the applicant company complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, disputing the outcome of the proceedings.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention8.  The Court reiterates that while Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. In principle, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, 23 February 2017, with further references). The Court should not act as a fourth-instance body and will therefore not question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts’ assessment, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (ibid.; see also López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, § 149, 17 October 2019, with further references).
9.  The Court further reiterates that Article 6 does not impose on domestic courts an obligation to order an expert opinion solely because it is sought by a party. It is primarily for the national court to decide whether the requested measure is relevant and necessary for deciding a case (see Gaggl v. Austria, no. 63950/19, § 49, 8 November 2022, with further references).
10.  Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the Constitutional Court convincingly explained why in the circumstances of the present case there was no need for an expert witness to be appointed (see paragraph 6 above). The Court firstly notes that, after conducting an adversarial trial and admitting evidence, the criminal court established beyond reasonable doubt that A.Z., as the person in charge at the applicant company, had been responsible for the accident (see paragraphs 2 and 6 above). Furthermore, in accordance with the relevant procedural rules, a final judgment of a criminal court was res judicata for civil courts (compare Victor Laurențiu Marin v. Romania, no. 75614/14, § 144, 12 January 2021). Moreover, in accordance with Article 147 of the Civil Code, the legal or natural person for whom an employee was working at the relevant time is strictly liable for the damage inflicted on a third party by the employee during or in connection with work (so‑called “strict liability”).
11.  The applicant company’s responsibility stemmed from the finding in the criminal proceedings that its employee had been responsible for the accident. In accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law, the civil courts were bound by the findings of the criminal court and could not establish that A.Z. – and by extension the applicant company – had acted lawfully (see paragraphs 4 and 6 above). There is no allegation by the applicant company that further expert reports were required under the domestic law in such situations (compare Gaggl, cited above, § 58). The Court further notes that the applicant company was able to submit evidence concerning the issues that fell within the scope of the review by the civil court, namely the amount of any damages to be awarded and F.M.’s level of contribution for the work-related accident. It did not argue that the appointment of an expert was necessary in respect of those aspects of the case.
12.  Accordingly, having regard to the applicant company’s submissions and to the Constitutional Court’s reasoning, the Court finds that the refusal to appoint an expert witness in the civil proceedings against the applicant could not be considered arbitrary. This complaint should therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Other complaints13.  The applicant company also raised other complaints under various Convention provisions (see paragraph 7 above).
14.  The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. They must therefore also be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 June 2026.
 
 Olga Chernishova Lətif Hüseynov
 Deputy Registrar President