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ECLI:NL:PHR:2014:1774

Rolnr. 13/04679 mr. J. Spier Zitting 28 maart 2014 (bij vervroeging) Conclusie inzake Republiek Ecuador (hierna: Ecuador) tegen 1. Chevron Corporation (USA) 2. Texaco Petroleum Company (hierna tezamen: Chevron) Inhoudsopgave 1. Feiten 2. Procesverloop 3. Inleiding en achtergronden 4. Stond de weg voor Chevron open naar de Inter-Amerikaanse Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens 5. Denial of Justice 6. De reikwijdte van de toetsingsmogelijkheden in cassatie (art. 79 RO) 7. De uitleg van verdragen 8. Uitleg in good faith 9. Art. 32 WVV 10. Terugwerkende kracht in het internationale recht 11. Een gure tegenwind steekt op voor BITs? 12. De rol van BITs bij het aantrekken van investeringen 13. Bespreking van het principale cassatiemiddel Inleiding Behandeling ten gronde Klachten van de onderdelen 1.1 en 1.2 Bespreking van de klachten van de onderdelen 1.1 en 1.2 De klacht(

  1. en)van onderdeel 1.3 en de bespreking daarvan De klachten van onderdeel 1.4 en 1.5 en de bespreking daarvan De klachten van onderdeel 2 en de bespreking daarvan Wederom beweerde strijd met art. 31 WVV (onderdeel 2.3) De temporele werking (onderdeel 3) Entr’acte: onderdeel 5.2 Terug naar onderdeel 3 Onderdeel 4: voorbijgaan aan essentiële stelling Onderdeel 5: weergave en standpunten en BIT Onderdeel 6: bezemklacht Afronding 14. Bespreking van de incidentele klachten 15. Kostenkwesties Conclusie 1Feiten 1.1 In cassatie kan worden uitgegaan van de navolgende feiten. 1.2 Chevron Corporation is indirect aandeelhoudster van TexPet. In het begin van de jaren ’60 van de vorige eeuw heeft Ecuador aan TexPet een concessie verleend voor oliewinning en olie-exploitatie in het Amazone-gebied in Ecuador. In 1971 heeft Ecuador een staatsoliemaatschappij opgericht, CEPE, later Petroecuador (CEPE/PE). In 1973 zijn de voorwaarden van de concessie uit 1964 heronderhandeld en zijn partijen voor de duur van 19 jaar een concessieovereenkomst aangegaan met betrekking tot een kleiner gebied in het Amazone-bassin (hierna: de Concessieovereenkomst). 1.3 De Concessieovereenkomst is door het verstrijken van de looptijd op 6 juni 1992 geëindigd. Op 17 november 1995 hebben Ecuador, CEPE/CE en TexPet een Global Settlement Agreement and Release (hierna: de Global Settlement Agreement) gesloten in verband met de beëindiging en afwikkeling van de Concessieovereenkomst. Daarin is onder meer voorzien in het herstel van milieuschade door de oliewinning. 1.4 TexPet heeft in de periode van december 1991 tot december 1993 zeven procedures bij Ecuadoriaanse gerechten aanhangig gemaakt in verband met volgens TexPet toerekenbare tekortkomingen van Ecuador onder de Concessieovereenkomst. Volgens TexPet heeft Ecuador de Concessieovereenkomst stelselmatig geschonden door de binnenlandse behoefte te hoog voor te stellen en meer olie van TexPet op te eisen dan waarop zij recht had en die olie vervolgens zelf te exporteren. TexPet heeft in die procedures meer dan US$ 354 miljoen gevorderd terzake van overmatige olieafdrachten aan Ecuador, waarvoor Ecuador volgens TexPet de internationale marktprijs had moeten betalen in plaats van de lagere binnenlandse prijs. 1.5 In 1993 hebben de Verenigde Staten van Amerika (hierna ook: de VS) en Ecuador een Bilateraal Investeringsverdrag (hierna: BIT, of: het verdrag) gesloten dat op 11 mei 1997 in werking is getreden. 1.6 Chevron heeft op 21 december 2006 een BIT-arbitrageprocedure aanhangig gemaakt tegen Ecuador. In die arbitrage, volgens de UNCITRAL Rules, zijn Charles N. Brower, A.J. van den Berg en K-H Böckstiegel tot arbiters benoemd (hierna: het Scheidsgerecht of arbiters). Chevron heeft zich in die arbitrage op het standpunt gesteld dat Ecuador aansprakelijk is voor de schade die zij heeft geleden wegens (onder meer) schending van art. II lid 7 BIT. Die schending was volgens Chevron het gevolg van een ontoelaatbare vertraging in de afdoening van de zeven procedures bij de Ecuadoriaanse gerechten. 1.7 In het arbitrale tussenvonnis van 1 december 2008 (hierna: ‘de Interim Award’) heeft het Scheidsgerecht zich bevoegd verklaard om van de vorderingen van Chevron kennis te nemen. In het arbitraal (gedeeltelijk) eindvonnis van 30 maart 2010 (‘de Partial Award’) heeft het Scheidsgerecht geoordeeld dat Ecuador zich schuldig heeft gemaakt aan rechtsweigering (‘denial of justice’) in verband met ontoelaatbare termijnoverschrijding (‘undue delay’), omdat in de zeven procedures bij de Ecuadoriaanse gerechten niet tijdig een vonnis is gewezen. Daarom is Ecuador veroordeeld om aan Chevron schadevergoeding te betalen. Het Scheidsgerecht heeft in het arbitraal eindvonnis van 31 augustus 2011 (‘de Final Award’) de hoogte van de schadevergoeding bepaald op US$ 96.355.369,17 (inclusief rente). 2Procesverloop 2.1 In de procedure met rolnummer 11-402 heeft Ecuador de vernietiging van de Interim Award van 1 december 2008 en de Partial Award van 30 maart 2010 gevorderd; In de procedure met rolnummer 11-2813 heeft Ecuador vernietiging van de Final Award van 31 augustus 2011 gevorderd. In ’s Hofs weergave in rov. 2 heeft Ecuador aan deze vorderingen ten grondslag gelegd dat een geldige overeenkomst tot arbitrage ontbreekt en dat het Scheidsgerecht zich in de Interim Award derhalve ten onrechte bevoegd heeft verklaard, zodat de arbitrale vonnissen aan vernietiging blootstaan op de grond vermeld in art. 1065 lid 1 sub a Rv. Daarnaast heeft Ecuador in eerste aanleg aangevoerd dat het Scheidsgerecht op een aantal punten zijn opdracht heeft geschonden door essentiële verweren van Ecuador buiten beschouwing te laten. Mede daarom zouden de arbitrale vonnissen volgens Ecuador niet met redenen zijn omkleed. Ecuador heeft hierbij verwezen naar de vernietigingsgronden in art. 1065, lid 1, sub c en d Rv. 2.2 De Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage heeft in haar vonnis van 2 mei 2012 beide grondslagen verworpen en de vorderingen afgewezen. De kern van haar oordeel wordt weergegeven in de hierna geciteerde rov. 5 en 9 van ’s Hofs arrest. 2.3 Ecuador is in hoger beroep gekomen van het onder 2.2 genoemde vonnis. 2.4 Het Hof ’s-Gravenhage heeft het bestreden vonnis bekrachtigd in zijn arrest van 18 juni 2013. Het Hof oordeelde daartoe als volgt: “Bevoegdheid en toepasselijk recht 4. Tussen partijen staat vast dat Nederland geldt als de plaats van arbitrage, zodat op grond van artikel 1073 lid 1 Rv. de bepalingen van Titel 1 van Boek 3 Rv. (artt. 1020-1073 Rv.) op de onderhavige procedure van toepassing zijn. Nu de arbitrale vonnissen bij de rechtbank Den Haag zijn gedeponeerd, ontlenen de rechtbank en het hof Den Haag bevoegdheid aan artikel 1064 lid 2 Rv. Beoordeling van het beroep 5. In hoger beroep is, blijkens de grieven, nog slechts de eerst genoemde vernietigingsgrond, te weten: het ontbreken van een geldige overeenkomst tot arbitrage, en daarmee de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht, aan de orde. De rechtbank heeft te dien aanzien overwogen dat de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht gebaseerd is op een overeenkomst die wordt geacht te zijn vervat in het BIT, waarbij artikel VI lid 4 van het BIT geldt als een open aanbod van de ene verdragsstaat aan onderdanen en ondernemingen van de andere verdragsstaat om ‘any investment dispute’ door middel van arbitrage te beslechten (rov. 4.10). In grief 4 klaagt Ecuador over het onderdeel van de overweging dat de overeenkomst tot arbitrage is vervat in het BIT. Dat is volgens Ecuador onjuist omdat art. VI van het BIT slechts een aanbod van de verdragsstaten aan de onderdanen van de andere verdragsstaat bevat. De grief faalt. De rechtbank heeft dit immers in het vervolg van de desbetreffende overweging nader gepreciseerd. (…) 7. Ecuador grondt haar beroep op onbevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht op de stelling dat, nu de investering van TexPet in Ecuador op 6 juni 1992 is geëindigd, terwijl het BIT eerst op 11 mei 1997 in werking is getreden, gelet op art. XII geen sprake is van een investering die onder de reikwijdte van het BIT valt en mitsdien ook niet van een investeringsgeschil als bedoeld in art. VI (de arbitrageclausule) van het BIT. Chevron heeft daartegen een tweeledig verweer gevoerd:
  2. a)onderscheid dient te worden gemaakt tussen de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht, die uitsluitend aan het bepaalde in art. VI van het BIT dient te worden getoetst, en de vraag of Ecuador zijn verplichtingen onder het verdrag heeft geschonden; alleen in het kader van de laatste vraag is van belang of de belangen waarvan Chevron bescherming verlangt onder de reikwijdte van het verdrag vallen;
  3. b)indien daarover al anders zou worden geoordeeld geldt dat wel degelijk sprake is van een ten tijde van inwerkingtreding van het BIT nog bestaande investering in de zin van het verdrag. 8. In de arbitrage hebben partijen dienovereenkomstige stellingen betrokken. Het Scheidsgerecht heeft, zonder kenbaar in te gaan op het door Chevron gestelde onderscheid (zie hiervoor onder a), geoordeeld, kort gezegd, dat het bevoegd is omdat ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het BIT sprake was van een bestaande investering in de zin van art. I (en XII) van dat verdrag. 9. De rechtbank heeft ten aanzien van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht overwogen, kort samengevat:
  4. i)dat de rechter zich bij de toetsing aan artikel 1065 lid 1 sub a Rv. niet terughoudend dient op te stellen, maar de bevoegdheid van arbiters volledig dient te toetsen (rov. 4.5);
  5. ii)dat Ecuador niet heeft weersproken dat het geschil tussen partijen voortvloeit uit, dan wel betrekking heeft op de Concessieovereenkomst, die als investeringsovereenkomst in de zin van artikel VI lid l onder a kan worden aangemerkt, en evenmin dat het geschil tussen partijen een geschil in de zin van artikel VI lid 1 onder c vormt, zodat aan de voorwaarden die artikel VI voorschrijft voor beslechting van het geschil door het Scheidsgerecht is voldaan (rov. 4.10); iii) dat de volledige toetsing van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht ingevolge artikel 1065 lid 1 sub a Rv. niet meebrengt dat de rechtbank zich ook dient uit te spreken over de vervolgvraag of de arbitrageclausule in artikel VI moet worden gelezen in samenhang met artikel XII van het BIT, en in die zin de (temporele) reikwijdte van de arbitrageclausule begrenst; dat onderscheid te worden gemaakt tussen enerzijds de vraag naar de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht om het door Chevron voorgelegde geschil te beslechten (de vraag naar een geldige arbitrageovereenkomst), en anderzijds de vraag naar de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht om te oordelen over investeringen die ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het BIT waren beëindigd (de interpretatie en reikwijdte van art. XII), welke vraag niet ter volle toetsing aan de rechtbank voorligt (rov. 4.11); en dat ook uit de tekst van art. VI volgt dat dit een geheel zelfstandige bepaling behelst, nu daaruit niet blijkt dat bij beoordeling van de vraag of sprake is van een ‘investment dispute’ moet worden teruggegrepen naar de definitie van art. I of de temporele reikwijdte van art. XII (rov. 4.12). Aldus heeft de rechtbank het hiervoor onder
  6. a)genoemde verweer van Chevron gehonoreerd. 10. In grief 1 betoogt Ecuador dat, voor zover de rechtbank oordeelt dat de rechter de in rov. 4.4 genoemde terughoudendheid bij de toetsing van arbitrale vonnissen ook aan de dag dient te leggen bij een vordering tot vernietiging gegrond op art. 1065 lid 1 sub a Rv. (onbevoegdheid), dit onjuist is. De grief faalt. Uit rov. 4.5 blijkt immers dat de rechtbank ten aanzien van die vernietigingsgrond (terecht) een volle toets voorstaat. 11. De grieven 2, 3 en 5 zijn gericht tegen het oordeel van de rechtbank dat de inhoud van de artikelen I en XII niet bij de beoordeling van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht dient te worden betrokken (zie rov. 9 hiervoor, onder iii)). De grieven 6 en 7 strekken ten betoge dat geen sprake was van een ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het BIT nog bestaande investering en dat het in art. VI van het BIT vervatte aanbod van Ecuador, om geschillen door middel van arbitrage te beslechten, om die reden niet gold voor het door Chevron aan het Scheidsgerecht voorgelegde geschil. Ter onderbouwing van haar grieven verwijst Ecuador naar de tekst van de artikelen I, VI en XII van het verdrag, alsmede het doel daarvan. 12. Het eerste geschilpunt tussen partijen is of de inhoud van de artt. I en XII moet worden betrokken bij de beoordeling van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht. Het hof komt op dit punt tot een ander oordeel dan de rechtbank. Juist is dat de bevoegdheidsvraag een andere is dan de vraag of de vorderingen toewijsbaar zijn. Juist is ook dat een arbitraal beding voor de beoordeling van de bevoegdheid van arbiters dient te worden beschouwd als een afzonderlijke overeenkomst (art. 1053 Rv.). Echter, dat neemt niet weg dat de bevoegdheidsvraag niet kan worden beantwoord zonder daarbij te betrekken de vraag of bij de uitleg van het arbitraal beding (art. VI van het BIT) de inhoud van de artt. I en XII moet worden betrokken. Of dat zo is, is een kwestie van uitleg van art. VI zelf. 13. Tussen partijen is niet in geschil dat het BIT dient te worden uitgelegd volgens de regels neergelegd in het Weens Verdragenverdrag

(1969), hierna: WVV. De relevante bepalingen daarvan luiden als volgt (in de Engelse tekst): Article 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (
  1. a)any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (
  2. b)any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (
  3. a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (
  4. b)any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (
  5. c)any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (
  6. a)leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (
  7. b)leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Aldus dient een verdrag in eerste instantie te worden uitgelegd overeenkomstig de betekenis die de daarin opgenomen bewoordingen in het normale spraakgebruik hebben, bezien in de context waarin zij zijn geplaatst en met inachtneming van de doelstelling van het verdrag (art. 31 lid 1). Een term heeft een bijzondere betekenis indien wordt vastgesteld dat de partijen dat beoogd hebben (art. 31 lid 4). De context van de uit te leggen bepaling bestaat, behalve uit de preambule en de tekst van het verdrag, uit een eventuele overeenkomst of een ander door de partijen aanvaard instrument met betrekking tot de sluiting van het verdrag (art. 31 lid 2). Naast de context dienen bij de uitleg onder meer eventuele nadere overeenkomsten tussen de verdragspartijen met betrekking tot de interpretatie en toepassing van het verdrag in aanmerking te worden genomen, alsook de wijze waarop in de praktijk toepassing aan het verdrag is gegeven (‘subsequent state practice’) (art. 31 lid 3). Deze primaire uitlegmaatstaf wordt aangeduid als de objectieve of tekstuele methode. De totstandkomingsgeschiedenis van het verdrag (waaronder de ‘traveaux préparatoires’) behoort blijkens art. 32 WVV tot de secundaire uitlegbronnen. 14. Partijen hebben aangegeven dat er, naast de inhoud van het BIT zelf, geen relevante uitlegbronnen in voormelde zin zijn (vgl. de pleitnota van Ecuador in eerste aanleg, onder 2.4 en 2.5). Bij gelegenheid van het pleidooi in hoger beroep heeft de advocaat van Ecuador desgevraagd meegedeeld dat niets bekend is over de totstandkoming van het verdrag, anders dan dat er veel van dit soort verdragen met een vergelijkbare inhoud zijn. De enige bronnen waarnaar partijen hebben verwezen zijn: de ‘submittal note’ waarmee het BIT door President Clinton aan het Congres van de Verenigde Staten is aangeboden (Chevron) en de stellingname van de Verenigde Staten in de later nog te bespreken Mondev-arbitrage (Ecuador). De submittal note kwalificeert evenwel niet als een uitleginstrument als bedoeld in art. 31 lid 2 WVV. Op de vraag of de stellingname van de Verenigde Staten kan worden aangemerkt als relevant onderdeel van state practice zal het hof later ingaan. 15. Startpunt voor beoordeling van de bevoegdheidsvraag is het arbitraal beding, i.e. art. VI van het BIT. Anders dan de rechtbank, is het hof van oordeel dat het enkele feit (indien juist) dat uit de bewoordingen van art. VI niet blijkt dat moet worden teruggegrepen op de definitiebepaling van art. I en/of de bepaling omtrent de temporele reikwijdte van het verdrag (art. XII), niet doorslaggevend is voor het antwoord op de vraag of de inhoud van die bepalingen bij de uitleg van art. VI moet worden betrokken. Immers, bij de uitleg van een verdragsbepaling dienen de bewoordingen te worden uitgelegd in het licht van hun context (waaronder de verdere inhoud van het verdrag) en de doelstelling van het verdrag. Dat art. VI voor de beoordeling van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht als afzonderlijke overeenkomst moet worden beschouwd doet daaraan niet af (vgl. hiervoor, rov. 12). 16. Chevron heeft zich ter onderbouwing van de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht beroepen op twee van de in art. VI genoemde gevallen: lid 1, aanhef en onder
  8. a)en lid 1, aanhef en onder c). Het hof ziet aanleiding eerst deze laatste grond te bespreken. Art. VI lid 1, aanhef en onder
  9. c)luidt: “For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (...) (
  10. c)an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment. ” Uit het (door het hof) onderstreepte zinsdeel blijkt dat in het arbitraal beding zelf (althans ten aanzien van de thans besproken grond) een koppeling wordt gelegd tussen het geschil en het toepassingsbereik (door partijen ook wel genoemd: “de beschermingsomvang”) van het verdrag. Immers, in grond
  11. c)wordt arbitrage als wijze van geschilbeslechting aangeboden voor geschillen met betrekking tot rechten die door het verdrag worden gecreëerd of toegekend. Chevron doet in dit verband een beroep op het recht, haar toegekend in art. II, lid 7 BIT. Daarmee wordt van belang of Chevron aanspraak kan maken op dat recht en is onontkoombaar dat de toepasselijkheid van het BIT ratione materiae en ratione temporis wordt beoordeeld. Dat aldus het oordeel over ‘de beschermingsomvang’ van het verdrag - in zoverre, dat wil zeggen: om de bevoegdheid van het Scheidsgerecht te kunnen beoordelen - ter volle toetsing aan de nationale overheidsrechter wordt voorgelegd, is een gevolg van de wijze waarop de verdragspartijen het arbitraal beding hebben ingekleed. Anders dan Chevron betoogt, staat dat niet in de weg aan voornoemde beoordeling. 17. Over de toepasselijkheid van het BIT ratione temporis bepaalt art. XII, lid 1: “This Treaty (...) shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter. (...)” Afgezien van de vraag of dat ook geldt wanneer het woord ‘investment’ wordt gebruikt in bijvoeglijke zin - bv. als onderdeel van de begrippen ‘investment dispute’ of ‘investment agreement’ - is naar 's hofs oordeel in elk geval niet voor twijfel vatbaar dat voor de vaststelling van de betekenis van het (zelfstandig naam-)woord ‘investment’ in de bepalingen van het BIT, de definitie van deze term in art. I van het verdrag bepalend is. Dat volgt uit art. I, lid 1, aanhef onder a): “For the purposes of this Treaty, (
  12. a)“investment" means (...)” Aangenomen moet worden dat, behoudens wanneer er indicaties zijn voor het tegendeel, elke keer wanneer in het verdrag het woord ‘investment’ voorkomt, dit moet worden begrepen in de in art. I gedefinieerde zin. Dat is immers het doel van een definitiebepaling. Er is het hof geen aanwijzing gebleken dat de term ‘investment’ in art. XII, lid 1 (“It shall apply to investments.. ”) niet in de door art. 1 omschreven zin moet worden opgevat. 18. Vervolgens dient de vraag te worden beantwoord hoe ‘investment’ in art. I is gedefinieerd. In dit verband is van belang dat tussen partijen vaststaat dat de Concessieovereenkomst in 1992 is geëindigd en daarmee ook de oliewinningsactiviteiten die daarvan het onderwerp waren. Tussen partijen is voorts in confesso dat deze activiteiten (in ieder geval) kwalificeren als ‘investment’ in de zin van het BIT. Het hof zal deze activiteiten hierna aanduiden als “de operationele fase”. Chevron meent dat ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het BIT (11 mei 1997) nog steeds sprake was van een investering in de zin van het verdrag. Zij stelt dat het begrip ‘investering’ in het BIT en ook in de ‘BIT-praktijk’ ruim wordt opgevat en de gehele levenscyclus van een investering omvat, inclusief de afwikkelingsfase. Chevron wijst erop dat de opsomming van vormen van investering in art. I (
  13. a)van het BIT niet limitatief is. Zowel de vorderingen die Chevron heeft ingesteld bij de Ecuadoriaanse gerechten (zie hiervoor, rov. 1.3), als de activiteiten die zij heeft ondernomen om de (volgens Ecuador) in de operationele fase van de investering veroorzaakte milieuschade te herstellen, kwalificeren volgens Chevron als investering in de afwikkelingsfase. Meer in het bijzonder vallen de genoemde vorderingsrechten volgens haar onder de in art. I, lid 1 onder (
  14. a)(iii) en (
  15. v)bedoelde ‘claims’, respectievelijk ‘rights’. 19. Ecuador weerspreekt niet dat de omschrijving van ‘investment’ in art. I (
  16. a)BIT ruim is en de opsomming niet-limitatief. Zij weerspreekt evenmin dat ook de afwikkeling van een investering onder ‘de beschermingsomvang’ van het BIT valt. Die, wat zij noemt: “additionele bescherming” treedt volgens haar echter, in verband met het bepaalde in art. XII, pas in werking wanneer het gaat om een investering die ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het BIT nog in de operationele fase verkeerde (zie onder meer de pleitnota Ecuador in eerste aanleg onder 4.4), althans, zo heeft Ecuador bij pleidooi in hoger beroep nader verduidelijkt, in een fase die bijdraagt aan de economie van het land waar geïnvesteerd wordt. Dat volgt volgens Ecuador uit het doel van het BIT, dat zij nader omschrijft als de stimulering van investeringen. Bescherming van investeringen waarvan de operationele fase reeds is geëindigd kan volgens Ecuador niet aan dat doel bijdragen. Meer in het bijzonder droegen volgens Ecuador noch de vorderingsrechten van Chevron, noch de activiteiten ter opruiming van milieuschade, bij aan haar economie. Wat betreft de tekst van art. I (
  17. a)betoogt Ecuador dat de omstandigheid dat de onder (
  18. i)tot en met (
  19. v)opgesomde verschijnselen krachtens de aanhef van (
  20. a)onder de definitie vallen, niet meebrengt dat de betreffende onderdelen zelf tot investering worden verheven. Zo zijn de vorderingsrechten van Chevron volgens Ecuador wel aan te merken als ‘claim to money’ als bedoeld onder (c), maar niet op zichzelf te beschouwen als ‘investment’. Daarnaast betoogt zij (met betrekking tot onderdeel (c)) dat vereist is dat die claims zijn ‘associated with an investment’, waarbij ‘investment’ moet worden opgevat als een investering in operationele zin, althans een investering in een fase die bijdraagt aan de economie van het betreffende land, op het moment van inwerkingtreding van het verdrag. 20. Het hof is van oordeel dat de uitleg die Ecuador aldus aan het begrip ‘investment’ in de artt. I en XII geeft, niet houdbaar is. Daartoe wordt het volgende overwogen. 21. Zoals blijkt uit de titel en de preambule van het BIT, is het doel daarvan het stimuleren en beschermen van investeringen door onderdanen van een verdragsstaat in de andere verdragsstaat. Bescherming vindt plaats door een eerlijke en redelijke behandeling van investeringen. In die zin is bescherming van investeringen dienstbaar aan de stimulering van (nieuwe) investeringen; zie ook het tweede onderdeel van de preambule, waarin wordt erkend dat “agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties”. Daarnaast kan als ervaringsfeit worden aangemerkt dat een faire afwikkeling van een investering bevorderlijk is voor het aantrekken van nieuwe investeringen. Het door partijen aangedragen feit dat wereldwijd enkele duizenden, soortgelijke bilaterale investeringsverdragen zijn afgesloten, vormt daarvan een bevestiging. 22. Uit de stellingen van partijen volgt dat (in hun beider perceptie) onder 'investment' in het normale spraakgebruik wordt verstaan: de operationele fase. Reeds uit art. I (
  21. a)blijkt dat in het BIT het begrip ‘investment’ een ruimere betekenis heeft. Ook Ecuador erkent dat (zie hiervoor, rov. 19). In zoverre blijkt uit het verdrag zelf dat voldaan is aan het bepaalde in art. 31, lid 4 WVV. Uit de woorden in art. 1 (a), aanhef, “and includes” volgt dat de verschijnselen genoemd in de daarop volgende opsomming (
  22. i)tot en met (v), tot onderdeel van het begrip ‘investment’ worden gemaakt. Aldus behoren onder andere ‘claims to money, associated with an investment’(onder iii) tot een ‘investment’ onder het BIT. Het hof is met Chevron en het Scheidsgerecht van oordeel dat het woord 'investment' in de aanduiding ‘associated with an investment’, evenals het tweede woord ‘investment’ in de frase “investment” means every kind of investment’ in de aanhef van art. I (a), klaarblijkelijk is bedoeld in de betekenis die het woord in het normale spraakgebruik heeft. Immers, anders zou een circulaire definitie ontstaan, hetgeen vanuit een oogpunt van logica en werkbaarheid niet voor de hand ligt. Een investering in de zin van art. I (en daarmee: in de zin van het verdrag) omvat (‘includes’) dus (onder meer) een vorderingsrecht dat samenhangt met een investering in operationele zin. De bepaling in lid 3 van art. I, inhoudend dat een wijziging in de vorm waarin middelen zijn geïnvesteerd daaraan niet het karakter van een investering ontneemt, is hiermee in lijn. 23. Het hof verwerpt het betoog van Ecuador dat een vorderingsrecht pas dan samenhangt met een investering, in de zin van art. I (
  23. a)(iii), indien die investering (in operationele zin) ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het verdrag nog bestond. Dat volgt niet uit de bewoordingen van art. I. Voorts zou die uitleg ertoe leiden dat het woord ‘investments’ in art. XII de betekenis heeft die daaraan in het normale spraakgebruik wordt toegekend, in plaats van de gedefinieerde betekenis. Zoals het hof hiervoor, in rov. 17, heeft overwogen, is niet van enige aanwijzing gebleken dat het woord ‘investments’ in art. XII anders dan in de in art. I gedefinieerde (ruimere) zin moet worden opgevat. Een dergelijke aanwijzing is, anders dan Ecuador betoogt, niet gelegen in de doelstelling van het BIT. Zoals hiervoor, in rov. 21 is overwogen, is een faire en redelijke afhandeling van een investering (in de betekenis volgens het normale spraakgebruik) bevorderlijk voor het aantrekken van nieuwe investeringen en daarmee voor het investeringsklimaat. Dat geldt in gelijke mate voor de afhandeling van investeringen waarvan de operationele fase reeds is geëindigd. Voor zover Ecuador een beroep doet op haar eigen, hiervan afwijkende bedoeling, inhoudend dat zij haar aanbod tot arbitrage niet heeft willen doen voor geschillen over investeringen waarvan de operationele fase ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het verdrag reeds was geëindigd, althans die geen bijdrage meer leverden aan haar economie, gaat het hof daaraan voorbij. Ingevolge de uitlegregels neergelegd in het WVV is de (eenzijdige, niet uit het verdrag kenbare) bedoeling van een partij immers niet maatgevend. 24. Ook het beroep van Ecuador op het standpunt dat door de Verenigde Staten is ingenomen in de Mondev-arbitrage leidt niet tot een andere uitleg. Het ging daarin om een arbitrage op grond van het in 1994 tot stand gekomen North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tussen De Verenigde Staten, Canada en Mexico. In die arbitrage werden de Verenigde Staten aangesproken op de afhandeling van een claim van een Canadese investeerder door de rechterlijke autoriteiten in de staat Massachusetts. Ook in die kwestie was de operationele fase van de investering ten tijde van de inwerkingtreding van het verdrag reeds geëindigd. De Verenigde Staten bepleitten de onbevoegdheid van arbiters op vergelijkbare gronden als Ecuador dat in de onderhavige procedure doet. Deze proceshouding kan evenwel niet worden gekwalificeerd als ‘state practice’ van de Verenigde Staten die ingevolge art. 31 lid 3 sub b WVV relevant is voor de uitleg van het onderhavige BIT. Het gaat daarbij immers niet om ‘state practice’ bij de toepassing van het onderhavige BIT. Evenmin is voldaan aan de in art. 31 lid 3 onder b WVV vermelde voorwaarde dat deze ‘practice’ ‘establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’. 25. Vaststaat dat Chevron op het moment van inwerkingtreding van het BIT vorderingsrechten als bedoeld in art. I(
  24. a)(iii) van het verdrag had en daarmee een ‘investment’ in de zin van art. I (
  25. a)en (dus) art. XII, lid 1. Daarmee was sprake van een ‘alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment’ in de zin van art. VI, lid 1, onder c. Dat het door het Scheidsgerecht beslechte geschil, over de vraag of bij de afhandeling van die vorderingsrechten is voldaan aan de in art. II, lid 7 van het BIT neergelegde verplichting (kort gezegd: het bieden van een effectieve rechtsgang), kwalificeert als een ‘dispute arising out or relating to’ zodanige ‘alleged breach’ is niet in geschil. Het door Chevron aan het Scheidsgerecht voorgelegde geschil valt derhalve onder de reikwijdte van het in art. VI van het BIT opgenomen aanbod aan onderdanen van de andere verdragspartij om een geschil door middel van arbitrage te laten beslechten, zodat het Scheidsgerecht terzake bevoegd was. 26. Bij deze stand van zaken kan in het midden blijven:
  26. i)of de vorderingsrechten van Chevron tevens kwalificeren als ‘rights’ in de zin van art. 1(
  27. a)(v);
  28. ii)of de activiteiten (in opdracht) van Chevron tot herstel van milieuschade kunnen worden aangemerkt als ‘investment’ in de zin van het BIT; iii) of het Scheidsgerecht tevens bevoegdheid kon ontlenen aan art. VI, lid I, onder a. 27. Het hof overweegt nog dat, hoewel Ecuador dat argument niet (met zoveel woorden) tot onderwerp van haar grieven heeft gemaakt, het oordeel van het hof niet meebrengt dat aan het BIT, in afwijking van het bepaalde in art. 28 WVV, terugwerkende kracht wordt verleend. Krachtens art. XII van het verdrag is dit van toepassing op bestaande en toekomstige investeringen in de zin van art. I (a). Aldus is sprake van onmiddellijke werking. Voorts is niet weersproken dat het geschil over de schending van art. II lid 7 van het verdrag is ontstaan na de inwerkingtreding ervan en dat arbiters slechts het handelen van Ecuador van nadien hebben beoordeeld. 28. Gelet op het voorgaande slagen de grieven 2, 3 en 5, maar kan dit, gelet op het falen van de grieven 6 en 7, niet tot vernietiging van het bestreden vonnis leiden. Grief 8, handelend over de bewijslast ten aanzien van het bestaan van een geldige arbitrageovereenkomst, behoeft geen behandeling.” 2.5.1 Ecuador heeft tijdig beroep in cassatie ingesteld. Chevron heeft geconcludeerd tot verwerping en heeft voorwaardelijk incidenteel cassatieberoep ingesteld. Ecuador heeft bij conclusie van antwoord in het voorwaardelijk incidentele beroep geconcludeerd tot verwerping zonder verder op de voorgedragen gronden in te gaan. Vervolgens hebben partijen, op verzoek van Ecuador, hun standpunten mondeling bepleit. 2.5.2 In haar pleidooi heeft Ecuador geen aandacht besteed aan het voorwaardelijk incidenteel beroep. Desgevraagd deelde mr. Van Geuns mee geen behoefte te hebben daarover iets (naders) te zeggen. 3Inleiding en achtergronden 3.1.1 Het Hof heeft een zeer geserreerde weergave gegeven van de feiten. Voor een goed begrip lijkt dienstig om wat uitvoeriger stil te staan bij de achtergronden, de inzet van de procedure en het oordeel van arbiters. Immers wordt vernietiging van dat oordeel gevorderd. Gemakshalve duid ik verweerders tot cassatie en haar rechtsvoorgangers hierna aan als Chevron. 3.1.2 Opmerking verdient dat het geschil in dit stadium van de rechtsstrijd is beperkt tot de vraag of arbiters bevoegd waren om van het door Chevron aanhangig gemaakte geschil kennis te nemen. Vanaf het hoger beroep heeft Ecuador de strijd opgegeven voor zover het gaat om het inhoudelijke oordeel van arbiters. Ik behoef op de merites van de zaak dus niet in te gaan en zal dat ook niet doen. 3.1.3 In cassatie is de zaak nog verder op een smalspoor terecht gekomen, allicht omdat Ecuador meende dat, gezien de beperkte toetsingsmogelijkheden, met betrekking tot de overige punten geen reële kans van slagen bestond. Thans spelen nog de volgende kwesties: * doel (en strekking) van het BIT, mede gelet op de preambule (onderdeel 1, 1.4 en 1.5) * de temporele beperkingen (onderdelen 1.1 en 3) * een door het Hof aan zijn oordeel ten grondslag gelegd ervaringsfeit over hetgeen investeerders zou bewegen (onderdeel 1.2); * de vraag of ’s Hofs uitleg zich verdraagt met het WVV (onderdelen 1.3 en 2.3); * de definitie van “investment” en “associated with an investment” (onderdeel 2); * diverse klachten die scharnieren om het passeren van wezenlijke stellingen en de weergave van het betoog van Ecuador (onderdelen 4 en 5). 3.2 Dat ik uitvoerig inga op de achtergronden en inzet van de procedure houdt verband met het volgende. Het geschil ziet op een zéér gecompliceerde zaak tussen een buitenlandse Staat en een grote buitenlandse multinational. Volgens de aanbiedingsbrief van Ecuador zou de werkelijke inzet van de onderhavige procedure US$ 18 miljard zijn. Bij pleidooi in cassatie werd dat bedrag teruggebracht tot US$ 8,5 miljard. Volgens Chevron zou het hooguit gaan om US$ 9,5 miljard. 3.3 Het navolgende is goeddeels ontleend aan de “Interim Award” van arbiters van 1 december 2008; waar wordt verwezen naar (rand)nummers, wordt verwezen naar dit vonnis. Ter vermijding van misverstand: vermelding van deze gegevens betekent niet dat ik van de juistheid van het navolgende uitga. Voor zover nodig zal ik daarop onder 13 ingaan. 3.4 Heel kort gezegd meent Chevron dat Ecuador onder de tussen partijen bestaande overeenkomsten te weinig heeft betaald voor door Chevron gewonnen olie. 3.5 Chevron heeft een aantal procedures aanhangig gemaakt bij de rechter te Ecuador. Over die procedures heeft zij het volgende gesteld: “5. In six cases, TexPet filed all necessary evidence of its claims within the proper time periods, took all steps necessary under Ecuadorian procedural rules in a timely manner, and repeatedly requested final decisions from the courts. But for well over a decade, 12 different judges in three different courts refused to rule on any of the six cases. Those cases have stood legally ready for decision under Ecuadorian law since at least 1998, but the courts steadfastly refused to rule year after year. In the seventh case, despite TexPet’s repeated requests, the court refused even to take evidence from the appointed experts for over 14 years. In short, the Ecuadorian judiciary has egregiously delayed all of TexPet’s claims against the Government, and it has demonstrated a refusal to judge any of those claims in a fair and impartial manner as required under Ecuadorian and international law. 6. Meanwhile, in late 2004, the political branches of the same Ecuadorian Government that is the defendant in all seven cases began to exert control over Ecuador’s judiciary. Although Ecuador’s 1998 Constitution enshrines the principle of judicial independence that is so fundamental to a state’s ability to meet its obligation to provide foreign nationals with impartial justice under the law, the political branches purged Ecuador’s Constitutional, Electoral and Supreme Courts, and replaced the constitutionally-elected judges with political allies. The Supreme Court has been unconstitutionally purged twice in less than three years, and the current court was not legitimately elected under the Constitution. The Subrogate President of the Supreme Court sits as a first-instance judge in three of TexPet’s cases against the Government. Since 2004, judicial independence in Ecuador has been virtually non-existent, as recognized by many prominent international organizations and commentators. 7. In light of the egregious delays suffered in its seven cases and the move by the Executive Branch, which defends those cases, to extend its control over the Ecuadorian judiciary, TexPet provided Ecuador with notice of its intention to file this arbitration in May 2006. In response to that notice and the subsequent filing of this arbitration proceeding in December 2006, the long-dormant and now-politicized courts began to take some action. In two of TexPet’s cases, the judge dismissed TexPet’s claims as “abandoned” based on a grossly-wrong and manifestly-improper application of a Code of Civil Procedure provision. In one of those cases, TexPet had provided all evidence and taken all necessary steps to obtain a decision, and the only thing left was for the court to decide the case. In the other case, TexPet had repeatedly requested that the court move forward with the evidentiary phase of the case, but the court had refused for 14 years to schedule a judicial inspection. In a third case, the judge dismissed TexPet’s claim based on a clearly inapplicable statute of limitations for sales to retail consumers, even though under the unambiguous definition of those terms under Ecuadorian law, the Government was not a retail consumer of TexPet’s. All three of those cases were not simply decided wrongly, they were decided in a grossly incompetent, biased and manifestly unjust fashion, in manifest disregard of clear principles of Ecuadorian law. In a fourth case -- the smallest of TexPet’s claims worth approximately one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the total damages owed by Ecuador to TexPet -- the court belatedly ruled in TexPet’s favor. The Government has appealed the decision, and the case therefore continues to languish in the Ecuadorian courts without TexPet being able to collect on its judgment. That judgment is clearly part of a transparent tactic to posture the Government for this proceeding.” 3.6 Volgens Chevron was – kort gezegd – in Ecuador voor haar geen recht te krijgen. Dienaangaande heeft zij het volgende aangevoerd: “8. Ecuador’s conduct constitutes both a denial of justice under customary international law and a violation of its treaty obligations to TexPet in two independent respects:
(1)undue delay in deciding TexPet’s seven cases, which have languished for well over a decade in the Ecuadorian courts; and
(2)the courts’ grossly incompetent, biased and manifestly unjust decisions in ultimately deciding some of the cases in manifest disregard of Ecuadorian law. In both respects, Ecuador violated its treaty obligations to
(1)provide TexPet with effective means of asserting claims and enforcing its rights;
(2)provide fair and equitable treatment to TexPet’s investments;
(3)provide full protection and security to those investments; and
(4)refrain from treating those investments in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
  1. (…) International law provides that when a country’s courts deny justice to a foreign investor, and it would be futile for the investor to continue to pursue its claims in the host country’s courts, an international arbitral tribunal must take and decide the claims. That is the situation here.” 3.7.1 Chevron heeft, voor zover thans van belang, gevorderd: “
  2. For the foregoing reasons, Claimants request that the Tribunal render an award in favor of the Claimants: (i) Finding and declaring that Respondent has breached its obligations under Article II
(7)of the Treaty by failing to provide to Claimants an effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to their investments and investment agreements; (
  1. ii)Finding and declaring that Respondent has committed a denial of justice under customary international law;” 3.7.2 Het onder 3.7.1 genoemde verzoek heeft Chevron later als volgt geherformuleerd: “504. For the foregoing reasons, Claimants request that the Tribunal render an award in favor of the Claimants: (
  2. i)Declaring that Respondent has breached its obligations under Article II
(7)of the Treaty by failing to provide to Claimants an effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to their investments and investment agreements; (
  1. ii)Declaring that Respondent has committed a denial of justice under customary international law;” 3.8.1 Ecuador heeft de bevoegdheid van arbiters bestreden. 3.8.2 Zij heeft voorts ten verwere aangevoerd dat “(…) While Chevron portrays itself as diligently pressing for judgments in its seven lawsuits, by its own admission it took little action to meet its burden as plaintiff to advance the cases beyond the minimum perfunctory actions it considered necessary to keep them alive in the courts (by all appearances, for future negotiating leverage) (…)”. 3.8.3 Met betrekking tot de “politization” van haar rechterlijke macht heeft Ecuador aangevoerd dat het “(…) in actuality, as universally attested to by international commentators, [has been] a reform effort carried out by the Ecuadorian people to raise the quality of jurisprudence in its country’s courts (…)”. 3.8.4 Sterker nog, “Indeed, the recent activity in TexPet’s lawsuits is not, as it alleges, the result of any “retaliation” for Chevron’s initiation of arbitration in this case – a reckless and completely unsubstantiated charge – but rather the early fruits of those very reforms.” 3.9 Blijkens de “Notice of Arbitration” grondt Chevron het arbitrageverzoek op art. VI lid 3(a)(iii) van de bilaterale overeenkomst tussen Ecuador en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (BIT). 3.10 Onder het hoofdje “Jurisdictional Issues” geven arbiters aan om welke bevoegdheidsvragen het gaat: “39. The first set of issues concerns the preclusive effect, if any, that the Claimants’ statements or conduct prior to the commencement of arbitration should have on their ability to pursue the present claim (see Section J.II below). 40. The second set of issues concerns whether the Claimants’ contractual claims in the lawsuits in Ecuadorian courts qualify as an investment or part of an investment under the BIT (see Section J.III below). Alternatively, the question concerns whether the claims arise out of or relate to “investment agreements” under the BIT (see Section J.IV below). 41. The third set of issues concerns whether the Claimants must exhaust local remedies in order to fulfill the requirements of their claims for denial of justice and other BIT violations and, if so, whether they have in fact exhausted all required local remedies (see Section J.V below). 42. The last set of issues concerns the application ratione temporis of the BIT to a case whose factual background includes significant periods before the BIT’s entry into force. In dispute is the temporal ambit of the BIT as regards pre-existing disputes and pre-entry into force acts and omissions. Also at issue is whether Ecuador’s conduct constitutes a continuing or composite act allowing the conduct to be caught within the temporal ambit of the BIT (see Sections J.VI – J.VIII below).” 3.11.1 Volgens arbiters zijn de volgende verdragsbepalingen hier van belang “F.I. Treaty between the United States of America and Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (“BIT”) 43. The principal relevant provisions of the BIT are set out below: Article I 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, (
  2. a)“investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes: (
  3. i)tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (
  4. ii)a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof; (iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an investment; (
  5. iv)intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and artistic works, including sound recordings; inventions in all fields of human endeavor; industrial designs; semiconductor mask works; trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business information; and trademarks, service marks, and trade names; and (
  6. v)any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law; […] Article VI 1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (
  7. a)an investment agreement between that Party and such national or company; (
  8. b)an investment authorization granted by that Party’s foreign investment authority to such national or company; or (
  9. c)an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment. 2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for resolution: (
  10. a)to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or (
  11. b)in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedures; or (
  12. c)in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3. 3. (
  13. a)Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (
  14. a)or (
  15. b)and that six months have elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration: (
  16. i)to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“Centre”) established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 (“ICSID Convention”), provided that the Party is a party to such Convention; or (
  17. ii)to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or (iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); or (
  18. iv)to any other arbitration institution, or in accordance with any other arbitration rules, as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute. (
  19. b)once the national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the consent. 4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for: (
  20. a)written consent of the parties to the dispute for Purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; and (
  21. b)an “agreement in writing” for purposes of Article II of the United Nation Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 (“New York Convention”). 5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(
  22. a)(ii), (iii) or (
  23. iv)of this Article shall be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention. 6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry our without delay the provisions of any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement. 7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national or company concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or guarantee contract, indemnification or other compensation for all or part of its alleged damages. 8. For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political subdivision thereof that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, shall be treated as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 25
(2)(
  1. b)of the ICSID Convention. […] Article XII 1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall continue in force unless terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. It shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter. 2. Either Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the other Party, terminate this Treaty at the end of the initial ten year period or at any time thereafter. 3. With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination of this Treaty and to which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the other Articles of this Treaty shall thereafter continue to be effective for a further period of ten years from such date of termination. 4. The Protocol and Side Letter shall form an integral part of the Treaty. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate at Washington on the twenty-seventh day of August, 1993, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic. F.II. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) 44. The principal relevant provisions of the VCLT are set out below: SECTION 2. APPLICATION OF TREATIES Article 28 Non-retroactivity of treaties Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. […] Article 30 Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter 1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs. 2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. 3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. 4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: (
  2. a)as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3; (
  3. b)as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty. SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES Article 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (
  4. a)any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (
  5. b)any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (
  6. a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (
  7. b)any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (
  8. c)any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (
  9. a)leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (
  10. b)leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 3.11.2 Uit het BIT is voorts de considerans (preambule) van belang. Deze vermeldt onder meer: “Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them (de Verenigde Staten en Ecuador), with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party; Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties; Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources;” 3.11.3 Naast de reeds onder 3.11.1 geciteerde bepalingen is nog van belang: “Article I 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, (...) (
  11. e)“associated activities” include the organization, control, operation, maintenance and disposition of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities for the conduct of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, use, protection and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual property rights; the borrowing of funds; the purchase, issuance, and sale of equity shares and other securities; and the purchase of foreign exchange for imports. (...) 3. Any alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect their character as investment. Article II (...) 7. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment, investment agreements, and investment authorisations.” 3.12 Arbiters memoreren dat in november 1993 een class action van een aantal (klaarblijkelijk) Ecuadoriaanse burgers tegen Chevron aanhangig is gemaakt bij een Amerikaanse rechter. Zij schrijven daarover: “61. (…) The action claimed compensation for environmental harm caused by TexPet as well as extensive equitable relief and an injunction restraining TexPet from entering into further activities that risked environmental harm. 62. The Aguinda plaintiffs argued that they could obtain the class action relief they were seeking only under United States law and from a court in the United States. TexPet moved to dismiss the Aguinda action on several grounds, including for forum non conveniens. This required that the parties to that litigation address the adequacy of the Ecuadorian courts as an alternative forum for the Aguinda action. During the course of jurisdictional debates at first instance and various levels of appeal over a period ranging from December 17, 1993, to April 7, 2000, TexPet’s counsel maintained in expert affidavits and briefs, inter alia, that the Ecuadorian courts were efficient and fair. In further appeals through 2002, TexPet continued to argue the adequacy of Ecuadorian courts as an alternative forum. The Aguinda action was ultimately dismissed from US courts. The same plaintiffs then commenced an action against TexPet in 2003 in a court seated in the town of Lago Agrio, Ecuador (the “Lago Agrio action”).” 3.13 Vervolgens staan arbiters stil bij een aantal ontwikkelingen in Ecuador: “63. Since the Aguinda case, a number of events have occurred involving the Ecuadorian judiciary. On November 25, 2004, Ecuador’s Congress passed a resolution finding that the Constitutional Court and Electoral Court were illegally appointed in 2003. It dismissed the members of both. On December 5, 2004, a special session of Ecuador’s Congress dismissed the entire Supreme Court. The same session of Congress also impeached six of the recently-removed judges of the Constitutional Court. On April 15, 2005, President Guttiérrez declared a state of emergency, suspending certain civil rights and dismissing all the newly-appointed judges of the Supreme Court. President Guttiérrez was later ousted and fled the country. During this period, both the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the Organization of American States’ Mission in Ecuador intervened. Soon thereafter, the Ecuadorian Congress nullified the 2004 resolution dismissing the Supreme Court judges, but did not reappoint these former judges. 64. On April 25, 2005, Ecuador’s Congress approved amendments to the Organic Law of the Judiciary which introduced a new mechanism to appoint judges to the Supreme Court. Members of the international community monitored and supported the new selection process and new Supreme Court judges were appointed in November 2005. Some observers, such as the Andean Community and the Red De La Justicia, approved of these reforms as re-establishing the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, while others, including the UN Special Rapporteur, deemed the reforms insufficient to bring Ecuador back in line with basic human rights norms. 65. On December 21, 2006, the Claimants filed their Notice of Arbitration commencing the current arbitration proceedings. 66. In January 2007, President Rafael Correa called for a referendum to establish a Constituent Assembly to create a new constitution. Despite initial opposition by the Congress and Electoral Court, the holding of the referendum was eventually approved. However, when President Correa modified the statute controlling the Constituent Assembly to be proposed in the referendum, and the Electoral Court approved President Correa’s changes, the Congress removed the President of the Electoral Court in an apparent effort to block the referendum. In support of the Executive, the military and police then physically prevented the Congress from assembling in order to overturn President Correa’s measure. Some of the ousted members of the Congress then sought relief from the Constitutional Court, which eventually ruled that their ouster was illegal. The new Congress members who had replaced them in the meantime, reacted by dismissing the entire Constitutional Court and shortly thereafter selecting a member of President Correa’s political party to head a new Constitutional Court. In the midst of the above events, on April 15, 2007, the referendum in favor of establishing a Constituent Assembly passed in a popular vote. 67. On September 30, 2007, the members of the Constituent Assembly were elected. On November 27, 2007, the Constituent Assembly dismissed the Congress and proclaimed that it held absolute authority. In particular, it claimed the power to remove and sanction members of the judiciary that violate its decisions. It also undertook a mandate of judicial reform, criticizing the corruption of the judiciary. On December 14, 2007, the Constituent Assembly proposed to reduce judges’ salaries by more than 50%. This provoked a series of resignations by judges. 68. On January 8, 2008, the Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the Constituent Assembly’s absolute powers. The Constitutional Court held that the Constituent Assembly’s decisions were not subject to challenge by any other organ of government. In February 2008, the current President of the Supreme Court of Ecuador concurred in public statements that the Constituent Assembly enjoys absolute authority and that, because of this, the rule of law is only a partial reality in Ecuador: “No podemos cubrir el sol con un dedo; la realidad jurídical y constitucional que vive el pais es una realidad a medias, no vivimos en toda su plenitud en un estado de derecho” [“We cannot deny it: the judicial and constitutional reality in our country is a partial reality; we are not fully living in a state of law”]. (Exh. C-104).” 3.14 Met betrekking tot de rechtsbedeling in de bij de rechter te Ecuador aanhangige procedures gaan arbiters van het navolgende uit: “149. Of TexPet’s seven Ecuadorian court cases at issue, one remains pending at first instance, two are the subject of pending appeals, two have been dismissed and are now closed, and two have been the subject of recent decisions. Several of the cases have seen action subsequent to service of the Notice of Arbitration in the present case. (…) 150. The first Esmeraldas Refinery claim, Case 23-91, was filed on December 17, 1991. In early August 1995, the evidentiary phase of the case was completed. In December 2002 and January 2004, autos para sentencia were issued. The court subsequently dismissed the case on January 29, 2007, on grounds of prescription under a statute that provides for a two-year prescription period for retail sales. On February 9, 2007, TexPet appealed that decision. On March 7, 2008, the dismissal was upheld on appeal. On April 4, 2008, TexPet filed a cassation appeal. This was rejected on May 14, 2008. On May 16, 2008, TexPet filed a fact appeal. This was rejected on June 9, 2008. The case is now closed. 151. The second Esmeraldas Refinery claim, Case 152-93, was filed on December 10, 1993. The evidentiary phase of the case was completed by mid-1996 and an auto para sentencia, indicating that the trial was closed and ready for judgment, was issued on May 22, 2002. To date, no decision at first instance has been made. 152. The first Amazonas Refinery claim, Case 7-92, was filed on April 15, 1992. On May 5, 1993, the court set a date for the experts to officially accept their appointments and to conduct a judicial inspection of documents. As explained in paragraph 258, below, the official acceptance did not occur. Between July 1993 and February 2007, TexPet repeatedly requested that the court set a new date for the experts to accept their appointments and proceed with the evidentiary phase. The case was dismissed on April 9, 2007, on the basis that the case had been abandoned by the Claimants. This dismissal was appealed by the Claimants on April 25, 2007. On May 20, 2008, TexPet’s appeal was rejected. On May 27, 2008, TexPet filed a cassation appeal. This was rejected on June 24, 2008. On June 30, 2008, TexPet filed a fact appeal. This was rejected on July 16, 2008. The case is now closed. 153. The second Amazonas Refinery claim, Case 153-93, was filed on December 14, 1993. In this case, all expert reports were submitted by October 31, 1996, and an auto para sentencia was issued on October 12, 1998, and again on May 22, 2002. On July 14, 2009, the President of the Provincial Court of Pichincha (formerly the Superior Court of Quito) rendered a judgment in favor of the Government of Ecuador. 154. The Imported Products claim, Case 154-93, was filed on December 14, 1993. In that case, the evidentiary phase was completed by July 8, 1997, and an auto para sentencia was issued on October 8, 1997, and again on May 21, 2002. On September 10, 2009, the President of the Provincial Court of Pichincha (formerly the Superior Court of Quito) rendered a judgment in favor of the Government of Ecuador. 155. The Force Majeure claim, Case 8-92, was filed on April 15, 1992. By March 1995, the evidentiary phase of the case was completed. An auto para sentencia was issued in that case on July 18, 1995. Following the Notice of Arbitration, the case was dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute the claims on October 2, 2006. That dismissal was reversed on January 22, 2008, on the grounds that an auto para sentencia had already been issued. The case was sent back to the court of first instance and was dismissed again on July 1, 2008, on grounds of prescription under a statute that provides for two-year prescription for retail consumer sales. On July 2, 2008, TexPet appealed the latest decision and that appeal remains pending. 156. The last claim, made under the Refinancing Agreement, was filed on April 15, 1992 and originally numbered Case 6-92. The evidentiary phase was completed by March 1995. In October 2003, the court decided that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and sent the case to a different court (and renumbered it Case 983-03). The new court issued an auto para sentencia on February 6, 2007. Following the Notice of Arbitration, on February 26, 2007, the court found in favor of TexPet. However, the judgment stipulated that the claim was to be paid to the “legal representative” of TexPet. According to the Claimants, this has prevented them from collecting on the judgment because, under Ecuadorian law, only domestic corporations may have “legal representatives,” while foreign corporations act only through “attorneys-in-fact.” Both parties have appealed the judgment and the appeal remains pending.” 3.15 Onder het hoofdje “Arguments by the Respondents” vatten arbiters de argumenten van Ecuador, strekkend ten betoge van de onbevoegdheid van arbiters samen. Voor zover thans nog van belang gaat het om het volgende: “78. On ratione materiae, the Respondent submits that the present claims based on TexPet’s lawsuits do not fit within the definition of an “investment dispute” found in Article VI
(1)of the BIT. The Respondent thus asserts that the present dispute is outside the substantive scope of Ecuador’s consent to arbitrate under the BIT. The Respondent raises several objections in this regard.
  1. The Respondent contends that the present claims do not arise out of or relate to an “investment agreement” or a treaty breach “with respect to an investment.” First, the Claimants’ lawsuits do not possess the necessary characteristics to qualify as an “investment.” Moreover, the Claimants’ lawsuits cannot be fit under the heading of “claims to money” in the BIT’s definition of covered investments. This is because the claims are not “associated with an investment” as required under that definition since the Claimants’ investments no longer existed at the time of entry into force of the BIT. Nor do TexPet’s claims fall under the heading of “rights conferred by law or contract” since the BIT only covers rights to do something or otherwise engage in some activity sanctioned by law analogous to rights under licenses or permits. Finally, the non-retroactivity of the BIT also prevents the Claimants from relying on “investment agreements” that had ceased to exist by the time of entry into force of the BIT.
  2. Even if the claims constituted an “investment dispute” under the BIT, the Respondent further contends that the claims for denial of justice are not ripe for adjudication. Under international law, a State is not responsible for the acts of its judiciary unless a claimant has exhausted all available procedural remedies. Claims for denials of justice must therefore be based on the acts of the judicial system as a whole. Since the Claimants have failed to demonstrably exhaust potential procedural remedies in their cases, the claims for denial of justice cannot be made out and the claims must be deemed premature.
  3. With respect to jurisdiction ratione temporis, the Respondent argues that States are responsible for the breach of treaty obligations only if such obligations were in force at the time that the alleged breach occurred. Any pre-BIT conduct of Ecuador’s thus falls outside the temporal scope of the BIT according to the non-retroactivity principle of international law reflected in Article 28 VCLT. The Respondent raises three distinct objections in this regard.
  4. The first objection is that the current dispute and all its associated facts arose prior to the coming into force of the BIT on May 11,
  5. It is merely the continuation in a different form of a pre-BIT dispute. The Respondent argues that such pre-BIT disputes are excluded from the temporal ambit of the BIT. The Tribunal should thus dismiss the present claims on the basis that they do not present a new dispute to which the BIT may apply.
  6. According to the Respondent, the non-retroactivity principle and the law of State responsibility also bar the consideration of any pre-BIT acts in the determination of a breach. The Tribunal cannot judge Ecuador’s acts or omissions according to BIT standards that did not exist at the time of such conduct. The foundation of the claims – the original alleged breaches of contractual obligations – are thus excluded from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Moreover, the rest of the claim cannot stand on its own because the Respondent’s conduct constitutes neither a “composite” nor a “continuing” act at international law.
  7. The third ratione temporis objection asserts that the claims concern investments which ceased to exist upon TexPet’s withdrawal from Ecuador. By 1995, the 1973 Agreement had expired, TexPet’s operations in Ecuador had ended and all remaining rights relating to the earlier contracts had terminated pursuant to the Settlement Agreements. Accordingly, by the time of the BIT’s entry into force in 1997, the Claimants’ investment and related rights constituted a “situation which ceased to exist” according to Article 28 VCLT.” 3.16 Chevron heeft, het ligt gezien de onderhavige procedure voor de hand, het betoog van Ecuador bestreden. Arbiters vatten haar argumenten als volgt samen: “
  8. The Claimants first argue that they continued to have investments in Ecuador after the entry into force of the BIT. The BIT’s definition of “investment” is broad. Investments must also be examined holistically and not separated into components. Therefore, the investments undertaken pursuant to the 1973 and 1977 Agreements must be taken to include the legal and contractual claims emanating from those agreements that are the subject of their pending court cases as well as the environmental remediation work related to TexPet’s operations that continued into 1998, after the BIT had come into force.
  9. The Claimants further argue that the dispute concerns “investment agreements,” namely the 1973 and 1977 Agreements. Such disputes are independently covered under the BIT. Moreover, since jurisdiction over such claims is not limited to treaty-based claims, the temporal limitations that apply to BIT claims do not apply. It is enough that these claims have continued to exist past the date of the BIT’s entry into force.
  10. The Claimants assert that the BIT does not bar pre-existing disputes. The BIT would need to include explicit language in order to exclude such disputes. Instead, according to Article XII of the BIT, disputes must merely be “existing” at the time of entry into force to be covered by the BIT. In any event, since the claims are for denials of justice, the dispute only crystallized after a critical degree of undue delay and politicization of the judiciary that came about in
  12. The Claimants also reject the idea that claims under the BIT must be strictly based on post-BIT acts and omissions. First, pre-BIT conduct can serve as background to the denial of justice claims which only truly arose after entry into force of the BIT. Second, the non-retroactivity principle cannot bar responsibility for “continuing” or “composite” acts. The persistent failure of the Ecuadorian courts to decide the Claimants’ cases and the events leading to the destruction of the independence of the Ecuadorian judiciary constitute continuing and composite acts.” 3.17 Voor de goede orde teken ik nog aan dat arbiters de door partijen aangedragen stellingen kenschetsen als “helpful” en dat het de in hun ogen “most relevant” behandelen. Het juridische debat in cassatie is beperkt gebleven, met name ook op het punt van verwijzingen naar relevante juridische bronnen. Mr. Van der Beek heeft naar één juridische bron (een arrest van Uw Raad over art. 79 RO) verwezen; mr. Van Geuns heeft op twee plaatsen in de cassatiedagvaarding naar juridische bronnen verwezen; in zijn pleitnota komen ze niet voor. Partijen verwachten blijkbaar veel van de zelfwerkzaamheid van Raad en Parket. 3.18 Met betrekking tot het gewicht dat toekomt aan beslissingen van “other courts and tribunals” merken arbiters het volgende op: “
  13. Relevance of Decisions of other Tribunals
  14. In the legal arguments made in their written and oral submissions, the Parties rely on numerous decisions of other courts and tribunals. Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to make certain general preliminary observations in this regard.
  15. First of all, the Tribunal considers it useful to make clear from the outset that it regards its task in these proceedings as the very specific one of applying the relevant provisions of the BIT and of arriving at the proper meaning to be given to those particular provisions in the context of the BIT in which they appear.
  16. On the other hand, Article 32 VCLT permits recourse, as supplementary means of interpretation, not only to a treaty’s “preparatory work” and the “circumstances of its conclusion,” but indicates by the word “including” that, beyond the two means expressly mentioned, other supplementary means of interpretation may be applied in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 VCLT. Article 38
(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that judicial decisions and awards are applicable for the interpretation of public international law as “subsidiary means.” Therefore, these legal materials can also be understood to constitute “supplementary means of interpretation” in the sense of Article 32 VCLT.
  1. That being so, it is not evident how far arbitral awards are of determinative relevance to the Tribunal’s task. It is at all events clear that the decisions of other tribunals are not binding on this Tribunal. The many references by the Parties to certain arbitral decisions in their pleadings do not contradict this conclusion.
  2. However, this does not preclude the Tribunal from considering arbitral decisions and the arguments of the Parties based upon them, to the extent that it may find that they throw any useful light on the issues that arise for decision in this case.” 3.19 In deze procedure staan (thans nog) twee vragen centraal: is sprake van terugwerkende kracht als zou worden uitgegaan van de toepasselijkheid van het BIT voor het onderhavige geschil en is – kort gezegd – sprake van een “investment” in de zin van het BIT. Het lijkt goed om hetgeen partijen, in de weergave van arbiters, te dezer zake hebben aangevoerd en het oordeel dat arbiters daarover hebben geveld in extenso weer te geven. “
  3. Arguments by the Respondent
  4. The Respondent rejects the possibility that the Claimants can fit their claims under Article VI
(1)(c) of the BIT. In order to fall within Article VI
(1)(c) as a “breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment,” the Respondent argues that TexPet’s lawsuits must constitute an “investment.” The Respondent argues that the claims themselves lack the necessary characteristics of an “investment.” Along with “investment capital” and “risk,” an investment must somehow contribute to the economic development of the host State. The Respondent continues: As a practical matter […] Claimants have failed to plead an “investment” as none of Claimants’ activities as of the date the BIT entered into force (May 11, 1997), or at any time thereafter, has contributed — or even been intended to contribute — to the economic development of the Republic. To the contrary, the 1973 and 1977 Contracts terminated years before the BIT entered into force, and Claimants’ litigation claims are intended to take money from the State, not to benefit the State (R II, paras. 160-162; Tr. at 95:7-20, 114:6-19; HR1 p. 54). 151. The Respondent further argues that the lawsuits cannot be fit under BIT Article I
(1)(a)(iii), “claims to money or claims to performance having economic value, and associated with an investment.” Under that article, the lawsuits qualify as “claims” but are not associated with any “investment” because the investments that they would potentially relate to ceased to exist before the entry into force of the treaty. The non-retroactivity of the BIT prevents the Claimants from relying on an association to pre-BIT investments (R II, paras. 165-167; Tr. at 95:21-96:2, 121:4-14; R III, para. 150; R IV, para. 27). The BIT only protects the “claims” so long as the investment with which they are associated expired after the date when the BIT entered into force. It does not protect purely historical investments that are beyond being encouraged according to the forward-looking purpose of the BIT (Tr. at 403:2-404:1; HR1 p. 44; R IV, paras. 10-15). However, when TexPet withdrew from Ecuador, it also withdrew its investment capital and actively sought to eliminate any remaining investment risk (R II, paras. 167-171; HR1 pp. 49-51). TexPet had no investment with which their claims could be associated by the time the BIT entered into force. The Respondent submits that the above temporal limitation is analogous to the implied territorial limitation to the definition of investment found in Canadian Cattlemen (R II, para. 166; Tr. at 119:22-120:10; R III, para. 161; R IV, paras. 28-29). 152. The Respondent rebuts several arguments advanced by the Claimants in regard to Article I
(1)(a)(iii). To the extent that Mondev v. United States is cited for the idea that lawsuits can constitute investments, that case is distinguishable. NAFTA, the treaty at issue in Mondev, differs significantly in its language from the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Amongst other differences, NAFTA’s definition of “investment” does not require that claims be associated with an “investment” in order to be protected. NAFTA instead includes any claims that “involve the same kinds of interests” as its other categories of included investments. In fact, the tribunal in Mondev based its decision on the fact that the claims in that case involved the same kinds of interests as “interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources,” an extremely broad category with no parallel in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT (Tr. at 107:7-108:19; HR1 p. 46; R III, para. 160; R IV, para. 38). The Respondent also counters the Claimants’ reliance on the U.S. President’s transmittal letter to the U.S. Senate concerning the BIT, which suggests that the phrase “associated with an investment” was only inserted in order to exclude simple trade transactions from coverage under the BIT. Although this may be one effect of the phrase, the letter does not suggest that it is the only effect (Tr. at 117:13-118:5; HR1 p. 58; R IV, para. 20). 153. Additionally, the Respondent argues that the lawsuits cannot be fit under the heading of “rights conferred by law or contract” under Article I
(1)(a)(v) of the BIT. To start, the Respondent submits that the lawsuits fall squarely in the category of “claims to money or claims to performance having economic value” under BIT Article I
(1)(a)(iii). In that provision, the claims must be “associated with an investment,” which the Respondent asserts that they are not for the reasons noted above. Article I
(1)(a)(v) on the other hand envisages “rights, not to receive money or performance from another, but to act in a manner, or to do something, to which the owner of the right would not otherwise be entitled” (R II, para. 172; Tr. at 96:3-10; HR1 p. 60). This is what is suggested by the inclusion of the words “licenses and permits” in the provision (R II, paras. 179-185; HR1 pp. 62-63; R III, paras. 167-169). The provision does not intend to include mere “claims” already addressed in Article I
(1)(a)(iii) (R II, paras. 186-188). The Claimants should not be allowed to broaden the scope of Article I
(1)(a)(v) to the point of engulfing Article I
(1)(a)(iii) and rendering that provision meaningless (R II, paras. 172-178; Tr. at 123:16-20; HR1 p. 64; R III, paras. 164-165). All the true “rights” that the Claimants may have held definitively ended with the expiry of the Concession Agreements, TexPet’s withdrawal from Ecuador, and the numerous Settlement Agreements signed between the Parties (R II, paras. 186-197; Tr. at 123:5-15; HR1 p. 61). 154. Having argued that the lawsuits cannot be an investment in their own right, the Respondent also refutes the idea that the investments could be considered a part of an overall investment under the Claimants’ “lifespan” theory. They cite that the language of Article I
(1)(a)(iii) seems to separate and oppose “claims” to the “investment” that they must be associated to under that provision. Article I
(1)(a)(iii) would, in fact, become superfluous because the investment would subsume the claims without the need to accord them separate status as an investment (Tr. at 111:12-22; R III, paras. 176-177). Where the Claimants refer to Article II
(7), Article I
(3), and Article II
(3)(b) as showing the different stages of the “lifespan” of a protected investment, the Respondent asserts that these provisions say nothing about what constitutes an investment, but only about what investment-related activities are protected (R IV, para. 24). In fact, Article II
(7), like Article I
(1)(a)(iii), distinguishes and opposes “claims” and “rights” from “investments” (R IV, para. 22). The Respondent also points to Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador which held that disputed claims to money (tax refund claims) could not be considered to be an “investment” or even part of one (Tr. at 112:4-18; HR1 p. 48; R IV, paras. 16, 32-33).
  1. The Respondent states that the only case possibly endorsing the “lifespan” theory of investment advanced by the Claimants is the Mondev case, which is either distinguishable or incorrect. First, the Respondent notes that the lifespan issue was not the subject of written briefing in that case (Tr. at 101:15-19; R III, paras. 183-184; R IV, para. 37). Second, the tribunal in Mondev was motivated by an equitable consideration not present in this case, namely that a State should not be able to defeat jurisdiction by virtue of the very expropriation claimed against (Tr. at 102:8-21; HR1 pp. 446-47; R III, paras. 185-188; R IV, paras. 40-43). Third, the tribunal’s logic in that case is circular. If a claim for a pre-treaty expropriation is enough for jurisdiction, then every person who had property expropriated, no matter how long before the treaty comes into effect, would be entitled to claim under the treaty (Tr. at 104:19-105:19; R III, paras. 193-194).
  2. According to the Respondent, other cases cited by the Claimants do not support the “lifespan” theory either and bolster the Respondent’s own position. In Jan de Nul v. Egypt, for example, both parties and the tribunal recognized that the investment had ended even if some claims were still outstanding. Egypt, however, did not object to jurisdiction based upon the fact that the investment did not exist on the date of entry into force of the BIT. The BIT did not expressly require an investment to be in existence as of its effective date and the investments were covered under a predecessor BIT in any event (R III, paras. 195-199; R IV, paras. 34-35). Meanwhile, in the case of Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal flatly rejected the idea that a tax refund claim could be an investment or part of one (R III, paras. 200-201).
  3. Lastly, the Respondent challenges the Claimants’ reference to their remediation work pursuant to environmental agreements to extend their investment past the date of entry into force. The remediation work on its own does not exhibit the characteristics of investments (R III, paras. 227-228). In any event, only a de minimis portion of the work took place after the BIT’s entry into force and was wholly disconnected from the matters involved in TexPet’s seven lawsuits (HR1 pp. 55-56; R III, paras. 226, 229). The remediation work also did not continue the investment. There was a two-year hiatus between the expiration of the investment and the execution of the first environmental agreement, breaking the “continuum of events” required under the Claimants’ lifespan theory (R III, para. 205). The Respondent cites an admission by TexPet’s in-house counsel that “addressing potential environmental impact arising from the Consortium’s operations was treated as a separate issue” from those involved in the global settlement and was thus negotiated in a separate agreement with separate agreed upon consideration (Tr. at 116:6-13; HR1 p. 52; R III, paras. 208-211; R IV, para. 48). The Claimant is also not able to rely on the “unity of the investment” principle because the 1994 MOU and 1995 Remediation Agreement do not exhibit sufficiently close linkages to the 1973 and 1977 Agreements required by the jurisprudence. Nor did the jurisprudence on the unity principle ever consider the issue of whether or not an “investment” existed at the cut-off date under the relevant treaty (Tr. at 116:14-117:6; R III, paras. 214-221). 2Arguments by the Claimants
  4. The Claimants accuse the Respondent of mischaracterizing the Claimants’ investments. The Claimants state that, at the time the BIT entered into force on May 11, 1997, TexPet still possessed legal and contractual rights, whose enforcement was being sought through the claims pending in the seven court cases. These rights derived from the investment agreements of 1973 and 1977 and from many millions of dollars invested in exploring for and producing oil in Ecuador. In addition, at the time the BIT entered into force, TexPet was undertaking and continued to undertake several projects associated with the winding up of its investment under Settlement Agreements with Ecuador. These included a substantial environmental investigation and remediation project and several community development projects, both stemming from TexPet’s oil exploration and production activities as part of the Consortium (C II, paras. 128-130; Tr. at 246:13-248:8; HC3 p. 4; C IV, paras. 28-35).
  5. The Claimants argue that the plain meaning of Article I
(1)(a) covers a broad scope of investments. The definition of the term “investment” therein includes “every kind of investment” and the article provides a non-exhaustive list of overlapping examples included in the definition of investment (C II, paras. 132-135; Tr. at 233:19-25; HC3 pp. 6-7; C III, paras. 13-14). The Claimants cite a number of cases that construed the inclusion of “every kind of investment” or “every kind of asset” language to create a broad scope of covered investments (C II, paras. 140-143). The object and purpose of the BIT is also furthered by a broad definition and not by a restrictive one (C II, para. 137; Tr. at 233:1-5; HC3 p. 5; C III, paras. 10-12).
  1. The Claimants disagree with the Respondent’s assertion that TexPet’s investment has not contributed to the development of Ecuador. When the investments are seen as a whole, it is clear that the Claimants incurred substantial risk and made a significant and direct contribution of revenues to the Government, technical and human resources to the Consortium, and oil for domestic consumption (C II, para. 153). In addition, the Claimants undertook significant environmental investigation, remediation, and community development projects, which were still being carried out when the BIT entered into force (C II, para. 158; HC3 p. 14).
  2. The Claimants also disagree with the Respondent’s argument that the Claimants did not have a subsisting interest in Ecuador at the time of entry into force of the BIT because the 1973 and 1977 Agreements had expired by that time. Viewing the investments as a whole, the legal and contractual rights being enforced in the domestic claims cannot be separated from the rest of the Claimants’ overall investment in Ecuador pursuant to those agreements (C II, paras. 154-155; Tr. At 231:3-232:4; HC3 pp. 10-15).
  3. The Claimants further dispute that the non-retroactivity of the BIT prevents them from basing their claims on contractual rights related to pre-BIT investment activity. Although Article XII of the BIT limits the application of the BIT’s protections “to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter,” “this merely requires that the claim to money or performance exist at the time of the BIT’s entry into force” (C II, para. 169; C IV, paras. 19-20).
  4. The Claimants emphasize that investments must be viewed holistically and not as discrete transactions or components. Arbitral precedent supports the view that an investment includes everything associated with a given “overall operation” or “overall project” of an investor (CII, paras. 144-150). The Claimants rely in particular on paragraphs 80-83 of the case of Mondev. In that case, the claimant’s only subsisting interest was “certain claims for damages” relating to a failed investment. The underlying investment project had failed and no longer existed by the time of NAFTA’s entry into force. On this basis, the United States raised an objection that there were no investments existing on the date of entry into force of NAFTA. The tribunal rejected this argument. According to the Claimants, the tribunal held that “once an investment exists it is protected throughout its lifespan by an investment treaty that enters into force at any time before the ultimate conclusion of the investment” (C II, paras. 156-157, 170-173; Tr. at 251:14-252:19; HC3 pp. 16-20; C III, paras. 27-42). The provisions of the BIT also support this view, such as Article I
(3)which protects alterations in the form of the investment and Article II
(3)(b) which protects investments throughout their “management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion or disposal” (Tr. at 248:16-23; C III, para. 21). 164. In reference to the Respondent’s interpretation of Article I
(1)(a)(iii), the Claimants argue that the phrase restricting the definition of investments to claims to money or performance “associated with an investment” was only intended to exclude stand-alone claims associated with a simple commercial transaction. President Clinton’s transmittal message to the U.S. Senate concerning the BIT states that, [t]he requirement that a “claim to money” be associated with an investment excludes claims arising solely from trade transactions, such as a simple movement of goods across a border, from being considered investments covered by the Treaty. (C II, para. 162; Tr. at 235:7-14; HC3 p. 7; C III, paras. 17-19) Further support for this interpretation comes from commentary to the 1992 U.S. Model BIT, which contains language identical to Article I
(1)(a)(iii) of the BIT (C II, para. 163). The Claimants believe that the Canadian Cattlemen case relied on by the Respondent also supports their position. In that case, the tribunal interpreted NAFTA Article 1139(j) to exclude claims to money arising from simple cross-border trade transactions in similar fashion to the interpretation of the BIT that the Claimants urge here (C II, paras. 165-167). In fact, the Claimants assert that the Respondent’s interpretation would render Article I
(1)(a)(iii) redundant because the investment with which the claim was associated would already be sufficient to attract the protection of the BIT (C IV, paras. 26-27).
  1. The Claimants generally criticize the Respondent for importing and applying notions of investment under the ICSID Convention to the present UNCITRAL proceeding. For the Claimants, the definition of “investment” in the instant case depends solely on interpretation of the plain language of the BIT (C II, paras. 176-183).
  2. In reference to the Respondent’s interpretation of Article I
(1)(a)(v), the Claimants argue that the “Respondent manufactures an artificial distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘claims’”(C II, para. 186; Tr. at 258:13-259:7; HC3 pp. 23; C III, para. 20). The Claimants allege that the 1995 Global Settlement did not terminate the Claimants’ contractual rights at issue in the court cases and the plain meaning of “rights” in Article I
(1)(a)(v) includes court claims to enforce pre-existing rights (C II, paras. 186-187). The reference to “licenses and permits” does not limit the “rights” included in the provision because the provision includes contractual rights and licenses and permits (C II, paras. 188-191). Even if the reference did have a limiting effect, the rights that the Claimants seek to enforce in the court claims are within the same broad category as licenses and permits since they relate to the 1973 Agreement’s granting of rights to explore for and exploit oil (C II, para. 192). 167. The provision also does not contain language limiting the rights included to those “associated with an investment.” In response to the Respondent’s argument that “associated with an investment” should be read into the clause in order not to render Article I
(1)(a)(iii) meaningless, the Claimants contend that this approach would apply the rule of effectiveness so as to produce a result contrary to the plain language and spirit of the BIT (C II, paras. 193-197). 3The Tribunal
  1. As mentioned above, the detailed analyses of the relevant provisions of the BIT and related instruments submitted by the Parties have been helpful for this Tribunal. The following considerations of the Tribunal, without addressing all the arguments of the Parties, concentrate on what the Tribunal itself considers to be determinative on jurisdiction. 3.a. Retroactivity in general
  2. The Parties have argued at length on the general issue of retroactivity of treaties in relation to the Respondent’s ratione materiae objections as well as their ratione temporis objections. Since the Parties have argued the present issue in relation to the general issue of retroactivity of treaties, the Tribunal will deal with certain aspects of this question preliminarily before applying any conclusions in this regard to Article XII of the BIT and to the specific case at hand. The Tribunal will draw from these conclusions in later sections of this Award.
  3. The legal provisions relevant to the general question of retroactivity are, in particular, Article 28 of the VCLT and Article 13 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility (“ILC Draft Articles”).
  4. Article 28 VCLT is titled “Non-retroactivity of treaties” and reads as follows: Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.
  5. The language of Article 28 VCLT makes clear that there is no retroactivity unless a different intention appears from the treaty or can otherwise be established. ILC Draft Article 13 confirms this same principle for State responsibility: An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.
  6. The principle of non-retroactivity is not different for provisions in treaties dealing with the resolution of disputes, and in particular jurisdictional clauses contained therein. In the drafting of the VCLT, the retroactivity of such treaties was considered. However, specific rules regarding the retroactivity of these treaties and clauses were not taken up in the final version of Article 28 of the VCLT. Its “unless” language can nonetheless easily be applied to jurisdictional or arbitral treaties dealing with acts or disputes that have arisen before the conclusion of the given treaty. As a result the final version of Article 28 of the VCLT applies also to treaties dealing with the resolution of disputes.
  7. None of the investment jurisprudence cited by the Parties establishes a different approach. The cases of Luchetti and Vieira, on the one hand, and Mavrommatis, on the other, can be seen as applying Article 28 in view of the specific wording and intention of the respective treaties dealt with in those cases. Tradex Hellas applied the same principle to a situation where both a BIT and a domestic investment law potentially provided alternative bases for jurisdiction over the claim. The tribunal in that case found jurisdiction based on establishing a legislative intent that the domestic investment law applied to pre-existing disputes, but found no intention to apply the BIT retroactively to a claim filed before the BIT had entered into force.
  8. Therefore, in line with the Ambatielos case and the Respondent’s general line of argument, the Tribunal finds that the BIT, including its jurisdictional provisions, cannot apply retroactively unless such an intention can be established in the BIT or otherwise.
  9. There may be a different approach to retroactivity in the human rights context. The Tribunal need not, however, decide if any presumption of retroactivity exists for human rights treaties as a genre. The Tribunal considers that any possible presumption must result from the specific context and purpose of international human rights or a sui generis rule in that field. In either case, the Tribunal does not find the analogy between BITs and human rights treaties sufficiently strong to warrant deviating from the dominant legal framework for retroactivity just described. 3.b. Application to the present case
  10. Under Article VI
(1)(c), the Tribunal has jurisdiction over “a dispute … arising out of or relating to … an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.” The Tribunal has a twofold task to determine whether the present dispute can be fit into this provision. First, the Tribunal must determine whether the Claimants have an investment within the meaning of that term in the BIT. If the Claimants do have an investment, the Tribunal must then determine if that investment is covered by the BIT in light of Article XII
(1)of the BIT (“It shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter”). These are two distinct determinations and they should be approached separately and sequentially. 178. Assuming that those two questions (i.e., an investment ratione materiae and an investment ratione temporis) are answered in the affirmative, a further question is whether the BIT applies also to disputes that have arisen prior to its entry into force. That question is addressed in Section J.VI below (“Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis regarding Pre-Existing Disputes”). Thus, Article XII
(1)addresses retroactivity regarding investments, but not retroactivity regarding disputes. Article VI
(1)in turn concerns resolutions of disputes without addressing retroactivity. The distinction between the applicability ratione temporis of substantive obligations in a BIT and jurisdiction ratione temporis was also made in Generation Ukraine and Salini v. Jordan. 179. The Tribunal finds it useful to start by repeating the BIT’s definition of “investment,” found in Article I
(1)(a): “investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes: (
  1. i)tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (
  2. ii)a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof; (iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an investment; (
  3. iv)intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: […] (
  4. v)any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law; The Tribunal must first determine whether the Claimants hold an investment that falls within the above definition. 180. The Respondent does not and cannot reasonably deny that the Claimants had what would be considered to be an investment in Ecuador in their oil exploration and extraction activities ranging from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Nor can the Respondent deny that all the necessary characteristics were present in this investment. The Respondent disputes instead that the Claimants’ lawsuits in Ecuadorian courts cannot, on their own, be considered to be an “investment” under the BIT. The Tribunal, however, agrees with the Claimants that in the present situation, which is similar to that in Mondev (discussed below), these lawsuits concern the liquidation and settlement of claims relating to the investment and, therefore, form part of that investment. 181. The Claimants highlighted in their submissions that the definition of “investment” in the BIT is a broad one that covers “every kind of investment.” Beyond being broad in its general terms, the definition enumerates a myriad of forms of investment that are covered. It first specifies that it covers investment forms “such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts.” It then gives a further non-exhaustive list of forms that an investment may take. The list covers, among other things, multiple further incorporeal assets and speaks of a variety of rights, claims, and interests that an investor may hold in them. In addition, Article I
(3)of the BIT provides that “[a]ny alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect their character as investment.” 182. The Claimants have also highlighted that Article II
(3)(b) of the BIT protects investments from “arbitrary or discriminatory measures” with respect to their “management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion or disposal.” They also point to the further guarantee in Article II
(7)of “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment.”
  1. Taken together, the above-mentioned provisions indicate to the Tribunal that once an investment is established, the BIT intends to close any possible gaps in the protection of that investment as it proceeds in time and potentially changes form. Once an investment is established, it continues to exist and be protected until its ultimate “disposal” has been completed – that is, until it has been wound up.
  2. The Claimants’ investments were largely liquidated when they transferred their ownership in the concession to PetroEcuador and upon the conclusion of various Settlement Agreements with Ecuador. Yet, those investments were and are not yet fully wound up because of ongoing claims for money arising directly out of their oil extraction and production activities under their contracts with Ecuador and its state-owned oil company. These claims were excluded from any of the Settlement Agreements (R II, para. 169; C II, para. 40). The Claimants continue to hold subsisting interests in their original investment, but in a different form. Thus, the Claimants’ investments have not ceased to exist: their lawsuits continued their original investment through the entry into force of the BIT and to the date of commencement of this arbitration.
  3. This conclusion is consistent with the Mondev case, where the tribunal was clear that by the time of entry into force of NAFTA “all Mondev had were claims to money associated with an investment which had already failed” (emphasis added). The United States objected that these claims were insufficient to constitute an investment. However, the tribunal considered that it would merely be providing protection to the subsisting interests that Mondev continued to hold in the original investment. The tribunal summarized its finding as follows: Issues of orderly liquidation and the settlement of claims may still arise and require “fair and equitable treatment”, “full protection and security” and the avoidance of invidious discrimination. A provision that in a receivership local shareholders were to be given preference to shareholders from other NAFTA States would be a plain violation of Article 1102
(2). The shareholders even in an unsuccessful enterprise retain interests in the enterprise arising from their commitment of capital and other resources, and the intent of NAFTA is evidently to provide protection of investments throughout their life-span, i.e., “with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”
  1. Despite the Respondent’s comment that the Mondev decision may not have benefited from a detailed written briefing, the Tribunal finds no reason to disagree with the above statement. Nor does the Tribunal see any sufficient difference between NAFTA and the BIT to depart from that reasoning. In the present case, the relevant language of the BIT is at least as broad in scope as the NAFTA provisions relied upon by the Mondev tribunal for its “life-span” theory of investment protection.
  2. The existence of an investment at the time of entry into force and at the time of commencement of the arbitration does not completely resolve the issue. The Tribunal must determine whether the BIT confers jurisdiction over pre-existing investments. Recalling what has been stated on retroactivity above, this is not a question of the general rule of non-retroactivity but of the interpretation of Article XII
(1)of the BIT. The general rule of non-retroactivity might restrict the application of the BIT to only investments that come into existence after the entry into force of the BIT. However, in accordance with Article 28 VCLT’s “unless” clause, Article XII
(1)of the BIT must be interpreted to determine to what extent it makes an exception to non-retroactivity. 188. The relevant portion of Article XII
(1)states that the BIT “shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter.” Article XII
(1)of the BIT has to be applied in the sense of Article 28 of the VCLT: in addition to investments made or acquired after entry into force, it expressly provides for application to “investments existing at the time of entry into force.” That can only mean that investments made before entry are covered if they still existed at the time of entry into force. How long the investment may have existed before the entry into force is in fact irrelevant. Therefore, in spite of the general rule of non-retroactivity, the Tribunal may apply the BIT to a pre-existing investment such as the Claimants’ lawsuits in the present case. 189. The Tribunal has already found that the Claimants’ lawsuits are an “investment” under the BIT. Consequently, and in view of the language of Article XII
(1), the Tribunal finds that the Claimants’ investments were “existing at the time of entry into force” of the BIT.
  1. Although the Tribunal is satisfied that the above reasoning disposes of the Respondent’s ratione materiae objections, the Tribunal nonetheless wishes to address certain of the Respondent’s submissions regarding interpretation of the BIT’s definition of investment, given the extensive argument that the Parties have submitted on the matter.
  2. Under Article I
(1)(a)(iii), the Respondent’s approach first notes that for “claims to money” to constitute an investment, they must be associated with an “investment.” The Respondent therefore argues that the Tribunal must refer back to the BIT’s definition of “investment” to define a further investment with which the claims to money are associated. The Respondent asks the Tribunal to simultaneously restrict the definition of the associated “investment” through Article XII
(1)’s limitation to investments existing at the time of entry into force of the BIT.
  1. The Tribunal does not agree that the further mention of the term “investment” within the definition itself should be understood as providing for a recursive definition. Instead, the further mention of the term should be taken to refer to the plain meaning of the word. This is shown by the opening phrase “‘investment’ means every kind of investment … such as [certain kinds of investment] … and includes [other kinds of investment].” A recursive approach to the opening use of “every kind of investment” would, in the Tribunal’s view, render the definition circular and meaningless. Meanwhile, the use of the plain meaning of the word “investment” provides a basis with which to supplement the non-exclusive list of covered investments, particularly as regards new kinds of investment that may arise in the future.
  2. This approach resolves the concern expressed in Mondev and Jan de Nul that an investor whose investment was definitively expropriated would hold a claim to compensation but would technically no longer hold any existing “investment.” The Canadian Cattlemen decision is also consistent with this approach. That decision interpreted NAFTA Article 1139(j)’s similar language to exclude claims to money arising from “mere cross-border trade interests,” but was willing to include claims arising from “something more permanent – such as a commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory” without necessarily requiring a separate and associated investment to be proven. Given that NAFTA’s definition of investment is worded in a more restrictive fashion, the phrase “associated with an investment” requires, at its strictest, that the claims involve interests of the same nature as other covered categories of investments.
  3. As for Article I
(1)(a)(v) “rights pursuant to law or contract,” the Tribunal considers that, in isolation, the rights spoken of in this provision might be construed according to canons of interpretation to be limited to “licenses and permits” and rights analogous to those. The context and purpose of the BIT, however, do not support this interpretation. The word “rights” is used in a broader and more general sense in various other provisions of the BIT. As mentioned above, the BIT intends a broad coverage, using language that is inclusive. This is evident, for example, in Article II
(7)’s guarantee of “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment.” 195. The non-restrictive meaning of “rights” becomes even clearer when the structure of Article I
(1)(a)(v) is contrasted to the wording of the other categories of investment. Article I
(1)(a)(i) starts by stating that it covers the category of tangible and intangible property. It then proceeds to specify that this coverage “includ[es] rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges.” Similarly, Article I
(1)(iv) begins with the general category of intellectual property and then specifies that this category “includes, inter alia, rights relating to” a number of specific types of intellectual property. Article I
(1)(ii) covers “a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof.” In all the above cases, the category to which the “rights” or “interests” must pertain is clearly stated prior to the use of the term. In light of the above, the contrary formulation of Article I
(1)(v) whereby the BIT covers “any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law” (emphasis added) suggests that the “rights conferred by law or contract” are a general category unto themselves, not to be limited by the subsequent language of “licenses and permits.” (…) “J.VI. Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis regarding Pre-Existing Disputes 1Arguments by the Respondent
  1. In grounding its first ratione temporis objection – that a new and distinct “dispute” must be found for the BIT to apply – the Respondent relies principally on the ICSID case of Lucchetti (R II, paras. 66-71). In particular, the Respondent references a passage that it claims embodies the “Lucchetti test”: The Tribunal must therefore now consider whether, in light of other here relevant factors, the present dispute is or is not a new dispute. In addressing that issue, the Tribunal must examine the facts that gave rise to the [present] dispute and those that culminated in the [previous] dispute, seeking to determine in each instance whether and to what extent the subject matter or facts that were the real cause of the disputes differ from or are identical to the other. According to a recent ICSID case, the critical element in determining the existence of one or two separate disputes is whether or not they concern the same subject matter. The Tribunal considers that, whether the focus is on the “real causes” of the dispute or on its “subject matter,” it will in each instance have to determine whether or not the facts or considerations that gave rise to the earlier dispute continued to be central to the later dispute. [citations omitted] (R II, para. 70)
  2. In that case, the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis because the alleged new dispute was a pre-BIT dispute that had continued past the date of entry into force of the BIT. This finding was despite the allegation of wrongful post-BIT acts that were related to but separate from the pre-BIT dispute (R II, para. 71). The Respondent also highlights the tribunal’s finding that the fact that an international law BIT cause of action was being invoked by the claimant as opposed to obligations under municipal laws was irrelevant (R II, paras. 98-103).
  3. The Respondent also cites Vieira v. Chile as a recent example of the affirmation and application of the “Lucchetti test” above in similar circumstances. That case added the proposition that post-entry into force acts will not create a new dispute if these are “secondary” in importance or centrality to the overall dispute when compared with the pre-BIT acts (R II, paras. 72-76).
  4. In applying Lucchetti to the present facts, the Respondent points out that, in the Claimants’ own characterization of the present claim, the pre-BIT cases in Ecuadorian courts are emphasized as the source of the present dispute and the post-entry into force acts are merely accessory to the denial of justice claim (R II, paras. 79-83). Even if the denial of justice is taken separately from the pre-BIT acts, the resulting liability would necessarily be based on the substance of the pre-BIT disputes: “If Claimants’ alleged dispute based on ‘denial of justice’ were truly a separate and independent one from the disputes that prompted the seven claims, the outcome of the latter would be irrelevant – or at most, only marginally relevant – to the present dispute” (R II, paras. 84-85).
  5. The Respondent deems irrelevant the fact that the claim is presented as a denial of justice. Claims of denial of justice, regardless of their particular legal characteristics, are no different than other BIT protections such as fair and equitable treatment. The Lucchetti test concerns identity of subject matter and not identity of claims. Because the dispute had crystallized prior to the entry into force of the BIT and the current claims are a mere continuation of that dispute, an assertion of jurisdiction over the dispute would equate to asserting jurisdiction over pre-BIT investments. This would clearly violate the principle of non- retroactivity enshrined in Article 28 VCLT and BIT Article XII, requiring that the BIT only be applied to “investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter” (R II, paras. 95-96; Tr. At 197:23-198:9). In this light, the Respondent asks the Tribunal to avoid setting a precedent that allows would-be claimants to subvert temporal restrictions of BITs by repackaging their pre-BIT claims as denials of justice (R II, para. 97; Tr. at 194:15-197:22; HR2 pp. 24-25). “Differently put: the Tribunal should not permit Claimants to use their denial of justice claim as a Trojan horse for pre-BIT disputes” (R II, para. 93).
  6. The Respondent also considers irrelevant the fact that the BIT in question here does not contain an explicit clause barring its retroactive effect on pre-existing disputes (as the BIT in Lucchetti did). According to the Respondent, “the Vienna Convention establishes a presumption of non-retroactivity: the principle applies tacitly in all cases unless the parties to the treaty have expressly established otherwise” (R II, para. 106; Tr. at 202:10-13; R IV, para. 147). The Respondent cites M.C.I. v. Ecuador as having settled upon this interpretation of the BIT at issue here (R II, paras. 105-106; Tr. at 206:10-207:11; HR2 pp. 20-21). In addition, the Peru-Chile BIT in Lucchetti had a broader scope, applying to “investments made before or after the treaty’s entry into force.” Thus, the drafters of that agreement might be presumed to have wanted to be more explicit about non-retroactivity in that context (R II, paras. 107-108; Tr. at 202:13-203:12). The Respondent further cites several cases, including Impregilo, Salini, and Generation Ukraine, where language indicating a broader scope of included “disputes” still did not rebut the presumption of non-retroactivity (R II, paras. 109-115; Tr. at 205:2-206:15, 392:8-394:7; HR2 pp. 12-19; HC3 pp. 7-8).
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