Judgment Hasmik Khachatryan v. Armenia - Armenia’s failure to respond adequately to serious acts of domestic violence breached the Convention
2024-12-12T00:00:00
issued by the Registrar of the Court
ECHR 297 (2024)
12.12.2024
Armenia’s failure to respond adequately to serious acts of domestic violence
breached the Convention
The case Hasmik Khachatryan v. Armenia (application no. 11829/16) concerned severe domestic
violence inflicted on Ms Khachatryan by her common-law husband. After she had brought criminal
proceedings against him, and even though she had requested protection from him, he continued to
pursue and threaten her, and ended up assaulting her again. Although he was convicted, he was
ultimately exempted from serving his sentence.
In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously,
that there had been:
a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment/investigation) of the
European Convention on Human Rights as concerned the legislative and regulatory framework, and
the State’s obligation to respond adequately to reports of domestic violence and to carry out an
effective investigation.
The Court found in particular that the legislative framework in force at the time had fallen short of
the State’s duty to establish and effectively apply a system punishing all forms of domestic violence
and providing sufficient safeguards for victims. The national courts had adopted a purely formalistic
approach and had not taken into account a number of relevant factors for the overall assessment of
the case and the sentencing process. The way in which the criminal-law mechanisms that existed at
the time had been implemented, specifically the application of the amnesty, was flawed to the point
of constituting a breach of the State’s duties under Article 3 of the Convention. Armenia had failed in
its obligation to respond adequately to the serious domestic violence suffered by Ms Khachatryan.
In addition, the Court considered that enabling the victims of domestic violence to seek
compensation for non-pecuniary damage from the perpetrator was one way of making sure that
States took into account the full extent of the harm, not only physical but also psychological,
suffered by them. It concluded that there was an obligation under Article 3 of the Convention for
States to enable the victims of domestic violence to claim compensation in respect of non-pecuniary
damage from the perpetrator.
A legal summary of this case will be available in the Court’s database HUDOC (link).
Principal facts
The applicant, Hasmik Khachatryan, is an Armenian national who was born in 1986 and lives in
Yerevan.
In 2004 Ms Khachatryan married S.H. in a non-State-registered church ceremony. The couple lived
with S.H.’s parents in the village of Gandzak, and had two children – a daughter, born in 2006, and a
son, born in 2007. The couple’s relationship gradually deteriorated, allegedly because S.H. turned to
alcohol after they discovered that their daughter had a hearing problem and needed special care. He
picked arguments, harassed and threatened his common-law wife, and resorted to physical violence.
1. Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery,
any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges
considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final
judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.
Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution.
Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
After one such occasion, Ms Khachatryan was treated at the Armenia Medical Centre in Yerevan. The
hospital reported her injuries to the police, but she refused to lodge a complaint. A forensic medical
examination ordered by the police showed that she had sustained concussion, a nasal bone fracture,
closed craniocerebral trauma, a ruptured eardrum, and haematomas caused by a hard, blunt object.
She did make a statement a couple of days later when the police in Yerevan notified the police in
Gavar, as did her parents and another relative. She also sought support from a non-governmental
organisation in Yerevan which provided her with shelter for a month, assistance, counselling, and
advice on how to deal with S.H.
Ms Khachatryan lodged a criminal complaint with the Gavar police on 2 July 2013. Two weeks later,
she asked if she and her relatives could be questioned in Yerevan for her own safety, as S.H. was
threatening her with “revenge” should she return. She received no response.
Criminal proceedings were instituted on 24 July 2013. A second forensic examination found, in
addition to the injuries previously identified, multiple scars on her scalp., left wrist and shin. A formal
confrontation was held between Ms Khachatryan and S.H. on 1 October 2013. According to
Ms Khachatryan, S.H. shouted at her and threatened her throughout, with the investigator not
daring to interfere, and one of the police officers, who was S.H.’s cousin, interrupting the meeting
several times, even bringing his cousin coffee. She asked for the criminal investigation to be
transferred elsewhere. A month later, S.H. hit Ms Khachatryan outside their daughter’s school, and
shouted and swore at her. Reporting the incident to the police, Ms Khachatryan asked not to have to
have any more face-to-face interviews with him.
Charges of aggravated torture aggravated since Ms Khachatryan was considered to be
“dependent” on him, never having been in paid employment were brought against S.H. on 14
November 2013. The police refused to open a criminal case in relation to the incident outside the
school.
In December 2013, and again at hearings in January and February 2014, Ms Khachatryan asked for
S.H. to be placed in detention, since he kept insulting and threatening her and saying he would take
his revenge. When giving evidence Ms Khachatryan told the trial court that she had been scared of
what S.H. might do to her. For instance, he kept telling her that he would hang her and that nobody
would find out. She described how S.H. had stopped her from having contact with her family once
they were married, that they had moved to Yerevan to enable their daughter to receive care for her
hearing problem but that S.H. had sent her and the children back to live with his parents after a year
while he lived with another woman for three years. Every time he returned to his parents’ house, he
would beat her up and take money. She had been too afraid of him and his threats to leave him.
During the trial, S.H. described his relationship with his wife as “normal” and stated that they had
had a “minor family argument”.
At some point during the trial, Ms Khachatryan lodged a civil claim against S.H. seeking
compensation for the medical expenses she had incurred due to treatment for her injuries. She also
asked for damages for the emotional and psychological suffering he had inflicted.
The Regional Court delivered its judgment on 22 December 2014. It dropped the original charge of
aggravated torture since it considered that Ms Khachatryan had not been financially or otherwise
dependent on S.H. since he had been living with his mistress and it was S.H.’s mother who provided
for the family. The Regional Court sentenced S.H. to one year and six months’ imprisonment, which
rendered him eligible for an exemption from serving his punishment under the Amnesty Act of 3
October 2013, and exempted him from serving his sentence. It also rejected Ms Khachatryan’s civil
claim. Upon appeal, that judgment was upheld in full in April 2015. Subsequent appeals lodged by
Ms Khachatryan and S.H. were declared inadmissible.
2
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and 8 (right to respect for
private and family life) taken separately and in conjunction with Article 13 (right to an effective
remedy), the applicant complained that the Armenian authorities had failed to protect her from
S.H.’s violence throughout the criminal proceedings; that they had failed to impose a proportionate
punishment and make sure it was carried out; and that she had had no legal means of claiming
compensation for non-pecuniary damage from him.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 22 February 2016.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Mattias Guyomar (France), President,
María Elósegui (Spain),
Armen Harutyunyan (Armenia),
Gilberto Felici (San Marino),
Andreas Zünd (Switzerland),
Diana Sârcu (the Republic of Moldova),
Kateřina Šimáčková (the Czech Republic),
and also Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 3
As the national legislation at the time had not distinguished between domestic violence and violence
in general and lacked any form of protection from acts of domestic violence, the Court found that
the legal framework that had been in force had fallen short of the State’s duty to establish and
effectively apply a system punishing all forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient
safeguards for victims.
On a number of occasions during the investigation and the trial, Ms Khachatryan had asked for
protection from S.H. She had repeated her request when giving evidence before the Regional Court.
However, the authorities dealing with the applicant’s case at different stages of the criminal
proceedings had failed to take any measures for her protection. As a result, she had been denied the
effective protection to which she was entitled under the Convention.
The Court found that the national courts had taken a purely formalistic approach and had not taken
into account a number of relevant factors for the overall assessment of the case and the sentencing
process. They had disregarded that Ms Khachatryan and S.H. had been married in church in 2004,
had children together, had never separated and that, having no paid employment, Ms Khachatryan
had been financially dependent on S.H.’s family with whom she lived. Moreover, throughout the
proceedings and also before the trial court, S.H. had consistently referred to her as his “wife”, and
the threats he had made had included threats of what he would do to her if he ever suspected that
she was being unfaithful.
While there was no obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or in a particular sentence,
the national courts should not be prepared to allow grave attacks to go unpunished or allow serious
offences to be punished by excessively lenient sanctions. The Court found it concerning that the
national criminal courts, having completely ignored the context of domestic violence, first
reclassified the offence to its non-aggravated form, which carried a significantly lower penalty, then
imposed on S.H. a sentence at the lower end of the range of applicable penalties for the reclassified
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offence, and finally exempted him from serving even that sentence, thereby completely removing
the deterrent effect of the criminal-law framework.
In the Court’s view, such an approach by the national courts could be interpreted as a certain
leniency towards punishing violence against women, instead of communicating a strong message to
the community that domestic violence would not be tolerated. That kind of leniency could also
discourage victims from reporting domestic violence, and this was already an issue of significant
concern in so far as Armenia was concerned.
The Court considered that the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms that existed at the
time had been implemented, specifically the application of the amnesty, which had resulted in S.H.
being let off for his criminal conduct, had been flawed to the point of constituting a breach of the
State’s duties under Article 3 of the Convention. Armenia had therefore failed in its procedural
obligation to respond adequately to the serious domestic violence suffered by Ms Khachatryan.
In this case, the Court had to determine whether the State was under an obligation under Article 3
of the Convention to enable a victim of domestic violence to claim compensation in respect of non-
pecuniary damage from the perpetrator. It considered that enabling the victims of domestic violence
to seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage from the perpetrator was one way of making sure
that States took into account the full extent of the harm, not only physical but also psychological,
suffered by them. It concluded that there was an obligation under Article 3 of the Convention for
States to allow victims of domestic violence to claim compensation in respect of non-pecuniary
damage from the perpetrator of the violence directly, or indirectly through the State concerned.
The Court concluded that the legislative restriction that had prevented Ms Khachatryan from
obtaining compensation from S.H. for the non-pecuniary damage which she had suffered had been
in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
Other Articles
The Court examined the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention alone.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that Armenia was to pay the applicant 24,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-
pecuniary damage and EUR 2,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
The judgment is available only in English.
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