ARIES GORAN DOOEL IMPORT-EXPORT SKOPJE v. NORTH MACEDONIA

    SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 34199/23 ARIES GORAN DOOEL IMPORT-EXPORT SKOPJE against North Macedonia   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 19 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:  Gediminas Sagatys, President,  Jovan Ilievski,  Hugh Mercer, judges, and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 34199/23) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 4 September 2023 by Aries Goran Dooel import-export Skopje (“the applicant company”), a company registered in Skopje; the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the right of access to a court to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The case concerns the applicant company’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of a breach of the right of access to a court. The complaint was similar to the one subject to the Court’s judgment in Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia (nos. 53030/19 and 31378/20, §§ 7-10, 9 May 2023). 2.  On 12 May 2023 the appeal court, confirming the first-instance court’s decision, rejected as incomplete an objection lodged by the applicant company against a payment order issued by a notary public, because it had not been drafted by a lawyer. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT3.  On 4 September 2023 the applicant company, represented by its sole owner, lodged its application with the Court, in which it submitted, inter alia, that the payment order (see paragraph 2 above) had been based on incorrect documents. In this context, it referred to the respondent State as a “criminal (злосторничка) genocidal-chauvinist...State”. Using the same language, it further submitted that it would lodge other applications with the Court against the respondent State. It also submitted that a public enterprise charged the applicant company’s owner for services which had allegedly not been delivered, and in doing so, supported by the domestic courts and the respondent State in general, it subjected him to “mobbing of the lowest criminal kind” (мобинг од најдолен злосторнички вид). 4.  After having been given notice of part of the application, the Government requested that the Court declare the application inadmissible as constituting an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, on account of the language used by the applicant company in its application form. 5.  The applicant company replied that the Government had not specified which phrases used by it had been offensive and had acted “in the usual manner typical for the State’s communist regime (комунистичкото устројство на државата) between 1945-1991”. Relying on its right to freedom of expression, it further stated that “the owner of the applicant company had suffered damages while the State officials displayed sadistic behaviour [towards it] without suffering any consequences and while being well-paid for it.” It also submitted that it had lodged another application (no. 6581/21) of which the Government had been given notice, and which, in its view, justified the language used. It further stated that a political party and high-level officials had initiated proceedings against the owner of the company, driven by “chauvinist hatred and revenge‑motivated behaviour” towards him, while “abusing their political power” to prevent him from exercising his rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of expression. In this context, the applicant company submitted judgments of civil courts, in which a civil claim for defamation initiated against its owner by a political party and State officials had been dismissed with final effect. The applicant company argued that in those judgments the domestic courts had found that those officials had lied and had abused their power for their personal benefit. It further stated that the way in which political actors in the respondent State exercised power amounted to a “public display of faeces” (Северна Македонија ... држава во која политичките чинители јавно ги изнесуваат фекалиите од практикувањето на власт), and for that reason, the State had no right to complain about the language used by the applicant company. Lastly, it argued that the language used was a “justified political and legal means of an emotional nature”, that it was part of “business customs and practices” and that it was caused by continuous violations of the rights of its owner. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 6.  The Court does not consider it necessary to address all the inadmissibility objections raised by the Government (namely, that the applicant company had not suffered a significant disadvantage, that the application had been lodged outside the four‑month time‑limit, and that domestic remedies had not been exhausted), as the application is in any event inadmissible for the reasons elaborated below. 7.  The Court reiterates that the use of particularly vexatious, insulting, threatening or provocative language by the applicant in his or her correspondence – whether this be against the respondent Government, its Agent, the authorities of the respondent State, the Court itself, its judges, its Registry or members thereof – may lead to an application being considered as an abuse of the right of petition within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient for the applicant’s language to be merely cutting, polemical or sarcastic; it must exceed “the bounds of normal, civil and legitimate criticism” in order to be regarded as abusive (see X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 22457/16, § 146, 2 February 2021). If, however, the applicant refrains, during the proceedings before the Court, from further using provocative or offensive language and expressly withdraws it and offers an apology, the grounds for considering the application as abusive may have ceased to exist (see, for example, Chernitsyn v. Russia, no. 5964/02, §§ 25‑28, 6 April 2006). 8.  In the present case, in its application the applicant company used insulting language towards the State, stating, inter alia, that it was “genocidal”, “chauvinist”, and “a criminal enterprise” (see paragraph 3 above, and compare with the language used by the applicant in the case of Řehák v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208/01, 18 May 2004) and that the respondent State and its courts had supported “mobbing of the lowest criminal kind” of the applicant company’s owner. 9.  Subsequently, in its reply to the Government’s observations, the applicant company continued using vulgar and offensive language (see paragraph 5 above). In addition, it stated that the domestic courts had found that the public officials who had initiated proceedings against the owner of the applicant company had lied and abused their political power. However, these allegations are unsubstantiated since, as is evident from the judgments submitted by the applicant company, the courts never made such findings. Those statements cannot be taken as value judgments either (contrast Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, §§ 116-118, 22 December 2008). 10.  None of the statements made by the applicant company were connected to the subject matter of the impugned domestic proceedings or to the complaints raised before the Court in the present application (contrast Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino, no. 35511/20, § 83, 15 December 2022). In addition, it cannot be considered that the subject matter and the nature of the complaints in the present case, which concerns the rejection of the applicant company’s objection against a payment order issued by a notary public, imposed a heavy emotional burden on the owner and representative of the applicant company (compare and contrast X and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 146, which concerned the alleged sexual abuse of children in an orphanage). Neither can the arguments related to the other application lodged by the applicant company, of which the Government had been given notice, justify the statements at issue (compare and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Khachaturov v. Armenia, no. 59687/17, § 74, 24 June 2021). Lastly, the Court is not convinced that the language used in the applicant company’s submissions should be considered as part of “usual customs and practices”, as argued by the applicant company. 11.  The Court considers that the language used by the applicant company in the present case (see paragraphs 3 and 5 above), having also regard to the context in which it was used, is insulting and amounts to gratuitous attacks on the authorities of the respondent State, and that the allegations he made were at least in part intolerable to a level which exceeds the bounds of “normal, civil and legitimate criticism” or of an exercise of the right to freedom of expression (compare, mutatis mutandis, Chernitsyn, cited above, § 26, and Řehák, cited above). It observes in this context that, after the respondent State was given notice of the application, the applicant company had an opportunity to withdraw its offensive statements, but it did not do so. It did not express regret for the language used, but, to the contrary, continued making offensive statements (compare Di Salvo v. Italy (dec.), no. 16098/05, 11 January 2007). Such conduct by the applicant company is contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application. 12.  It follows that the present application must be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 11 June 2026.    Dorothee von Arnim Gediminas Sagatys  Deputy Registrar President