FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 49552/16
GRAFESCOLO S.R.L.
against the Republic of Moldova
 
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 21 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
 María Elósegui, President,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Sébastien Biancheri, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 49552/16) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 August 2016 by Grafescolo S.R.L. (“the applicant company”), incorporated in the Republic of Moldova in 1999, which was represented by Mr V. Nagacevschi, a lawyer practising in Chișinău;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr D. Obadă;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.  The case concerns a civil dispute in which a city hall obtained a decision setting aside a sales agreement more than three years after its conclusion despite the applicant company’s argument that the action had been time‑barred. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of a violation of its rights to a fair trial and of its property rights.
2.  On 13 February 2003 the Vadul lui Vodă City Council (“the city council”) adopted a decision authorising the applicant company to purchase a plot of land – together with the greenhouses situated on it – which belonged to the local authorities and which was located on the banks of the Nistru River. On 11 March 2003 the Vadul lui Vodă City Hall (“the city hall”) and the applicant company concluded a sales agreement pursuant to which the applicant company paid part of the purchase price and registered its ownership of the land.
3.  On 25 December 2006 the city hall asked the Ciocana District Court to set aside the sales agreement, arguing that it had been concluded in breach of Law no. 440/1995 on water protection areas of rivers and water basins (“Law no. 440/1995”), which expressly prohibited the sale of land located within 100 metres of the Nistru River. The applicant company contended that the city hall’s action was time‑barred as it had been lodged more than three years after the conclusion of the sales agreement. By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Ciocana District Court allowed the city hall’s request, declared the sale null and void, and ordered the reimbursement of the sums previously paid by the applicant company. The Supreme Court of Justice upheld that judgment on 16 January 2008, without addressing the time‑bar argument raised by the applicant company.
4.  The applicant company lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”), alleging that the domestic courts had failed to address its argument that the city hall’s action had been time‑barred. In its judgment in Grafescolo S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 36157/08, 22 July 2014), the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, holding that the domestic courts had failed to respond to the applicant company’s complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations when ruling on the dispute.
5.  Following the Court’s judgment, on 18 February 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice granted the Government Agent’s request to revise the final decision of 16 January 2008 and retained the case for further examination. On 20 May 2015 the Supreme Court remitted the case to the Chișinău Court of Appeal for fresh examination.
6.  By a decision of 15 December 2015, the Chișinău Court of Appeal allowed the applicant company’s appeal against the Ciocana District Court’s judgment of 13 April 2007. Without addressing the argument relating to limitation periods, it held that setting aside the 2003 sales agreement would amount to an interference with the applicant company’s property rights.
7.  On 4 March 2016 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s decision, seeking the dismissal of the city hall’s action as time‑barred, in so far as it had been lodged after the expiry of the three‑year limitation period. On 30 March 2016 the city hall also lodged an appeal on points of law, requesting that the Supreme Court of Justice rule on the statute of limitations issue raised by the applicant company. It reiterated that the land in question was situated within a water protection zone forming part of the public domain which, under Law no. 1308/1997 on the normative price and the procedure of sale and purchase of land (“Law no. 1308/1997”), was inalienable and imprescriptible.
8.  By a final decision of 29 June 2016, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant company’s appeal and allowed the city hall’s appeal on points of law. It quashed the Chișinău Court of Appeal’s decision of 15 December 2015 and upheld the Ciocana District Court’s judgment of 13  April 2007, setting aside the sales agreement and ordering restitutio in integrum. The Supreme Court expressly addressed the applicant company’s argument concerning the alleged expiry of the limitation period. It observed, in particular, that the city hall had brought its action seeking a declaration that the sales agreement was null and void under Article 217 § 3 of the Civil Code, according to which such actions are unlimited in time (imprescriptible). It further held that neither Article 78 of the former Civil Code (in the version in force until 2003) nor Article 267 of the Civil Code (in the version in force since 2003) could serve as a basis for applying the general three‑year limitation period. Having found that the action was not time‑barred, the Supreme Court concluded that the plot of land and related constructions were not eligible for sale under any circumstances, in so far as they were located within a water protection zone and therefore protected from being disposed of under section 9 (6) of Law no. 1308/1997.
9.  The applicant company complained that the proceedings had been unfair and in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, arguing that, by its decision of 29 June 2016, the Supreme Court of Justice had failed to address its complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations and to dismiss the city hall’s court action, thereby infringing its property rights.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10.  The applicant company complained that the domestic courts had failed to examine its complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations applicable to the city hall’s request to have the 2003 sales agreement set aside. It maintained that, notwithstanding the revision procedure used following the Court’s judgment in Grafescolo S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 36157/08, 22 July 2014), the domestic courts had repeatedly failed to give proper consideration to that argument, thereby breaching its right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government contested that claim, submitting that the proceedings had met the standards of fairness required by Article 6 § 1. They argued that the Supreme Court of Justice had adequately addressed the applicant company’s arguments in sufficient detail – in particular concerning the statutory limitation period – concluding that actions seeking a declaration of absolute nullity were not subject to statutory limitation.
11.  The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges domestic courts to give reasons for their decisions, but this cannot be understood to mean that a detailed answer to every argument raised by the parties is required. The extent to which the duty to provide reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case. What matters is whether the reasoning demonstrates that the essential issues of the case have been addressed adequately and sufficiently (see Grafescolo S.R.L., cited above, §§ 23-24). Furthermore, in matters involving complex questions of domestic law and the legal classification of actions, especially where matters of public interest or public property are concerned, the Court recognises a wide margin of appreciation for the national authorities (see Sanofi Pasteur v. France, no. 25137/16, §§ 56-58, 13 February 2020).
12.  The Court observes that the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 29 June 2016 explicitly considered the applicant company’s complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitation. It did not merely reiterate previous conclusions but took into account the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, in particular Article 217 § 3 and the relationship between that provision and the provisions on general limitation periods (Article 78 of the Civil Code, in the version in force until 2003, and Article 267 of the Civil Code, in the version in force thereafter). The Supreme Court explained why the general three‑year limitation period did not apply, basing its conclusion on the specific legal status of the land – that is, the fact that it formed part of the public domain and was situated within a water protection zone. Under domestic law, actions concerning the protection of such land are imprescriptible (see paragraph 8 above).
13.  The Court reiterates that its role is not to substitute itself for the competent domestic courts in interpreting domestic law, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Nothing in the materials before it suggests that this was the case. Accordingly, the complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and must be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
14.  The applicant company further complained that the decision setting aside the 2003 sales agreement and the ensuing loss of the land and greenhouses constituted an interference with its possessions. It claimed that the interference had been unlawful, arbitrary, and disproportionate. The Government contended that the applicant company did not have possessions or legitimate expectations protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention because the original agreement had been declared null ab initio under domestic law. They argued that the applicant company could not have legitimately expected to retain rights over property that domestic law classified as inalienable and imprescriptible. Moreover, the applicant company had obtained reimbursement of the sums paid under the sales agreement.
15.  The Court notes that the applicant company submitted that the 2003 sales agreement, duly registered at that time, had generated a protected proprietary interest. For the purposes of the present case, the Court is prepared to accept that the applicant company had “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The domestic courts’ decisions declaring the sales agreement null and void and ordering restitutio in integrum therefore constituted an interference with its possessions amounting, in effect, to a reversal of title.
16.  The Court observes that the domestic authorities set aside the sales agreement on the basis that the land was situated within 100 metres of the Nistru River, an area designated as a water protection zone. Under domestic law, including Law no. 1308/1997, such property belonged to the public domain and cannot validly be disposed of by sale. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Justice expressly clarified that an application for a declaration of nullity was imprescriptible under Article 217 § 3 of the Civil Code.
17.  The Court therefore considers that the interference complained of had a clear legal basis, which was accessible to the applicant company and applied by the domestic courts following a detailed examination upon the reopening of the proceedings. The requirement of lawfulness was therefore met.
18.  The Court observes that the protection of the environment and safeguarding public resources – including land forming part of the public domain – constitute legitimate public interests. The setting aside of the contract sought to enforce mandatory rules prohibiting the disposal of protected land located within a water protection zone, thereby restoring the integrity of the public domain. Accordingly, the interference pursued a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
19.  The Court further notes that the applicant company obtained the land on the basis of a contract concluded in spite of mandatory statutory prohibitions, which expressly precluded the sale of land located within water protection zones. The domestic courts, after the reopening of the proceedings in the wake of the judgment in Grafescolo S.R.L. (cited above), reassessed the applicant company’s submissions – including its complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations – and made reasoned findings on the imprescriptible nature of the action. The renewed proceedings therefore addressed the procedural defects identified in the Court’s previous judgment (see paragraph 12 above).
20.  Regarding the substance, the Court observes that the absolute prohibition on the sale of the land was known or should have been known to any diligent purchaser and that the applicant company could not reasonably have expected to secure ownership rights on the basis of an unlawful contract. The legal situation was restored to the precontractual position, and no excessive burden had been imposed on the applicant company beyond the consequences inherent in an unlawful transaction being declared null and void. Moreover, the applicant company had obtained reimbursement of the sums paid under the sales agreement. Accordingly, the interference cannot be said to have upset the requisite balance or imposed a disproportionate burden on the applicant company.
21.  Having regard to the lawfulness of the measure, the legitimate public aims pursued, and the lack of any disproportionate impact on the applicant company, the Court concludes that the complaint under of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 11 June 2026.
 
 Martina Keller María Elósegui
 Deputy Registrar President